Feature/OPED
Multilateral Collaboration Still Crucial For Tackling Africa’s Conflicts
By Professor Maurice Okoli
Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have adopted an incredible approach towards tackling chronic conflicts and related security threats from various extremist groups like Boko Haram, al-Qaida, and Islamic State-affiliated groups by creating a formidable military alliance in the semi-arid Sahel region in West Africa.
As these West African States are entangled in fierce ethnic-Islamic conflicts that have adversely impacted their sustainable development and economic progress, the trio-military force reflects more proactive and dynamic coordination in resolving their security hurdles. It would also enhance practical possibilities of combating terrorism and extremism in the interests of strengthening peace and security in the Sahel-Sahara region and other parts of West Africa.
Historically the three were closely under French political control and have extended economic and security ties since colonial times. This geographically landlocked Burkina Faso has had several military coup d’états, the latest took place in Jan. 2022. Mali (May 24, 2021) and Niger (July 26, 2023) witnessed similar political trends, and both are now under military administration and share startling critical accusations of corruption and malfunctioning of state governance against previous governments. But the finger-end points to France for gross under-development and large-scale exploitation.
These former French colonies have, for the past years, suffered from growing political deficiencies and frequent Islamic attacks. But the key reason, the underlying cause, those tribes are rebelling is due to deep-seated abject poverty across the region. Staging military takeovers was the trio’s dynamic struggle to wage a collective war against their governments and France’s influence and hegemony. For instance, France, the United States and other European nations have poured hundreds of millions of dollars into shoring up Niger’s army and the coup has been seen as a major setback. Overall security environment poses uncertain challenges and devises strategies to tackle these emerging threats in the region.
Existing Sanctions
Since last year, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have been under regional and continental sanctions. The 15-member West African regional bloc has imposed stringent sanctions, finding a peaceful solution to the deepening crisis, but yielded little tangible results with no clarity on the next steps.
The African Union (AU), the continental organization which primarily coordinates the political and economic as well as the socio-cultural activities, observes the new trends as military rule spreads or re-appears in the West African region. That however, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat, strongly condemned such actions and further moved to impose its sanctions as well on the military-ridden states. Their AU memberships, since then, have accordingly been suspended too.
Quite recently, on 28 November 2023, the United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres and the African Union Commission Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat convened their seventh African Union-United Nations Annual Conference in New York. In a joint communiqué issued at the end of the meeting, both reviewed progress in the implementation of the UN-AU Joint Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security and the AU-UN Framework for the Implementation of Agenda 2063.
In particular, António Guterres and Moussa Mahamat again condemned the resurgence of unconstitutional changes of government in Africa and stressed the need for a timely and peaceful return to constitutional order in Burkina Faso, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Sudan which are undergoing complex political transitions to sustain peace, development and human rights in the long term. There must be extensive political awareness among the people in the Sahel region to focus on democracy, development, security and stability. It also called for the release of President Bazoum and other arrested government officials.
Nevertheless, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) were tasked to enhance their joint efforts to promote inclusive political transitions in those countries in support of the efforts of the respective transitional authorities and regional bodies. The meeting called for continued efforts towards the timely completion of all ongoing political transitions through peaceful, inclusive, transparent and credible elections.
Against this backdrop, they expressed concern over the challenges African countries continue to face towards the achievement of the AU Agenda 2063. Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali and Niger, nevertheless have displayed defiance to the sanctions and, crafting a number of approaches and making their efforts toward addressing security and development-oriented issues combined with some kind of good governance.
Revisiting the Past
Within the context of the changing political situation, Russia is rapidly penetrating the Sahel. Moreover, to Russia’s expectations, these Sahelian States have in place provisional governments, which include civil society representatives. “We believe that a military approach to settling the crisis in Niger risks leading to a protracted standoff in the African country and a sharp destabilization of the situation in the Sahara-Sahelian region as a whole,” according to the statement posted to the Foreign Affairs Ministry’s website.
South African Institute of International Affairs reports established the fact that Russia seeks to build on Soviet-era ties, steadily widening its influence, and noticeably deploy the rhetoric of anti-colonialism in Africa. Russia is engaged in an asymmetric influence campaign in Africa. Borrowing from its Syria playbook, Moscow has followed a pattern of parachuting to prop up politically isolated leaders facing crises, often with abundant natural resources. Russia is fighting neo-colonialism from the West, especially in relations with the former colonies. According to the report, Russia sees France as a threat to its interests in Francophone West Africa, the Maghreb and the Sahel. The SAIIA is South Africa’s premier non-government research institute on international issues. (SAIIA, Nov. 2021 Report).
“Sanctions have already been announced against Niger, and its membership in the organization is likely to be suspended. Thus, a belt of states in political isolation and bordering on each other is forming in the Sahara-Sahelian region: Guinea – Mali – Burkina Faso – Niger. Russia is interested in expanding relations with Niger, as well as with all other African States, and thus could help to normalize the situation there,” Vsevolod Sviridov, Expert at the HSE University Center for African Studies, told Russia’s Financial Izvestia.
Russia’s Economic Interest
In pursuit of development, the five Sahel states need peace. An analysis of geopolitical factors underscores glaring facts that Russia is getting stronger with its military influence on a bilateral basis, bartering equipment in exchange for access to natural resources. Mali has an agreement with Russia to build a gold refinery while Burkina Faso also wanted energy power. A four-year memorandum guarantees the West African country’s largest gold refinery. Russia’s state nuclear energy company Rosatom signed a deal with Mali in October 2023 to explore minerals and produce nuclear energy. It unreservedly offered a high-level promise to build a 200- to 300-megawatt solar power plant by mid-2025.
Economic Performance
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank research reports show that Sahelian states’ economy may face relative stagnation due to unstable conditions including persistent protests in the region. Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali and Niger have been severely affected by the rise in militancy, affecting overall economic performance. Agriculture represents 32% of its gross domestic product and occupies 80% of the working population in Burkina Faso. A large part of the economic activity of the country is funded by international aid, despite having gold ores in abundance. Burkina Faso is the fourth-largest gold producer in Africa, after South Africa, Mali and Ghana.
The December 2023 report by the World Bank, for example, indicated that the poverty rate across the Sahelian region is still deepening due to poor management and governance. The economic and social development could, to some extent, be sustained based on ensuring political stability in the subregion, supporting and intensifying local production, its openness to international trade and export diversification.
According to the UN’s Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) report of 2023, Niger is one of the poorest countries in the world. It faces challenges to development due to its landlocked position, even though it possesses some natural resources including uranium ore. Government finance is derived from revenue exports (mining, oil and agricultural exports) as well as various forms of taxes collected by the government. Reports, however, estimated improvement in its revenues after the exit of France. Niger was the main supplier of uranium to the EU, followed by Kazakhstan and Russia.
Across the Sahel, the estimated aggregate population of 120 million is predominantly young, with 49.2% generally under 25 years old. The conflicts have only deepened poverty and food insecurity, and the challenges increasingly gaining ground in those countries. Future growth may be sustained by the exploitation of various untapped resources. Uranium prices have recovered somewhat over the last few years. But much also depends largely on state control, and good governance, by prioritizing economic sectors in the region.
Latest Developments
Niger has scrapped two key security agreements with the European Union that were intended to help fight violence in the Sahel region. It completely withdrew from EU Military Partnership Mission that was launched in February in Niger. It has also revoked approval for the EU Civilian Capacity-Building Mission, which was established in 2012 to help the country’s security forces fight militants and other threats. Most of Niger’s foreign economic and security allies have sanctioned the country, including France, which had 1,500 troops operating in Niger. All of them have been asked to leave.
In June 2022, Mali also abruptly withdrew from the G5-Sahel group and its Joint Force. The Joint Force was created in 2017 by the “G5” Heads of State—Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger—to counter-terrorism in the region. Reports pointed to the anti-French sentiments and under-equipped local armies to quickly step up their game against Islamist rebels in the volatile Sahelian region. By the end of 2022, France reduced and moved its troops. That ended the so-called “Operation Barkhane” which was a military mission marked by a tactic of permanent occupation of the Sahel countries by French troops. The French government, however, apparently would try to reorganize its strategy in Africa. From some indications, it appears the focus of action turns to the Gulf of Guinea.
At the AU Extraordinary Summit from May 25 to 28, 2022, held in Equatorial Guinea, Moussa Faki Mahamat, Chairperson of the African Union Commission, highlighted the factors contributing to the lack of development including good governance, the growing tendency of usurping power by the military and the significance of forging collective solidarity as a basis for resolving continental and regional problems. Both Senegalese president Macky Sall (then the AU Chairperson) and Moussa Mahamat, issued statements urging the interim military governments to return to constitutional regimes as early as possible, reassuring that the solutions to continental problems and overcoming the existing challenges depend on strong mobilization of African leaders and the effective coordination provided by the African Union. Regrettably, all these have not yet become a thing of the past.
United Nation’s Approach
The United Nations (UN) Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, Jean-Pierre Lacroix, has argued that the peacekeeping and terrorism fight faces greater challenges than ever and that it requires multinational mechanisms and approaches. It also requires member-states to adopt a collective capacity to support political and peace processes. Conflict is more complex and multi-layered.
According to Jean-Pierre Lacroix, peacekeepers are facing terrorists, criminals, armed groups and their allies, who have access to powerful modern weapons and a vested interest in perpetuating the chaos in which they thrive. Further complicating this situation is the fact that most peacekeeping operations – particularly our large, so-called multidimensional missions in Africa – have long been affected by a discrepancy between their capacities and what is demanded of them by the Security Council and host countries. Financial resources are often inadequate for their mandated tasks.
What’s at Stake
Niger and Burkina Faso exited the anti-Islamist force this early December 2023, withdrawing from an international force known as the G5 that was set up to fight Islamists in the Sahel region. Now Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger – run by military rulers following coups who have formed their mutual defence pact. Their so-called Alliance of Sahel States (AES) was signed back in September. United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres has often spoken against such inter-state collaboration.
But Chad and Mauritania are still part of the G5 force which is meant to be made up of about 5,000 soldiers. A statement from the military-led governments of Burkina Faso and Niger was critical of the G5 force for failing to make the Sahel region safer. It also suggested the anti-jihadist force undermined the two African nations’ desire for greater “independence and dignity” – and was serving foreign interests instead. They almost certainly meant France, whose power has dramatically deteriorated.
Usually referred to as the G5 Sahel, these countries – Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger – are engulfed with various socio-economic problems primarily due to the system of governance and poor policies toward sustainable development. In addition, rights abuse and cultural practices to a considerable extent affect the current state of development.
The big question is what impact this would have on the Islamist militant groups that have been growing in numerical strength, scope of operations and degree of force across the Sahel region. Russia is back in prominence on the world stage. As it flexes its muscles and tentacles to gain influence, the stature of the EU/US continues seemingly fading away. And former French colonies are simply turning to Russia for military support, bartering their natural resources for further much-anticipated collaborative partnerships. Russia has already agreed to develop nuclear power plants in Mali, while in Burkina Faso, it plans to construct an oil refinery.
For fear and concerns about the new rise of all kinds of terrorism and frequent attacks, the Sahel-5 are all turning to Russia for military assistance to fight growing terrorism, and efforts to strengthen political dialogue and promote some kind of partnerships relating to trade and the economy in the region. At the same time, with renewed and full-fledged interest to uproot French domination, Russia has ultimately begun making inroads into the entire Sahel region, an elongated landlocked territory located between North Africa (Maghreb) and West Africa, that stretches from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea.
Unique Lessons from Southern Africa
At least the majority of African leaders have to consider a complete overhaul of their security system across Africa. The Security Committees of the African Union and that of the Economic Community of West African States have to learn a few lessons and methodological approaches in dealing with indiscriminate threats of terrorism, militant groups, Islamic State-linked insurgencies and other related issues in Mozambique.
The worsening security situation at that time was a major setback for Mozambique but has been controlled by the involvement of regional troops from Rwanda and the Southern African Development Community Military Mission (SAMIM). Rwanda offered 1,000 in July 2021. South Africa has the largest contingent of approximately 1,500 troops. External countries are enormously helping to stabilize the situation in Mozambique. Its former colonizers Portugal and the United States both sent special forces to train local troops. Mozambique’s approach towards fighting growing threats of terrorism and conflict resolution offers explicit valuable lessons for the G5 Sahel which are Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger.
At the panel discussions during the mid-December U.S.-Africa Summit in Washington, Mozambican President Filipe Nyusi was very outspoken and shared valuable experiences with the audience about the use of well-constituted regional military force for enforcing peace and security in Mozambique. He told the panellists that there has been “remarkable progress” as businesses have restarted and displaced people began returning to Cabo Delgado, northern Mozambique. His argument simply was on the necessity of adopting ‘African solutions to African problems’ on peace and security issues across Africa, and this should be seriously considered as the most suitable, comprehensive approach under the current emerging geopolitical situation.
Joint regional forces within the context of multilateralism still have, to a large degree, significance in tackling conflicts in Africa. The Joint Forces of the Southern African Development Community are keeping peace in northern Mozambique. The rules, standards and policies, provision of assistance as well as the legal instruments and practices are based on the protocols of building and security stipulated by the African Union. It falls within the framework of peace and security requirements of the African Union. And has an appreciable commendation from the United Nations Security Council.
“We welcome collective action from SADC in committing to bringing sustainable peace to the region. We urge our leaders to consider the lessons learnt from other similar conflicts in Africa. In the Sahel, Somalia, and the Niger Delta offer stark contemporary reminders that a purely militaristic solution (devoid of measures to address the causes of the insurgency) increases the likelihood of its intractability. It is also unlikely to pave the way towards achieving sustainable peace,” the official statement from SADC.
The complexity and challenges in navigating this regional security partnership could be diverse, it depends also on political culture and mechanism of pragmatic approach. There have been various assessments and interpretations, but the security initiative to create the joint southern force underscores the multiplex dynamics to better play at home-grown solutions. The SADC initiative portrays a distinctive blueprint for purely African-headed peacekeeping success stories in the region, precisely for Mozambique and this could be replicated in West Africa.
With the changes sweeping across the world, it is glaringly well-known that a number of external countries are using Africa to achieve geopolitical goals, sowing seeds of confrontation which threaten African unity. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE), during the 36th Ordinary Session of the African Union (AU) held in Addis Ababa, interestingly used the phrase – “African solutions to African problems” – seven times in his speech delivered on February 2023. He strongly suggested that for the existing conflicts and disputes on the continent, it is necessary to mobilize collective efforts to resolve them and “must be confined to this continent and quarantined from the contamination of non-African interference.”
Final Security Breathe
As the security situation stands, the best option is to consider new approaches, taking into cognizance local factors, to regulate tensions and to prioritize development and economic sovereignty in the Sahel. And of course, many experts have suggested that addressing the Sahel crisis requires collective efforts and cooperation from all parties involved that can bring positive change in the region. Ultimately, it must be through tailored collective efforts and, most importantly, within the African context taking local conditions into account. As shown by Mozambique, carefully evaluating the tangible advantages combined with results, underscores the degree of consideration given to foreign involvement in conflicts without bartering natural resources. Sometimes the geopolitical factors are intertwined, though. In any case, to separate facts from fiction, Mozambique’s exemplary case is undoubtedly marked by significant successes.
In the context of – “African solutions to African problems” – the SADC’s regional force was earlier constituted in April 2021, agreed to deploy a regional force (3,000 troops) in Cabo Delgado, located in northern Mozambique and to fight threats of terrorism in neighbouring Southern African countries. What is referred to as Islamic attacks and insurgency caused havoc and devastation in Cabo Delgado province of Mozambique. The insurgency began in 2017 and left an unimaginable negative effect on settlements of the civilian population, and business and industry operations. The situation now is under control and seen as a distinctive example for the rest of Africa. With relative regional peace, Southern Africa looks now toward the direction of attaining its economic sovereignty. Besides that, SADC counted on funding from the United States and European Union (EU) and the United Nations.
Professor Maurice Okoli is a fellow at the Institute for African Studies and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences. He is also a fellow at the North-Eastern Federal University of Russia. He is an expert at the Roscongress Foundation and the Valdai Discussion Club. As an academic researcher and economist with a keen interest in current geopolitical changes and the emerging world order, Maurice Okoli frequently contributes articles for publication in reputable media portals on different aspects of the interconnection between developing and developed countries, particularly in Asia, Africa and Europe. With comments and suggestions, he can be reached via email: [email protected].
Feature/OPED
Nigeria’s Booming Growth Leaves Citizens Trapped in Deeper Poverty
By Blaise Udunze
With the chanting of the ‘Renewed Hope’, it appears to be Uhuru in Nigeria, following the recent World Economic Outlook presented by the International Monetary Fund, which projected that Nigeria’s economy would expand by 4.1 per cent in 2026. Though this specifically shows an economy faster than economies like the United States and the United Kingdom, as it handed the administration of President Bola Tinubu a powerful narrative. No doubt, the projection happens to be a narrative of progress, of reform, of a nation supposedly turning the corner after years of instability and setting the kind of moment that reassures investors, quiets critics and signals competence.
But once its statistical sheen is put aside, the weight of reality takes centre stage. The truth is, while Nigeria may be growing on paper, it is simultaneously shrinking and does not in any way reflect the lived experience of its citizens, as the populace can attest to. With the current lived experience, nowhere is this contradiction more glaring than in the widening gulf between macroeconomic projections and the daily economic suffering of over 200 million people.
The truth is uncomfortable, but it must be said plainly that a country where poverty is deepening, inflation is persistent, debt is rising, and basic survival is becoming more difficult cannot meaningfully claim economic success, no matter what the growth figures suggest.
The most damning evidence against the “fastest-growing economy” narrative, as enumerated by the Special Adviser to President Tinubu on Policy Communication, Daniel Bwala, comes not from opposition voices or political critics, but this time it is coming from the World Bank itself. Alarming to this is that according to its latest Nigeria Development Update, poverty in the country rose to 63 per cent barely months back, translating to roughly 140 million Nigerians living below the poverty line. This is not just a statistic; it is a humanitarian crisis unfolding in real time, which in a real sense calls for quick interventions.
Even more troubling is the trend. Poverty has not plateaued; it is accelerating, worsening and not stabilising at all. From 56 per cent in 2023 to 61 per cent in 2024, and now 63 per cent in 2025, the trajectory is unmistakable, as can be seen the data shows a clear upward trend over time that calls for concern. And projections from PwC suggest that the numbers will climb even higher, with an estimated 141 million Nigerians expected to be poor in 2026.
It would surprise many that these figures expose a fundamental contradiction; it is a total irony that an economy is growing while its people are becoming poorer, hence, while no one would hesitate to say that the type of growth taking place is flawed. Well, without jumping to a hasty conclusion, the answer lies in that growth. To say that the economic growth taking place is imbalanced, it is uneven, exclusionary, and not absolutely linked or largely disconnected from the sectors that sustain the majority of Nigerians. Growth driven by services and capital-intensive industries does little for a population whose livelihoods depend heavily on agriculture and informal enterprise. When growth bypasses the poor, it ceases to be development and becomes mere arithmetic.
The government’s defence often leans on the argument that inflation is easing and that reforms are beginning to stabilise the economy. But even this claim is increasingly fragile, as reported that the recent data from the National Bureau of Statistics shows that inflation has begun to rise again. This now shows that the headline inflation is ticking up to 15.38 per cent in March 2026, alongside a sharp month-on-month increase of 4.18 per cent. The pain Consumer Price Index climbed to 135.4, underscoring sustained pressure on household spending.
Another aspect that raises further questions is that the most critical component for ordinary Nigerians, which is the food inflation, skyrocketed to 14.31 per cent, with a similar month-on-month surge. It must be made known that these are not just numbers on a chart; they represent the escalating cost of survival, mostly for the common man. The ripple effect of this, which is yet to change, is that families are compelled to pay more for basic meals, more for transportation, and more for the essentials of daily life.
Noteworthy is that even when inflation showed signs of moderation in previous months, the fact is that it did little to reverse the damage already inflicted. The World Bank has been clear on this point when it said that household incomes have not kept pace with price increases. The underlying point is that the earlier spikes in inflation eroded purchasing power to such an extent that any subsequent easing has been insufficient to restore real income levels, and this is where the figures churned out were misleading.
This explains the inconsistency at the heart of Nigeria’s economy, where nominal indicators are improving, but real conditions are deteriorating. Nigerians are earning more in absolute terms but are able to afford less. This is further confirmed by data showing that while nominal household spending increased significantly, real consumption declined, while it would be said that people are spending more money, but they are consuming less. That is not growth; but the right word for it is economic suffocation.
The structural consequences of ongoing reforms compound the situation. The removal of fuel subsidies, which was the gift to Nigerians for electing President Tinubu and the liberalisation of the foreign exchange market were framed as necessary steps toward long-term stability. And in theory, they are defensible policies. But in practice, the result has been an extraordinary cost-of-living crisis, especially for the larger section of struggling Nigerians.
Speaking of the fuel subsidy removal, which has driven up transportation costs across the country, affecting both urban commuters and rural farmers, the pain has been further intensified by the geopolitical conflict in the Middle East. The second policy shift, which was the exchange rate liberalisation, has led to currency depreciation, with the experiences biting hard across the board, making imported goods more expensive and fueling inflationary pressures. These policy choices, which were perhaps deemed necessary, and without further ado have imposed immediate and severe burdens on households that were already vulnerable.
The International Monetary Fund has warned that these pressures are far from over. Rising global tensions, particularly in the Middle East, are pushing up the cost of energy, food, and transportation. For Nigerians, especially those at the lower rung in society, this translates into even higher living costs and deeper economic strain to contend with.
In this context, the government’s insistence on celebrating growth projections begins to appear not just disconnected, but insensitive. For millions of Nigerians, the economy is not an abstract concept measured in percentages. It is a daily struggle defined by whether they can afford food, transport, and shelter.
Compounding these challenges is Nigeria’s growing debt burden. Unexpectedly, public debt has climbed to over N159 trillion, with projections indicating a continued rise in the coming years because of the government’s appetite for borrowing. While the debt-to-GDP ratio may appear moderate compared to global averages, this comparison is totally misleading. The question is why the debt is ballooning when Nigeria’s revenue base is narrow, heavily reliant on oil, and constrained by a large informal sector that contributes little to tax income.
The current position of things is that debt servicing consumes a disproportionate share of government revenue, leaving limited fiscal space for investment in infrastructure, healthcare, education, and social protection, which has continued to expose the majority of Nigerians to untold hardship. It is a precarious position, one where the government is borrowing more while having less capacity to translate that borrowing into meaningful development outcomes, and the part that is also critical is that Nigeria’s rising debt profile is entering discomforting quarters, as concerns shift from the sheer size of borrowings to the growing risks associated with refinancing existing obligations.
Even more troubling are the emerging questions around fiscal transparency and governance. Only recently, there were allegations by Peter Obi on the missing N34 trillion in federation revenue that remains unaccounted. This, according to him, has intensified concerns about systemic leakages and institutional corruption. The fact is, even though these claims remain contested, they resonate deeply in a country where public trust in government financial management is already fragile and has remained a subject of discussion for many Nigerians.
The truth is that if even a fraction of such resources were effectively managed and invested, the impact on infrastructure, social services, and poverty reduction could be transformative, but this has yet to be embarked upon. Instead, the persistence of such allegations reinforces the perception of an economy where wealth exists but is inaccessible to the majority, which brings to bare if there will ever be a respite in a situation like this.
Adding another layer to this complexity is the excessive contradiction of oil revenue. With global crude prices that were once sold above $113 per barrel and currently hovering around $85-$90, which is still far exceeding Nigeria’s budget benchmark, the country stands to hugely benefit from a significant windfall, as was the case in the past. You know that history is more revealing than ever; it suggests that such opportunities are often squandered.
Analysts repeatedly have continued to warn that without disciplined fiscal management, these revenues may be absorbed by debt servicing or recurrent expenditure rather than being invested in productive sectors. The risk is that Nigeria once again experiences a boom without transformation, a cycle that has defined its economic history for decades.
Meanwhile, the irony in all of this is that, despite having plenty, every day Nigerian continues to bear the brunt of systemic inefficiencies. As the people bear the brunt, the country’s transportation costs are rising, food prices remain volatile, and access to basic services is increasingly strained, while the rural areas are not left out of the equation, as insecurity continues to disrupt agricultural production. This has further constrained food supply and driven up prices. In urban centres, the cost of living is pushing more households into financial distress.
The cumulative, as well as the ripple effects of these pressures, are a society under strain. Lest we mistake this, economic hardship is not just a financial issue; it has social and psychological consequences, while unbeknownst to many, its resultant effect fuels frustration, erodes trust in institutions, which also leads to fertile ground for instability.
What makes the current situation particularly troubling is the widening disconnect between official narratives and lived reality. There are two instances in which it was noted that, on the one hand, the government points to IMF projections and macroeconomic indicators as evidence of progress. On the other hand, citizens experience rising poverty, declining purchasing power, and limited opportunities. Another good example stems from when President Tinubu declared in September of last year that the federal government had met its 2025 non-oil income goal by August.
However, the former Minister of Finance, Wale Edun, stated that the Federal Government lacked sufficient funds to appropriately fund its capital budget during a public hearing at the National Assembly late last year. The minister stated that in order to pay the N54.9 trillion “budget of restoration,” which was intended to stabilise the economy, ensure peace, and create prosperity, the federal government had estimated N40.8 trillion in income for 2025.
These two reports sounded and appeared contradictory, and it was probably one of many factors responsible for the fallout.
This disconnect is more than a communication gap; it is a credibility crisis. When people’s lived experiences contradict official claims, trust erodes. And without trust, even well-intentioned policies struggle to gain acceptance.
The claim that Nigeria is growing faster than advanced economies may be technically accurate, and perhaps it must be seen as an absolute insult to Nigerians and it must be noted that it is fundamentally irrelevant to the country’s core challenges. This key fact must be taken into cognisance that growth rates, in isolation, do not capture the quality, inclusiveness, or sustainability of economic progress, and this is because they do not reflect whether growth is creating jobs, reducing poverty, or improving living standards. Note that in Nigeria’s case, the evidence suggests otherwise, in which the reality continues to dominate outcomes, and this is not the case.
For growth to be meaningful, it must translate into tangible improvements in people’s lives. At this point, it is necessary to understand that it must create jobs, raise incomes, and expand opportunities. Another important factor that must not be left out is that it must be inclusive, reaching not just the top tiers of society but the millions at the base of the economic pyramid. At present, Nigeria falls short on all these counts.
The path forward requires more than optimistic projections and reform rhetoric. It demands a fundamental rethinking of economic priorities. Policies must be designed not just for macroeconomic stability but for human welfare, and while investment must be directed toward sectors that generate employment and improve productivity, particularly agriculture and manufacturing. Social safety nets must be strengthened to protect the most vulnerable from economic shocks, which has yet to be considered by the government of the day.
Equally important is the need for transparency and accountability in public finance. Without trust in how resources are managed, even the most ambitious economic plans will struggle to gain legitimacy.
Nigeria is not lacking in potential, and this is one of the ironies of it all since it has a young population, abundant natural resources, and a dynamic entrepreneurial spirit. But potential, without effective governance and inclusive policies, remains unrealised.
The uncomfortable reality is that Nigeria is at risk of normalising a dangerous illusion, which connotes that growth on paper is equivalent to progress in practice. The truth is that it is not and cannot be contested. And until this illusion and deception are confronted, the gap between economic narratives and human realities will continue to widen.
In the end, the true measure of an economy is not how fast it grows, but how well it serves its people. By that standard, Nigeria’s current trajectory raises serious questions, take it or leave it. Because in a nation where over 140 million people live in poverty, where inflation continues to erode incomes, where debt is rising and where basic survival is becoming more difficult, the claim of being a “fast-growing economy” is not just misleading. Yes, it is a mirage!
And for millions of Nigerians struggling to get by each day, it is a mirage that offers no relief, no hope, and no future.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: [email protected]
Feature/OPED
Nigerian Opposition: What You Have to Do
By Prince Charles Dickson, PhD
“And Jesus said to Judas… what you are going to do, do quickly.”
There is a hard, almost rude lesson in that line. History does not wait for the timid to finish their committee meeting. Politics, especially Nigerian politics, is not kind to hesitation dressed as strategy. It rewards those who understand timing, nerve, structure, and the brutal arithmetic of power. That is where the Nigerian opposition now stands: not at the edge of impossibility, but at the edge of urgency.
The first truth is the one opposition politicians do not enjoy hearing at rallies where microphones are loud, and introspection is scarce. They are not getting it right. The evidence is not only in Tinubu’s strength, but in their own disorder. INEC said on February 5, 2026, that there were now 21 registered political parties and warned that persistent internal leadership crises within parties pose a serious threat to democratic consolidation. Eight days later, the commission formally released the notice and timetable for the 2027 general elections. In other words, this is no longer the season of abstract grumbling. The whistle has gone. The race is live.
Yet the opposition often behaves like students who entered the examination hall with righteous anger but forgot their pens. Too much of its energy is spent on lamentation, rumours, courtroom oxygen, personality feuds, and that old Nigerian hobby of mistaking noise for architecture. You cannot defeat an incumbent machine by forming a WhatsApp coalition of wounded egos and calling it national salvation. Voters may clap for drama, but they still ask the unromantic question: who is in charge, what is the plan, and why should we trust you with the keys?
Now comes the more uncomfortable truth. The opposition is not facing an ordinary incumbent. It is facing Bola Ahmed Tinubu, a man whose political DNA was forged in opposition. He is not merely benefiting from power; he understands opposition as craft, pressure, infiltration, timing, persistence, and theatre. In his June 12, 2025, Democracy Day speech, he taunted rivals by saying it was “a pleasure to witness” their disarray, while also reminding Nigerians that he once stood almost alone against an overbearing ruling machine. This was not casual banter. It was a warning shot from a politician who knows both the grammar of resistance and the machinery of incumbency.
That is why copying Tinubu’s old template will not be enough. Yes, the coalition instinct is understandable. In July 2025, major opposition figures, including Atiku Abubakar and Peter Obi, aligned under the ADC banner, presenting themselves as a bulwark against one-party drift, with David Mark as interim chairman. But here is the problem: Tinubu’s own coalition history worked not simply because men gathered in one room and glared at the ruling party. It worked because there was a disciplined merger logic, state-level anchoring, message coordination, and a ruthless understanding of elite bargaining. What the present opposition sometimes offers instead is photocopy politics with low toner: a coalition of convenience trying to frighten a man who practically wrote the Nigerian handbook on political accommodation, defection management, and patient conquest.
This is also why the opposition’s moral complaint, though not baseless, cannot be its only language. Yes, concerns about democratic shrinkage are real. Tinubu himself publicly denied that Nigeria is moving toward a one-party state, even as defections from opposition parties to the APC intensified and his own party welcomed them. But to say “democracy is in danger” is not yet the same thing as building a democratic alternative. Nigerians do not eat constitutional anxiety for breakfast. They want a credible opposition that can protect pluralism and still explain food prices, jobs, security, power supply, transport costs, and what exactly it would do on Monday morning after taking office.
On the government’s side, the picture is mixed enough to make both triumphalism and apocalypse look unserious. Reuters reported this week that the World Bank expects Nigeria’s economy to grow by about 4.2% in 2026, with external buffers improving and the debt-to-GDP ratio falling for the first time in a decade. Inflation had eased to 15.06% in February from roughly 33% in late 2024. Those are not imaginary numbers, and any fair-minded analysis must admit that Tinubu’s reforms have altered the macroeconomic conversation. But the same report warned that the Iran war has pushed fuel prices up by more than 50%, with obvious consequences for transport, food, and household pain. Add the continuing insecurity, underscored again this week by the killing of a Nigerian army general in Borno, and the government begins to look like a man who has repaired the roof but left half the house still flooding. That is not a collapse. It is not a command either. It is a meandering reform under political stress.
So, what must the opposition do, and do quickly? First, it must stop making Tinubu the only subject of the campaign. Anti-Tinubu is not a manifesto. It is a mood. Moods trend; structures win. Second, it must settle leadership questions early and publicly, because no voter wants to hire a rescue team still fighting over the steering wheel. Third, it needs an issue coalition, not just an elite coalition. Security, inflation, youth jobs, electricity, federalism, and institutional reform must become a coherent national offer, not a buffet of press conference talking points. Fourth, it must build from the states upward. Presidential romance without subnational organisation is political karaoke: loud, emotional, and usually off-key by the second verse.
Fifth, it must look seriously at the legal terrain. The Electoral Act 2026 has made party organisation even more central. PLAC notes that the new law tightens party registration rules, removes deemed registration, expands INEC’s regulatory discretion, and preserves the fact that candidates still need political parties as the vehicle for contesting most elective offices because independent candidacy is not permitted. In plain language, parties matter even more now. A fragmented opposition is therefore not just aesthetically untidy. It is strategically suicidal.
Still, there are dangers in the opposite direction, too. A desperate anti-Tinubu mega-bloc could become a cargo truck of incompatible ambitions. If all it offers is the promise to defeat one man, it may reproduce the same habits it condemns once power arrives. Nigeria does not need a ruling party so swollen that democracy gasps for air. But it also does not need an opposition whose only ideology is turn-by-turn revenge. The health of democracy lies somewhere between monopoly and mob. It requires competition with content, not merely competition with bitterness. Tinubu himself, in that same June 12 speech, defended multiparty politics even while mocking the opposition’s disorder. That irony should not be wasted. He has thrown them both an insult and an assignment.
So, yes, the opposition is right to worry. But worry is not a strategy. Outrage is not an organisation. The coalition is not coherent. And history is not sentimental. The man they are up against is ruthless, seasoned, and intimate with the dark arts of democratic combat. He knows the game. Some of his opponents are still learning the rules from old newspaper cuttings.
Which brings us back to the scripture. What you are going to do, do quickly. Not recklessly. Not hysterically. Quickly. Settle your house. Name your purpose. Offer something fresher than recycled indignation. Build a machine that is not merely anti-Tinubu but pro-Nigeria in a way ordinary Nigerians can feel in their pockets and in their pulse. Otherwise, the opposition will keep arriving at battle dressed in borrowed armour, only to discover that the tailor works for the man they came to unseat—May Nigeria win!
Feature/OPED
The Digital Imperative for Women-Led Businesses in Nigeria
By Gloria Onosode
Nigeria is targeting an ambitious $1 trillion economy by 2030. To achieve this, women-led businesses must transition from mere passive observers to primary growth drivers at the heart of the economy and strategic participants in their respective industries.
According to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), the increased ownership rate of MSMEs by women represents a significant contribution to economic growth and job creation. Digital empowerment for these enterprises must move from being a social responsibility or gender support initiative to contributing to broader economic development.
To reach the $1 trillion GDP milestone, women-led businesses must be positioned to operate at a macroeconomic scale. This requires moving beyond subsistence trading and into the digital value chain. For instance, a fashion designer in Aba, through digital positioning, can access broader markets and commercial networks and thereby facilitate better record-keeping and data-driven decision-making, supporting improved financial record-keeping, which may be considered in credit assessments by financial institutions.
FairMoney Microfinance Bank (MFB), a bank licensed and regulated by the Central Bank of Nigeria, contributes to the digital transitioning of small businesses in Nigeria by providing tools specifically designed for the realities of the Nigerian entrepreneur. For women, whose businesses often fluctuate with seasonal demands or family needs, the ability to protect and grow capital is paramount. FairMoney MFB offers features that empower women to move from informal ‘under-the-mattress’ savings to digitised interest-bearing savings products. By embracing digital transition, tech-based saving platforms can enable business owners to set specific goals, such as purchasing new equipment, saving towards business goals in a disciplined manner, while earning interest at applicable rates.
For that business owner who requires immediate liquidity, our flexible savings feature offers interest while allowing for withdrawal access that is subject to applicable terms and conditions to cover emergency restocks. For longer-term scaling, our fixed-term savings feature allows entrepreneurs to lock away funds for a fixed period and accrue interest based on product terms, subject to terms and conditions. By automating savings and providing interest at applicable rates, FairMoney MFB is designed to support financial planning and resilience over time for women-led SMEs.
Nigerian women are among the most entrepreneurial globally, consistently defying structural barriers to build enterprises from the ground up. According to the Small and Medium Enterprise Development Agency of Nigeria (SMEDAN), Nigeria has approximately 39.6 million nano, micro, small, and medium enterprises. Charles Odii, Director General at SMEDAN in 2024, also recently shared that approximately 72% of these enterprises are now classified as being owned or led by women. This is a significant jump from previous years, which hovered around 40–43%, largely due to the surge in ‘nano’ and ‘micro’ home-based businesses. These female-led enterprises are the primary engines of job creation and community stability.
Despite this drive, women entrepreneurs face a unique set of structural hurdles that stifle their ability to scale. The ‘financing gap’ remains the most formidable obstacle. The World Bank IFC Nigeria2Equal initiative reports that while Nigeria has one of the highest female entrepreneurship rates globally, the credit gap for these women is estimated at over 2.9 trillion Naira, forcing them into the ‘savings and family’ funding model.
The case for supporting these businesses extends beyond equity; it is rooted in the ‘multiplier effect’. Research demonstrates that women reinvest up to 90% of their income into their families and communities, specifically in education, healthcare, and nutrition. Supporting these enterprises is, therefore, a direct investment in Nigeria’s human capital. By bringing these businesses into the formal sector, the accuracy of economic planning will be improved. When a woman-led SME flourishes, the benefits ripple across the entire socioeconomic landscape.
The future of the Nigerian economy is intrinsically tied to the success of its women. When we prioritise women-led businesses, we are not merely fulfilling a gender quota; we can contribute to unlocking economic potential across sectors. By bridging the digital gap and providing robust financial tools for saving and credit to women-led businesses, Nigeria can begin to support the growth of micro-enterprises over time. A $1 trillion Nigeria is not just a dream; it represents a significant opportunity that can be progressively realised by the resilient women entrepreneurs of our nation.
Gloria Onosode is the Director of Enterprise Sales at FairMoney Business
-
Feature/OPED6 years agoDavos was Different this year
-
Travel/Tourism10 years ago
Lagos Seals Western Lodge Hotel In Ikorodu
-
Showbiz3 years agoEstranged Lover Releases Videos of Empress Njamah Bathing
-
Banking8 years agoSort Codes of GTBank Branches in Nigeria
-
Economy3 years agoSubsidy Removal: CNG at N130 Per Litre Cheaper Than Petrol—IPMAN
-
Banking3 years agoSort Codes of UBA Branches in Nigeria
-
Banking3 years agoFirst Bank Announces Planned Downtime
-
Sports3 years agoHighest Paid Nigerian Footballer – How Much Do Nigerian Footballers Earn
