Feature/OPED
Dangote, the Congo Plant and the Imperative of African Industrialization
By Ehiedu Iweriebor
The Dangote Group of Nigeria, one of the pre-eminent industrial conglomerates in Africa, in pursuit of its pan-African development and emancipation strategy, on November 23, 2017 formally launched its newest economic development industrial project, the Dangote Cement plant in Mfila, in Congo-Brazzaville.
With this $300 million, 1.5 million metric tonne per annum plant, the Group now has a presence in ten of the 17 countries in which it plans to construct and expand cement plans.
While it had to re-calibrate the pace and timing of its earlier ambitious plans to complete its various planned plants at an earlier date, because of the economic down turn in Nigeria from 2014, the completion of the Congo plant indicates that the Group’s Pan-African cement plant’s expansion and new plants’ construction programme is still very much on course even though the pace of completion is now staggered over a longer time frame.
This new plant, as an industrial project will have direct and indirect benefits in Congo-Brazzaville that domestic resource-based industrial projects plants usually generate. It is expected to provide at least 1,000 direct jobs and numerous other employment opportunities that will be stimulated by its presence.
For example, other sectors that will be stimulated include the following: expansion of local civil and housing construction projects by state and private builders; expansion of cement block makers; the establishment of a transportation fleet for the distribution of the cement and the employment of drivers, conductors and mechanics for the trucks; the expanded use of fuel; the emergence of small and medium scale cement distributors and even big distribution companies and workers and new sale stores; banks, food suppliers and sellers of small dry goods and items.
In short, the impact of this plant will be the progressive creation of new economic activities and employment opportunities. From these new economic activities the Congolese state, the local government and community authorities will derive Internally Generated Revenues (IGR) that did not previously exist.
The various speeches at the launching of the Congo-Brazzaville plant highlighted the economic development significance and prospective impact of this this massive industrial project. President Denis Sassou Nguesso of Congo-Brazzaville, noted that the plant was the biggest industrial plant in the country and the investment represented an industrial revolution within the regional group – Economic Community of Central African States.
He noted that from their assessment of the impact of Dangote cement plants in other countries, they had always stimulated multiplier effects through the promotion of complementary and cognate industries and hoped that similar multiple direct and indirect effects will happen in the country.
He also noted the timeliness of the take-off of the plant as a contributor to state revenues at a time when his government’s revenues had precipitously declined by 31.3 percent and oil sector revenues had also declined by 65.1 due to the fall in oil prices.
Clearly, the Congo-Brazzaville government appreciates the investment, presence and impact of the Dangote cement plant.
In his own address, the Nigerian President, Muhammadu Buhari, affirmed that Aliko Dangote and the Dangote Group by their pan-African investments had emerged as “worthy Ambassadors” of the country.
He highlighted the various areas in which the Dangote Group had through its massive investments in the cement sector changed the course of Nigeria’s economic history. These include the provision of a key material for infrastructure development, the introduction of road construction with cement, the pursuit of expansion through backward integration and import substitution and the achievement of national self-sufficiency in cement availability and the contributions to savings of over $2 billion annually from the termination of dependency through importation.
Aliko Dangote, President of the Dangote Group, in his address, articulated the significance of the plant in terms of timely completion, its contribution of widespread availability of affordable cement, the plant’s contribution to the country’s expanded cement production capacity in excess of current demand and the consequence of reducing dependency on cement importation. He also noted that the plant will contribute to the country’s economic renaissance through foreign exchange conservation, employment generation, infrastructure expansion and multiple economic activities.
Dangote graciously and gratefully highlighted the strong and dedicated support provided by the government and people of Congo-Brazzaville from project’s conception to completion. Partly in pursuit of the Group’s philosophy and strategy of Corporate Social Responsibility, the Group was implementing several social projects including school construction, provision of scholarships, renovation of a hospital, road construction and bridge renovation. It also affirmed its company’s policy and commitment to give priority in employment to indigenes of the area of the plant’s location.
The various addresses highlighted the great economic impact of the Dangote’s chosen investments in cement production. But they did not often directly and fully underscore the actual primary sources of its revolutionary impact as a specific type of non-dependent industrial project with its inherent catalytic consequences. That is that they are resource-based industrial plants whose productions are based on the exploitation and processing of a local resource.
In short, the reasons for the great impact of these projects is that unlike the more common, attractive and lucrative arenas of foreign direct investment (FDI) such as extractive, wasting and non-development sectors like mineral and mining sectors and enclave assembly plant industries that are unconnected to the local economic environment, Dangote chose a different trajectory.
The Dangote Group’s choice of resource-based industrialization based on a comprehensive backward integration strategy as the primary pathway and its contribution to African self-actuated and self-directed economic development, prosperity generation, transformation and emancipation is developmentally apt, strategic and fecund.
This can best be understood within the perspective of Africa’s greatest failure in the post-independence era: economic development. This has been due to the failure to create and apply an autonomous economic philosophy and strategy of self-actuated development based on the well-established principles of endogenous technology capacitation and industrialization.
On the contrary, African states and leaders at independence chose the maintenance of the inherited colonial economy, and in the neo-colonial framework of the times, the focus became the expansion of the production and export of raw materials: agricultural and mineral; the mass importation of consumer goods, intermediate goods and capital goods. This entailed the corresponding non-domestication of the historically established levers of development levers: the productive forces – technology and industrialization and equally importantly the ideological premise of development: the psychologically disposition, political will and activated self-agency for self-actuated and self-reliant development that is imperative to any successful development.
The result of this failure of the inherited and non-development neo-colonial economic system and strategy has been the condition of growth without development characterized by the persistence of underdevelopment, expanded dependency and poverty generation. The fact is that no African state since independence from the 1950s has been able to establish and sustain a philosophy, policy and strategy of self-actuated development and secure domestic prosperity generation.
This economic development failure was aggravated by the largely successful recolonization of African economic development objectives, policies, strategies and programmes in the 1980s through the acceptance, imposition and implementation of the Multilateral imperialist agencies – World Bank and International Monetary Fund(IMF) – non-development dogmas embodied in their Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) by the African leadership and states. Based on the unproven and unvarying dogmas called conditionalities: currency devaluation, trade liberalization, removal of subsidies, deregulation and privatization, they were not intended in any way to address the core causes of the balance of payments crisis of African economies of the late 1970s and early 1980s, that is African countries development incapacitation, raw material exports, dependency, mass importation, non-industrialization, under-production and poverty generation.
It was the African leaders’ inability or unwillingness to identify and address these fundamental issues and their preference for pre-packaged supposedly neutral external “expert technical” solutions that led them as supplicants to these neo-imperialist agencies.
The substantive objective of these imperialist agencies was to forcefully return the incrementally economically self-directed African states back into the conditions economic colonialism with its exclusive focus on primary commodities (raw materials) production and export and dependency on importation of all manufactured goods.
Furthermore, the World Bank and IMF also wanted to effect the removal of African states’ as promoters and activators of economic and social development especially freedom conferring industrialization through the cession of development responsibility by privatization to the undeveloped and dependent local capitalist groups; but more consequentially to foreigners through the fetish of foreign Direct Investments (FDI) as the new promoters of African “economic development.”
But the FDI fetish is a dangerously misleading dogma of non-development: it misdirects, misrepresents and disarms societies and leaderships from ownership and responsibility for the philosophy, objectives and strategies for their own societies’ development.
The ability of external forces to inflict these damaging, disruptive and painful consequences of neo-colonial economic failure and their expression in persistent underdevelopment, dependency, underproduction, poverty, beggarliness, humiliation and indignity on Africans, has been possible due to active and direct complicity of much of African leaderships’ and elite who were successfully programmed to marginalize African agency and responsibility for its own development. These African elite enthroned and accepted foreign diktat, policies and programmes as inescapable for African development.
Yet, this situation of the subservience and servility of the psychologically programmed African leadership, elite, intelligentsia has not been uniformly one-dimensional.
Not all African leaderships, elite, intelligentsia, business people, bureaucrats and technocrats have supinely conceded to Africa’s surrender, submission and acquiescence to conditions permanent underdevelopment and cession of self-responsibility for development to others.
Some among these were patriotic elite and leaderships who came to the ineluctable and correct conclusion that Africa can only enter into the state of freedom, dignified existence and a prosperous world by the pro-active choice and creation of its own philosophy and strategy of self-actuated development.
This new development strategy will comprise the assumption of responsibility; the centrality of African agency; technological capacitation; modernization of all productive forces including agriculture and mineral production but above all the relentless pursuit of mass industrialization and mass production as the indisputable pathway and proven expressions of societal self-modernization in the contemporary world.
In the African business world today, it can be said without equivocation that Dangote and the Dangote Group has been and is in the vanguard of the promotion African self-development through resource based development capacitation; backward integration and genuine import substitution; radical reduction of import dependency for consumer goods and industrial inputs; mass industrialization, mass production and in-country and incontinent prosperity generation.
The expansive range of the industrial products of the Dangote Group beyond cement; and including food and agro industry: sugar, salt, tomato, rice, pasta, milk, flour; poly products and heavy industry like motor vehicles, coal mining and processing, refined petroleum, fertilizer and petrochemicals all attest to the promoter and Group’s understanding of the centrality of industrialization to genuine economic diversification and successful societal development and advancement.
The opening of the Congo cement plant within the Dangote Group’s pan-African industrial development strategy and its multiplier effects, creation of diverse employment opportunities and in-country prosperity generation, all attests to the Group’s contribution economic development and empowerment, and re-dignifying of Africans through the single-minded commitment to economic advancement through industrialization.
What is now required of African states, leaderships, technocratic and bureaucratic elite and business leaders and intelligentsia is following Dangote’s example, to prioritize technological capacitation and industrialization as the indisputable foundations and pathways for the project of Africa’s self-conceived, self-directed, self-funded and self-actuated and non-dependent programme of radical economic transformation and renaissance in the modern era. Only liberated African peoples, states and leaders can create this made in Africa – Africa by Africans for Africans and the world.
Ehiedu Iweriebor is a Professor, Department of Africana and Puerto Rican/Latino Studies, Hunter College, City University of New York, USA.
By Blaise Udunze
Nigeria’s refining crisis is one of the country’s most enduring economic contradictions. Africa’s largest crude oil producer, strategically located on the Atlantic coast and home to over 200 million people, has for decades depended on imported refined petroleum products. This illogicality has drained foreign exchange, weakened the naira, distorted investment incentives, and hollowed out state institutions. Instead of catalysing industrialisation, Nigeria’s oil wealth became a mechanism for capital flight, rent-seeking, and institutional decay.
With the challenges surrounding the refining of crude oil, the establishment of Dangote Refinery signifies an important historic moment. The refinery promises to reduce fuel imports to a bare minimum, sustain foreign exchange growth, ensure there is constant fuel domestically, and strategically position Nigeria as a regional exporter of refined oil products if functioned at full capacity. Dangote Refinery symbolises what private capital, technology, and ambition can achieve in Africa following years of fuel queues, subsidy scandals, and global embarrassment.
Nigerians must have a rethink in the cause of celebration. Nigeria’s refining problem is not simply about capacity; it is about systems. Without addressing the policy failures and institutional weaknesses that made Dangote an exception rather than the rule, the country risks replacing one failure with another, this time cloaked in private-sector success.
For a fact, Nigeria desperately needs the emergence of Dangote refinery, and its success is in the national interest. Hence, this is not an argument against the Dangote Refinery. But history warns that structural failures are not solved by scale alone. Over the year, situations have shown that without competition and strong institutions, concentrated market power, whether public or private, can undermine price stability, energy security, and consumer welfare.
The Long Silence of Refinery Investments
Perhaps the most troubling question in Nigeria’s oil history is why none of the global oil majors like Shell, ExxonMobil, Chevron, Total, or Agip has built a major refinery in Nigeria for over four decades. These companies operated profitably in Nigeria, extracted their crude, and sold refined products back to the country, yet never committed capital to domestic refining.
Over the period, it has been shown that policy incoherence has been the cause, not a matter of technical incapacity, such as price controls, resistant licensing processes, subsidy arrears, frequent regulatory changes, and political interference, which made refining an unattractive investment. Importation, by contrast, offered quick returns, lower political risk, and guaranteed margins, often backed by government subsidies.
Nigeria carelessly designed a system that rather rewarded importers and punished refiners. Dangote did not succeed because the system improved; he succeeded despite it. His refinery exists largely because of the concessions from the government, exceptional financial capacity, political access, and a willingness to absorb risks that institutions should ordinarily mitigate. This raises a deeper concern; when institutions fail, progress becomes dependent on extraordinary individuals rather than predictable systems.
The Tragedy of NNPC Refineries
If private investors stayed away, Nigeria’s state-owned refineries should have filled the gap. Instead, the Port Harcourt, Warri, and Kaduna refineries became monuments to mismanagement. Records have shown that between 2010 and 2025, Nigeria reportedly wasted between $18 billion and $25 billion, over N11 trillion, just for Turn Around Maintenance and rehabilitation. Kaduna Refinery alone is estimated to have consumed over N2.2 trillion in a decade.
Despite these expenditures, output remained negligible. This was not merely a technical failure but a governance one. Contracts were poorly monitored, accountability was absent, and consequences were nonexistent. In functional systems, such outcomes trigger investigations, sanctions, and reforms. In Nigeria, the cycle simply repeated itself, eroding public trust and deepening dependence on imports.
Where Is BUA?
Dangote is not the only Nigerian conglomerate to announce refinery ambitions. In 2020, BUA Group unveiled plans for a 200,000-barrels-per-day refinery. Years later, progress remains unclear, timelines have shifted, and execution appears stalled.
This pattern is revealing. When multiple large investors struggle to translate plans into reality, the issue is not ambition but environment. Refinery projects in Nigeria appear viable only at a massive scale and with extraordinary political leverage. Smaller or mid-sized players are effectively crowded out, not by market forces, but by systemic dysfunction.
Policy Failure and the Singapore Comparison
Nigeria often aspires to emulate Singapore’s refining and petrochemical success. The comparison is instructive. Singapore has no crude oil, yet built one of the world’s most sophisticated refining hubs through consistent policy, investor protection, infrastructure planning, and regulatory certainty.
Nigeria chose a different path: price controls, subsidies, weak contract enforcement, and politically motivated policy reversals. Refineries became tools of patronage rather than productivity. Capital exited, infrastructure decayed, and import dependence deepened. The outcome was predictable.
The Cost of Import Dependence
For years, Nigeria spent billions of dollars annually importing petrol, diesel, and aviation fuel. This placed constant pressure on foreign reserves and the naira. Petrol subsidies alone were estimated at N4-N6 trillion per year, often exceeding national spending on health, education, or infrastructure.
Even after subsidy removal, legacy costs remain: distorted consumption patterns, weakened public finances, and entrenched interests built around importation. These interests did not disappear quietly.
Who Really Benefited from the Subsidy?
Although framed as pro-poor, fuel subsidies disproportionately benefited importers, traders, shipping firms, depot owners, financiers, and politically connected intermediaries. Smuggling across borders meant Nigerians subsidised fuel consumption in neighbouring countries.
Ordinary citizens received marginal relief at the pump but paid far more through inflation, deteriorating infrastructure, and underfunded public services. The subsidy system functioned less as social protection and more as elite redistribution.
The Traders’ Dilemma
Why did major fuel marketers like Oando invest in refineries abroad but not in Nigeria? Again, incentives explain behaviour. Importation offered faster returns, lower capital requirements, and political insulation. Domestic refining demanded long-term investment under unstable rules.
In an irrational system, rational actors optimise accordingly. Importation thrived not because it was efficient, but because policy made it so.
FDI and the Confidence Problem
Sustainable Foreign Direct Investment follows domestic confidence. When local investors, who best understand political and regulatory risks, avoid long-term industrial projects, foreign investors take note. Capital flows to environments with predictable pricing, rule of law, and policy consistency.
Nigeria’s challenge is not attracting speculative capital, but building conditions for patient, productive investment.
Dangote and the Monopoly Question
Dangote Refinery deserves credit. But scale brings power, and power demands oversight. If importers exit and no competing refineries emerge, Dangote could dominate refining, pricing, and supply. Nigeria’s experience with cement, where domestic production rose but prices soared due to limited competition, offers a cautionary tale.
Markets function best with competition. Without it, price manipulation, supply risks, and weakened energy security become real dangers, especially in countries with fragile regulatory institutions.
The Way Forward: Competition, Not Replacement
Nigeria does not need to weaken Dangote; it needs to multiply Dangotes. The goal should be a competitive refining ecosystem, not a replacement of a public monopoly with a private monopoly.
This requires transparent crude allocation, open access to pipelines and storage, fair pricing mechanisms, and strong antitrust enforcement. State refineries must either be professionally concessional or decisively restructured. Stalled projects like BUA’s should be unblocked, and modular refineries should be supported.
The Litmus Test
Nigeria’s refining crisis was decades in the making and cannot be solved by one refinery, however large. Dangote Refinery is a turning point, but only if embedded within systemic reform. Otherwise, Nigeria risks trading one form of dependency for another.
The true test is not whether Nigeria can refine fuel, but whether it can build fair, open, and resilient institutions that serve the public interest. In refining, as in democracy, excessive concentration of power is dangerous. Competition remains the strongest safeguard.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: [email protected]
By Linda Saunders
Intro: In many small businesses, the owner often starts out as the bookkeeper, the customer-service desk, the IT technician and the person who steps in when a delivery goes wrong. With so many balls up in the air – and such little room for error – one dropped ball can derail the entire day and trigger a chain of problems that’s hard to recover from. Unlike larger companies that have the luxury of spreading the load across dedicated teams and systems, SMEs carry it all on a few shoulders.
South Africa’s SME sector carries significant weight, contributing around 19% of GDP and a third of formal employment, according to the latest available Trade & Industrial Policy Strategies (TIPS) 2024 review. That is causing persistent constraints, including tight margins, erratic demand, high administrative load, and limited internal capacity.
This is not unique to South Africa. Many smaller businesses across the continent still rely on manual processes. It is common to find sales records kept separately from customer notes, or inventory data that is updated only occasionally. The result is slow turnaround times, duplicated effort and a lack of visibility across the business. Given that SMEs have such a huge influence on national economies, accounting for over 90% of all businesses, between 20-40% of GDP in some African countries, and a major source of employment, providing around 80% of jobs, these operational constraints have a broad impact on economies.
What has changed in recent years is that digital tools once seen as the preserve of larger companies have become more attainable for smaller operators. They do not remove the structural challenges SMEs face, but they can ease the load. Better systems do not replace judgement, experience or customer relationships; they simply give small companies more room to work with.
Cloud-based systems, automation and integrated customer-management tools have become more affordable and easier to deploy. They do not remove the structural pressures facing small businesses, but they can ease the operational load and create more space for productive work.
Doing more with the teams SMEs already have
Small teams often end up wearing several hats. One person might take customer calls, update stock records, handle service issues and manage follow-ups. When demand rises, these manual processes become harder to sustain. Local surveys regularly point to this strain, showing that smaller companies spend significant portions of the week on paperwork, compliance and routine administrative tasks – work that adds little value but cannot be ignored.
This is where automation is proving useful. Routine tasks such as onboarding new customers, checking documents, routing queries to the right person, logging interactions and sending follow-ups can now run quietly in the background. In larger companies, whole departments handle this work. In small businesses, the same burden has traditionally fallen on one or two people. When these processes run reliably without constant attention, a business with 10 employees can manage busier periods without rushed outsourcing or slipping service standards.
The point is not to replace staff, but to reduce the operational drag that limits what small teams can deliver. Structured workflows give SMEs a level of steadiness they have rarely had the time or money to build themselves.
Using better data to make better decisions
A second constraint facing SMEs is disorganised information. When customer details are lost in email, sales notes in chat groups, stock figures in spreadsheets and queries in separate systems, decisions depend on whatever information happens to be at hand. Forecasting becomes guesswork, and early warning signs are easy to miss.
Putting all this information in a single place changes the quality of decision-making. When sales, service and stock data can be viewed together, patterns become easier to spot: which products are moving, which customers are becoming less active, where delays tend to occur, and which periods consistently drive higher demand.
Importantly, SMEs do not need corporate analytics teams for this. Modern CRM platforms can organise information automatically and surface basic trends. For retailers preparing for 2026, this can help avoid over – or under – stocking. For service businesses, it can highlight customers who may be at risk of leaving, prompting earlier intervention. In competitive markets, having clearer information is a practical advantage.
Building a foundation before the pressure arrives
Rapid growth can be as destabilising for SMEs as an economic downturn. When orders increase, manual processes quickly reach their limit. Errors are more likely, staff become overwhelmed and the customer experience suffers. Many small businesses only upgrade their systems once these problems appear, by which time the cost, both financial and reputational, is already significant.
Putting basic workflow tools and a unified customer record in place early provides a useful buffer. Tasks follow the same steps every time, reducing inconsistency. Customers reach the right person more quickly. Staff spend less time checking or re-entering information and more time on work that matters. These small operational gains compound over time, especially during busy periods.
This is not about chasing every new technology. It is about avoiding a common pattern in the SME sector: when demand rises, systems buckle, and growth becomes more difficult.
Confidence matters as much as capability
Smaller companies understandably worry about risk when adopting new systems. Data protection, monitoring, and compliance can feel daunting without an IT department. The advantage of modern platforms is that many of these protections, like encryption, audit trails, and event monitoring, are built in. Transparent design also helps SMEs understand how automated decisions are made and how customer data is handled.
This reassurance is important because SMEs should not have to choose between improving their operations and protecting their customers’ information.
2026 will reward readiness
Technology will not replace the qualities that give SMEs their edge: personal service, flexibility, and the ability to respond quickly to customer needs. What it can do is relieve the administrative load that prevents those strengths from being fully used.
SMEs that invest in simple automation and better data practices now will enter 2026 with greater capacity and clearer insight. They won’t be competing with larger companies by matching their resources, but by removing the disadvantages that have traditionally held them back.
In the year ahead, the most competitive businesses will not be the biggest; they’ll be the ones that prepared early for the year ahead.
Linda Saunders is the Country Manager & Senior Director Solution Engineering for Africa at Salesforce
By Cyprian Rono
Africa’s quest to trade with itself has never been more urgent. With the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) gaining momentum, governments are working to deepen intra-African commerce. The idea of “One African Market” is no longer aspirational; it is emerging as a strategic pathway for economic growth, job creation, and industrial competitiveness. Yet even as infrastructure and regulatory reforms advance, one fundamental question remains; how will Africa finance its cross-border trade, across markets with diverse currencies, regulations, and standards?
Today, only 15 to 18 percent of Africa’s internal trade happens within the continent, compared to 68 percent in Europe and 59 percent in Asia. Closing this gap is essential if AfCFTA is to deliver prosperity to Africa’s 1.3 billion people.
A major constraint is the continent’s huge trade finance deficit, which exceeds USD 81 billion annually, according to the African Development Bank. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which provide more than 80 percent of the continent’s jobs, are the most affected. Many struggle with insufficient collateral, stringent risk profiling and compliance requirements that mirror international banking standards rather than the realities of African business.
To build integrated value chains, exporters and importers must operate within trusted, predictable, and interconnected financial systems. This requires strong pan-African financial institutions with both local knowledge and continental reach.
Homegrown trade finance is therefore indispensable. Pan-African banks combine deep domestic roots with extensive regional reach, making them the most credible engines for financing trade integration. By retaining financial activity within the continent, homegrown lenders reduce exposure to external shocks and keep liquidity circulating locally. They also strengthen existing regional payment infrastructure such as the Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS), developed by the Africa Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) and backed by the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Secretariat, enabling faster, cheaper and seamless cross-border payments across the continent.
Digital transformation amplifies this advantage. Real-time payments, seamless Know-Your-Customer (KYC) verification, automated credit scoring and consistent service delivery across markets are essential for intra-African trade. Institutions such as Ecobank, operating in 34 African countries with integrated core banking systems, demonstrate how such digital ecosystems can enable continent-wide commerce.
Platforms such as Ecobank’s Omni, Rapidtransfer and RapidCollect, together with digital account-opening services, make it much easier for traders to operate across borders. Rapidtransfer enables instant, secure payments across Ecobank’s 34-country network, reducing delays in regional trade, while RapidCollect gives cross-border enterprises the ability to receive payments from multiple African countries into a single account with real-time confirmation and automated reconciliation. Together, these solutions create an integrated digital ecosystem that lowers friction, accelerates payments, and strengthens intra-African commerce.
Trust, however, remains a significant barrier. Cross-border commerce depends on the confidence that partners will honour contracts, deliver goods as promised, pay on time, and present authentic documentation. Traders often lack reliable information on potential partners, operate under different regulatory regimes, and exchange documents that are difficult to verify across borders. This heightens the risk of fraud, non-payment, and contractual disputes, discouraging businesss from expanding beyond familiar markets.
Technology is closing this trust gap. Artificial Intelligence enables lenders to assess risk using alternative data for SMEs without formal credit histories. Distributed ledger tools make shipping documents, certificates of origin, and inspection reports tamper-proof. In addition, supply-chain visibility platforms enable real-time tracking of goods and cross-border digital KYC ensures that both buyers and sellers are verified before any transaction occurs.
Ecobank’s Single Trade Hub embodies this trust infrastructure by offering a secure digital marketplace where buyers and sellers can trade with confidence, even in markets where no prior relationships exist. The platform’s Trade Intelligence suite provides customers instant access to market data from customs information and product classification tools across 133 countries.
Through its unique features such as the classification of best import/export markets, over 25,000 market and industry reports, customs duty calculators, and local and universal customs classification codes, businesses can accurately assess market opportunities, anticipate trends, reduce compliance risks, and optimise supply chains, ultimately helping them compete and grow in regional and global markets.
SMEs need more than financing. Many operate in cash-heavy cycles where suppliers and logistics providers require upfront payment. Lenders can support these businesses with advisory services, business intelligence, compliance guidance, and platforms for secure partner verification, contract negotiation, and secure settlement of payments. Trade fairs, industry forums, and partnerships with chambers of commerce further build the trust networks needed for cross-border trade.
Ultimately, Africa’s path toward meaningful trade integration begins with financial integration. AfCFTA’s promise will only be realised when enterprises can trade with confidence, knowing that payments will be honoured, partners verified, and disputes resolved. This requires collaboration between banks, regulators, and trade institutions, alongside harmonised financial regulations, interoperable payment systems, and continent-wide verification networks.
Africa can no longer rely on external actors to finance its trade. Its economic transformation depends on strong, trusted, and digitally enabled African financial institutions that understand Africa’s unique risks and opportunities. By building an African-led trade finance ecosystem, the continent can unlock liquidity, reduce dependence on external currencies, empower SMEs, and retain more value locally. Africa’s trade revolution will accelerate when its financing is driven by African institutions, African systems, and African ambition.
Cyprian Rono is the Director of Corporate and Investment Banking for Kenya and EAC at Ecobank Kenya
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