Feature/OPED
CBN’s $1trn Mirage: Why Nigeria’s Real Sector Holds the Missing Key
By Blaise Udunze
When the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) recently declared that the country was on course to becoming a $1 trillion economy through ongoing banking reforms, the statement was met with cautious optimism. To many, it sounded like a long-awaited promise of prosperity as a declaration that Nigeria’s economic renewal is finally underway. But behind the projection lies a critical question, if banking reforms alone drive the kind of broad-based, sustainable growth required to make Nigeria a trillion-dollar economy?
The truth, according to several experts and economic data, is that banking reforms though necessary are insufficient. The structure of the Nigerian economy is still too fragile, the real sector too weak, and the policy framework too inconsistent to sustain such lofty growth. Without targeted reforms that strengthen production, industry, and exports, the trillion-dollar dream risks remaining what one economist aptly described as a “mirage.”
Tilewa Adebajo, Chief Executive Officer of CFG Advisory, did not mince words when he addressed the subject on ARISE NEWS earlier this year. “We said Nigeria already has the potential of a $1 trillion economy. But $1 trillion economy is a mirage. We shouldn’t go there again,” he said. “If you do not have your policies in place, you cannot reach that $1 trillion economy.”
Adebajo’s caution strikes at the heart of the matter, saying potential is not performance. Nigeria has abundant human and natural resources, but poor policy implementation, weak governance, and persistent inflation continue to choke productivity and investment.
According to Adebajo, reforms alone cannot drive growth. “Reforms on themselves cannot be the solution or answer to growing the economy,” he explained. For him, the CBN’s focus on financial sector restructuring must be complemented by microeconomic solutions such as job creation, poverty alleviation, and social intervention policies that ease the hardship of ordinary Nigerians.
“There has to now be a human face,” he emphasized. Economic transformation, he argues, must not only be about GDP numbers but about improving the quality of life for millions trapped in poverty.
While the CBN’s recapitalisation directive aims to strengthen the banking system and attract foreign capital, many industry players insist that banking strength is meaningless without productive outlets for credit. The Group Managing Director of UBA Plc, Oliver Alawuba, made this clear at the Annual Conference of the Finance Correspondents Association of Nigeria (FICAN).
He stated that achieving the $1 trillion economy target “requires not just incremental growth, but structural shifts in how we approach banking, financial innovation, and sectoral development.”
For Alawuba, the real sector in agriculture, manufacturing, and services must become the true engine of growth.
“A vibrant real sector will drive employment, foster innovation, and strengthen the overall economy by reducing dependency on the oil sector,” he said.
Recapitalization alone, he noted, “is not enough; it must be followed by focused lending to strategic areas that promise the highest economic returns.”
This sentiment reflects a broader consensus among economists that credit must flow to where value is created. Yet, Nigerian banks often prefer the comfort of investing in risk-free government securities over financing industrial or agricultural expansion. The result is a financial system that thrives on paper profits but contributes little to real economic output.
Indeed, Nigeria’s real sector has remained under pressure for years. Manufacturing’s share of GDP still hovers around 10 to 12 percent, hampered by erratic power supply, high logistics costs, and dependence on imported inputs. Agriculture, employing over one-third of the population, remains largely subsistence-based and technologically backward. Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), which make up 90 percent of businesses and contribute 48 percent of GDP, continue to struggle with limited access to affordable, long-term credit.
Alawuba suggests that this is where the banking recapitalisation drive must meet fintech innovation. By creating products specifically tailored to SMEs such as flexible loan packages, digital lending tools, and market access platforms which banks can unlock exponential growth. He argues that the future of Nigeria’s economy depends on “the strategic alignment of policy, investment, technology, and, most importantly, our collective will to innovate and grow.”
However, achieving this alignment requires more than monetary engineering; it demands a complete rethink of fiscal and industrial policy. As Isa Omagu of the Bank of Industry (BoI) explained during the same forum, “The economy stands on both the monetary and fiscal sides; we need both sides to work together.” While the monetary side stabilizes prices, fiscal authorities must “come in on the issue of governance.” Nigeria’s biggest economic problem, he said, is simple: “We are not producing enough, and we cannot continue to consume imported goods and expect the economy to be robust.”
Omagu’s statement underscores the country’s most pressing contradiction as a consumption-driven economy that produces little of what it consumes. He called for deeper investment in agriculture, infrastructure, and services to minimize importation and reduce pressure on the foreign exchange market. “We cannot achieve a $1 trillion economy without focusing or boosting our production capacity,” he warned.
The Deputy Director of the Banking Examination Department at the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC), Emeka Udechukwu, echoed a similar concern. He warned that “without a vibrant real sector, the economy might not grow fast enough to hit the $1 trillion target.” He argued that while the CBN’s loan-to-deposit ratio policy was designed to compel banks to lend more to the productive sector, “fundamental infrastructural deficits” and policy inconsistencies have undermined its impact. “If there is challenge in the real sector of any economy, that economy is already challenged,” he said. “We have to go back to the real sector and do what we are supposed to do.”
This diagnosis aligns with what many analysts have long argued that Nigeria’s economic problem is not lack of money but lack of production. Trillions of naira circulate within the financial system, yet they rarely translate into new factories, expanded farms, or exportable goods. A $1 trillion GDP projection, therefore, may reflect currency devaluation or statistical rebasing more than genuine productivity gains.
The country’s overreliance on oil further complicates the path to sustainable growth. Data from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) shows that in the last quarter of 2023, crude oil accounted for over 81 percent of total exports, while non-oil exports amounted to just around N1 trillion. Even though non-oil exports grew by 38.5 percent in early 2024, their value remains meagre for an economy seeking diversification.
Nigeria’s non-oil export base including manufactured goods, agricultural products, and services remains underdeveloped. Experts argue that to escape this trap, Nigeria must learn from Asian success stories like Singapore and Vietnam, where industrialization, export-oriented manufacturing, and human capital investment transformed poor economies into global competitors.
Singapore, for instance, transitioned from high unemployment and poor infrastructure in the 1960s to one of the world’s richest nations through massive investment in education, manufacturing, and technology. Its top exports today include integrated circuits and machinery products that drive global industries. Similarly, Vietnam evolved from an agrarian, war-torn economy to a manufacturing hub exporting electronics, textiles, and footwear worth over $370 billion in 2022. Nigeria, by contrast, has watched its GDP fall from $400 billion in 2013 to around $250 billion by 2023.
Both countries demonstrate that industrialization, not financial speculation, drives long-term growth. As Uchenna Uzo, a marketing professor at Lagos Business School, put it, “Manufacturing and local production are the key things that can set Nigeria apart.” He added that Nigeria can also attract diaspora investment if it builds the right infrastructure and policy stability.
The lesson is clear; a trillion-dollar economy cannot be decreed from monetary policy statements or achieved through banking reforms alone. It must be earned through production, value addition, and innovation. Nigeria’s manufacturing base must expand, its agricultural productivity must rise, and its infrastructure such as power, transport, and logistics must be modernized.
Banking reforms should therefore serve as an enabler, not a substitute, for real sector development. The CBN’s recapitalization drive, while commendable, must be tied to sectoral targets. Banks that expand credit to manufacturing, agriculture, or export-oriented businesses should enjoy regulatory incentives, while speculative investments in non-productive assets should be discouraged.
Equally important is the need to tame inflation and stabilize the currency. As Adebajo noted, Nigeria can only sustain GDP growth of 8-10 percent if inflation is kept below 12 percent. Persistent inflation erodes purchasing power, deters investment, and undermines long-term planning. Without macroeconomic stability, even the best-intentioned reforms will falter.
Furthermore, there must be a coordinated industrial policy that aligns monetary, fiscal, and trade objectives. For instance, while the CBN seeks to strengthen the naira, the fiscal authorities must simultaneously support local manufacturers through tax incentives, infrastructure investment, and export facilitation. Import restrictions, when necessary, should be strategically designed to protect emerging industries without stifling competition.
Nigeria’s SME ecosystem also deserves targeted support. As the Bank of Industry’s Omagu and UBA’s Alawuba both emphasized, SMEs are the backbone of employment and innovation. Yet, they are often the most credit-starved. Government-backed credit guarantees, venture funds, and fintech-driven micro-lending could bridge this gap, helping small enterprises become the foundation of Nigeria’s industrial base.
Equally, agricultural transformation must move beyond subsistence farming to agro-industrialisation such as processing, packaging, and exporting value-added products rather than raw materials. This approach will not only increase farmers’ incomes but also create jobs and reduce pressure on foreign exchange demand. A focus on value chain development from farm to factory to market will ensure that the benefits of growth reach ordinary citizens.
At a time when 133 million Nigerians are multidimensionally poor, according to NBS data, the urgency for real sector reforms cannot be overstated. An economy that depends overwhelmingly on oil exports, consumes more than it produces, and imports most of its essential goods cannot claim to be on the path to a trillion dollars in any meaningful sense.
The government’s projection of achieving a $1 trillion economy by 2030 could still be attainable but only if the country embarks on deep structural reforms. These include ensuring reliable power supply, revamping transport infrastructure, tackling corruption that inflates project costs, and improving governance and policy consistency.
Nigeria must also invest aggressively in education and skills development, following the example of countries like Singapore, which turned human capital into its greatest economic asset. A young, skilled population can drive innovation, entrepreneurship, and technological adoption which is the real levers of modern economic power.
The road to a trillion-dollar economy will not be paved by balance sheets and banking reforms alone. It will be built by factories, farms, and entrepreneurs. It will depend on a nation’s ability to produce, innovate, and trade competitively. It will require a deliberate shift from policy announcements to policy execution, where government actions translate into measurable outcomes for citizens.
Nigeria’s trillion-dollar dream is achievable, but not on the current trajectory. Without revitalizing the real sector, ensuring macroeconomic stability, and investing in people and production, the CBN’s optimism risks sounding like rhetoric detached from reality. Banking reforms may stabilize the system, but only real sector reforms can sustain growth.
In the end, Nigeria’s economic destiny will not be determined in banking halls but in the fields, factories, and workshops where real value is created. The trillion-dollar economy will not come from financial statements, it will come from the sweat of productive Nigerians who, if properly empowered, can transform potential into prosperity.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional writes from Lagos, can be reached via: bl***********@***il.com
By Blaise Udunze
Daily, the world watches Nigeria through a familiar lens in what appears to be a gory situation. Especially in cases when the news headlines tell stories of farmer-herder clashes, bandit attacks, kidnappings, villages reduced to ashes or deserted by the dwellers, as thousands of Nigerians have been displaced across states such as Zamfara, Plateau, Benue, Niger, Kaduna and Nasarawa. Subliminally, this is about to become a similarly ugly occurrence in southwestern Nigeria, which is fast becoming obvious if not nipped in the bud quickly.
Recorded data have shown that bandits, Boko Haram, and others killed over 190,000 Nigerians in 17 years and displaced 3.7 million people.
A human rights organisation, the International Society for Civil Liberties and Rule of Law (Intersociety), in its fearful revelation, has said that no fewer than 190,150 Nigerians have been killed by bandits, Boko Haram insurgents, and suspected armed herdsmen between July 2009 and March 19, 2026, as this calls for concern.
The dominant explanations often point to ethnic tensions, religious divisions, climate change, shrinking grazing routes or weak security institutions. No doubt, those factors are certainly part of Nigeria’s complex security crisis. Yet another question deserves serious examination.
What if, in some locations, the violence is also serving another purpose? What if some of the territories experiencing repeated displacement are the same places sitting atop some of Nigeria’s most valuable mineral deposits? More importantly, if such a pattern exists, who benefits when communities disappear?
Of a truth, these questions are uncomfortable, but undeniably they deserve careful investigation rather than dismissal.
For ages, Nigeria has been naturally endowed, and it is estimated to be rich in enormous significant reserves of gold, lithium, uranium, tin, columbite and other strategic minerals increasingly sought after in the global transition to clean energy technologies. As international demand for battery minerals continues to rise, these resources have become far more valuable than they were only a decade ago.
If one overlays publicly available geological information with maps showing persistent violence, some observers argue that striking geographical overlaps appear in several regions. Such overlaps alone cannot establish causation. Correlation is not proof of conspiracy. However, they raise questions worthy of independent scrutiny.
One issue attracting increasing attention and adequately yearns for answer is whether prolonged insecurity may inadvertently or deliberately create conditions that make mineral extraction easier.
Under Nigeria’s Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act 2007, mineral resources belong to the Federal Government, while mining rights are granted through licences and leases. Community engagement and land access are expected to form part of the licensing process, although implementation varies depending on circumstances. This raises an important policy question.
What happens when the communities expected to participate in those processes have already fled because of violence?
Displacement changes the dynamics of land ownership, consent and access. While no evidence automatically proves that attacks are orchestrated to facilitate mining, the sequence of violence followed by renewed commercial activity in some locations deserves closer examination by regulators, lawmakers and investigative journalists.
In conflict studies, researchers have long observed that wars often generate economic winners alongside humanitarian losers. Could elements of Nigeria’s insecurity also be producing economic beneficiaries?
Reports over the years have documented concerns about illegal mining operations across parts of northern Nigeria. Government agencies themselves have repeatedly acknowledged that criminal networks profit from the country’s vast mineral wealth. The unresolved question is whether isolated criminality has, in some instances, evolved into more sophisticated alliances involving political influence, financial interests and international supply chains. If so, the implications extend far beyond Nigeria.
Invariably, it is clearly known that lithium has become one of the world’s most strategic commodities, powering electric vehicle batteries and renewable energy storage systems. Gold has always remained one of the safest global investment assets during periods of uncertainty. Meanwhile, it is well confirmed that the global appetite for these minerals creates enormous financial incentives.
Suppose violent displacement reduces resistance to extraction. Suppose shell companies subsequently acquire mining interests. Suppose minerals then leave Nigeria through legitimate-looking export documentation while their true value remains understated.
These scenarios remain allegations unless supported by verifiable evidence. Yet they outline a framework that investigators may wish to test rather than ignore. Financial crime experts frequently identify trade mis-invoicing as one of the most common methods of illicit financial flows worldwide.
Could Nigeria’s solid minerals sector be vulnerable to similar practices? If valuable lithium ore is deliberately but inaccurately described as lower-value material on export documents, substantial wealth could potentially leave the country without reflecting its true market value. Likewise, if unrefined gold exits through privileged channels with limited scrutiny, questions naturally arise about oversight, transparency and accountability over criminal activities which have continued to stunt and disrupt the country’s socio-economic growth and at the same time cause carnage.
Such possibilities are not accusations against any particular institution or company. Rather, they illustrate why stronger monitoring systems are increasingly essential. Another question concerns logistics.
With the high level of criminal activities, industrial mining requires heavy machinery, diesel supplies, transportation networks and specialised personnel. These are not operations that can remain invisible indefinitely.
If certain territories are genuinely too dangerous for security agencies, how do industrial-scale extraction activities reportedly continue in some remote locations? If they do, who protects those operations? Who authorises their movement? Who verifies what is extracted? Who ensures royalties and export revenues reach public coffers? These are governance questions that demand institutional answers.
Equally important is the international dimension. Minerals extracted in Nigeria ultimately enter global supply chains. Gold may pass through international refining hubs before entering financial markets. Lithium may become part of battery manufacturing destined for electric vehicles, which are being sold across Europe, North America and Asia.
One known fact is that consumers purchasing products containing these minerals rarely know the full story of where they originated.
Increasingly, however, investors and governments are demanding ethical sourcing standards that trace minerals from extraction to final manufacture.
A critical factor that must be taken into cognisance is that if insecurity is creating opportunities for illegal or unethical extraction anywhere in the world, multinational companies have responsibilities alongside national governments, of which the onus falls on the Nigerian government.
Transparency cannot stop at the mine gate. Nor should accountability end at national borders. Another issue requiring attention concerns beneficial ownership.
Across many jurisdictions, shell companies can obscure the identities of individuals ultimately controlling commercial assets. If politically exposed persons or powerful business interests are hidden behind complex corporate structures registered offshore, identifying beneficiaries becomes significantly more difficult. This challenge is hardly unique to Nigeria.
Findings showed that from Latin America to Central Africa and Southeast Asia, resistant corporate networks have frequently complicated efforts to combat corruption and illicit resource extraction. That is precisely why open corporate registries, beneficial ownership databases and transparent mining licence disclosures are becoming global governance priorities. For Nigeria, the stakes could hardly be higher.
The country stands at the centre of the world’s emerging critical minerals economy. The Nigerian government can’t feign ignorance of the fact that, when handled transparently, these resources could finance infrastructure, education, healthcare, and industrial development for generations.
In no way would the government claim not knowing that when handled poorly, they risk becoming another chapter in the well-documented “resource curse,” where extraordinary natural wealth coincides with persistent poverty, insecurity and institutional weakness.
The ultimate challenge, therefore, is not simply about mining. It is about governance. It is about whether public institutions possess both the independence and capacity to ensure that natural resources benefit citizens rather than narrow interests. It is about whether conflict zones receive genuine peacebuilding efforts instead of becoming forgotten frontiers. And it is about whether international markets demand accountability with the same enthusiasm they demand raw materials.
None of these questions should be answered through speculation. They require rigorous investigations, forensic financial analysis, satellite imagery, mining license audits, customs records, beneficial ownership disclosures and courageous journalism.
They require governments willing to open their books. They require international cooperation capable of tracing money across borders. Most importantly, they require asking questions that have too often remained unasked.
Perhaps Nigeria’s security crisis is exactly what it appears to be: a tragic convergence of historical grievances, weak institutions, criminality and environmental pressures. Or perhaps, in some places, another layer of economic incentive deserves closer scrutiny.
Until those questions are thoroughly investigated, one possibility will continue to linger. Maybe the world’s attention has been fixed on the blood spilt above ground, while too little attention has been paid to the extraordinary wealth lying beneath it.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: bl***********@***il.com
Feature/OPED
What Does Nigeria’s $51bn Reserves Milestone Mean if Most New Foreign Money Can Leave Quickly?
Nigeria’s foreign reserves have climbed to about $51 billion, a decade-plus high, according to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). EBC Financial Group (EBC) notes that this reflects stronger investor confidence, but the second half may show whether it holds, as the build rests on three cyclical drivers: oil earnings, short-term foreign money and a narrowing official-to-street naira gap.
Reserves rose from about $32 billion in April 2024, during a dollar shortage, to about $51 billion now, near the CBN’s target. Much came from two cyclical sources, strong oil earnings and money chasing high-yielding naira assets, so EBC expects the pace to slow or reverse. Fitch Ratings, a major international credit rating agency, expects a marginal decline to about $47 billion by the end of 2026, citing higher spending and external pressures.
David Precious, Senior Market Analyst at EBC Financial Group, said, “Nigeria’s reserve build is real but may not be durable yet, because nearly all of the new money is the kind that can leave quickly. Of the $10.37 billion that came in over the first quarter, the overwhelming majority was short-term portfolio funds rather than long-term investment, so a shift in oil prices, global interest rates or confidence in the naira might pull a large part of it straight back out.”
Most New Money Can Still Leave Quickly
The composition of the foreign inflows explains the caution over how long the build can last. The country attracted $10.37 billion in foreign investment in the first quarter of 2026, up 83.83 per cent year-on-year, according to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Of that, $9.86 billion or 95.09 per cent, was portfolio money, largely short-term naira debt such as Treasury bills that investors can sell at the next auction, while foreign direct investment, the long-term kind that builds factories and jobs, was $135.08 million, or 1.30 per cent. Put simply, of each dollar coming in, about 95 cents can leave quickly, and barely one cent stays.
That money supports reserves while it stays. Dollars brought in to buy naira assets add to market supply, letting the CBN hold more reserves and steady the naira. It leaves when conditions change. Nigeria earns most of its export dollars from oil and gas, so lower oil prices mean fewer dollars, and as a member of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), it cannot simply produce more, output capped by quota and reduced by theft and ageing fields. Higher global interest rates draw money toward safer returns abroad, and a weakening naira prompts investors to sell early. When oil fell in 2016 and 2020, foreign investors withdrew and could not convert naira to dollars as supply dried up, leaving the CBN to clear more than $7 billion in trapped obligations into 2024.
The Oil Boost is No Longer Certain
Oil looked like a dependable source of the dollars behind the reserves only months ago. Earlier in 2026, concern over disruption around the Strait of Hormuz lifted crude prices, and stronger receipts flowed in, with crude oil export earnings of $8.11 billion in the first quarter in the CBN’s balance-of-payments data. That support is now easing. The tension has subsided, and Brent traded near $72 on June 29, down about 24 per cent over the month, back to pre-conflict levels. With the price boost gone and output constrained, reserves are more exposed, leaning on non-oil earnings and investor patience rather than oil.
The Naira Still Trades at Two Prices
The naira has traded at two prices, an official rate and a higher parallel-market rate, and closing that gap into one trusted price is what many investors might watch most. Before committing funds, they may want assurance they can convert naira to dollars at a fair rate when they exit, and a wide gap revives the fear of being trapped that lingers from earlier shortages. The gap has narrowed to roughly N20 to N30, with the CBN’s official rate near N1,380 per dollar on June 26 against parallel-market quotes around N1,400. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2026 Article IV review urged Nigeria to depend less on this fast-moving portfolio money and to keep phasing out its multiple exchange-rate practices. The CBN’s Foreign Exchange Manual, in force from 1 June, is intended to make the market clearer, though such rules build confidence only once investors can freely trade dollars at the posted rate.
What could Make the Build Durable
A few signs that may show the build turning durable include a smaller gap between the official and street naira rates, more long-term foreign investment, and steadier oil earnings. A gap that stays small, now roughly N20 to N30, may mean investors trust the official rate and no longer need the street market. A clear rise in foreign direct investment, only $135 million last quarter against $9.86 billion of short-term money, might mean lasting capital is replacing funds that can leave at the next auction. Oil earnings that hold up, rather than sliding from the low $70s, should help keep reserves steady, since oil and gas bring in most of Nigeria’s export dollars.
“Reserves built on money chasing high yields can fall as fast as they rose, as they did after the last two oil shocks, when investors left, and the CBN spent years clearing a foreign-exchange backlog,” Precious added. “What holds through a downturn is slower money, direct investment, steady oil and non-oil export earnings and one credible naira rate, and that is the shift Nigeria has yet to make.”
By Olajumoke Bello
Across Nigeria, small and medium enterprises remain the backbone of economic activity. They drive trade, create jobs, and sustain millions of livelihoods. Yet, despite their importance, many SMEs continue to operate below their full potential due to persistent structural challenges.
Access to finance remains one of the most cited constraints. However, the issue today goes beyond the availability of capital. Many businesses struggle with financial readiness, weak documentation, and limited understanding of what lenders require. This often leads to missed opportunities, even when funding options exist.
At the same time, SMEs face gaps in market access and visibility. Business owners operate in highly localised environments, with limited exposure to broader networks that can unlock partnerships, new markets, and growth opportunities. This isolation can constrain scalability and reduce long-term competitiveness.
Equally important is the capability gap. Many entrepreneurs grow through resilience and experience but lack structured knowledge on critical areas such as financial management, export readiness, and digital adoption. Without this, even well-capitalised businesses can struggle to sustain growth.
These challenges point to a clear need for a more practical and integrated approach to SME support. It is no longer sufficient to offer standalone solutions. SMEs require ecosystems that combine knowledge, access, and direct engagement in ways that reflect how they actually operate.
A key shift is the move from centralised interventions to localised engagement. SMEs are deeply influenced by their immediate environments, whether markets, industrial clusters, or trade corridors. Solutions must therefore be brought closer to where these businesses function, allowing for more relevant support and stronger relationships.
Another important shift is from awareness to action. Business owners do not only need information; they need insights that they can apply immediately. This includes understanding how to structure their finances, how to access trade opportunities, and how to connect with the right partners to scale their operations.
There is also a growing need for continuity. Many SME-focused initiatives deliver strong initial impact but lack follow-through. For support to be effective, it must extend beyond one-off engagements into sustained relationships, with clear pathways for onboarding, advisory, and growth.
For financial institutions, this presents both responsibility and an opportunity. Supporting SMEs now requires moving beyond transactional banking to deeper partnership models. It requires understanding businesses at a granular level and co-creating solutions that evolve with their needs.
At Stanbic IBTC, this perspective continues to shape our approach to SME development. Our focus is on delivering practical support that translates into real business outcomes, helping enterprises grow, compete, and contribute more meaningfully to the economy.
As part of this commitment, we are extending our SME engagement to the regions through the Nigeria Business Summit Regional Tour. The tour will take structured, on-ground activations into key commercial hubs, where SMEs can access funding guidance, trade insights, advisory support, and direct engagement with financial experts.
The regional tour will take place across five strategic locations, bringing these solutions closer to business owners in Aba, Onitsha, Ibadan and Kano.
This approach reflects an important principle. When support moves closer to businesses and when solutions are delivered in ways that are practical and continuous, SMEs are better positioned to grow sustainably. In turn, this strengthens not only individual enterprises but the broader economy.
Olajumoke Bello is the Head of Enterprise Banking at Stanbic IBTC Bank
