Feature/OPED
CBN’s 303rd MPC Meeting: A Technocratic Victory, an Economic Setback, and a Missed Opportunity on Nigeria’s Real Crisis
By Blaise Udunze
The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 303rd Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) meeting arrived at a time of unprecedented tension within the Nigerian economy. The country has not faced a more difficult convergence of challenges for more than a decade in the area of crushing food inflation, unrelenting insecurity, slowing growth, weak purchasing power, a fragile exchange rate, and rapidly eroding business confidence, as these are the current realities.
Yet, against this troubling backdrop, the MPC chose to retain the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) at 27 percent, kept the Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) at a record-high 45 percent, held the Liquidity Ratio (LR) at 30 percent, and adjusted the asymmetric corridor, making it more reflective of technocratic cautions than economic realities
With the tense atmosphere, boldness, contextual sensitivity, and human-centric policymaking are required to douse the challenges. Instead, what Nigeria received was another round of technocratic orthodoxy, at a time when orthodoxy has clearly failed.
Why This MPC Meeting Matters More Than Any in Recent Memory
The importance of the 303rd MPC meeting cannot be overstated. It occurred at a time when:
– Nigeria’s food inflation remains structurally high, driven mainly by insecurity, not excess liquidity.
– Banditry, farmer-herder conflicts, kidnapping, and terrorism have made farming a high-risk activity across the North-East, North-West, North-Central, and increasingly the South, which has created an environment where fear, uncertainty, and instability have become the daily reality for millions of Nigerians.
– Growth has slowed, reflecting a tightening credit environment and collapsing consumer demand, while households spend 70-80 percent of income on food, according to industry surveys.
– Private-sector credit is shrinking, while government borrowing is expanding.
– The naira, though stabilising, remains vulnerable.
Given these realities, the MPC was expected to signal a shift, however modest, toward a more growth-supportive stance. Instead, it doubled down on tight policy.
Many analysts interpret this as a sign that the CBN is more committed to defending the naira and preserving the appearance of stability than responding to the lived experiences of citizens and businesses.
The CBN’s Insecurity Blind Spot: Food Prices Cannot Fall When Farmers Are Running for Their Lives
One of the biggest ironies in Nigeria today is the insistence by some policymakers that food prices are “declining” or that inflation is “moderating,” even as insecurity remains the biggest structural threat to price stability.
This contradiction reveals the central tension of Nigeria’s current economic moment; the macro indicators are improving, but the real economy, especially the food system, is collapsing under insecurity.
Recently, the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) issued a stark warning that 35 million Nigerians are projected to face severe food insecurity by the 2026 lean season, which is the highest number ever recorded. Why? Because insurgent attacks are intensifying. Farmers are being killed or kidnapped. Entire communities are paying “harvest taxes” to armed groups.
Today, we witness farmers abandoning thousands of hectares of farmland. Irrigation systems, seeds, and inputs are inaccessible in conflict zones. This creates a vicious cycle as:
– insecurity reduces agricultural production,
– Reduced production pushes food prices up,
– Rising food prices fuel inflation,
– inflation erodes purchasing power,
– poverty deepens,
– insecurity worsens.
Yet the MPC communique did not mention this core driver of inflation in any meaningful way.
Instead, it continued to frame inflation as a monetary problem; something interest rates alone can fix. This is not only analytically flawed; it shows a more dangerous misdiagnosis that will prolong Nigeria’s food crisis.
The Hidden Question: Are Nigeria’s Inflation Numbers Truly Reliable?
A quiet but growing debate is emerging within the financial community about Nigeria’s inflation numbers and macroeconomic figures being massaged.
Dr. Tilewa Adebajo, CEO of CFG Advisory, put it bluntly, “Zero rate cut suggests the CBN MPC may not be totally confident in the NBS recent inflation numbers at 16 percent.”
This suspicion is not unfounded. Considering the recent realities facing the citizens, Nigerians are spending more on food than at any time in the last two generations. Staple prices such as rice, yams, garri, and beans are still high in almost every major market. Transport, rent, fuel, and electricity costs remain on the high side. Businesses report that operating expenses have not declined by any meaningful margin. Yet official inflation fell sharply to 16.05 percent.
It is mathematically difficult for headline inflation to fall significantly when food inflation, which is the most dominant component, continues to rise due to insecurity, logistics disruptions, and energy costs. This mismatch has forced many economists to ask: what exactly is being measured, and is the methodology still credible? For households already on the brink, numbers that suggest “improvement” feel not only inaccurate but insulting.
The Disconnect Between Governance and Lived Experience
This is where Nigeria’s economic narrative collapses, as the statistics may suggest progress, but households feel worse off than ever. This is why growing segments of society describe government optimism as tone-deaf.
A country cannot be “on the right path” when its citizens cannot afford rice, cannot fuel their generators, cannot pay transport fares, and cannot access credit to expand their businesses.
This disconnect exposes what many call the technocratic illusion, which is overly relying on models, spreadsheets, and monetary tenets in a country where insecurity, not excessive demand, is driving inflation. It reflects a divide between governance and reality, data and hunger, stability and survival.
Tight Monetary Policy: A Victory for Banks, a Defeat for the Real Economy
While the CBN insists that its tight stance is essential for price stability, analysts warn that the costs are becoming unbearable. Dr. Muda Yusuf argues that even a small rate cut of 25 to 50 basis points would have signaled a commitment to growth. Instead:
– Lending rates remain between 33 percent and 45 percent, suffocating SMEs.
– Credit to the private sector fell from N75.9 trillion to N72.5 trillion in just one month.
– Government borrowing is rising, crowding out real-sector lending.
– Manufacturers have cut production, citing financing conditions.
– Job creation is slowing, especially in youth-led sectors.
Banks, meanwhile, are reporting stronger margins and higher interest income. The question is no longer whether tight policy fights inflation. The question is whether Nigeria’s economy can survive its side effects.
The Naira: Stability Built on Fragile Foundations
The CBN’s main justification for maintaining the high MPR is to attract foreign portfolio investment (FPI), support the naira, and avoid destabilizing capital outflows. But this stability is fragile. FPIs are temporary “hot money.” They disappear at the slightest global shock.
Nigeria has suffered the consequences of relying on this route in 2014, 2018, 2020, and 2022. A sustainable naira requires:
– More domestic production
– Higher exports
– Better security
– Improved energy supply
– and a functional agricultural sector.
None of these received priority mention in the MPC deliberations.
The Real Test of Reform Is in People’s Lives, Not in Abuja’s Spreadsheets
Nigeria’s macroeconomic gains are being celebrated abroad. But hunger, joblessness, and despair are expanding at home. This is the irony of the current moment:
– Inflation is easing, yet hunger is rising.
– FX reserves are improving, yet insecurity is deepening.
– Subsidies are gone, yet the fiscal space they were meant to create is invisible.
– Reforms have stabilised numbers, but not people.
The World Bank’s October 2025 report warned that Nigeria’s progress means nothing if human welfare remains in decline. The success of reforms must now be measured not by GDP or FX reserves, but by how many Nigerians can afford to eat, work, and live with dignity.
A Missed Opportunity, Again
The 303rd MPC meeting should have been a turning point, a recognition that Nigeria’s inflation crisis is rooted in insecurity and supply shocks, not excess liquidity. Instead, the committee delivered technical caution, policy defensiveness, and an over-reliance on interest rate orthodoxy.
Nigeria needs a monetary policy that understands where the real crisis lies, in the abandoned farmlands, the unsafe highways, the displaced farming communities, and the markets where food prices rise weekly.
Without confronting this, Nigeria will continue to win macroeconomic battles while losing the war for human survival.
The Path Nigeria Must Chart to End Insecurity, Food Inflation, and Economic Stagnation
Nigeria’s 303rd MPC meeting made one thing clear that the country cannot escape its economic turmoil through monetary tightening alone. Interest rates cannot secure farms, rebuild supply chains, or put food on the table. What Nigeria needs now is a decisive, coordinated strategy that goes beyond the narrow lens of inflation targeting.
– First, security must become the cornerstone of price stability.
Food inflation will not recede until farmers can return to their lands without fear. A National Agro-Security Task Force merging military units, agro-rangers, police, intelligence agencies, and vetted community guards must secure farmlands and food corridors. Without safety in the agricultural belt, every other policy becomes cosmetic.
– Second, the CBN must adopt a dual mandate: price stability and growth.
Nigeria’s rigid monetary stance is suppressing credit, killing jobs, and suffocating production. Lowering the CRR to a realistic 25-30 percent and providing targeted single-digit loans to SMEs and manufacturers is essential for economic revival. Monetary policy must support growth, not stifle it.
– Third, Nigeria must rebuild trust in its economic data.
Doubts about inflation figures erode confidence. Modernizing NBS data-collection methods through digital analytics, satellite tools, and transparent audits is crucial. No country can chart a path out of crisis with unreliable statistics.
– Fourth, structural reforms must address cost-push inflation at its root.
Nigeria’s inflation is driven by high production costs despite poor roads, expensive power, weak logistics, and inefficient transport systems. Repairing agricultural roads, expanding rail freight, investing in cold-chain infrastructure, and boosting industrial power supply will reduce costs and unlock productivity.
– Fifth, the country must build an export-driven economy.
Stable exchange rates come from production, not high interest rates. Tax incentives for exporters, fully functional Special Economic Zones, and improvements in customs efficiency will help Nigeria attract stable capital and grow non-oil exports.
– Sixth, social protection must expand to shield vulnerable households.
Targeted food vouchers, transport subsidies, and school feeding programs are necessary to cushion families from economic shocks. Reform without social protection is a recipe for social unrest.
– Finally, Nigeria needs a whole-of-government Economic War Room.
Security agencies, economic ministries, the CBN, the NBS, and the private sector must collaborate in real time to track inflation drivers, coordinate responses, and prevent policy contradictions. Economic management must become proactive, not reactive.
Stability Must Translate to Human Welfare
The 303rd MPC meeting signaled caution, but what Nigeria needs is direction. It needs clarity, boldness, and policies rooted in the lived realities of millions. Monetary tightening has achieved what it can; the next phase requires confronting insecurity, energizing production, restoring data credibility, and building a growth-driven economy.
Nigeria cannot tighten its way out of this crisis. It must reform, secure, produce, and most importantly, protect its people. If not, the nation will continue to win statistical battles while losing the war for human survival.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos, can be reached via: bl***********@***il.com
By Blaise Udunze
Daily, the world watches Nigeria through a familiar lens in what appears to be a gory situation. Especially in cases when the news headlines tell stories of farmer-herder clashes, bandit attacks, kidnappings, villages reduced to ashes or deserted by the dwellers, as thousands of Nigerians have been displaced across states such as Zamfara, Plateau, Benue, Niger, Kaduna and Nasarawa. Subliminally, this is about to become a similarly ugly occurrence in southwestern Nigeria, which is fast becoming obvious if not nipped in the bud quickly.
Recorded data have shown that bandits, Boko Haram, and others killed over 190,000 Nigerians in 17 years and displaced 3.7 million people.
A human rights organisation, the International Society for Civil Liberties and Rule of Law (Intersociety), in its fearful revelation, has said that no fewer than 190,150 Nigerians have been killed by bandits, Boko Haram insurgents, and suspected armed herdsmen between July 2009 and March 19, 2026, as this calls for concern.
The dominant explanations often point to ethnic tensions, religious divisions, climate change, shrinking grazing routes or weak security institutions. No doubt, those factors are certainly part of Nigeria’s complex security crisis. Yet another question deserves serious examination.
What if, in some locations, the violence is also serving another purpose? What if some of the territories experiencing repeated displacement are the same places sitting atop some of Nigeria’s most valuable mineral deposits? More importantly, if such a pattern exists, who benefits when communities disappear?
Of a truth, these questions are uncomfortable, but undeniably they deserve careful investigation rather than dismissal.
For ages, Nigeria has been naturally endowed, and it is estimated to be rich in enormous significant reserves of gold, lithium, uranium, tin, columbite and other strategic minerals increasingly sought after in the global transition to clean energy technologies. As international demand for battery minerals continues to rise, these resources have become far more valuable than they were only a decade ago.
If one overlays publicly available geological information with maps showing persistent violence, some observers argue that striking geographical overlaps appear in several regions. Such overlaps alone cannot establish causation. Correlation is not proof of conspiracy. However, they raise questions worthy of independent scrutiny.
One issue attracting increasing attention and adequately yearns for answer is whether prolonged insecurity may inadvertently or deliberately create conditions that make mineral extraction easier.
Under Nigeria’s Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act 2007, mineral resources belong to the Federal Government, while mining rights are granted through licences and leases. Community engagement and land access are expected to form part of the licensing process, although implementation varies depending on circumstances. This raises an important policy question.
What happens when the communities expected to participate in those processes have already fled because of violence?
Displacement changes the dynamics of land ownership, consent and access. While no evidence automatically proves that attacks are orchestrated to facilitate mining, the sequence of violence followed by renewed commercial activity in some locations deserves closer examination by regulators, lawmakers and investigative journalists.
In conflict studies, researchers have long observed that wars often generate economic winners alongside humanitarian losers. Could elements of Nigeria’s insecurity also be producing economic beneficiaries?
Reports over the years have documented concerns about illegal mining operations across parts of northern Nigeria. Government agencies themselves have repeatedly acknowledged that criminal networks profit from the country’s vast mineral wealth. The unresolved question is whether isolated criminality has, in some instances, evolved into more sophisticated alliances involving political influence, financial interests and international supply chains. If so, the implications extend far beyond Nigeria.
Invariably, it is clearly known that lithium has become one of the world’s most strategic commodities, powering electric vehicle batteries and renewable energy storage systems. Gold has always remained one of the safest global investment assets during periods of uncertainty. Meanwhile, it is well confirmed that the global appetite for these minerals creates enormous financial incentives.
Suppose violent displacement reduces resistance to extraction. Suppose shell companies subsequently acquire mining interests. Suppose minerals then leave Nigeria through legitimate-looking export documentation while their true value remains understated.
These scenarios remain allegations unless supported by verifiable evidence. Yet they outline a framework that investigators may wish to test rather than ignore. Financial crime experts frequently identify trade mis-invoicing as one of the most common methods of illicit financial flows worldwide.
Could Nigeria’s solid minerals sector be vulnerable to similar practices? If valuable lithium ore is deliberately but inaccurately described as lower-value material on export documents, substantial wealth could potentially leave the country without reflecting its true market value. Likewise, if unrefined gold exits through privileged channels with limited scrutiny, questions naturally arise about oversight, transparency and accountability over criminal activities which have continued to stunt and disrupt the country’s socio-economic growth and at the same time cause carnage.
Such possibilities are not accusations against any particular institution or company. Rather, they illustrate why stronger monitoring systems are increasingly essential. Another question concerns logistics.
With the high level of criminal activities, industrial mining requires heavy machinery, diesel supplies, transportation networks and specialised personnel. These are not operations that can remain invisible indefinitely.
If certain territories are genuinely too dangerous for security agencies, how do industrial-scale extraction activities reportedly continue in some remote locations? If they do, who protects those operations? Who authorises their movement? Who verifies what is extracted? Who ensures royalties and export revenues reach public coffers? These are governance questions that demand institutional answers.
Equally important is the international dimension. Minerals extracted in Nigeria ultimately enter global supply chains. Gold may pass through international refining hubs before entering financial markets. Lithium may become part of battery manufacturing destined for electric vehicles, which are being sold across Europe, North America and Asia.
One known fact is that consumers purchasing products containing these minerals rarely know the full story of where they originated.
Increasingly, however, investors and governments are demanding ethical sourcing standards that trace minerals from extraction to final manufacture.
A critical factor that must be taken into cognisance is that if insecurity is creating opportunities for illegal or unethical extraction anywhere in the world, multinational companies have responsibilities alongside national governments, of which the onus falls on the Nigerian government.
Transparency cannot stop at the mine gate. Nor should accountability end at national borders. Another issue requiring attention concerns beneficial ownership.
Across many jurisdictions, shell companies can obscure the identities of individuals ultimately controlling commercial assets. If politically exposed persons or powerful business interests are hidden behind complex corporate structures registered offshore, identifying beneficiaries becomes significantly more difficult. This challenge is hardly unique to Nigeria.
Findings showed that from Latin America to Central Africa and Southeast Asia, resistant corporate networks have frequently complicated efforts to combat corruption and illicit resource extraction. That is precisely why open corporate registries, beneficial ownership databases and transparent mining licence disclosures are becoming global governance priorities. For Nigeria, the stakes could hardly be higher.
The country stands at the centre of the world’s emerging critical minerals economy. The Nigerian government can’t feign ignorance of the fact that, when handled transparently, these resources could finance infrastructure, education, healthcare, and industrial development for generations.
In no way would the government claim not knowing that when handled poorly, they risk becoming another chapter in the well-documented “resource curse,” where extraordinary natural wealth coincides with persistent poverty, insecurity and institutional weakness.
The ultimate challenge, therefore, is not simply about mining. It is about governance. It is about whether public institutions possess both the independence and capacity to ensure that natural resources benefit citizens rather than narrow interests. It is about whether conflict zones receive genuine peacebuilding efforts instead of becoming forgotten frontiers. And it is about whether international markets demand accountability with the same enthusiasm they demand raw materials.
None of these questions should be answered through speculation. They require rigorous investigations, forensic financial analysis, satellite imagery, mining license audits, customs records, beneficial ownership disclosures and courageous journalism.
They require governments willing to open their books. They require international cooperation capable of tracing money across borders. Most importantly, they require asking questions that have too often remained unasked.
Perhaps Nigeria’s security crisis is exactly what it appears to be: a tragic convergence of historical grievances, weak institutions, criminality and environmental pressures. Or perhaps, in some places, another layer of economic incentive deserves closer scrutiny.
Until those questions are thoroughly investigated, one possibility will continue to linger. Maybe the world’s attention has been fixed on the blood spilt above ground, while too little attention has been paid to the extraordinary wealth lying beneath it.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: bl***********@***il.com
Feature/OPED
What Does Nigeria’s $51bn Reserves Milestone Mean if Most New Foreign Money Can Leave Quickly?
Nigeria’s foreign reserves have climbed to about $51 billion, a decade-plus high, according to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). EBC Financial Group (EBC) notes that this reflects stronger investor confidence, but the second half may show whether it holds, as the build rests on three cyclical drivers: oil earnings, short-term foreign money and a narrowing official-to-street naira gap.
Reserves rose from about $32 billion in April 2024, during a dollar shortage, to about $51 billion now, near the CBN’s target. Much came from two cyclical sources, strong oil earnings and money chasing high-yielding naira assets, so EBC expects the pace to slow or reverse. Fitch Ratings, a major international credit rating agency, expects a marginal decline to about $47 billion by the end of 2026, citing higher spending and external pressures.
David Precious, Senior Market Analyst at EBC Financial Group, said, “Nigeria’s reserve build is real but may not be durable yet, because nearly all of the new money is the kind that can leave quickly. Of the $10.37 billion that came in over the first quarter, the overwhelming majority was short-term portfolio funds rather than long-term investment, so a shift in oil prices, global interest rates or confidence in the naira might pull a large part of it straight back out.”
Most New Money Can Still Leave Quickly
The composition of the foreign inflows explains the caution over how long the build can last. The country attracted $10.37 billion in foreign investment in the first quarter of 2026, up 83.83 per cent year-on-year, according to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Of that, $9.86 billion or 95.09 per cent, was portfolio money, largely short-term naira debt such as Treasury bills that investors can sell at the next auction, while foreign direct investment, the long-term kind that builds factories and jobs, was $135.08 million, or 1.30 per cent. Put simply, of each dollar coming in, about 95 cents can leave quickly, and barely one cent stays.
That money supports reserves while it stays. Dollars brought in to buy naira assets add to market supply, letting the CBN hold more reserves and steady the naira. It leaves when conditions change. Nigeria earns most of its export dollars from oil and gas, so lower oil prices mean fewer dollars, and as a member of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), it cannot simply produce more, output capped by quota and reduced by theft and ageing fields. Higher global interest rates draw money toward safer returns abroad, and a weakening naira prompts investors to sell early. When oil fell in 2016 and 2020, foreign investors withdrew and could not convert naira to dollars as supply dried up, leaving the CBN to clear more than $7 billion in trapped obligations into 2024.
The Oil Boost is No Longer Certain
Oil looked like a dependable source of the dollars behind the reserves only months ago. Earlier in 2026, concern over disruption around the Strait of Hormuz lifted crude prices, and stronger receipts flowed in, with crude oil export earnings of $8.11 billion in the first quarter in the CBN’s balance-of-payments data. That support is now easing. The tension has subsided, and Brent traded near $72 on June 29, down about 24 per cent over the month, back to pre-conflict levels. With the price boost gone and output constrained, reserves are more exposed, leaning on non-oil earnings and investor patience rather than oil.
The Naira Still Trades at Two Prices
The naira has traded at two prices, an official rate and a higher parallel-market rate, and closing that gap into one trusted price is what many investors might watch most. Before committing funds, they may want assurance they can convert naira to dollars at a fair rate when they exit, and a wide gap revives the fear of being trapped that lingers from earlier shortages. The gap has narrowed to roughly N20 to N30, with the CBN’s official rate near N1,380 per dollar on June 26 against parallel-market quotes around N1,400. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2026 Article IV review urged Nigeria to depend less on this fast-moving portfolio money and to keep phasing out its multiple exchange-rate practices. The CBN’s Foreign Exchange Manual, in force from 1 June, is intended to make the market clearer, though such rules build confidence only once investors can freely trade dollars at the posted rate.
What could Make the Build Durable
A few signs that may show the build turning durable include a smaller gap between the official and street naira rates, more long-term foreign investment, and steadier oil earnings. A gap that stays small, now roughly N20 to N30, may mean investors trust the official rate and no longer need the street market. A clear rise in foreign direct investment, only $135 million last quarter against $9.86 billion of short-term money, might mean lasting capital is replacing funds that can leave at the next auction. Oil earnings that hold up, rather than sliding from the low $70s, should help keep reserves steady, since oil and gas bring in most of Nigeria’s export dollars.
“Reserves built on money chasing high yields can fall as fast as they rose, as they did after the last two oil shocks, when investors left, and the CBN spent years clearing a foreign-exchange backlog,” Precious added. “What holds through a downturn is slower money, direct investment, steady oil and non-oil export earnings and one credible naira rate, and that is the shift Nigeria has yet to make.”
By Olajumoke Bello
Across Nigeria, small and medium enterprises remain the backbone of economic activity. They drive trade, create jobs, and sustain millions of livelihoods. Yet, despite their importance, many SMEs continue to operate below their full potential due to persistent structural challenges.
Access to finance remains one of the most cited constraints. However, the issue today goes beyond the availability of capital. Many businesses struggle with financial readiness, weak documentation, and limited understanding of what lenders require. This often leads to missed opportunities, even when funding options exist.
At the same time, SMEs face gaps in market access and visibility. Business owners operate in highly localised environments, with limited exposure to broader networks that can unlock partnerships, new markets, and growth opportunities. This isolation can constrain scalability and reduce long-term competitiveness.
Equally important is the capability gap. Many entrepreneurs grow through resilience and experience but lack structured knowledge on critical areas such as financial management, export readiness, and digital adoption. Without this, even well-capitalised businesses can struggle to sustain growth.
These challenges point to a clear need for a more practical and integrated approach to SME support. It is no longer sufficient to offer standalone solutions. SMEs require ecosystems that combine knowledge, access, and direct engagement in ways that reflect how they actually operate.
A key shift is the move from centralised interventions to localised engagement. SMEs are deeply influenced by their immediate environments, whether markets, industrial clusters, or trade corridors. Solutions must therefore be brought closer to where these businesses function, allowing for more relevant support and stronger relationships.
Another important shift is from awareness to action. Business owners do not only need information; they need insights that they can apply immediately. This includes understanding how to structure their finances, how to access trade opportunities, and how to connect with the right partners to scale their operations.
There is also a growing need for continuity. Many SME-focused initiatives deliver strong initial impact but lack follow-through. For support to be effective, it must extend beyond one-off engagements into sustained relationships, with clear pathways for onboarding, advisory, and growth.
For financial institutions, this presents both responsibility and an opportunity. Supporting SMEs now requires moving beyond transactional banking to deeper partnership models. It requires understanding businesses at a granular level and co-creating solutions that evolve with their needs.
At Stanbic IBTC, this perspective continues to shape our approach to SME development. Our focus is on delivering practical support that translates into real business outcomes, helping enterprises grow, compete, and contribute more meaningfully to the economy.
As part of this commitment, we are extending our SME engagement to the regions through the Nigeria Business Summit Regional Tour. The tour will take structured, on-ground activations into key commercial hubs, where SMEs can access funding guidance, trade insights, advisory support, and direct engagement with financial experts.
The regional tour will take place across five strategic locations, bringing these solutions closer to business owners in Aba, Onitsha, Ibadan and Kano.
This approach reflects an important principle. When support moves closer to businesses and when solutions are delivered in ways that are practical and continuous, SMEs are better positioned to grow sustainably. In turn, this strengthens not only individual enterprises but the broader economy.
Olajumoke Bello is the Head of Enterprise Banking at Stanbic IBTC Bank
