Feature/OPED
Dangote, the Congo Plant and the Imperative of African Industrialization
By Ehiedu Iweriebor
The Dangote Group of Nigeria, one of the pre-eminent industrial conglomerates in Africa, in pursuit of its pan-African development and emancipation strategy, on November 23, 2017 formally launched its newest economic development industrial project, the Dangote Cement plant in Mfila, in Congo-Brazzaville.
With this $300 million, 1.5 million metric tonne per annum plant, the Group now has a presence in ten of the 17 countries in which it plans to construct and expand cement plans.
While it had to re-calibrate the pace and timing of its earlier ambitious plans to complete its various planned plants at an earlier date, because of the economic down turn in Nigeria from 2014, the completion of the Congo plant indicates that the Group’s Pan-African cement plant’s expansion and new plants’ construction programme is still very much on course even though the pace of completion is now staggered over a longer time frame.
This new plant, as an industrial project will have direct and indirect benefits in Congo-Brazzaville that domestic resource-based industrial projects plants usually generate. It is expected to provide at least 1,000 direct jobs and numerous other employment opportunities that will be stimulated by its presence.
For example, other sectors that will be stimulated include the following: expansion of local civil and housing construction projects by state and private builders; expansion of cement block makers; the establishment of a transportation fleet for the distribution of the cement and the employment of drivers, conductors and mechanics for the trucks; the expanded use of fuel; the emergence of small and medium scale cement distributors and even big distribution companies and workers and new sale stores; banks, food suppliers and sellers of small dry goods and items.
In short, the impact of this plant will be the progressive creation of new economic activities and employment opportunities. From these new economic activities the Congolese state, the local government and community authorities will derive Internally Generated Revenues (IGR) that did not previously exist.
The various speeches at the launching of the Congo-Brazzaville plant highlighted the economic development significance and prospective impact of this this massive industrial project. President Denis Sassou Nguesso of Congo-Brazzaville, noted that the plant was the biggest industrial plant in the country and the investment represented an industrial revolution within the regional group – Economic Community of Central African States.
He noted that from their assessment of the impact of Dangote cement plants in other countries, they had always stimulated multiplier effects through the promotion of complementary and cognate industries and hoped that similar multiple direct and indirect effects will happen in the country.
He also noted the timeliness of the take-off of the plant as a contributor to state revenues at a time when his government’s revenues had precipitously declined by 31.3 percent and oil sector revenues had also declined by 65.1 due to the fall in oil prices.
Clearly, the Congo-Brazzaville government appreciates the investment, presence and impact of the Dangote cement plant.
In his own address, the Nigerian President, Muhammadu Buhari, affirmed that Aliko Dangote and the Dangote Group by their pan-African investments had emerged as “worthy Ambassadors” of the country.
He highlighted the various areas in which the Dangote Group had through its massive investments in the cement sector changed the course of Nigeria’s economic history. These include the provision of a key material for infrastructure development, the introduction of road construction with cement, the pursuit of expansion through backward integration and import substitution and the achievement of national self-sufficiency in cement availability and the contributions to savings of over $2 billion annually from the termination of dependency through importation.
Aliko Dangote, President of the Dangote Group, in his address, articulated the significance of the plant in terms of timely completion, its contribution of widespread availability of affordable cement, the plant’s contribution to the country’s expanded cement production capacity in excess of current demand and the consequence of reducing dependency on cement importation. He also noted that the plant will contribute to the country’s economic renaissance through foreign exchange conservation, employment generation, infrastructure expansion and multiple economic activities.
Dangote graciously and gratefully highlighted the strong and dedicated support provided by the government and people of Congo-Brazzaville from project’s conception to completion. Partly in pursuit of the Group’s philosophy and strategy of Corporate Social Responsibility, the Group was implementing several social projects including school construction, provision of scholarships, renovation of a hospital, road construction and bridge renovation. It also affirmed its company’s policy and commitment to give priority in employment to indigenes of the area of the plant’s location.
The various addresses highlighted the great economic impact of the Dangote’s chosen investments in cement production. But they did not often directly and fully underscore the actual primary sources of its revolutionary impact as a specific type of non-dependent industrial project with its inherent catalytic consequences. That is that they are resource-based industrial plants whose productions are based on the exploitation and processing of a local resource.
In short, the reasons for the great impact of these projects is that unlike the more common, attractive and lucrative arenas of foreign direct investment (FDI) such as extractive, wasting and non-development sectors like mineral and mining sectors and enclave assembly plant industries that are unconnected to the local economic environment, Dangote chose a different trajectory.
The Dangote Group’s choice of resource-based industrialization based on a comprehensive backward integration strategy as the primary pathway and its contribution to African self-actuated and self-directed economic development, prosperity generation, transformation and emancipation is developmentally apt, strategic and fecund.
This can best be understood within the perspective of Africa’s greatest failure in the post-independence era: economic development. This has been due to the failure to create and apply an autonomous economic philosophy and strategy of self-actuated development based on the well-established principles of endogenous technology capacitation and industrialization.
On the contrary, African states and leaders at independence chose the maintenance of the inherited colonial economy, and in the neo-colonial framework of the times, the focus became the expansion of the production and export of raw materials: agricultural and mineral; the mass importation of consumer goods, intermediate goods and capital goods. This entailed the corresponding non-domestication of the historically established levers of development levers: the productive forces – technology and industrialization and equally importantly the ideological premise of development: the psychologically disposition, political will and activated self-agency for self-actuated and self-reliant development that is imperative to any successful development.
The result of this failure of the inherited and non-development neo-colonial economic system and strategy has been the condition of growth without development characterized by the persistence of underdevelopment, expanded dependency and poverty generation. The fact is that no African state since independence from the 1950s has been able to establish and sustain a philosophy, policy and strategy of self-actuated development and secure domestic prosperity generation.
This economic development failure was aggravated by the largely successful recolonization of African economic development objectives, policies, strategies and programmes in the 1980s through the acceptance, imposition and implementation of the Multilateral imperialist agencies – World Bank and International Monetary Fund(IMF) – non-development dogmas embodied in their Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) by the African leadership and states. Based on the unproven and unvarying dogmas called conditionalities: currency devaluation, trade liberalization, removal of subsidies, deregulation and privatization, they were not intended in any way to address the core causes of the balance of payments crisis of African economies of the late 1970s and early 1980s, that is African countries development incapacitation, raw material exports, dependency, mass importation, non-industrialization, under-production and poverty generation.
It was the African leaders’ inability or unwillingness to identify and address these fundamental issues and their preference for pre-packaged supposedly neutral external “expert technical” solutions that led them as supplicants to these neo-imperialist agencies.
The substantive objective of these imperialist agencies was to forcefully return the incrementally economically self-directed African states back into the conditions economic colonialism with its exclusive focus on primary commodities (raw materials) production and export and dependency on importation of all manufactured goods.
Furthermore, the World Bank and IMF also wanted to effect the removal of African states’ as promoters and activators of economic and social development especially freedom conferring industrialization through the cession of development responsibility by privatization to the undeveloped and dependent local capitalist groups; but more consequentially to foreigners through the fetish of foreign Direct Investments (FDI) as the new promoters of African “economic development.”
But the FDI fetish is a dangerously misleading dogma of non-development: it misdirects, misrepresents and disarms societies and leaderships from ownership and responsibility for the philosophy, objectives and strategies for their own societies’ development.
The ability of external forces to inflict these damaging, disruptive and painful consequences of neo-colonial economic failure and their expression in persistent underdevelopment, dependency, underproduction, poverty, beggarliness, humiliation and indignity on Africans, has been possible due to active and direct complicity of much of African leaderships’ and elite who were successfully programmed to marginalize African agency and responsibility for its own development. These African elite enthroned and accepted foreign diktat, policies and programmes as inescapable for African development.
Yet, this situation of the subservience and servility of the psychologically programmed African leadership, elite, intelligentsia has not been uniformly one-dimensional.
Not all African leaderships, elite, intelligentsia, business people, bureaucrats and technocrats have supinely conceded to Africa’s surrender, submission and acquiescence to conditions permanent underdevelopment and cession of self-responsibility for development to others.
Some among these were patriotic elite and leaderships who came to the ineluctable and correct conclusion that Africa can only enter into the state of freedom, dignified existence and a prosperous world by the pro-active choice and creation of its own philosophy and strategy of self-actuated development.
This new development strategy will comprise the assumption of responsibility; the centrality of African agency; technological capacitation; modernization of all productive forces including agriculture and mineral production but above all the relentless pursuit of mass industrialization and mass production as the indisputable pathway and proven expressions of societal self-modernization in the contemporary world.
In the African business world today, it can be said without equivocation that Dangote and the Dangote Group has been and is in the vanguard of the promotion African self-development through resource based development capacitation; backward integration and genuine import substitution; radical reduction of import dependency for consumer goods and industrial inputs; mass industrialization, mass production and in-country and incontinent prosperity generation.
The expansive range of the industrial products of the Dangote Group beyond cement; and including food and agro industry: sugar, salt, tomato, rice, pasta, milk, flour; poly products and heavy industry like motor vehicles, coal mining and processing, refined petroleum, fertilizer and petrochemicals all attest to the promoter and Group’s understanding of the centrality of industrialization to genuine economic diversification and successful societal development and advancement.
The opening of the Congo cement plant within the Dangote Group’s pan-African industrial development strategy and its multiplier effects, creation of diverse employment opportunities and in-country prosperity generation, all attests to the Group’s contribution economic development and empowerment, and re-dignifying of Africans through the single-minded commitment to economic advancement through industrialization.
What is now required of African states, leaderships, technocratic and bureaucratic elite and business leaders and intelligentsia is following Dangote’s example, to prioritize technological capacitation and industrialization as the indisputable foundations and pathways for the project of Africa’s self-conceived, self-directed, self-funded and self-actuated and non-dependent programme of radical economic transformation and renaissance in the modern era. Only liberated African peoples, states and leaders can create this made in Africa – Africa by Africans for Africans and the world.
Ehiedu Iweriebor is a Professor, Department of Africana and Puerto Rican/Latino Studies, Hunter College, City University of New York, USA.
By Blaise Udunze
It is considered that in every organised society, the home is supposed to be a place of security. It should be where families find peace after a hard day’s work, where children grow, where dreams are nurtured, and where the pressures of life temporarily fade away. This narrative comes with keen interest, having witnessed that for millions of Nigerians, home has become the country’s newest economic battlefield. This is fast becoming the experience for the vast majority of Nigerians.
Across the length and breadth of Nigeria, citizens are deeply lamenting the skyrocketing rent. Regrettably, this has become one of the fastest-rising costs of living. An unexpected trend which has become a huge concern is that currently apartments that were rented for N700,000 or N1 million just a few years ago are now advertised for N3 million, N5 million or even higher. Amidst this bizarre development, do you know that they are often without significant improvements to the property itself? One key troubling development is that recent estimates suggest that house rents in many Nigerian cities have surged by between 100 and 300 per cent over the last two years, a pace that far exceeds the country’s official inflation rate and has placed unprecedented pressure on households already struggling with rising food, transportation and energy costs.
Landlords, through estate agents, increasingly demand one or two years’ rent upfront. Tenants are expected to pay 10 per cent of the principal rent toward agency fees, legal fees, agreement charges, caution deposits, and, in most cases, the service charge (which appears to be higher), security levies, and utility-related costs before receiving the keys. In many cases, these additional charges add hundreds of thousands or even millions of naira to the advertised rent, making the total cost of securing accommodation far beyond the reach of average-income earners. Equally disturbing is the unchecked exploitation by agent marauders, who prey on desperate house seekers by imposing outrageous and often illegal fees that further deepen Nigeria’s housing crisis. What should ordinarily be a routine life event has become a financial ordeal.
Nigeria’s housing crisis is no longer simply a property story. It has evolved into an economic emergency with profound implications for families, businesses, public health and national development.
The Federal Government’s National Housing Data Technical Committee estimates that Nigeria faces a housing deficit of approximately 15 to 20million homes. At the same time, millions of existing houses are considered structurally inadequate and lack access to essential infrastructure. If this figure is something to consider, anyone would know that these figures reveal two overlapping crises. First, this shows that millions of Nigerians cannot find decent accommodation, whilst millions more live in overcrowded, unsafe or poorly serviced housing.
At the same time, Nigeria’s population continues to expand rapidly, with cities absorbing hundreds of thousands of new residents every year.
One of the challenges is that urbanisation has consistently outpaced housing development, widening the gap between supply and demand while, predictably, rents continue to rise and affordability continues to decline.
Remarkably, housing experts generally recommend that households should spend no more than 30 per cent of their income on accommodation. For many Nigerian families, that recommendation has become almost impossible to achieve.
Teachers, nurses, journalists, police officers, civil servants, young bankers, entrepreneurs, artisans and other middle-income earners increasingly devote more than half of their annual income to rent alone. For many, housing has become the single largest financial obligation, leaving very little for every other necessity of life.
After paying landlords, food budgets shrink. Healthcare is postponed. Children are transferred to less expensive schools. Retirement savings disappear. Business investments are suspended. Vacations become unimaginable luxuries. The rent bill has become the first expense families think about and the last financial burden they can escape.
The effects extend far beyond individual households. This is totally outrageous, as financial analysts have long observed that when accommodation consumes a disproportionate share of disposable income, consumer spending across the economy inevitably weakens.
Families postpone replacing household appliances. Vehicle purchases are delayed. Furniture sales decline. Restaurants receive fewer customers. Clothing retailers experience lower patronage. Small businesses lose purchasing power from consumers whose earnings are now tied up in rent. The result is a vicious economic cycle in which rising housing costs suppress consumption, reduce business activity, and ultimately slow economic growth.
Behind every rent increase lies a deeply personal story. Consider a fictional but representative family whose experience mirrors that of countless Nigerians. The aspect of receiving notice that the annual rent for their modest two-bedroom apartment would rise from N1.2 million to N3 million comes with uneasiness. At this point, the Blessings’ family had spent months desperately searching for an alternative.
Unable to afford the increase and harassment from the landlord, they eventually relocated nearly 30 kilometres away from their former neighbourhood. The consequences were immediate. Their children had to change schools. The family’s daily commuting time doubled. Transportation costs rose sharply. Family time disappeared.
The father now leaves home before sunrise and returns late at night. The mother spends more each month commuting than she once spent on groceries. Their financial burden has not disappeared. It has merely shifted from rent to transportation and also deals with other issues like epileptic power supply and flooding, especially during this rainy season.
Unfortunately, such stories are no longer exceptional. They have become increasingly common across Nigeria’s major cities. Perhaps no demographic feels this pressure more acutely than young professionals.
Come to think of it, graduates entering the workforce quickly discover that entry-level salaries cannot support decent accommodation close to their workplaces. You would also see many remaining with their parents far longer than anticipated. Other effects include seeing them share apartments with several unrelated adults to reduce costs, whilst some endure daily commutes lasting three or four hours because affordable housing exists only in distant suburbs.
The fact is that the consequences extend beyond inconvenience because long commuting hours reduce productivity, increase fatigue, heighten stress levels and significantly diminish quality of life. Another aspect of this, which is discouraging, is that for many talented young Nigerians, financial independence, home ownership and family formation are becoming increasingly distant aspirations. Several interconnected forces explain why rents continue to climb so aggressively.
Inflation has significantly increased the cost of cement, steel, roofing sheets and virtually every construction material required to build houses. The depreciation of the naira has made imported building materials substantially more expensive. No doubt, from recent findings, there are clear indications that there is a significant increase in the prices of building materials. Let us see the period between 2024 to 2026, Cement: N6,500 – N13,000; blocks: N600 – N1100; 30T of sand: N165,000 – N250,000; 30T of granite: N530,000 – N780,000; rebars (iron) ton: N850,000 – N1,150,000 amongst others. To be fair, it is a known fact that high interest rates have increased borrowing costs for developers, while land acquisition remains prohibitively expensive in many urban centres. The very question at heart is, how has this recent development significantly impacted the apartments built five years ago and beyond?
The government has made it difficult to the point that obtaining development approvals can be slow and costly. Developers also contend with multiple taxes, infrastructure levies and rising labour costs before construction even begins. No doubt, these expenses inevitably find their way into rental prices. But one question keeps running through the minds of many, which is, how do these directly impact apartments built many years back? The truth is that market realities alone do not explain every increase.
In many locations, speculative pricing has taken hold. Some landlords have raised rents far beyond what can reasonably be attributed to maintenance or inflation, taking advantage of overwhelming demand and the severe shortage of available accommodation.
The inability of many Nigerians to purchase homes has further intensified the pressure on the rental market. Inflation, high mortgage rates and limited access to long-term housing finance have pushed home ownership beyond the reach of millions, forcing them to remain tenants for much longer than planned. This should be blamed on the government of the day, as more people compete for a limited supply of rental properties, landlords possess even greater leverage to increase prices.
Housing insecurity is also producing a less visible but equally damaging consequence for deteriorating mental health.
The constant fear of eviction, the uncertainty surrounding annual rent reviews and the enormous pressure of raising large lump sums every one or two years create persistent psychological stress.
Think of the impact of parents’ worry about disrupting their children’s education. Young couples postpone marriage because they cannot afford accommodation. Family disagreements increasingly revolve around financial pressures. Consider the part of many Nigerians who quietly or secretly or unknowingly battle anxiety, emotional exhaustion and depression arising from the struggle to secure decent housing.
None of these psychological costs clearly appear in official economic statistics, but the truth is that they profoundly affect productivity, family stability and overall well-being. It is equally obvious that the crisis is also affecting employers and businesses.
Workers forced to travel long distances arrive at work exhausted. Traffic congestion consumes valuable productive hours each day. It turns out that companies increasingly struggle to retain staff who relocate in search of affordable accommodation. Also, know that many employers face mounting pressure to increase housing allowances simply to remain competitive.
All these call for a balancing as employees demand higher wages to offset escalating living costs, further increasing operating expenses for businesses already contending with inflation, unstable exchange rates and rising energy prices.
Housing affordability is therefore no longer merely a social concern. It has become a business and national competitiveness issue.
Though Nigeria is not alone in confronting housing affordability challenges, its recent trend calls for attention. Across Africa, rapid urbanisation continues to outpace housing supply.
For this reason, Kenya has introduced ambitious affordable housing programmes aimed at expanding supply, although implementation challenges remain; this can’t be compared to Nigeria’s current situation. Ghana is not left out of the equation as it continues to battle a significant housing deficit. Ghana is also grappling with the irony of completed homes that remain unaffordable for many citizens. South Africa, despite possessing a relatively more developed mortgage market, continues to experience severe affordability pressures in cities such as Johannesburg and Cape Town.
Nigeria’s situation, however, is intensified by its enormous population, rapid urban expansion, limited mortgage penetration and one of Africa’s largest housing deficits.
Nigeria has witnessed successive governments introducing affordable housing initiatives, mortgage schemes and public-private partnerships which fails before implementation. While these programmes represent positive intentions, delivery has consistently fallen far behind growing demand.
Housing experts argue that meaningful reform requires far more than constructing a limited number of housing estates.
Nigeria must simplify land acquisition processes, reduce infrastructure costs, expand mortgage accessibility, improve planning approvals, encourage private-sector investment in affordable housing and strengthen incentives for developers willing to build homes for middle- and low-income earners.
Improving housing data is important, but accurate statistics alone cannot reduce rents. Effective implementation remains the country’s greatest policy challenge.
Let’s consider some of these salient points proffered by urban planners who insist that Nigeria’s housing crisis cannot be solved exclusively through market forces. According to them, governments at all levels must invest strategically in infrastructure and create financing mechanisms that reduce development costs. To further help reduce the housing gap, they encourage the construction of affordable rental housing rather than focusing disproportionately on luxury developments.
The truth is that if housing continues to consume an ever-growing share of household income, consumer spending, investment and long-term economic growth will remain constrained. Another key barrier that must be addressed quickly, as highlighted by researchers, is inflation, limited housing finance, weak regulatory enforcement and inconsistent policy implementation, which happen to be major bottlenecks to affordable housing delivery.
One key question that yearns for answers is whether it is not obvious to the government and other stakeholders that housing is far more than concrete walls, roofing sheets and painted ceilings? The fact is that shelter, as the meaning implies, shapes educational outcomes, influences public health, determines productivity, strengthens families, supports social mobility and contributes directly to national competitiveness.
At this stage, it is a complete shame and at the same time an irony that a nation where hardworking teachers, nurses, journalists, entrepreneurs, artisans, security personnel and civil servants cannot comfortably afford decent shelter risks weakening its middle class, widening inequality and undermining sustainable economic growth.
If the truth must be told, Nigeria’s rent crisis is therefore not merely about landlords and tenants. For a fact, it is about the future of work, family stability, economic opportunity and social justice. Clearly, it is about whether millions of hardworking citizens can enjoy the dignity that comes with secure and affordable housing.
The mistake all along, which must be eschewed, is that a country’s progress is being measured solely by the number of luxury estates it builds or the height of its skyscrapers. More importantly, it should also be measured by whether ordinary citizens can afford a safe place to call home without sacrificing their children’s education, healthcare, savings or future aspirations.
If this is not adequately addressed, this rent trap will persist until affordable housing becomes a genuine national priority backed by bold reforms and sustained implementation; millions of Nigerians will continue facing an impossible choice, which would invariably lead them to surrender their financial future to keep a roof over their heads or abandon the comfort, security and dignity that every family deserves.
Concerned stakeholders shouldn’t continue to believe that the true cost of Nigeria’s rent crisis is therefore measured only in naira. It is measured in postponed dreams, delayed marriages, fractured families, declining productivity, abandoned ambitions, struggling businesses and the quiet erosion of hope among citizens who work tirelessly every day but find the simple promise of a decent home slipping further beyond their reach.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: bl***********@***il.com
By Blaise Udunze
Daily, the world watches Nigeria through a familiar lens in what appears to be a gory situation. Especially in cases when the news headlines tell stories of farmer-herder clashes, bandit attacks, kidnappings, villages reduced to ashes or deserted by the dwellers, as thousands of Nigerians have been displaced across states such as Zamfara, Plateau, Benue, Niger, Kaduna and Nasarawa. Subliminally, this is about to become a similarly ugly occurrence in southwestern Nigeria, which is fast becoming obvious if not nipped in the bud quickly.
Recorded data have shown that bandits, Boko Haram, and others killed over 190,000 Nigerians in 17 years and displaced 3.7 million people.
A human rights organisation, the International Society for Civil Liberties and Rule of Law (Intersociety), in its fearful revelation, has said that no fewer than 190,150 Nigerians have been killed by bandits, Boko Haram insurgents, and suspected armed herdsmen between July 2009 and March 19, 2026, as this calls for concern.
The dominant explanations often point to ethnic tensions, religious divisions, climate change, shrinking grazing routes or weak security institutions. No doubt, those factors are certainly part of Nigeria’s complex security crisis. Yet another question deserves serious examination.
What if, in some locations, the violence is also serving another purpose? What if some of the territories experiencing repeated displacement are the same places sitting atop some of Nigeria’s most valuable mineral deposits? More importantly, if such a pattern exists, who benefits when communities disappear?
Of a truth, these questions are uncomfortable, but undeniably they deserve careful investigation rather than dismissal.
For ages, Nigeria has been naturally endowed, and it is estimated to be rich in enormous significant reserves of gold, lithium, uranium, tin, columbite and other strategic minerals increasingly sought after in the global transition to clean energy technologies. As international demand for battery minerals continues to rise, these resources have become far more valuable than they were only a decade ago.
If one overlays publicly available geological information with maps showing persistent violence, some observers argue that striking geographical overlaps appear in several regions. Such overlaps alone cannot establish causation. Correlation is not proof of conspiracy. However, they raise questions worthy of independent scrutiny.
One issue attracting increasing attention and adequately yearns for answer is whether prolonged insecurity may inadvertently or deliberately create conditions that make mineral extraction easier.
Under Nigeria’s Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act 2007, mineral resources belong to the Federal Government, while mining rights are granted through licences and leases. Community engagement and land access are expected to form part of the licensing process, although implementation varies depending on circumstances. This raises an important policy question.
What happens when the communities expected to participate in those processes have already fled because of violence?
Displacement changes the dynamics of land ownership, consent and access. While no evidence automatically proves that attacks are orchestrated to facilitate mining, the sequence of violence followed by renewed commercial activity in some locations deserves closer examination by regulators, lawmakers and investigative journalists.
In conflict studies, researchers have long observed that wars often generate economic winners alongside humanitarian losers. Could elements of Nigeria’s insecurity also be producing economic beneficiaries?
Reports over the years have documented concerns about illegal mining operations across parts of northern Nigeria. Government agencies themselves have repeatedly acknowledged that criminal networks profit from the country’s vast mineral wealth. The unresolved question is whether isolated criminality has, in some instances, evolved into more sophisticated alliances involving political influence, financial interests and international supply chains. If so, the implications extend far beyond Nigeria.
Invariably, it is clearly known that lithium has become one of the world’s most strategic commodities, powering electric vehicle batteries and renewable energy storage systems. Gold has always remained one of the safest global investment assets during periods of uncertainty. Meanwhile, it is well confirmed that the global appetite for these minerals creates enormous financial incentives.
Suppose violent displacement reduces resistance to extraction. Suppose shell companies subsequently acquire mining interests. Suppose minerals then leave Nigeria through legitimate-looking export documentation while their true value remains understated.
These scenarios remain allegations unless supported by verifiable evidence. Yet they outline a framework that investigators may wish to test rather than ignore. Financial crime experts frequently identify trade mis-invoicing as one of the most common methods of illicit financial flows worldwide.
Could Nigeria’s solid minerals sector be vulnerable to similar practices? If valuable lithium ore is deliberately but inaccurately described as lower-value material on export documents, substantial wealth could potentially leave the country without reflecting its true market value. Likewise, if unrefined gold exits through privileged channels with limited scrutiny, questions naturally arise about oversight, transparency and accountability over criminal activities which have continued to stunt and disrupt the country’s socio-economic growth and at the same time cause carnage.
Such possibilities are not accusations against any particular institution or company. Rather, they illustrate why stronger monitoring systems are increasingly essential. Another question concerns logistics.
With the high level of criminal activities, industrial mining requires heavy machinery, diesel supplies, transportation networks and specialised personnel. These are not operations that can remain invisible indefinitely.
If certain territories are genuinely too dangerous for security agencies, how do industrial-scale extraction activities reportedly continue in some remote locations? If they do, who protects those operations? Who authorises their movement? Who verifies what is extracted? Who ensures royalties and export revenues reach public coffers? These are governance questions that demand institutional answers.
Equally important is the international dimension. Minerals extracted in Nigeria ultimately enter global supply chains. Gold may pass through international refining hubs before entering financial markets. Lithium may become part of battery manufacturing destined for electric vehicles, which are being sold across Europe, North America and Asia.
One known fact is that consumers purchasing products containing these minerals rarely know the full story of where they originated.
Increasingly, however, investors and governments are demanding ethical sourcing standards that trace minerals from extraction to final manufacture.
A critical factor that must be taken into cognisance is that if insecurity is creating opportunities for illegal or unethical extraction anywhere in the world, multinational companies have responsibilities alongside national governments, of which the onus falls on the Nigerian government.
Transparency cannot stop at the mine gate. Nor should accountability end at national borders. Another issue requiring attention concerns beneficial ownership.
Across many jurisdictions, shell companies can obscure the identities of individuals ultimately controlling commercial assets. If politically exposed persons or powerful business interests are hidden behind complex corporate structures registered offshore, identifying beneficiaries becomes significantly more difficult. This challenge is hardly unique to Nigeria.
Findings showed that from Latin America to Central Africa and Southeast Asia, resistant corporate networks have frequently complicated efforts to combat corruption and illicit resource extraction. That is precisely why open corporate registries, beneficial ownership databases and transparent mining licence disclosures are becoming global governance priorities. For Nigeria, the stakes could hardly be higher.
The country stands at the centre of the world’s emerging critical minerals economy. The Nigerian government can’t feign ignorance of the fact that, when handled transparently, these resources could finance infrastructure, education, healthcare, and industrial development for generations.
In no way would the government claim not knowing that when handled poorly, they risk becoming another chapter in the well-documented “resource curse,” where extraordinary natural wealth coincides with persistent poverty, insecurity and institutional weakness.
The ultimate challenge, therefore, is not simply about mining. It is about governance. It is about whether public institutions possess both the independence and capacity to ensure that natural resources benefit citizens rather than narrow interests. It is about whether conflict zones receive genuine peacebuilding efforts instead of becoming forgotten frontiers. And it is about whether international markets demand accountability with the same enthusiasm they demand raw materials.
None of these questions should be answered through speculation. They require rigorous investigations, forensic financial analysis, satellite imagery, mining license audits, customs records, beneficial ownership disclosures and courageous journalism.
They require governments willing to open their books. They require international cooperation capable of tracing money across borders. Most importantly, they require asking questions that have too often remained unasked.
Perhaps Nigeria’s security crisis is exactly what it appears to be: a tragic convergence of historical grievances, weak institutions, criminality and environmental pressures. Or perhaps, in some places, another layer of economic incentive deserves closer scrutiny.
Until those questions are thoroughly investigated, one possibility will continue to linger. Maybe the world’s attention has been fixed on the blood spilt above ground, while too little attention has been paid to the extraordinary wealth lying beneath it.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: bl***********@***il.com
Feature/OPED
What Does Nigeria’s $51bn Reserves Milestone Mean if Most New Foreign Money Can Leave Quickly?
Nigeria’s foreign reserves have climbed to about $51 billion, a decade-plus high, according to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). EBC Financial Group (EBC) notes that this reflects stronger investor confidence, but the second half may show whether it holds, as the build rests on three cyclical drivers: oil earnings, short-term foreign money and a narrowing official-to-street naira gap.
Reserves rose from about $32 billion in April 2024, during a dollar shortage, to about $51 billion now, near the CBN’s target. Much came from two cyclical sources, strong oil earnings and money chasing high-yielding naira assets, so EBC expects the pace to slow or reverse. Fitch Ratings, a major international credit rating agency, expects a marginal decline to about $47 billion by the end of 2026, citing higher spending and external pressures.
David Precious, Senior Market Analyst at EBC Financial Group, said, “Nigeria’s reserve build is real but may not be durable yet, because nearly all of the new money is the kind that can leave quickly. Of the $10.37 billion that came in over the first quarter, the overwhelming majority was short-term portfolio funds rather than long-term investment, so a shift in oil prices, global interest rates or confidence in the naira might pull a large part of it straight back out.”
Most New Money Can Still Leave Quickly
The composition of the foreign inflows explains the caution over how long the build can last. The country attracted $10.37 billion in foreign investment in the first quarter of 2026, up 83.83 per cent year-on-year, according to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Of that, $9.86 billion or 95.09 per cent, was portfolio money, largely short-term naira debt such as Treasury bills that investors can sell at the next auction, while foreign direct investment, the long-term kind that builds factories and jobs, was $135.08 million, or 1.30 per cent. Put simply, of each dollar coming in, about 95 cents can leave quickly, and barely one cent stays.
That money supports reserves while it stays. Dollars brought in to buy naira assets add to market supply, letting the CBN hold more reserves and steady the naira. It leaves when conditions change. Nigeria earns most of its export dollars from oil and gas, so lower oil prices mean fewer dollars, and as a member of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), it cannot simply produce more, output capped by quota and reduced by theft and ageing fields. Higher global interest rates draw money toward safer returns abroad, and a weakening naira prompts investors to sell early. When oil fell in 2016 and 2020, foreign investors withdrew and could not convert naira to dollars as supply dried up, leaving the CBN to clear more than $7 billion in trapped obligations into 2024.
The Oil Boost is No Longer Certain
Oil looked like a dependable source of the dollars behind the reserves only months ago. Earlier in 2026, concern over disruption around the Strait of Hormuz lifted crude prices, and stronger receipts flowed in, with crude oil export earnings of $8.11 billion in the first quarter in the CBN’s balance-of-payments data. That support is now easing. The tension has subsided, and Brent traded near $72 on June 29, down about 24 per cent over the month, back to pre-conflict levels. With the price boost gone and output constrained, reserves are more exposed, leaning on non-oil earnings and investor patience rather than oil.
The Naira Still Trades at Two Prices
The naira has traded at two prices, an official rate and a higher parallel-market rate, and closing that gap into one trusted price is what many investors might watch most. Before committing funds, they may want assurance they can convert naira to dollars at a fair rate when they exit, and a wide gap revives the fear of being trapped that lingers from earlier shortages. The gap has narrowed to roughly N20 to N30, with the CBN’s official rate near N1,380 per dollar on June 26 against parallel-market quotes around N1,400. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2026 Article IV review urged Nigeria to depend less on this fast-moving portfolio money and to keep phasing out its multiple exchange-rate practices. The CBN’s Foreign Exchange Manual, in force from 1 June, is intended to make the market clearer, though such rules build confidence only once investors can freely trade dollars at the posted rate.
What could Make the Build Durable
A few signs that may show the build turning durable include a smaller gap between the official and street naira rates, more long-term foreign investment, and steadier oil earnings. A gap that stays small, now roughly N20 to N30, may mean investors trust the official rate and no longer need the street market. A clear rise in foreign direct investment, only $135 million last quarter against $9.86 billion of short-term money, might mean lasting capital is replacing funds that can leave at the next auction. Oil earnings that hold up, rather than sliding from the low $70s, should help keep reserves steady, since oil and gas bring in most of Nigeria’s export dollars.
“Reserves built on money chasing high yields can fall as fast as they rose, as they did after the last two oil shocks, when investors left, and the CBN spent years clearing a foreign-exchange backlog,” Precious added. “What holds through a downturn is slower money, direct investment, steady oil and non-oil export earnings and one credible naira rate, and that is the shift Nigeria has yet to make.”
