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Information Operations: An Understudied Facet of Russian Influence in Africa

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By Miriam Roday and Sarah Daly

In a quiet neighbourhood just outside of Accra, 16 Ghanaians were instructed to create social media accounts, representing themselves as Americans, to post content about divisive political issues, where and when U.S. audiences were most active online.

Starting in June 2019, posts like this tweet trickled into users’ newsfeeds: “How can a #police officer kill an 11-year-old #black boy and go unpunished? Why, are some lives more important than others?”

In the run-up to the 2020 U.S. presidential election, Russian operatives from Ghana and Nigeria crafted fake profiles on social media to stoke tensions and widen cleavages in American society.

Russian trolls posted in Facebook groups about police brutality and racial inequity, implying or claiming that they lived in the United States, and in one case, purported to be the cousin of a Black American who had died in police custody.

These trolling tactics may sound familiar. They were central themes of Moscow’s “sweeping and systematic” campaign to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Under the direction of Russian financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, the Kremlin deployed an army of professional trolls from the now-infamous Internet Research Agency (IRA) based in St. Petersburg to manipulate social media platforms and flood the information space with divisive and inflammatory narratives. During the 2016 election cycle, the effort succeeded in fomenting unrest and conflict.

Russia’s most recent campaign to sow discord within the American electorate, however, marks its first use of Africa as a launchpad for disinformation campaigns aimed at the United States.

Earlier in 2021, the intelligence community confirmed that Russian President Vladimir Putin tried to influence the contest between Joe Biden and Donald Trump, including by “exacerbating sociopolitical divisions in the US” and using troll farms in Ghana and Nigeria to “propagate US-focused narratives.”

A months-long investigation by CNN uncovered details about the pop-up operation in Ghana masquerading as a non-profit that received funding from an “anonymous source” in Europe. Its 16 employees, some unaware they were working with and for Russian operatives, built audiences and coordinated their posts by time and topic to maximize engagement with American users. Facebook corroborated these findings and linked several of the accounts to Prigozhin’s IRA that it had previously removed for “coordinated inauthentic behaviour.”

The Kremlin uses these troll accounts on social media to establish digital networks of influence and advance its agenda in the information space—to subvert public discourse and disseminate anti-Western messaging.

Russia’s interference campaign in 2016 illustrated how damaging these low-cost, low-risk tactics can be, especially against a fractious electorate in a highly polarized media environment. This threat is particularly palpable in Africa, where geopolitical developments and democratic backsliding make many states vulnerable to Russian interference.

And while the Kremlin’s use of Africa as a base for its information operations targeting a U.S. election may be novel, Russia has been running information manipulation campaigns within Africa for years. Moscow’s weaponization of information is an understudied, overlooked component of its strategic influence efforts that presents immediate national security risks to democratic processes and institutions across the continent.

Russia’s Evolving Information Operations 

The conversation surrounding Russian power projection in Africa often focuses on its revitalization of Soviet-era relationships and strategies to strike military, trade, and resource deals across the continent.

Russia’s use of parastatal and opaque private military companies to accomplish its goals has drawn international scrutiny. Nominally private, these entities and individuals operate at the direction of the Kremlin, and often deploy information operations to advance Russia’s broader goals in Africa: building a positive reputation for Russia as a “revitalized great power, international mediator, humanitarian actor, and effective counter-terrorism partner”; and courting current and future African leaders to establish long-term ties that will benefit its strategic interests.

Russian reputation-building campaigns involve circulating propaganda through various media, from social and state-funded to proxy sources in foreign news outlets. The Kremlin infiltrates and controls the information space by buying local media outlets or inserting Russian state-owned television channels RT and Sputnik in-country. Establishing mass media control allows Russia to shape the citizenry’s impressions of current events. The resulting de-democratization of information creates a similar effect to that of Russia’s social media campaigns: the Kremlin can develop and disseminate narratives not immediately identifiable as foreign propaganda and impose them onto a population.

Russia sees sidelining Western influence in Africa as integral to its campaign of upending the international order led by the United States. Using an ad-hoc blend of private military companies, non-governmental organizations, and local agents to carry its messages, Russia can launder narratives through the information ecosystem that paint the West as exploitative interventionist actors, and Moscow as a benevolent partner engaging with Africa on mutually beneficial terms.

Common tactics include criticizing the U.S. and French security assistance efforts and praising Russia’s ability to serve as a mediator and counter-terrorism partner despite limited evidence to support its effectiveness at either.

In addition to propagandizing, Russia uses its “franchised” proxies—local troll farms established by Russian operatives and affiliates—to influence domestic politics in Africa, often as a means to court political elites and secure support for extracting resources and building Russian military bases.

In October 2019, researchers at the Stanford Internet Observatory together with social media analytics firm, Graphika, uncovered Russian-linked information operations aimed at influencing the politics and public discourse of eight African countries.

Their joint report shows how using local trolls to augment mass and social media campaigns pays dividends allowing Russia to deploy effective, low-cost operations to more easily evade detection and obviate the need to conduct the operations within its own borders.

Russia has demonstrated a preference for autocratic or authoritarian-leaning political leaders and regimes that often coexist with a controlled information and media space.

For instance, in 2019, Russia orchestrated information operations in Sudan aimed at delegitimizing protestors in Khartoum and Moscow. Private researchers found that Prigozhin-linked proxies set up a Facebook page disguised as a local news network and frequently re-shared Sputnik articles.

The proxies, who were attempting to preserve President Omar al-Bashir’s leadership against popular opposition, also recommended public messaging themes to the regime and security responses to demonstrations. Though al-Bashir was deposed in April 2019, Russia’s influence campaign in Sudan corresponded to interests in licensing for gold mines and military basing in Port Sudan on the Red Sea. For Russia, relationship building, with later economic and security agreements in mind, supersede loyalty to a particular candidate or political platform.

Moscow has demonstrated this ideological flexibility in its extensive electioneering and propaganda efforts in the Central African Republic, Libya, Madagascar, and Mozambique, among others. The Kremlin seizes upon the information space as a means to gain political allies and threaten U.S. and French interests, even if it only manages to hijack African social and political discourse in the short term or on a particular issue.

To this end, Russian state-backed media outlets offer training courses on social media and the Kremlin sends “spin doctors” or propaganda specialists overseas to African clients. These impermanent and relatively agile information operations are ideal for producing a maximum effect on African states with minimum effort.

Growing Threat to Democracy 

Russia’s efforts to infiltrate the information space in Africa brought to the fore with its most recent attempt to influence the 2020 U.S. election, will likely grow in scale and sophistication. In the past few years, such campaigns have enabled the Kremlin to dictate the terms of the truth and to degrade democratic discourse, which directly undermines U.S. stated interests in the region, namely its commitment to strengthening democratic progress and peace. These campaigns draw Africa into the spotlight as a battlefield where Russia can hone its weaponization of the information space against the United States and its allies.

Just as the Soviet Union did during the Cold War, Russia perceives the African information environment as permissive and less monitored, a place where it can experiment with tactics to influence political processes, fan the flames of social unrest, and deflect culpability. The threat to Africa, however, is acute. Russian information operations could fuel conflict in states prone to election violence, could destabilize governments and economies, and further erode democratic gains across the continent.

The United States and its allies can mitigate this risk by bolstering the African information environment against Russian exploitation. Specifically, the West can double down on its support for African nations and leaders working to strengthen election integrity and public discourse and to preserve independent and diverse media.

Also, establishing the means for greater collaboration between governments, civil society, and tech companies to expose and raise awareness about Russian disinformation can increase societal resilience against it.

Countering Russia’s subversive activities in the information environment will not only stymy its attempt to broker political, economic, and security deals across the continent, but promote the endurance of democratic institutions at home and abroad.

Miriam Roday is a researcher in the Joint Advanced Warfighting Division at the Institute for Defense Analyses with a focus on digital disinformation, Russia, and transatlantic security.

Sarah Daly is an adjunct researcher in the Intelligence Analysis Division at the Institute for Defense Analyses with a focus on geopolitical and security developments in Africa.

The views, opinions, and findings expressed in this paper should not be construed as representing the official position of the Institute for Defense Analyses, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

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Mr President, Please Reconsider -No to State Police

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By Abba Dukawa

Nigeria stands today at a painful and defining crossroads in its security journey. Across the nation, families live with growing fear as insecurity spreads—kidnappings, banditry, and terrorism have become harsh realities in too many communities. These threats do not respect state boundaries. Organised criminal networks move across states, leaving ordinary citizens feeling exposed and abandoned.

Nigerians are facing intertwined challenges. The anger is no longer whispered in private—it is now spoken openly with frustration and worry. Another pressing issue confronting Nigerians is the renewed debate over the creation of state police. When will the federal government strengthen the effectiveness of its security agencies? How much longer must communities endure this uncertainty?

At the same time, another urgent debate rises from the hearts of the people. In the face of this deepening crisis, should state governments be allowed to establish their own police forces to protect their citizens? Or will Nigeria continue to rely solely on a centralised system that many believe is struggling to respond quickly enough to local threats?

These are not just political questions. They are questions of safety, dignity, and the right of every Nigerian to live without fear. The nation is waiting, hoping for bold decisions that will restore trust, strengthen security, and protect the future of its people.  State police cannot be the answer to these pressing issues that bedevil federal security agencies.

Recently, the President appealed to the leadership of the National Assembly to consider constitutional amendments that would create a legal framework for state police, arguing that such reform is necessary to address Nigeria’s worsening security challenges. The fragmented policing structure could complicate efforts to combat crime effectively.

Reigniting the debate over state police comes as no surprise, given that he has long been seen as an advocate for the idea since his tenure as Governor of Lagos State. He supported the concept then and has continued to promote it as President. Many Nigerians, particularly in the South-West, have long called for state police as a means to address the country’s growing insecurity. Despite the constitutional considerations, discussions around state police continue to evoke strong emotions nationwide.

How will state police address security breaches committed by local militias or vigilante groups such as the OPC in the Southwestern states? What actions would state police take regarding the Amotekun group, which is openly endorsed by Southwest governors, if it were to commit serious violations of the rights of citizens, especially those from other parts of the country? How quickly have the proponents of state police chosen to erase from memory the horrific atrocities the OPC inflicted on the Northern community in Lagos in February 2002? The scars of that tragedy are still raw, yet some behave as though it never happened—as if the pain and the lives lost meant nothing. It is a bitter betrayal of justice and our collective conscience.

Reintroducing this issue at a time when the federal security apparatus is already strained shows a lack of sensitivity. Proponents overlook that Section 214(1) clearly states there is only one police force for the federation, the Nigeria Police Force and no other police force may be established for any part of the federation. The section does not permit the establishment of state police. Policing is on the Exclusive Legislative List, meaning only the federal government can create or control a police force.

Even today, the Nigeria Police Force, under the centralised command of the Inspector-General, faces accusations of harassment and intimidation of the weak and vulnerable citizens. If such problems persist under federal control, imagine the risks of placing police authority under state governors, who already wield significant influence over state and local structures.

Implications For The State Police Structures In The Hand Of The State Governors

I must state clearly: I do not support the establishment of state police—at least not at this stage of Nigeria’s development. Our institutions remain fragile, and introducing such a system carries significant risks of abuse. History offers reasons for caution: the Native Authority police of the past were often linked to political repression and misuse of power.

Supporters argue that state police would bring law enforcement closer to local communities and improve response to crime. However, there are serious concerns rooted in Nigeria’s social realities.

Nigeria is a diverse nation with multiple ethnic and religious sentiments. If recruitment into state police forces becomes dominated by particular groups, minority communities may feel marginalised or threatened.

State police could deepen divisions and weaken public trust. State-controlled Police could also become instruments of political intimidation, especially during election periods, potentially targeting opposition figures, critics, and journalists.

Financial capacity is another major concern. Establishing and maintaining a professional police force requires substantial investment in training, equipment, salaries, welfare, and infrastructure. Many states already struggle to pay workers and provide essential services. How, then, can they adequately fund a state police? The likely outcome is poorly trained, under-equipped personnel—conditions that often foster corruption and inefficiency.

Even under federal oversight, Nigeria’s police system struggles with weak accountability and abuse of power. Transferring these weaknesses to the state level without safeguards could have severe consequences.

A poorly structured state police force could become loyal to governors rather than the Constitution, serving political interests rather than citizens’ interests. For these reasons, introducing state police, even with the constitutional amendment, could create more problems than it solves. Sustainability, accountability, and adherence to constitutional principles are critical and will likely be violated

Nigeria must strengthen law enforcement while protecting citizens’ rights and preserving national unity.  Mr President, please reconsider your decision on state police. Nigerians want a strong, effective, and unified police force, not one that risks further dividing a system already struggling to meet its constitutional obligations.

Dukawa can be reached at ab**********@***il.com

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Measures at Ensuring Africa’s Food Sovereignty

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By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh

China’s investments in Africa have primarily been in the agricultural sector, reinforcing its support for the continent to attain food security for the growing population, estimated currently at 1.5 billion people. With a huge expanse of land and untapped resources, China’s investment in agriculture, focused on increasing local production, has been described as highly appreciable.

Brazil has adopted a similar strategy in its policy with African countries; its investments have concentrated in a number of countries, especially those rich in natural resources. It has significantly contributed to Africa’s economic growth by improving access to affordable machinery, industrial inputs, and adding value to consumer goods. Thus, Africa has to reduce product imports which can be produced locally.

The China and Brazil in African Agriculture Project has just published online a series of studies concerning Chinese and Brazilian support for African agriculture. They appeared in an upcoming issue of World Development.  The six articles focusing on China are available below:

–A New Politics of Development Cooperation? Chinese and Brazilian Engagements in African Agriculture by Ian Scoones, Kojo Amanor, Arilson Favareto and Qi Gubo.

–South-South Cooperation, Agribusiness and African Agricultural Development: Brazil and China in Ghana and Mozambique by Kojo Amanor and Sergio Chichava.

–Chinese State Capitalism? Rethinking the Role of the State and Business in Chinese Development Cooperation in Africa by Jing Gu, Zhang Chuanhong, Alcides Vaz and Langton Mukwereza.

–Chinese Migrants in Africa: Facts and Fictions from the Agri-food Sector in Ethiopia and Ghana by Seth Cook, Jixia Lu, Henry Tugendhat and Dawit Alemu.

–Chinese Agricultural Training Courses for African Officials: Between Power and Partnerships by Henry Tugendhat and Dawit Alemu.

–Science, Technology and the Politics of Knowledge: The Case of China’s Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centres in Africa by Xiuli Xu, Xiaoyun Li, Gubo Qi, Lixia Tang and Langton Mukwereza.

 Strategic partnerships and the way forward: African leaders have to adopt import substitution policies, re-allocate financial resources toward attaining domestic production, and sustain self-sufficiency.

Maximising the impact of resource mobilisation requires collaboration among governments, key external partners, investment promotion agencies, financial institutions, and the private sector. Partnerships must be aligned with national development priorities that can promote value addition, support industrialisation, and deepen regional and continental integration.

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Recapitalisation Without Transformation is a Risk Nigeria Cannot Afford

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By Blaise Udunze

In barely two weeks, Nigeria’s banking sector will once again be at a historic turning point. As the deadline for the latest recapitalisation exercise approaches on March 31, 2026, with no fewer than 31 banks having met the new capital rule, leaving out two that are reportedly awaiting verification. As exercise progresses and draws to an end, policymakers are optimistic that stronger banks will anchor financial stability and support the country’s ambition of building a $1 trillion economy.

The reform, driven by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) under Governor Olayemi Cardoso, requires banks to significantly raise their capital thresholds, which are set at N500 billion for international banks, N200 billion for national banks, and N50 billion for regional lenders. According to the apex bank, 33 banks have already tapped the capital market through rights issues and public offerings; collectively, the total verified and approved capital raised by the banks amounts to N4.05 trillion.

No doubt, at first glance, the strategy definitely appears straightforward with the idea that bigger capital means stronger banks, and stronger banks should finance economic growth. But history offers a cautionary reminder that capital alone does not guarantee resilience, as it would be recalled that Nigeria has travelled this road before.

During the 2004-2005 consolidation led by former CBN Governor Charles Soludo, the number of banks in the country shrank dramatically from 89 to 25. The reform created larger institutions that were celebrated as national champions. The truth is that Nigeria has been here before because, despite all said and done, barely five years later, the banking system plunged into crisis, forcing regulatory intervention, bailouts, and the creation of the Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON) to absorb toxic assets.

The lesson from that experience is simple in the sense that recapitalisation without structural reform only postpones deeper problems.

Today, as banks race to meet the new capital thresholds, the real question is not how much capital has been raised but whether the reform will transform the fundamentals of Nigerian banking. The underlying fact is that if the exercise merely inflates balance sheets without addressing deeper vulnerabilities, Nigeria risks repeating a familiar cycle of apparent stability followed by systemic stress, as the resultant effect will be distressed banks less capable of bringing the economy out of the woods.

The real measure of success is far simpler. That is to say, stronger banks must stimulate economic productivity, stabilise the financial system, and expand access to credit for businesses and households. Anything less will amount to a missed opportunity.

One of the most critical issues surrounding the recapitalisation drive is the quality of the capital being raised.

Nigeria’s banking sector has reportedly secured more than N4.5 trillion in new capital commitments across different categories of banks. No doubt, on paper, these numbers may appear impressive. Going by the trends of events in Nigeria’s economy, numbers alone can be deceptive.

Past recapitalisation cycles revealed troubling practices, whereby funds raised through related-party transactions, borrowed money disguised as equity, or complex financial arrangements that recycled risks back into the banking system. If such practices resurface, recapitalisation becomes little more than an accounting exercise.

To avert a repeat of failure, the CBN must therefore ensure that every naira raised represents genuine, loss-absorbing capital. Transparency around capital sources, ownership structures, and funding arrangements must be non-negotiable. Without credible capital, balance sheet strength becomes an illusion that will make every recapitalisation exercise futile.

In financial systems, credibility is itself a form of capital. If there is one recurring factor behind banking crises in Nigeria, it is corporate governance failure.

Many past collapses were not triggered by global shocks but by insider lending, weak board oversight, excessive executive power, and poor risk culture. Recapitalisation provides regulators with a rare opportunity to reset governance standards across the industry.

Boards must be independent not only in structure but also in substance. Risk committees must be empowered to challenge executive decisions. Insider lending rules must be enforced without compromise because, over the years, they have proven to be an anathema against the stability of the financial sector. The stakes are high.

When governance fails, fresh capital can quickly become fresh fuel for old excesses. Without governance reform, recapitalisation risks reinforcing the very weaknesses it seeks to eliminate.

Another structural vulnerability lies in Nigeria’s increasing amount of non-performing loans (NPLs), which recently caused the CBN to raise concerns, as Nigeria experiences a rise in bad loans threatening banking stability.

Industry data suggests that the banking sector’s NPL ratio has climbed above the prudential benchmark of 5 per cent, reaching roughly 7 per cent in recent assessments. Many of these troubled loans are concentrated in sectors such as oil and gas, power, and government-linked infrastructure projects, alongside other factors such as FX instability, high interest rates, and the withdrawal of Covid-era forbearance, which threaten bank stability.

While regulatory forbearance has helped maintain short-term stability, it has also obscured deeper asset-quality concerns. A credible recapitalisation process must confront this reality directly.

Loan classification standards must reflect economic truth rather than regulatory convenience. Banks should not carry impaired assets indefinitely while presenting healthy balance sheets to investors and depositors.

Transparency about asset quality strengthens trust. Concealment destroys it. Few forces have disrupted Nigerian bank balance sheets in recent years as severely as exchange-rate volatility.

Many banks still operate with significant foreign exchange mismatches, borrowing short-term in foreign currencies while lending long-term to clients earning revenues in naira. When the naira depreciates sharply, these mismatches can erode capital faster than any credit loss.

Recapitalisation must therefore be accompanied by stricter supervision of foreign exchange exposure, as this part calls for the regulator to heighten its supervision. Banks should be required to disclose currency risks more transparently and undergo rigorous stress testing at intervals that assume adverse currency scenarios rather than best-case outcomes. In a structurally import-dependent economy, ignoring FX risk is no longer an option.

Nigeria’s banking system has long been characterised by excessive concentration in a few sectors and corporate clients, which calls for adequate monitoring and the need to be addressed quickly for the recapitalisation drive to yield maximum results.

Growth in most advanced economies comes from the small and medium-sized enterprises that are well-funded. Anything short of this undermines it, since the concentration of huge loans to large oil and gas companies, government-related entities, and major conglomerates absorbs a disproportionate share of bank lending. This has continued to pose a major threat to the system, as the case is with small and medium-sized enterprises, the backbone of job creation, which remain chronically underfinanced. This imbalance weakens the economy.

Recapitalisation should therefore be tied to policies that encourage credit diversification and risk-sharing mechanisms that allow banks to lend more confidently to productive sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing, and technology rather than investing their funds into the government’s securities. Bigger banks that remain narrowly exposed do not strengthen the economy. They amplify its fragilities.

Nigeria’s macroeconomic conditions, which are its broad economic settings, are defined by frequent and sometimes sharp changes or instability rather than stability.

Inflation shocks, interest-rate swings, fiscal pressures, and currency adjustments are not rare disruptions; but they have now become a normal part of the economic environment. Despite all these adverse factors, many banks still operate risk models that assume relative stability. Perhaps unbeknownst to the stakeholders, this disconnect is dangerous.

Owing to possible shocks, and when banks increase their capital (recapitalisation), it is required that banks adopt more sophisticated risk-management frameworks capable of withstanding severe economic scenarios, with the expectation that stronger banks should also have stronger systems to manage risks and survive economic crises. In Nigeria today, every financial institution’s stress testing must be performed in the face of the economy facing severe shocks like currency depreciation, sovereign debt pressures, and sudden interest-rate spikes.

Risk management should evolve from a compliance obligation into a strategic discipline embedded in every lending decision.

Public confidence in the banking system depends heavily on credible financial reporting.

Investors, analysts, and depositors need to be able to understand banks’ true financial positions without navigating non-transparent disclosures or creative accounting practices, which means the industry must be liberated to an extent that gives room for access to information.

Recapitalisation provides an opportunity to strengthen the enforcement of international financial reporting standards, enhance audit quality, and require clearer disclosure of capital adequacy, asset quality, and related-party transactions. Transparency should not be feared. It is the foundation of trust.

One thing that must be corrected is that while recapitalisation often focuses on financial metrics, the banking sector ultimately runs on human capital.

Another fearful aspect of this exercise for the economy is that consolidation and mergers triggered by the reform could lead to workforce disruptions if not carefully managed. Job losses, casualisation, and declining staff morale can weaken institutional culture and productivity. Strong banks are built by strong people.

If recapitalisation strengthens balance sheets while destabilising the workforce that powers the system, the reform risks undermining its own economic objectives. Human capital stability must therefore form part of the broader reform strategy.

Doubtless, another emerging shift in Nigeria’s financial landscape is the rise of digital financial platforms that are increasingly changing how people access and use money in Nigeria.

Millions of Nigerians are increasingly relying on fintech platforms for payments, microloans, and everyday financial transactions. One of the advantages it offers is that these services often deliver faster and more user-friendly experiences than traditional banks. While innovation is welcome, it raises important questions about the future structure of financial intermediation.

The point here is that the moment traditional banks retreat from retail banking while fintech platforms dominate customer interactions, systemic liquidity and regulatory oversight could become fragmented.

The CBN must see to it that the recapitalised banks must therefore invest aggressively in digital infrastructure, cybersecurity, and customer experience, while cutting down costs on all less critical areas in the industry.

Nigerians should feel the benefits of recapitalisation not only in stronger balance sheets but also in faster apps, reliable payment systems, and responsive customer service.

As banks grow larger through recapitalisation and consolidation, a new challenge emerges via systemic concentration.

Nigeria’s largest banks already control a significant share of industry assets. Further consolidation could deepen the divide between dominant institutions and smaller players. This creates the risk of “too-big-to-fail” banks whose collapse could threaten the entire financial system.

To address this risk, regulators must strengthen resolution frameworks that allow distressed banks to fail without triggering systemic panic, their collapse does not damage the whole financial system, and do not require taxpayer-funded bailouts to forestall similar mistakes that occurred with the liquidation of Heritage Bank.  Market discipline depends on credible failure mechanisms.

It must be understood that Nigeria’s banking recapitalisation is not merely a financial exercise or, better still, increasing banks’ capital. It is a rare opportunity to rebuild trust, strengthen governance, and reposition the financial system as a true engine of economic development.

One fact is that if the reform focuses only on capital numbers, the country risks repeating a familiar pattern of churning out impressive balance sheets followed by another cycle of crisis.

But the actors in this exercise must ensure that the recapitalisation addresses governance failures, asset quality concerns, risk management weaknesses, and transparency gaps; and the moment this is done, the banking sector could emerge stronger and more resilient.

Nigeria does not simply need bigger banks. It needs better banks, institutions capable of financing innovation, supporting entrepreneurs, and building economic opportunity for millions of citizens.

The true capital of any banking system is not just money. It is trust. And whether this recapitalisation ultimately succeeds will depend on whether Nigerians see that trust reflected not only in financial statements but in the everyday experience of saving, borrowing, and investing in the economy. Only then will bigger banks translate into a stronger nation.

Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: bl***********@***il.com

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