Feature/OPED
Bridging Africa’s Economic Horizons in 2025: Broader Strategic Perspectives
By Professor Maurice Okoli
African continent to a very great degree is rich in natural resources encompassing a wide range of both renewable and non-renewable assets. Africa is home to some 30 per cent of the world’s minerals, eight per cent of the world’s natural gas and 12 per cent of the world’s oil reserves. The continent has 40 per cent of the world’s gold and up to 90 per cent of its chromium and platinum.
The largest reserves of cobalt, diamond and uranium in the world are in Africa. It holds 65 per cent of the world’s arable land and 10 per cent of the planet’s internal renewable freshwater source.
For decades, Africa with its vast untapped natural resources has been the world’s geographical region of attention and priority, attracting various global players from all over the world for economic and political engagement.
In a quick assessment, China has emerged as the most powerful player with its geopolitical clout and leadership in fostering multifaceted economic growth. These can be interpreted differently and from different perspectives, and their unequivocal implications are also varied in terms of the current Africa’s transformations and future directions.
For Africa’s future pathway, the year 2025 could perhaps be set as another distinctive new chapter of strategic qualitative development and push for significant growth. The conditions for this expected growth could be linked to the fact that the continental organization African Union will install a new leadership in February 2025, South Africa chairs the G20, Commonwealth Secretariat and World Trade Organization are headed by two African women, a Ghanaian and a Nigerian citizen.
These resounding organizational features, at least, make 2025 an African year to facilitate investment and economic development opportunities, and through wide multilateral collaborations, both external investors and stakeholders, for remarkable changes.
(i) Kenya’s AUC leadership:
As well known, four candidates are slated for the February 2025 polls. Raila Odinga will face off with Djibouti’s Mohamoud Youssouf, Anil Gayan (Mauritius) and Richard Randriamandrato (Madagascar) for the African Union Commission chairmanship in the race to succeed the outgoing chairman Moussa Faki of Chad.
The latest development monitored for this article explicitly showed that Kenya’s candidate for the Africa Union Commission chairmanship Raila Odinga, highlighted his priorities and strategies to include enhancing intra-African trade by establishing a common market, implementing a broader economic transformation, strengthening regional integration and cooperation, and peace and security.
Undoubtedly, the African Union (AU) is a critical institution for promoting unity, peace, and development across the continent. However, there is a growing consensus that it requires reforms to increase its effectiveness, efficiency, and relevance in addressing Africa’s challenges. Here are reasons why reforms are necessary:
1. Structural and Institutional Weaknesses: The AU has been criticized for its slow decision-making processes and lack of streamlined operations. The relationship between the AU and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) is often unclear, leading to duplication of efforts and fragmented initiatives.
2. Financial Dependence: Over 60% of the AU’s budget comes from external donors, raising concerns about the organization’s independence and ability to prioritize African-led solutions. Worse, many member states have unsuccessfully been in a position to meet promptly their financial obligations, hindering the AU’s ability to execute its programs effectively. This is most often reflected in the limited success of peacekeeping: Despite efforts, the AU has struggled to resolve protracted conflicts in regions like the Sahel, Somalia, and the Great Lakes.
3. Geopolitical and Global Challenges: Adapting to a changing world, with shifts in global power dynamics, the AU must reform to ensure Africa’s interests are adequately represented on the global stage.
4. Lack of Accountability and Governance: There have been concerns over deep-seated corruption. Internal mismanagement and corruption have undermined the credibility of the AU. There is a need for stronger accountability mechanisms to ensure compliance with AU protocols and charters by member states.
Raila Odinga’s tremendous political experience and pan-African vision unreservedly underscored the unwavering commitment to reforms as potential steps to advance the basic objectives of uplifting the economic status of the continent under the banner “Africa We Want” incorporated into the Agenda 2063.
Kagame Report (2017): Spearheaded by Rwandan President Paul Kagame, this initiative proposed actionable reforms to address structural inefficiencies and financial sustainability. Efforts to reduce the number of AU departments and improve coordination among stakeholders. Reforming the African Union is essential for building a stronger, more unified Africa capable of addressing its internal challenges and asserting its position on the global stage.
As frequently reiterated, Africa with its huge human and natural resources can take its rightful position in the current 21st century in the world. But for the realization of this, Africa still has to coordinate with the Commonwealth Secretariat, WTO, G20 and BRICS in promoting industrialization, supporting manufacturing, and enhancing innovation through investments in education, technology, healthcare, affordable energy and skills development. These invariantly fall within the Africa’s Agenda 2063.
(ii) South Africa’s G20 chairmanship: South Africa is now the biggest economy in Africa, with a GDP of $373 billion in 2024. (WorldStatistics) In addition to its economic prominence in Africa, South Africa is a staunch member of BRICS+ (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), an informal association joined by Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates.
On one hand, it is important to mention here the role of South Africa as it takes the chairmanship of the Group of 20 (G20) in 2025. It is an intergovernmental forum comprising 19 sovereign countries, the European Union (EU), and the African Union (AU). In 2023, during its summit, the African Union joined as its 21st member and was officially represented at the 2024 G20 summit in Brazil.
On the other hand, since its inception, the recurring themes covered by G20 summit participants have related in priority to global economic growth,
international trade and financial market regulation – these are issues affecting Africa. South Africa could direct G20’s win-win influence in streamlining the beneficial economic sphere considered key to Africa’s development and which would unprecedentedly impact on aspects of life of an estimated 1.4 billion people in the 21st century.
With South Africa at the helm of G20 affairs, it is therefore paramount to seriously “re-evaluate” both the group and individual member’s relations with Africa. South Africa has a unique opportunity to influence the global agenda, especially in addressing the priorities of developing nations. Here are key actions South Africa should undertake:
1. Advocate for African and Global South Priorities
Debt Relief and Financing: Push for frameworks that support debt restructuring and sustainable financing for developing nations, ensuring equitable access to funds for recovery and development. Climate Justice: Emphasize the need for climate financing and support for adaptation, particularly for African nations facing severe climate vulnerabilities.
2. Enhance Multilateralism
Strengthen international cooperation on trade, technology transfer, and global health, highlighting Africa’s role in the global economy. Support reforms in global governance institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank, to give emerging economies more say in decision-making.
3. Promote Inclusive Growth
Champion policies to address inequality, including initiatives to improve education, health, and digital inclusion across member states. Focus on creating partnerships to promote job creation, particularly in green and digital economies.
4. Strengthen Food and Energy Security
Address disruptions in global supply chains exacerbated by geopolitical conflicts. Advocate for sustainable agricultural practices and support energy transition strategies that align with Africa’s development needs.
5. Foster Trade and Investment Opportunities
Use the G20 platform to attract investments in Africa, highlighting the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) as a mechanism for growth. Advocate for fair trade practices that enable African products to access global markets without undue barriers.
If South Africa effectively prioritizes these actions, it could strengthen Africa’s influence in global decision-making drive sustainable development and reduce inequality. The position of South Africa and the African continent are central players in solving global challenges. In a nutshell, South Africa’s leadership in the G20 offers an opportunity to align the group’s actions with Africa’s development aspirations while fostering global solidarity in an era of increasing geopolitical complexity.
(iii) Ghana’s directorship of Commonwealth Secretariat: In late October 2024, the Commonwealth of Nations marked yet another milestone with the appointment of Ghana’s Foreign Minister and Regional Integration, Shirley AyorkorBotchwey, as the next Secretary-General. For West Africans, her appointment was a prestigious testament, first to women’s empowerment and second, to resilience and a reminder that Africa’s voice matters on the world stage.
Despite these two reasons, however, it further presented a step forward in broadening African representation at the helm of international organizations and most importantly the extent this could impact the development of the multifaceted relations with the continent. The Commonwealth has played various roles and continues to attach indivisible value in fostering partnerships with various African countries.
Through these relations, Africa’s economy may benefit from a renewed diverse set of attention to sustainable development and job creation opportunities. It could also see increased investment and trade partnerships among its 56 member nations. Without mincing words, the Commonwealth has shown, in various ways, commitment to unity, peace, and sustainable progress in Africa.
Africa’s relationship with the Commonwealth presents several opportunities, particularly in the context of current geopolitical shifts. For instance, access to markets: The Commonwealth provides a platform for enhancing intra-Commonwealth trade, which is projected to reach $1 trillion annually. Africa can leverage this to diversify trade partners amid shifting global alliances. The next question relates to existing investment opportunities: the Commonwealth programs promote investment, particularly in sustainable industries, offering African countries opportunities to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in green and digital economies.
As the Secretary-General, Shirley AyorkorBotchwey has the possibility of negotiating for initiatives like the Commonwealth scholarships and fellowships to promote education and capacity building, helping African nations develop skilled workforces. And also for strengthening cultural programs and exchanges foster mutual understanding and cooperation.
With increasing competition between global powers, Africa can use the Commonwealth to diversify alliances, reducing over-reliance on single blocs like China or the West. By actively engaging with the Commonwealth, Africa can harness these opportunities to navigate the complexities of global power dynamics while fostering development and regional stability.
(iv) Nigeria’s pedalling World Trade Organization: Today’s transformations and reforms at the World Trade Organization have practical evidence to support the newly created single borderless market in Africa.
The African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) being the flagship of the African Union (AU) is intended to consolidate the intra-African trade to an expected tune of $2.7 trillion and the diverse spheres of the continental economy. In its 2024 report, the UNECA estimated that by 2045 intra-African trade will increase by nearly 35% compared to a situation without the AfCFTA.
This is one signal pointing to the fact that WTO has to strike a groundbreaking impactful collaboration with AfCFTA, but a lot would depend on how critical and important Africa’s partnership with external players is designed and pursued, uttermost offering Africa better opportunities for noticeable economic, socio-cultural and political growth.
In practical reality, Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala and WTO top management have to show seriousness in changing to result-oriented partnerships, especially in its historic trade cooperation these decades with Africa. Both the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) aim to reduce barriers to trade, such as tariffs and non-tariff barriers, fostering economic integration and market access.
The WTO provides a global framework for trade regulations, while AfCFTA operates within a similar rule-based framework at the continental level, ensuring predictability and transparency. Both organizations focus on enhancing the trade capacity of member states. The WTO supports developing nations with trade-related technical assistance, while AfCFTA includes initiatives to boost the trade readiness of African countries. The WTO and AfCFTA could work together to harmonize regional trade rules with global trade agreements, ensuring coherence between Africa’s trade policies and international standards.
In summary, the WTO and AfCFTA share common goals in promoting fair and inclusive trade practices, and collaboration between the two can significantly enhance the global trade integration of African countries.
(v) Conclusion – The Year of Africa: Achievable and strategic recommendations for 2025: Judging from the discussion, the African Union and individual African States, therefore in 2025, have to consider the absolute necessity to outlook for strategic collaboration with external partners and corporate shareholders within the framework of the African Union’s Agenda 2063. The necessity for African leaders to prioritize economic parameters and their related proactive measures that enhance practical support for both public and private-sector collaboration.
In furtherance to this, the necessity to draw a roadmap for businesses to achieve long-term sustainable growth, and utilize the opportunities in the intra-African single market while simultaneously adapting to shifting global market demands.
In addition, African leaders, in order to claim the public nobility, instead of rattling anti-western rhetoric have to build and muster their own negotiation capacity to deal with developed countries. In the subsequent years, reawaking the African Union and other Regional Economic Communities, and African leaders should arguably be the main priority, predictably as possible to play the economic development catch-up, in the Global South.
Professor Maurice Okoli is a fellow at the Institute for African Studies and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences. He is also a fellow and lecturer at the North-Eastern Federal University of Russia. He serves as an expert at the Roscongress Foundation and the Valdai Discussion Club.
As an academic researcher and economist with a keen interest in current geopolitical changes and the emerging world order, Maurice Okoli frequently
contributes articles for publication in reputable media portals on different aspects of the interconnection between developing and developed countries, particularly in Asia, Africa, and Europe. With comments and suggestions, he can be reached via email: markolconsult (at) gmail (dot) com.
By Blaise Udunze
Daily, the world watches Nigeria through a familiar lens in what appears to be a gory situation. Especially in cases when the news headlines tell stories of farmer-herder clashes, bandit attacks, kidnappings, villages reduced to ashes or deserted by the dwellers, as thousands of Nigerians have been displaced across states such as Zamfara, Plateau, Benue, Niger, Kaduna and Nasarawa. Subliminally, this is about to become a similarly ugly occurrence in southwestern Nigeria, which is fast becoming obvious if not nipped in the bud quickly.
Recorded data have shown that bandits, Boko Haram, and others killed over 190,000 Nigerians in 17 years and displaced 3.7 million people.
A human rights organisation, the International Society for Civil Liberties and Rule of Law (Intersociety), in its fearful revelation, has said that no fewer than 190,150 Nigerians have been killed by bandits, Boko Haram insurgents, and suspected armed herdsmen between July 2009 and March 19, 2026, as this calls for concern.
The dominant explanations often point to ethnic tensions, religious divisions, climate change, shrinking grazing routes or weak security institutions. No doubt, those factors are certainly part of Nigeria’s complex security crisis. Yet another question deserves serious examination.
What if, in some locations, the violence is also serving another purpose? What if some of the territories experiencing repeated displacement are the same places sitting atop some of Nigeria’s most valuable mineral deposits? More importantly, if such a pattern exists, who benefits when communities disappear?
Of a truth, these questions are uncomfortable, but undeniably they deserve careful investigation rather than dismissal.
For ages, Nigeria has been naturally endowed, and it is estimated to be rich in enormous significant reserves of gold, lithium, uranium, tin, columbite and other strategic minerals increasingly sought after in the global transition to clean energy technologies. As international demand for battery minerals continues to rise, these resources have become far more valuable than they were only a decade ago.
If one overlays publicly available geological information with maps showing persistent violence, some observers argue that striking geographical overlaps appear in several regions. Such overlaps alone cannot establish causation. Correlation is not proof of conspiracy. However, they raise questions worthy of independent scrutiny.
One issue attracting increasing attention and adequately yearns for answer is whether prolonged insecurity may inadvertently or deliberately create conditions that make mineral extraction easier.
Under Nigeria’s Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act 2007, mineral resources belong to the Federal Government, while mining rights are granted through licences and leases. Community engagement and land access are expected to form part of the licensing process, although implementation varies depending on circumstances. This raises an important policy question.
What happens when the communities expected to participate in those processes have already fled because of violence?
Displacement changes the dynamics of land ownership, consent and access. While no evidence automatically proves that attacks are orchestrated to facilitate mining, the sequence of violence followed by renewed commercial activity in some locations deserves closer examination by regulators, lawmakers and investigative journalists.
In conflict studies, researchers have long observed that wars often generate economic winners alongside humanitarian losers. Could elements of Nigeria’s insecurity also be producing economic beneficiaries?
Reports over the years have documented concerns about illegal mining operations across parts of northern Nigeria. Government agencies themselves have repeatedly acknowledged that criminal networks profit from the country’s vast mineral wealth. The unresolved question is whether isolated criminality has, in some instances, evolved into more sophisticated alliances involving political influence, financial interests and international supply chains. If so, the implications extend far beyond Nigeria.
Invariably, it is clearly known that lithium has become one of the world’s most strategic commodities, powering electric vehicle batteries and renewable energy storage systems. Gold has always remained one of the safest global investment assets during periods of uncertainty. Meanwhile, it is well confirmed that the global appetite for these minerals creates enormous financial incentives.
Suppose violent displacement reduces resistance to extraction. Suppose shell companies subsequently acquire mining interests. Suppose minerals then leave Nigeria through legitimate-looking export documentation while their true value remains understated.
These scenarios remain allegations unless supported by verifiable evidence. Yet they outline a framework that investigators may wish to test rather than ignore. Financial crime experts frequently identify trade mis-invoicing as one of the most common methods of illicit financial flows worldwide.
Could Nigeria’s solid minerals sector be vulnerable to similar practices? If valuable lithium ore is deliberately but inaccurately described as lower-value material on export documents, substantial wealth could potentially leave the country without reflecting its true market value. Likewise, if unrefined gold exits through privileged channels with limited scrutiny, questions naturally arise about oversight, transparency and accountability over criminal activities which have continued to stunt and disrupt the country’s socio-economic growth and at the same time cause carnage.
Such possibilities are not accusations against any particular institution or company. Rather, they illustrate why stronger monitoring systems are increasingly essential. Another question concerns logistics.
With the high level of criminal activities, industrial mining requires heavy machinery, diesel supplies, transportation networks and specialised personnel. These are not operations that can remain invisible indefinitely.
If certain territories are genuinely too dangerous for security agencies, how do industrial-scale extraction activities reportedly continue in some remote locations? If they do, who protects those operations? Who authorises their movement? Who verifies what is extracted? Who ensures royalties and export revenues reach public coffers? These are governance questions that demand institutional answers.
Equally important is the international dimension. Minerals extracted in Nigeria ultimately enter global supply chains. Gold may pass through international refining hubs before entering financial markets. Lithium may become part of battery manufacturing destined for electric vehicles, which are being sold across Europe, North America and Asia.
One known fact is that consumers purchasing products containing these minerals rarely know the full story of where they originated.
Increasingly, however, investors and governments are demanding ethical sourcing standards that trace minerals from extraction to final manufacture.
A critical factor that must be taken into cognisance is that if insecurity is creating opportunities for illegal or unethical extraction anywhere in the world, multinational companies have responsibilities alongside national governments, of which the onus falls on the Nigerian government.
Transparency cannot stop at the mine gate. Nor should accountability end at national borders. Another issue requiring attention concerns beneficial ownership.
Across many jurisdictions, shell companies can obscure the identities of individuals ultimately controlling commercial assets. If politically exposed persons or powerful business interests are hidden behind complex corporate structures registered offshore, identifying beneficiaries becomes significantly more difficult. This challenge is hardly unique to Nigeria.
Findings showed that from Latin America to Central Africa and Southeast Asia, resistant corporate networks have frequently complicated efforts to combat corruption and illicit resource extraction. That is precisely why open corporate registries, beneficial ownership databases and transparent mining licence disclosures are becoming global governance priorities. For Nigeria, the stakes could hardly be higher.
The country stands at the centre of the world’s emerging critical minerals economy. The Nigerian government can’t feign ignorance of the fact that, when handled transparently, these resources could finance infrastructure, education, healthcare, and industrial development for generations.
In no way would the government claim not knowing that when handled poorly, they risk becoming another chapter in the well-documented “resource curse,” where extraordinary natural wealth coincides with persistent poverty, insecurity and institutional weakness.
The ultimate challenge, therefore, is not simply about mining. It is about governance. It is about whether public institutions possess both the independence and capacity to ensure that natural resources benefit citizens rather than narrow interests. It is about whether conflict zones receive genuine peacebuilding efforts instead of becoming forgotten frontiers. And it is about whether international markets demand accountability with the same enthusiasm they demand raw materials.
None of these questions should be answered through speculation. They require rigorous investigations, forensic financial analysis, satellite imagery, mining license audits, customs records, beneficial ownership disclosures and courageous journalism.
They require governments willing to open their books. They require international cooperation capable of tracing money across borders. Most importantly, they require asking questions that have too often remained unasked.
Perhaps Nigeria’s security crisis is exactly what it appears to be: a tragic convergence of historical grievances, weak institutions, criminality and environmental pressures. Or perhaps, in some places, another layer of economic incentive deserves closer scrutiny.
Until those questions are thoroughly investigated, one possibility will continue to linger. Maybe the world’s attention has been fixed on the blood spilt above ground, while too little attention has been paid to the extraordinary wealth lying beneath it.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: bl***********@***il.com
Feature/OPED
What Does Nigeria’s $51bn Reserves Milestone Mean if Most New Foreign Money Can Leave Quickly?
Nigeria’s foreign reserves have climbed to about $51 billion, a decade-plus high, according to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). EBC Financial Group (EBC) notes that this reflects stronger investor confidence, but the second half may show whether it holds, as the build rests on three cyclical drivers: oil earnings, short-term foreign money and a narrowing official-to-street naira gap.
Reserves rose from about $32 billion in April 2024, during a dollar shortage, to about $51 billion now, near the CBN’s target. Much came from two cyclical sources, strong oil earnings and money chasing high-yielding naira assets, so EBC expects the pace to slow or reverse. Fitch Ratings, a major international credit rating agency, expects a marginal decline to about $47 billion by the end of 2026, citing higher spending and external pressures.
David Precious, Senior Market Analyst at EBC Financial Group, said, “Nigeria’s reserve build is real but may not be durable yet, because nearly all of the new money is the kind that can leave quickly. Of the $10.37 billion that came in over the first quarter, the overwhelming majority was short-term portfolio funds rather than long-term investment, so a shift in oil prices, global interest rates or confidence in the naira might pull a large part of it straight back out.”
Most New Money Can Still Leave Quickly
The composition of the foreign inflows explains the caution over how long the build can last. The country attracted $10.37 billion in foreign investment in the first quarter of 2026, up 83.83 per cent year-on-year, according to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Of that, $9.86 billion or 95.09 per cent, was portfolio money, largely short-term naira debt such as Treasury bills that investors can sell at the next auction, while foreign direct investment, the long-term kind that builds factories and jobs, was $135.08 million, or 1.30 per cent. Put simply, of each dollar coming in, about 95 cents can leave quickly, and barely one cent stays.
That money supports reserves while it stays. Dollars brought in to buy naira assets add to market supply, letting the CBN hold more reserves and steady the naira. It leaves when conditions change. Nigeria earns most of its export dollars from oil and gas, so lower oil prices mean fewer dollars, and as a member of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), it cannot simply produce more, output capped by quota and reduced by theft and ageing fields. Higher global interest rates draw money toward safer returns abroad, and a weakening naira prompts investors to sell early. When oil fell in 2016 and 2020, foreign investors withdrew and could not convert naira to dollars as supply dried up, leaving the CBN to clear more than $7 billion in trapped obligations into 2024.
The Oil Boost is No Longer Certain
Oil looked like a dependable source of the dollars behind the reserves only months ago. Earlier in 2026, concern over disruption around the Strait of Hormuz lifted crude prices, and stronger receipts flowed in, with crude oil export earnings of $8.11 billion in the first quarter in the CBN’s balance-of-payments data. That support is now easing. The tension has subsided, and Brent traded near $72 on June 29, down about 24 per cent over the month, back to pre-conflict levels. With the price boost gone and output constrained, reserves are more exposed, leaning on non-oil earnings and investor patience rather than oil.
The Naira Still Trades at Two Prices
The naira has traded at two prices, an official rate and a higher parallel-market rate, and closing that gap into one trusted price is what many investors might watch most. Before committing funds, they may want assurance they can convert naira to dollars at a fair rate when they exit, and a wide gap revives the fear of being trapped that lingers from earlier shortages. The gap has narrowed to roughly N20 to N30, with the CBN’s official rate near N1,380 per dollar on June 26 against parallel-market quotes around N1,400. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2026 Article IV review urged Nigeria to depend less on this fast-moving portfolio money and to keep phasing out its multiple exchange-rate practices. The CBN’s Foreign Exchange Manual, in force from 1 June, is intended to make the market clearer, though such rules build confidence only once investors can freely trade dollars at the posted rate.
What could Make the Build Durable
A few signs that may show the build turning durable include a smaller gap between the official and street naira rates, more long-term foreign investment, and steadier oil earnings. A gap that stays small, now roughly N20 to N30, may mean investors trust the official rate and no longer need the street market. A clear rise in foreign direct investment, only $135 million last quarter against $9.86 billion of short-term money, might mean lasting capital is replacing funds that can leave at the next auction. Oil earnings that hold up, rather than sliding from the low $70s, should help keep reserves steady, since oil and gas bring in most of Nigeria’s export dollars.
“Reserves built on money chasing high yields can fall as fast as they rose, as they did after the last two oil shocks, when investors left, and the CBN spent years clearing a foreign-exchange backlog,” Precious added. “What holds through a downturn is slower money, direct investment, steady oil and non-oil export earnings and one credible naira rate, and that is the shift Nigeria has yet to make.”
By Olajumoke Bello
Across Nigeria, small and medium enterprises remain the backbone of economic activity. They drive trade, create jobs, and sustain millions of livelihoods. Yet, despite their importance, many SMEs continue to operate below their full potential due to persistent structural challenges.
Access to finance remains one of the most cited constraints. However, the issue today goes beyond the availability of capital. Many businesses struggle with financial readiness, weak documentation, and limited understanding of what lenders require. This often leads to missed opportunities, even when funding options exist.
At the same time, SMEs face gaps in market access and visibility. Business owners operate in highly localised environments, with limited exposure to broader networks that can unlock partnerships, new markets, and growth opportunities. This isolation can constrain scalability and reduce long-term competitiveness.
Equally important is the capability gap. Many entrepreneurs grow through resilience and experience but lack structured knowledge on critical areas such as financial management, export readiness, and digital adoption. Without this, even well-capitalised businesses can struggle to sustain growth.
These challenges point to a clear need for a more practical and integrated approach to SME support. It is no longer sufficient to offer standalone solutions. SMEs require ecosystems that combine knowledge, access, and direct engagement in ways that reflect how they actually operate.
A key shift is the move from centralised interventions to localised engagement. SMEs are deeply influenced by their immediate environments, whether markets, industrial clusters, or trade corridors. Solutions must therefore be brought closer to where these businesses function, allowing for more relevant support and stronger relationships.
Another important shift is from awareness to action. Business owners do not only need information; they need insights that they can apply immediately. This includes understanding how to structure their finances, how to access trade opportunities, and how to connect with the right partners to scale their operations.
There is also a growing need for continuity. Many SME-focused initiatives deliver strong initial impact but lack follow-through. For support to be effective, it must extend beyond one-off engagements into sustained relationships, with clear pathways for onboarding, advisory, and growth.
For financial institutions, this presents both responsibility and an opportunity. Supporting SMEs now requires moving beyond transactional banking to deeper partnership models. It requires understanding businesses at a granular level and co-creating solutions that evolve with their needs.
At Stanbic IBTC, this perspective continues to shape our approach to SME development. Our focus is on delivering practical support that translates into real business outcomes, helping enterprises grow, compete, and contribute more meaningfully to the economy.
As part of this commitment, we are extending our SME engagement to the regions through the Nigeria Business Summit Regional Tour. The tour will take structured, on-ground activations into key commercial hubs, where SMEs can access funding guidance, trade insights, advisory support, and direct engagement with financial experts.
The regional tour will take place across five strategic locations, bringing these solutions closer to business owners in Aba, Onitsha, Ibadan and Kano.
This approach reflects an important principle. When support moves closer to businesses and when solutions are delivered in ways that are practical and continuous, SMEs are better positioned to grow sustainably. In turn, this strengthens not only individual enterprises but the broader economy.
Olajumoke Bello is the Head of Enterprise Banking at Stanbic IBTC Bank
