Feature/OPED
Anambra Governorship Poll 2021: Ruminating over Soludo’s Candidacy
By Jerome-Mario Utomi
The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), the nation’s electoral umpire, recently, in furtherance of its powers conferred on it by the Constitution, the Electoral Act and all other powers enabling it in that regard, fixed November 6, 2021, as the date for the conduct of the Anambra governorship poll.
Unlike other communication from public offices which are ‘self-undermining and often always reputed for encouraging complacency, there are some interesting instincts and reactions in Anambra State about the latest release by INEC.
Out of many, two are considered significant to the present discourse.
First, as a complex state with complex political problems, the INEC update has again resonated how issues such as; godfatherism, power rotation, the agitation for the breakaway state of Biafra and intra-party disagreements will determine the governorship election in the state.
Secondly, it has elicited over 30 political gladiators from the three major political parties in the state jostling for the governorship position. These political parties are All Progressive Congress (APC), Peoples Democratic (PDP) and All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA).
Interestingly also, a superficial look at the list reveals that they appear qualified for the number one job by virtue of constitutional provisions enshrined in the nation’s 1999 constitution(as amended).
But there is an inherent challenge.
When the list is further subjected to scrutiny or faced with embarrassing facts, it, in absolute terms, becomes obvious that while some are truly contenders who are ready to deploy what they have learned abroad to make informed public policies and reforms in the state if given the opportunity, others come into view more as pretenders that are neither capped, nor laced with the authentic leadership prowess needed to govern a state like Anambra.
These contenders looking at their track records and pedigrees are not leadership-focused but out to promote political discord in the state in ways that will undermine its development or better still keep the state on its knees.
This particular group (pretenders) belongs to the class that in the past viewed public offices as an opportunity for private gain as against an avenue for the public good. The time-honoured principle of the greater good for greater numbers does not exist in their leadership lexicon.
Before providing answers to how Ndi-Anambra can make the 2021 governorship election rewarding, there is a need to again, give a background to why the state has become a political flashpoint and currently needs a shift in political/leadership philosophy, vision and paradigm.
For the past two decades, when democracy re-emerged on the political surface called Nigeria, a fierce war has been raging between political and social forces in the state over the control of the state’s treasury and other political apparatus.
As a direct consequence, a long dark shadow was cast on the state and the people starved of developmental strides. Save for the leadership sagacity in the strategic economic reforms of Mr Peter Obi, remarkable former Anambra State governor, the state had no good record of survival.
While the piece has laid the groundwork that set the stage for the atrocities in the state, there is also how the defective provisions in Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution contribute to the state’s political malfeasances.
Beginning with the local government mal-administration, the 1999 Constitution currently being operated empowers state governors to appoint chairpersons of State Independent Electoral Commissions (SIEC), the electoral umpires mandated to conduct local government elections in the 36 states of the federation.
As the situation stands, says a report, there is some ambiguity as to whether the state governors can dissolve local councils before elections are conducted at the expiration of their tenure, but often, state governors capitalise on this ambiguity to dissolve local councils at the end of their tenure and appoint caretaker committees. Often, these committees are staffed with cronies and party sympathizers’.
Anambra State is a vivid example of a state where caretaker committees took charge of local council affairs for about 10 years under four successive governors; Chris Ngige, Peter Obi, Andy Uba and Virginia Etiaba and again Peter Obi, who towards the end of his administration, organised election on January 11, 2014.
Those elected have vacated their positions since 2016. As of the time of filing this report, no local council elections have been held in the state since the dissolution under Governor Willy Obiano’s led administration.
As an incentive to end this vicious circle of political/leadership poverty and other ingrained socioeconomic situations in the state, given their globally recognizable enterprising and entrepreneurial bents with a strong bias to trade and commerce, this is what this piece proposes, there is an urgent need for Ndi-Anambra to challenge the human spirit and through the process, demand the best.
Like faith which is said to be a belief in things not seen, it will, in the opinion of this piece, be most rewarding if the state supports the likes of Professor Charles Chukwuma Soludo, former governor and chairman of the board of directors of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN).
Soludo was named CBN governor on May 29, 2004, and also a member of the British Department for International Development’s International Advisory Group.
Aside from the awareness that as a dynamic leader, Soludo tends to be exceptionally good in painting a clear vision that inspires and motivates the populace, the reason for this decision is predicated on new global awareness that presently views leadership not from a unitary perspective but as a development-focused.
Looking at commentary, Soludo, a self-contained and quietly influential governorship aspirant on the platform of APGA in the forthcoming Anambra State governorship election, can at the most fundamental levels, bring a radical improvement and achieve sustainable development in a way that both protects the rights and opportunities of coming generations without presenting himself as all-knowing, more generous, more nationalistic, selfless, more honest or kind, more intelligent, good looking or well-briefed than other stakeholders.
This indication emerged recently during an interactive session with journalists in Awka, the Anambra headquarters. Where Soludo among other things noted that what drives his ambition is to build a prosperous homeland, which will create a disincentive for its citizens going elsewhere to look for opportunities.
Soludo said he would like to live in Anambra State for the rest of his life and would like his children who “are living in exile to return to Nigeria and live in an Anambra State that will be liveable.”
Though Soludo was silent on what presently makes Anambra not liveable or how he plans to change the narrative, that notwithstanding, the truth is that there is something fundamentally wrong with the state.
With the exception of Mr Peter Obi, successive administrations in the state have defined leadership too narrowly. Therefore, to change the system and bring far-reaching reforms, it will need the intervention of a development minded individual like Soludo.
He sees leadership as the ability to build an economy and a society with an all-encompassing improvement, ‘a process that builds on itself and involves both individuals and social change. And requires growth and structural change, with some measures of distributive equity, modernization in social and cultural attitudes, a degree of political transformation and stability, an improvement in health and education so that population growth stabilizes, and an increase in urban living and employment.’
Yes! Ndi Anambra needs to take Soludo because they have the obligation to guarantee the future of their children and state. And more importantly, because their individual salvation to a large extent depends on their collective salvation.
Jerome-Mario Utomi is the Programme Coordinator (Media and Policy), Social and Economic Justice Advocacy (SEJA), Lagos. He could be reached via je*********@***oo.com/08032725374.
Feature/OPED
What Does Nigeria’s $51bn Reserves Milestone Mean if Most New Foreign Money Can Leave Quickly?
Nigeria’s foreign reserves have climbed to about $51 billion, a decade-plus high, according to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). EBC Financial Group (EBC) notes that this reflects stronger investor confidence, but the second half may show whether it holds, as the build rests on three cyclical drivers: oil earnings, short-term foreign money and a narrowing official-to-street naira gap.
Reserves rose from about $32 billion in April 2024, during a dollar shortage, to about $51 billion now, near the CBN’s target. Much came from two cyclical sources, strong oil earnings and money chasing high-yielding naira assets, so EBC expects the pace to slow or reverse. Fitch Ratings, a major international credit rating agency, expects a marginal decline to about $47 billion by the end of 2026, citing higher spending and external pressures.
David Precious, Senior Market Analyst at EBC Financial Group, said, “Nigeria’s reserve build is real but may not be durable yet, because nearly all of the new money is the kind that can leave quickly. Of the $10.37 billion that came in over the first quarter, the overwhelming majority was short-term portfolio funds rather than long-term investment, so a shift in oil prices, global interest rates or confidence in the naira might pull a large part of it straight back out.”
Most New Money Can Still Leave Quickly
The composition of the foreign inflows explains the caution over how long the build can last. The country attracted $10.37 billion in foreign investment in the first quarter of 2026, up 83.83 per cent year-on-year, according to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Of that, $9.86 billion or 95.09 per cent, was portfolio money, largely short-term naira debt such as Treasury bills that investors can sell at the next auction, while foreign direct investment, the long-term kind that builds factories and jobs, was $135.08 million, or 1.30 per cent. Put simply, of each dollar coming in, about 95 cents can leave quickly, and barely one cent stays.
That money supports reserves while it stays. Dollars brought in to buy naira assets add to market supply, letting the CBN hold more reserves and steady the naira. It leaves when conditions change. Nigeria earns most of its export dollars from oil and gas, so lower oil prices mean fewer dollars, and as a member of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), it cannot simply produce more, output capped by quota and reduced by theft and ageing fields. Higher global interest rates draw money toward safer returns abroad, and a weakening naira prompts investors to sell early. When oil fell in 2016 and 2020, foreign investors withdrew and could not convert naira to dollars as supply dried up, leaving the CBN to clear more than $7 billion in trapped obligations into 2024.
The Oil Boost is No Longer Certain
Oil looked like a dependable source of the dollars behind the reserves only months ago. Earlier in 2026, concern over disruption around the Strait of Hormuz lifted crude prices, and stronger receipts flowed in, with crude oil export earnings of $8.11 billion in the first quarter in the CBN’s balance-of-payments data. That support is now easing. The tension has subsided, and Brent traded near $72 on June 29, down about 24 per cent over the month, back to pre-conflict levels. With the price boost gone and output constrained, reserves are more exposed, leaning on non-oil earnings and investor patience rather than oil.
The Naira Still Trades at Two Prices
The naira has traded at two prices, an official rate and a higher parallel-market rate, and closing that gap into one trusted price is what many investors might watch most. Before committing funds, they may want assurance they can convert naira to dollars at a fair rate when they exit, and a wide gap revives the fear of being trapped that lingers from earlier shortages. The gap has narrowed to roughly N20 to N30, with the CBN’s official rate near N1,380 per dollar on June 26 against parallel-market quotes around N1,400. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2026 Article IV review urged Nigeria to depend less on this fast-moving portfolio money and to keep phasing out its multiple exchange-rate practices. The CBN’s Foreign Exchange Manual, in force from 1 June, is intended to make the market clearer, though such rules build confidence only once investors can freely trade dollars at the posted rate.
What could Make the Build Durable
A few signs that may show the build turning durable include a smaller gap between the official and street naira rates, more long-term foreign investment, and steadier oil earnings. A gap that stays small, now roughly N20 to N30, may mean investors trust the official rate and no longer need the street market. A clear rise in foreign direct investment, only $135 million last quarter against $9.86 billion of short-term money, might mean lasting capital is replacing funds that can leave at the next auction. Oil earnings that hold up, rather than sliding from the low $70s, should help keep reserves steady, since oil and gas bring in most of Nigeria’s export dollars.
“Reserves built on money chasing high yields can fall as fast as they rose, as they did after the last two oil shocks, when investors left, and the CBN spent years clearing a foreign-exchange backlog,” Precious added. “What holds through a downturn is slower money, direct investment, steady oil and non-oil export earnings and one credible naira rate, and that is the shift Nigeria has yet to make.”
By Olajumoke Bello
Across Nigeria, small and medium enterprises remain the backbone of economic activity. They drive trade, create jobs, and sustain millions of livelihoods. Yet, despite their importance, many SMEs continue to operate below their full potential due to persistent structural challenges.
Access to finance remains one of the most cited constraints. However, the issue today goes beyond the availability of capital. Many businesses struggle with financial readiness, weak documentation, and limited understanding of what lenders require. This often leads to missed opportunities, even when funding options exist.
At the same time, SMEs face gaps in market access and visibility. Business owners operate in highly localised environments, with limited exposure to broader networks that can unlock partnerships, new markets, and growth opportunities. This isolation can constrain scalability and reduce long-term competitiveness.
Equally important is the capability gap. Many entrepreneurs grow through resilience and experience but lack structured knowledge on critical areas such as financial management, export readiness, and digital adoption. Without this, even well-capitalised businesses can struggle to sustain growth.
These challenges point to a clear need for a more practical and integrated approach to SME support. It is no longer sufficient to offer standalone solutions. SMEs require ecosystems that combine knowledge, access, and direct engagement in ways that reflect how they actually operate.
A key shift is the move from centralised interventions to localised engagement. SMEs are deeply influenced by their immediate environments, whether markets, industrial clusters, or trade corridors. Solutions must therefore be brought closer to where these businesses function, allowing for more relevant support and stronger relationships.
Another important shift is from awareness to action. Business owners do not only need information; they need insights that they can apply immediately. This includes understanding how to structure their finances, how to access trade opportunities, and how to connect with the right partners to scale their operations.
There is also a growing need for continuity. Many SME-focused initiatives deliver strong initial impact but lack follow-through. For support to be effective, it must extend beyond one-off engagements into sustained relationships, with clear pathways for onboarding, advisory, and growth.
For financial institutions, this presents both responsibility and an opportunity. Supporting SMEs now requires moving beyond transactional banking to deeper partnership models. It requires understanding businesses at a granular level and co-creating solutions that evolve with their needs.
At Stanbic IBTC, this perspective continues to shape our approach to SME development. Our focus is on delivering practical support that translates into real business outcomes, helping enterprises grow, compete, and contribute more meaningfully to the economy.
As part of this commitment, we are extending our SME engagement to the regions through the Nigeria Business Summit Regional Tour. The tour will take structured, on-ground activations into key commercial hubs, where SMEs can access funding guidance, trade insights, advisory support, and direct engagement with financial experts.
The regional tour will take place across five strategic locations, bringing these solutions closer to business owners in Aba, Onitsha, Ibadan and Kano.
This approach reflects an important principle. When support moves closer to businesses and when solutions are delivered in ways that are practical and continuous, SMEs are better positioned to grow sustainably. In turn, this strengthens not only individual enterprises but the broader economy.
Olajumoke Bello is the Head of Enterprise Banking at Stanbic IBTC Bank
By Winston Osuchukwu
The average Nigerian borrower is widely considered high-risk – a claim repeated in credit committees, priced into retail loans, and largely treated as settled fact. Every credit market accepts that an individual loan may not be repaid; this is ordinary, priced risk. The high-risk claim, however, is applied to whole segments – the informal trader, the gig economy earner whose income is steady but split across several accounts, the remote worker paid by an overseas client into a fintech FX wallet. What the assessment establishes is not whether they are likely to repay, but how they fit into an arbitrary segment. Having spent years building decisioning systems for this market, my thesis is a specific one: “high-risk” does not mean “no credit” – it simply requires that the lender embrace alternative datasets to price the risk appropriately.
This is not a criticism of the institutions that built their frameworks around collateral and documentation; those were rational responses to the tools available at the time. When data is scarce, prudence means defaulting to the status quo. The limitation is not that this approach is wrong, but that it leaves a blind spot – excluding fundamentally sound borrowers whose economic lives simply are not captured on the bank’s ledger. A market trader who has moved consistent, growing volumes of cash through mobile money for three years is not, in any meaningful sense, unknowable. Their financial behaviour is observable and patterned; it simply occurs outside the traditional banking system, rendering it invisible to conventional underwriting.
This is the gap technology is now positioned to close – not by replacing institutional judgment, but by augmenting it. When AI-driven analysis is applied rigorously to the financial behaviour these borrowers generate, a far more complete picture of their repayment ability emerges – and a meaningful share presents a risk profile that compares favourably with segments the traditional system has long considered safe. The “high-risk” label, applied broadly to an entire category of borrower, was never a risk pricing tool so much as the limit of what the available tools could see.
For banks, this is the opportunity to extend capital with confidence beyond the borrowers who fit their stringent criteria. Nigerian banks are highly liquid; the constraint on credit growth has rarely been capital, but the ability to assess and price the borrowers who sit outside the traditional file. Close that gap, and the whole ecosystem strengthens: banks grow their loan books into segments they have long wanted to serve, and the real economy gets the capital it needs to expand.
This is precisely what we focus on at Mathesis Analytics: building AI-powered credit decisioning that gives lenders a fuller, more defensible picture of the individuals long excluded as high-risk when they were simply misjudged. The Nigerian credit gap has never been a non-lendable population problem, but one of incomplete visibility. By unifying varied data sources and partnering with the institutions that hold the capital and scale to move the market, we translate out-of-ecosystem behaviour into reliable, bank-grade risk scores. Closing this gap is one of the clearest, highest-leverage opportunities in Nigerian financial services today.
Winston Osuchukwu is the founder & CEO of Mathesis Analytics
