Feature/OPED
Banks’ N1.96trn Black Hole: Who Took the Loans, Who Defaulted, and Why the Real Economy Suffers
By Blaise Udunze
Nigeria’s banking sector has entered a season of reckoning. Eight of the nation’s biggest banks have collectively booked N1.96 trillion in impairment charges in just the first nine months of 2025 which represents a staggering 49 percent increase from the N1.32 trillion recorded in the same period of 2024.
Behind these figures lies a deeper question that speaks to the very soul of Nigerian finance on who received these loans that have now turned sour? Were they the small and medium enterprises (SMEs), entrepreneurs, and job creators that fuel real economic growth, or were they politically connected insiders and corporate giants whose failures are now being quietly written off at the expense of the public trust?
The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) is unwinding its pandemic-era forbearance regime, a policy that allowed banks to restructure non-performing loans and delay recognizing potential losses. It was a relief measure meant to protect the economy during the COVID-19 shock. But as the CBN begins to phase out this regulatory cushion, the hidden weaknesses in many banks’ balance sheets are now coming to light.
The apex bank has since placed several lenders under close supervisory engagement, restricting them from paying dividends, issuing executive bonuses, or expanding offshore operations until they meet prudential standards. Those that have satisfied the conditions are being gradually transitioned out ahead of the full forbearance unwind scheduled for March 2026. This shift, though painful, is forcing banks to confront the true state of their loan books and the picture emerging is anything but flattering.
A review of financial statements of Nigeria’s top listed banks reveals the distribution of impairment charges as of the third quarter of 2025.
– Zenith Bank Plc leads the pack with an eye-popping N781.5 billion in impairments, a 63.6 percent jump from N477.8 billion in 2024. Most of this amount to about N711 billion which occurred in the second quarter of 2025, driven by losses on foreign-currency loans and the end of regulatory forbearance. The bank’s gross loans declined by 9 percent to N10 trillion, and though its non-performing loan (NPL) ratio improved to 3 percent, that was largely due to massive write-offs.
– Ecobank Transnational Incorporated (ETI) followed closely, provisioning N393.7 billion, up 47 percent year-on-year. Inflation, exchange-rate volatility, and macroeconomic stress in Nigeria and Ghana all contributed to loan-quality deterioration. Its total loan book stands at N21.1 trillion, with a modestly improved NPL ratio of 5.3 percent.
– Access Holdings Plc posted impairments of N350 billion, representing a 141.5 percent surge year-on-year. About N255 billion of this came from loans to corporate entities and organizations, while the rest were loans to individuals. The bank cited changing macroeconomic conditions, inflationary pressures, and continued regulatory adjustments as the main culprits.
– First HoldCo reported N288.9 billion, up 68.6 percent from N171.4 billion a year earlier. The bank attributed the spike to revaluation losses and write-downs of legacy exposures in the energy and trade sectors. Notably, about N100 billions of this was incurred in the third quarter alone.
– United Bank for Africa (UBA) saw a dramatic improvement, cutting impairments from N123.5 billion to 56.9 billion, thanks to recoveries of N50.4 billion. The bank’s proactive loan-book management and collateral recoveries were credited for this performance.
– Guaranty Trust Holding Company (GTCO) posted N69.8 billion, up slightly from N63.6 billion last year. The group wrote off a key oil-and-gas exposure but maintained strong profitability, with pre-tax return on equity (ROAE) of 39.5 percent.
– Stanbic IBTC Holdings Plc recorded N11.6 billion, a sharp 80 percent decline year-on-year following recoveries of N16.3 billion on previously impaired loans.
– Wema Bank Plc, with N11 billion in impairments, reported one of the lowest provisioning levels in the industry, despite 30 percent loan growth.
Altogether, these eight banks have set aside almost N2trillion in provisions to cover potential losses, a sum roughly equivalent to Nigeria’s entire federal capital expenditure for 2025.
There have been recent claims of a modest level of loan growth that is not commensurate with the overall expansion of the banking system’s balance sheet. Data from MoneyCentral shows that the combined total loans of the nine banks stood at N65.37 trillion as of September 2025, representing a 7.42 percent increase from N60.86 trillion in 2024. This contrasts sharply with a 52.63 percent surge in combined loans recorded in the 2024 financial year and a 32.64 percent increase in 2023, according to data gathered by MoneyCentral.
The underlying question, therefore, is which sectors of the economy are actually benefiting from this reported loan growth?
The real puzzle behind these numbers is who actually received these loans that are now being impaired. While banks have long positioned themselves as engines of private-sector growth, evidence suggests that much of their lending goes to a narrow base of corporate borrowers, politically connected elites, and oil-and-gas companies. These sectors offer large-ticket deals and quick interest earnings but also carry enormous risk.
In contrast, the SME sector, which employs more than 80 percent of Nigeria’s workforce, continues to face credit starvation. Many small businesses are forced to rely on expensive informal loans or personal savings because banks deem them too risky. The pattern is clear that banks chase safety and short-term profits over inclusive growth. When their big corporate bets fail, they write them off through impairment charges, but the cumulative effect is that real economic activity suffers while the credit system grows more fragile.
Another dimension to the problem is the banking industry’s heavy investment in government securities. Over the past two years, Nigerian banks have channeled N20.4 trillion into treasury bills, bonds, and other fixed-income instruments, reaping risk-free returns rather than funding productive ventures. This “securities trap” is profitable for banks but disastrous for the economy. Instead of financing factories, farmers, or tech innovators, banks earn easy money by lending to government thereby crowding out private investment and weakening the transmission of credit to the real sector. When interest rates rise or currency values swing, the market value of these securities falls, forcing banks to record mark-to-market losses that translate into impairment charges. Thus, the same safety net that shields banks from loan risk ends up creating financial volatility of its own.
Beyond macroeconomic challenges, Nigeria’s banks are also grappling with homegrown problems like insider abuses, weak corporate governance, and ineffective risk management. Past crises in the banking sector, from the 2009 consolidation fallout to the 2016 oil-sector shock, reveal a consistent pattern: directors and senior executives often have outsized influence over loan approvals, sometimes extending credit to themselves or politically exposed entities without proper collateral or due diligence. These insider-related loans frequently turn toxic, hidden under layers of restructuring and accounting manoeuvres until a regulatory audit forces exposure.
The recent impairments may well reflect a new cycle of these historical sins as loans extended under pressure, influence, or misplaced optimism, now coming home to roost as the CBN tightens oversight. Corporate-governance codes exist, but enforcement remains uneven. Some banks continue to operate “relationship banking,” were loyalty trumps prudence. The lack of whistleblower protection, combined with weak internal-audit independence, further compounds the problem. Until boards and regulators impose real consequences for reckless lending, the system will continue rewarding the wrong behaviour and punishing taxpayers and shareholders in the long run.
At its heart, impairment is a measure of how well banks anticipate and manage risk. A rise in impairments signals that too many loans were made without properly assessing the borrower’s ability to repay, or that risk models failed to adjust to changing macroeconomic conditions. Several banks blamed their losses on exchange-rate volatility and inflation, but these are hardly new risks in Nigeria’s economic environment. The fact that impairments ballooned even as profits remained high suggests that risk-management frameworks were reactive rather than preventive which focused on compliance rather than foresight. In some cases, the sheer scale of provisioning, such as Zenith’s N781 billion or Access’s N350 billion, points to systemic underestimation of credit risk.
Every naira written off as an impairment represents not just a failed loan but a lost opportunity for the real economy. N1.96 trillion could have funded tens of thousands of new small businesses, millions of jobs, and critical infrastructure projects. Instead, these funds are trapped in the closed circuit of banking losses or vanish into opaque corporate failures. This has broader implications: as banks absorb losses, they tighten lending criteria, making it harder for genuine borrowers to access loans. High impairments signal instability, discouraging foreign investors and depositors, while credit flow dries up, productivity and job creation suffer. The result is a paradoxical economy where banks post impressive profits yet the productive sector languishes.
If there is a silver lining, it is that some banks, notably UBA, Stanbic IBTC, and Wema Bank are demonstrating improved loan-recovery strategies, more disciplined credit models, and a stronger focus on risk-weighted assets. Their experiences prove that impairment is not inevitable; it is the outcome of choices like governance, culture, and accountability. For others, the current round of provisioning should serve as a wake-up call to rethink their business models, diversify exposures, and strengthen compliance culture.
To its credit, the CBN’s forbearance unwind is a critical step toward transparency. By compelling banks to recognize their true loan losses and restricting dividend payouts until they meet prudential standards, the regulator is forcing a long-overdue cleansing of the system. However, reform must go deeper than technical compliance. The CBN must enforce public disclosure of insider-related loans, tighten penalties for concealment, and promote lending to productive sectors through targeted incentives. For instance, a tiered capital framework could reward banks that extend a higher proportion of credit to SMEs and manufacturing, while imposing stricter capital charges on speculative or insider-related lending.
Nigeria’s banking sector has shown resilience through crises, from the global financial meltdown to oil-price collapses. But resilience should not become an excuse for complacency. The N1.96 trillion impairment charges of 2025 are more than a balance-sheet adjustment; they are a mirror reflecting structural flaws in lending culture, governance, and the alignment between finance and development. To rebuild trust and relevance, banks must reorient lending toward real-sector growth, invest in credit analytics and risk intelligence that anticipate shocks, enforce transparency in board-level loan approvals and insider exposures, and collaborate with regulators to design sustainable credit frameworks for SMEs. Above all, there must be a moral recalibration of banking purpose from chasing short-term profits to fueling long-term national prosperity.
The spike in impairment charges does not mean Nigeria’s banks are collapsing. Rather, it signals an industry confronting its hidden fragilities. As the forbearance curtain lifts, the system has a chance to reset to clean up bad debts, rebuild credibility, and reconnect finance with development. But that opportunity will be wasted if the same patterns persist: insider lending, governance lapses, and a preference for easy returns over real investment. Until these issues are confronted head-on, the question will continue to echo through boardrooms and regulatory halls are Nigerian banks truly financing growth or merely recycling risk and protecting privilege? Only transparency, discipline, and a renewed sense of purpose can answer that question in the affirmative.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional writes from Lagos, can be reached via: bl***********@***il.com
By Blaise Udunze
Daily, the world watches Nigeria through a familiar lens in what appears to be a gory situation. Especially in cases when the news headlines tell stories of farmer-herder clashes, bandit attacks, kidnappings, villages reduced to ashes or deserted by the dwellers, as thousands of Nigerians have been displaced across states such as Zamfara, Plateau, Benue, Niger, Kaduna and Nasarawa. Subliminally, this is about to become a similarly ugly occurrence in southwestern Nigeria, which is fast becoming obvious if not nipped in the bud quickly.
Recorded data have shown that bandits, Boko Haram, and others killed over 190,000 Nigerians in 17 years and displaced 3.7 million people.
A human rights organisation, the International Society for Civil Liberties and Rule of Law (Intersociety), in its fearful revelation, has said that no fewer than 190,150 Nigerians have been killed by bandits, Boko Haram insurgents, and suspected armed herdsmen between July 2009 and March 19, 2026, as this calls for concern.
The dominant explanations often point to ethnic tensions, religious divisions, climate change, shrinking grazing routes or weak security institutions. No doubt, those factors are certainly part of Nigeria’s complex security crisis. Yet another question deserves serious examination.
What if, in some locations, the violence is also serving another purpose? What if some of the territories experiencing repeated displacement are the same places sitting atop some of Nigeria’s most valuable mineral deposits? More importantly, if such a pattern exists, who benefits when communities disappear?
Of a truth, these questions are uncomfortable, but undeniably they deserve careful investigation rather than dismissal.
For ages, Nigeria has been naturally endowed, and it is estimated to be rich in enormous significant reserves of gold, lithium, uranium, tin, columbite and other strategic minerals increasingly sought after in the global transition to clean energy technologies. As international demand for battery minerals continues to rise, these resources have become far more valuable than they were only a decade ago.
If one overlays publicly available geological information with maps showing persistent violence, some observers argue that striking geographical overlaps appear in several regions. Such overlaps alone cannot establish causation. Correlation is not proof of conspiracy. However, they raise questions worthy of independent scrutiny.
One issue attracting increasing attention and adequately yearns for answer is whether prolonged insecurity may inadvertently or deliberately create conditions that make mineral extraction easier.
Under Nigeria’s Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act 2007, mineral resources belong to the Federal Government, while mining rights are granted through licences and leases. Community engagement and land access are expected to form part of the licensing process, although implementation varies depending on circumstances. This raises an important policy question.
What happens when the communities expected to participate in those processes have already fled because of violence?
Displacement changes the dynamics of land ownership, consent and access. While no evidence automatically proves that attacks are orchestrated to facilitate mining, the sequence of violence followed by renewed commercial activity in some locations deserves closer examination by regulators, lawmakers and investigative journalists.
In conflict studies, researchers have long observed that wars often generate economic winners alongside humanitarian losers. Could elements of Nigeria’s insecurity also be producing economic beneficiaries?
Reports over the years have documented concerns about illegal mining operations across parts of northern Nigeria. Government agencies themselves have repeatedly acknowledged that criminal networks profit from the country’s vast mineral wealth. The unresolved question is whether isolated criminality has, in some instances, evolved into more sophisticated alliances involving political influence, financial interests and international supply chains. If so, the implications extend far beyond Nigeria.
Invariably, it is clearly known that lithium has become one of the world’s most strategic commodities, powering electric vehicle batteries and renewable energy storage systems. Gold has always remained one of the safest global investment assets during periods of uncertainty. Meanwhile, it is well confirmed that the global appetite for these minerals creates enormous financial incentives.
Suppose violent displacement reduces resistance to extraction. Suppose shell companies subsequently acquire mining interests. Suppose minerals then leave Nigeria through legitimate-looking export documentation while their true value remains understated.
These scenarios remain allegations unless supported by verifiable evidence. Yet they outline a framework that investigators may wish to test rather than ignore. Financial crime experts frequently identify trade mis-invoicing as one of the most common methods of illicit financial flows worldwide.
Could Nigeria’s solid minerals sector be vulnerable to similar practices? If valuable lithium ore is deliberately but inaccurately described as lower-value material on export documents, substantial wealth could potentially leave the country without reflecting its true market value. Likewise, if unrefined gold exits through privileged channels with limited scrutiny, questions naturally arise about oversight, transparency and accountability over criminal activities which have continued to stunt and disrupt the country’s socio-economic growth and at the same time cause carnage.
Such possibilities are not accusations against any particular institution or company. Rather, they illustrate why stronger monitoring systems are increasingly essential. Another question concerns logistics.
With the high level of criminal activities, industrial mining requires heavy machinery, diesel supplies, transportation networks and specialised personnel. These are not operations that can remain invisible indefinitely.
If certain territories are genuinely too dangerous for security agencies, how do industrial-scale extraction activities reportedly continue in some remote locations? If they do, who protects those operations? Who authorises their movement? Who verifies what is extracted? Who ensures royalties and export revenues reach public coffers? These are governance questions that demand institutional answers.
Equally important is the international dimension. Minerals extracted in Nigeria ultimately enter global supply chains. Gold may pass through international refining hubs before entering financial markets. Lithium may become part of battery manufacturing destined for electric vehicles, which are being sold across Europe, North America and Asia.
One known fact is that consumers purchasing products containing these minerals rarely know the full story of where they originated.
Increasingly, however, investors and governments are demanding ethical sourcing standards that trace minerals from extraction to final manufacture.
A critical factor that must be taken into cognisance is that if insecurity is creating opportunities for illegal or unethical extraction anywhere in the world, multinational companies have responsibilities alongside national governments, of which the onus falls on the Nigerian government.
Transparency cannot stop at the mine gate. Nor should accountability end at national borders. Another issue requiring attention concerns beneficial ownership.
Across many jurisdictions, shell companies can obscure the identities of individuals ultimately controlling commercial assets. If politically exposed persons or powerful business interests are hidden behind complex corporate structures registered offshore, identifying beneficiaries becomes significantly more difficult. This challenge is hardly unique to Nigeria.
Findings showed that from Latin America to Central Africa and Southeast Asia, resistant corporate networks have frequently complicated efforts to combat corruption and illicit resource extraction. That is precisely why open corporate registries, beneficial ownership databases and transparent mining licence disclosures are becoming global governance priorities. For Nigeria, the stakes could hardly be higher.
The country stands at the centre of the world’s emerging critical minerals economy. The Nigerian government can’t feign ignorance of the fact that, when handled transparently, these resources could finance infrastructure, education, healthcare, and industrial development for generations.
In no way would the government claim not knowing that when handled poorly, they risk becoming another chapter in the well-documented “resource curse,” where extraordinary natural wealth coincides with persistent poverty, insecurity and institutional weakness.
The ultimate challenge, therefore, is not simply about mining. It is about governance. It is about whether public institutions possess both the independence and capacity to ensure that natural resources benefit citizens rather than narrow interests. It is about whether conflict zones receive genuine peacebuilding efforts instead of becoming forgotten frontiers. And it is about whether international markets demand accountability with the same enthusiasm they demand raw materials.
None of these questions should be answered through speculation. They require rigorous investigations, forensic financial analysis, satellite imagery, mining license audits, customs records, beneficial ownership disclosures and courageous journalism.
They require governments willing to open their books. They require international cooperation capable of tracing money across borders. Most importantly, they require asking questions that have too often remained unasked.
Perhaps Nigeria’s security crisis is exactly what it appears to be: a tragic convergence of historical grievances, weak institutions, criminality and environmental pressures. Or perhaps, in some places, another layer of economic incentive deserves closer scrutiny.
Until those questions are thoroughly investigated, one possibility will continue to linger. Maybe the world’s attention has been fixed on the blood spilt above ground, while too little attention has been paid to the extraordinary wealth lying beneath it.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: bl***********@***il.com
Feature/OPED
What Does Nigeria’s $51bn Reserves Milestone Mean if Most New Foreign Money Can Leave Quickly?
Nigeria’s foreign reserves have climbed to about $51 billion, a decade-plus high, according to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). EBC Financial Group (EBC) notes that this reflects stronger investor confidence, but the second half may show whether it holds, as the build rests on three cyclical drivers: oil earnings, short-term foreign money and a narrowing official-to-street naira gap.
Reserves rose from about $32 billion in April 2024, during a dollar shortage, to about $51 billion now, near the CBN’s target. Much came from two cyclical sources, strong oil earnings and money chasing high-yielding naira assets, so EBC expects the pace to slow or reverse. Fitch Ratings, a major international credit rating agency, expects a marginal decline to about $47 billion by the end of 2026, citing higher spending and external pressures.
David Precious, Senior Market Analyst at EBC Financial Group, said, “Nigeria’s reserve build is real but may not be durable yet, because nearly all of the new money is the kind that can leave quickly. Of the $10.37 billion that came in over the first quarter, the overwhelming majority was short-term portfolio funds rather than long-term investment, so a shift in oil prices, global interest rates or confidence in the naira might pull a large part of it straight back out.”
Most New Money Can Still Leave Quickly
The composition of the foreign inflows explains the caution over how long the build can last. The country attracted $10.37 billion in foreign investment in the first quarter of 2026, up 83.83 per cent year-on-year, according to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Of that, $9.86 billion or 95.09 per cent, was portfolio money, largely short-term naira debt such as Treasury bills that investors can sell at the next auction, while foreign direct investment, the long-term kind that builds factories and jobs, was $135.08 million, or 1.30 per cent. Put simply, of each dollar coming in, about 95 cents can leave quickly, and barely one cent stays.
That money supports reserves while it stays. Dollars brought in to buy naira assets add to market supply, letting the CBN hold more reserves and steady the naira. It leaves when conditions change. Nigeria earns most of its export dollars from oil and gas, so lower oil prices mean fewer dollars, and as a member of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), it cannot simply produce more, output capped by quota and reduced by theft and ageing fields. Higher global interest rates draw money toward safer returns abroad, and a weakening naira prompts investors to sell early. When oil fell in 2016 and 2020, foreign investors withdrew and could not convert naira to dollars as supply dried up, leaving the CBN to clear more than $7 billion in trapped obligations into 2024.
The Oil Boost is No Longer Certain
Oil looked like a dependable source of the dollars behind the reserves only months ago. Earlier in 2026, concern over disruption around the Strait of Hormuz lifted crude prices, and stronger receipts flowed in, with crude oil export earnings of $8.11 billion in the first quarter in the CBN’s balance-of-payments data. That support is now easing. The tension has subsided, and Brent traded near $72 on June 29, down about 24 per cent over the month, back to pre-conflict levels. With the price boost gone and output constrained, reserves are more exposed, leaning on non-oil earnings and investor patience rather than oil.
The Naira Still Trades at Two Prices
The naira has traded at two prices, an official rate and a higher parallel-market rate, and closing that gap into one trusted price is what many investors might watch most. Before committing funds, they may want assurance they can convert naira to dollars at a fair rate when they exit, and a wide gap revives the fear of being trapped that lingers from earlier shortages. The gap has narrowed to roughly N20 to N30, with the CBN’s official rate near N1,380 per dollar on June 26 against parallel-market quotes around N1,400. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2026 Article IV review urged Nigeria to depend less on this fast-moving portfolio money and to keep phasing out its multiple exchange-rate practices. The CBN’s Foreign Exchange Manual, in force from 1 June, is intended to make the market clearer, though such rules build confidence only once investors can freely trade dollars at the posted rate.
What could Make the Build Durable
A few signs that may show the build turning durable include a smaller gap between the official and street naira rates, more long-term foreign investment, and steadier oil earnings. A gap that stays small, now roughly N20 to N30, may mean investors trust the official rate and no longer need the street market. A clear rise in foreign direct investment, only $135 million last quarter against $9.86 billion of short-term money, might mean lasting capital is replacing funds that can leave at the next auction. Oil earnings that hold up, rather than sliding from the low $70s, should help keep reserves steady, since oil and gas bring in most of Nigeria’s export dollars.
“Reserves built on money chasing high yields can fall as fast as they rose, as they did after the last two oil shocks, when investors left, and the CBN spent years clearing a foreign-exchange backlog,” Precious added. “What holds through a downturn is slower money, direct investment, steady oil and non-oil export earnings and one credible naira rate, and that is the shift Nigeria has yet to make.”
By Olajumoke Bello
Across Nigeria, small and medium enterprises remain the backbone of economic activity. They drive trade, create jobs, and sustain millions of livelihoods. Yet, despite their importance, many SMEs continue to operate below their full potential due to persistent structural challenges.
Access to finance remains one of the most cited constraints. However, the issue today goes beyond the availability of capital. Many businesses struggle with financial readiness, weak documentation, and limited understanding of what lenders require. This often leads to missed opportunities, even when funding options exist.
At the same time, SMEs face gaps in market access and visibility. Business owners operate in highly localised environments, with limited exposure to broader networks that can unlock partnerships, new markets, and growth opportunities. This isolation can constrain scalability and reduce long-term competitiveness.
Equally important is the capability gap. Many entrepreneurs grow through resilience and experience but lack structured knowledge on critical areas such as financial management, export readiness, and digital adoption. Without this, even well-capitalised businesses can struggle to sustain growth.
These challenges point to a clear need for a more practical and integrated approach to SME support. It is no longer sufficient to offer standalone solutions. SMEs require ecosystems that combine knowledge, access, and direct engagement in ways that reflect how they actually operate.
A key shift is the move from centralised interventions to localised engagement. SMEs are deeply influenced by their immediate environments, whether markets, industrial clusters, or trade corridors. Solutions must therefore be brought closer to where these businesses function, allowing for more relevant support and stronger relationships.
Another important shift is from awareness to action. Business owners do not only need information; they need insights that they can apply immediately. This includes understanding how to structure their finances, how to access trade opportunities, and how to connect with the right partners to scale their operations.
There is also a growing need for continuity. Many SME-focused initiatives deliver strong initial impact but lack follow-through. For support to be effective, it must extend beyond one-off engagements into sustained relationships, with clear pathways for onboarding, advisory, and growth.
For financial institutions, this presents both responsibility and an opportunity. Supporting SMEs now requires moving beyond transactional banking to deeper partnership models. It requires understanding businesses at a granular level and co-creating solutions that evolve with their needs.
At Stanbic IBTC, this perspective continues to shape our approach to SME development. Our focus is on delivering practical support that translates into real business outcomes, helping enterprises grow, compete, and contribute more meaningfully to the economy.
As part of this commitment, we are extending our SME engagement to the regions through the Nigeria Business Summit Regional Tour. The tour will take structured, on-ground activations into key commercial hubs, where SMEs can access funding guidance, trade insights, advisory support, and direct engagement with financial experts.
The regional tour will take place across five strategic locations, bringing these solutions closer to business owners in Aba, Onitsha, Ibadan and Kano.
This approach reflects an important principle. When support moves closer to businesses and when solutions are delivered in ways that are practical and continuous, SMEs are better positioned to grow sustainably. In turn, this strengthens not only individual enterprises but the broader economy.
Olajumoke Bello is the Head of Enterprise Banking at Stanbic IBTC Bank
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