Feature/OPED
Information Operations: An Understudied Facet of Russian Influence in Africa
By Miriam Roday and Sarah Daly
In a quiet neighbourhood just outside of Accra, 16 Ghanaians were instructed to create social media accounts, representing themselves as Americans, to post content about divisive political issues, where and when U.S. audiences were most active online.
Starting in June 2019, posts like this tweet trickled into users’ newsfeeds: “How can a #police officer kill an 11-year-old #black boy and go unpunished? Why, are some lives more important than others?”
In the run-up to the 2020 U.S. presidential election, Russian operatives from Ghana and Nigeria crafted fake profiles on social media to stoke tensions and widen cleavages in American society.
Russian trolls posted in Facebook groups about police brutality and racial inequity, implying or claiming that they lived in the United States, and in one case, purported to be the cousin of a Black American who had died in police custody.
These trolling tactics may sound familiar. They were central themes of Moscow’s “sweeping and systematic” campaign to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Under the direction of Russian financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, the Kremlin deployed an army of professional trolls from the now-infamous Internet Research Agency (IRA) based in St. Petersburg to manipulate social media platforms and flood the information space with divisive and inflammatory narratives. During the 2016 election cycle, the effort succeeded in fomenting unrest and conflict.
Russia’s most recent campaign to sow discord within the American electorate, however, marks its first use of Africa as a launchpad for disinformation campaigns aimed at the United States.
Earlier in 2021, the intelligence community confirmed that Russian President Vladimir Putin tried to influence the contest between Joe Biden and Donald Trump, including by “exacerbating sociopolitical divisions in the US” and using troll farms in Ghana and Nigeria to “propagate US-focused narratives.”
A months-long investigation by CNN uncovered details about the pop-up operation in Ghana masquerading as a non-profit that received funding from an “anonymous source” in Europe. Its 16 employees, some unaware they were working with and for Russian operatives, built audiences and coordinated their posts by time and topic to maximize engagement with American users. Facebook corroborated these findings and linked several of the accounts to Prigozhin’s IRA that it had previously removed for “coordinated inauthentic behaviour.”
The Kremlin uses these troll accounts on social media to establish digital networks of influence and advance its agenda in the information space—to subvert public discourse and disseminate anti-Western messaging.
Russia’s interference campaign in 2016 illustrated how damaging these low-cost, low-risk tactics can be, especially against a fractious electorate in a highly polarized media environment. This threat is particularly palpable in Africa, where geopolitical developments and democratic backsliding make many states vulnerable to Russian interference.
And while the Kremlin’s use of Africa as a base for its information operations targeting a U.S. election may be novel, Russia has been running information manipulation campaigns within Africa for years. Moscow’s weaponization of information is an understudied, overlooked component of its strategic influence efforts that presents immediate national security risks to democratic processes and institutions across the continent.
Russia’s Evolving Information Operations
The conversation surrounding Russian power projection in Africa often focuses on its revitalization of Soviet-era relationships and strategies to strike military, trade, and resource deals across the continent.
Russia’s use of parastatal and opaque private military companies to accomplish its goals has drawn international scrutiny. Nominally private, these entities and individuals operate at the direction of the Kremlin, and often deploy information operations to advance Russia’s broader goals in Africa: building a positive reputation for Russia as a “revitalized great power, international mediator, humanitarian actor, and effective counter-terrorism partner”; and courting current and future African leaders to establish long-term ties that will benefit its strategic interests.
Russian reputation-building campaigns involve circulating propaganda through various media, from social and state-funded to proxy sources in foreign news outlets. The Kremlin infiltrates and controls the information space by buying local media outlets or inserting Russian state-owned television channels RT and Sputnik in-country. Establishing mass media control allows Russia to shape the citizenry’s impressions of current events. The resulting de-democratization of information creates a similar effect to that of Russia’s social media campaigns: the Kremlin can develop and disseminate narratives not immediately identifiable as foreign propaganda and impose them onto a population.
Russia sees sidelining Western influence in Africa as integral to its campaign of upending the international order led by the United States. Using an ad-hoc blend of private military companies, non-governmental organizations, and local agents to carry its messages, Russia can launder narratives through the information ecosystem that paint the West as exploitative interventionist actors, and Moscow as a benevolent partner engaging with Africa on mutually beneficial terms.
Common tactics include criticizing the U.S. and French security assistance efforts and praising Russia’s ability to serve as a mediator and counter-terrorism partner despite limited evidence to support its effectiveness at either.
In addition to propagandizing, Russia uses its “franchised” proxies—local troll farms established by Russian operatives and affiliates—to influence domestic politics in Africa, often as a means to court political elites and secure support for extracting resources and building Russian military bases.
In October 2019, researchers at the Stanford Internet Observatory together with social media analytics firm, Graphika, uncovered Russian-linked information operations aimed at influencing the politics and public discourse of eight African countries.
Their joint report shows how using local trolls to augment mass and social media campaigns pays dividends allowing Russia to deploy effective, low-cost operations to more easily evade detection and obviate the need to conduct the operations within its own borders.
Russia has demonstrated a preference for autocratic or authoritarian-leaning political leaders and regimes that often coexist with a controlled information and media space.
For instance, in 2019, Russia orchestrated information operations in Sudan aimed at delegitimizing protestors in Khartoum and Moscow. Private researchers found that Prigozhin-linked proxies set up a Facebook page disguised as a local news network and frequently re-shared Sputnik articles.
The proxies, who were attempting to preserve President Omar al-Bashir’s leadership against popular opposition, also recommended public messaging themes to the regime and security responses to demonstrations. Though al-Bashir was deposed in April 2019, Russia’s influence campaign in Sudan corresponded to interests in licensing for gold mines and military basing in Port Sudan on the Red Sea. For Russia, relationship building, with later economic and security agreements in mind, supersede loyalty to a particular candidate or political platform.
Moscow has demonstrated this ideological flexibility in its extensive electioneering and propaganda efforts in the Central African Republic, Libya, Madagascar, and Mozambique, among others. The Kremlin seizes upon the information space as a means to gain political allies and threaten U.S. and French interests, even if it only manages to hijack African social and political discourse in the short term or on a particular issue.
To this end, Russian state-backed media outlets offer training courses on social media and the Kremlin sends “spin doctors” or propaganda specialists overseas to African clients. These impermanent and relatively agile information operations are ideal for producing a maximum effect on African states with minimum effort.
Growing Threat to Democracy
Russia’s efforts to infiltrate the information space in Africa brought to the fore with its most recent attempt to influence the 2020 U.S. election, will likely grow in scale and sophistication. In the past few years, such campaigns have enabled the Kremlin to dictate the terms of the truth and to degrade democratic discourse, which directly undermines U.S. stated interests in the region, namely its commitment to strengthening democratic progress and peace. These campaigns draw Africa into the spotlight as a battlefield where Russia can hone its weaponization of the information space against the United States and its allies.
Just as the Soviet Union did during the Cold War, Russia perceives the African information environment as permissive and less monitored, a place where it can experiment with tactics to influence political processes, fan the flames of social unrest, and deflect culpability. The threat to Africa, however, is acute. Russian information operations could fuel conflict in states prone to election violence, could destabilize governments and economies, and further erode democratic gains across the continent.
The United States and its allies can mitigate this risk by bolstering the African information environment against Russian exploitation. Specifically, the West can double down on its support for African nations and leaders working to strengthen election integrity and public discourse and to preserve independent and diverse media.
Also, establishing the means for greater collaboration between governments, civil society, and tech companies to expose and raise awareness about Russian disinformation can increase societal resilience against it.
Countering Russia’s subversive activities in the information environment will not only stymy its attempt to broker political, economic, and security deals across the continent, but promote the endurance of democratic institutions at home and abroad.
Miriam Roday is a researcher in the Joint Advanced Warfighting Division at the Institute for Defense Analyses with a focus on digital disinformation, Russia, and transatlantic security.
Sarah Daly is an adjunct researcher in the Intelligence Analysis Division at the Institute for Defense Analyses with a focus on geopolitical and security developments in Africa.
The views, opinions, and findings expressed in this paper should not be construed as representing the official position of the Institute for Defense Analyses, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.
Feature/OPED
How AI Levels the Playing Field for SMEs
By Linda Saunders
Intro: In many small businesses, the owner often starts out as the bookkeeper, the customer-service desk, the IT technician and the person who steps in when a delivery goes wrong. With so many balls up in the air – and such little room for error – one dropped ball can derail the entire day and trigger a chain of problems that’s hard to recover from. Unlike larger companies that have the luxury of spreading the load across dedicated teams and systems, SMEs carry it all on a few shoulders.
South Africa’s SME sector carries significant weight, contributing around 19% of GDP and a third of formal employment, according to the latest available Trade & Industrial Policy Strategies (TIPS) 2024 review. That is causing persistent constraints, including tight margins, erratic demand, high administrative load, and limited internal capacity.
This is not unique to South Africa. Many smaller businesses across the continent still rely on manual processes. It is common to find sales records kept separately from customer notes, or inventory data that is updated only occasionally. The result is slow turnaround times, duplicated effort and a lack of visibility across the business. Given that SMEs have such a huge influence on national economies, accounting for over 90% of all businesses, between 20-40% of GDP in some African countries, and a major source of employment, providing around 80% of jobs, these operational constraints have a broad impact on economies.
What has changed in recent years is that digital tools once seen as the preserve of larger companies have become more attainable for smaller operators. They do not remove the structural challenges SMEs face, but they can ease the load. Better systems do not replace judgement, experience or customer relationships; they simply give small companies more room to work with.
Cloud-based systems, automation and integrated customer-management tools have become more affordable and easier to deploy. They do not remove the structural pressures facing small businesses, but they can ease the operational load and create more space for productive work.
Doing more with the teams SMEs already have
Small teams often end up wearing several hats. One person might take customer calls, update stock records, handle service issues and manage follow-ups. When demand rises, these manual processes become harder to sustain. Local surveys regularly point to this strain, showing that smaller companies spend significant portions of the week on paperwork, compliance and routine administrative tasks – work that adds little value but cannot be ignored.
This is where automation is proving useful. Routine tasks such as onboarding new customers, checking documents, routing queries to the right person, logging interactions and sending follow-ups can now run quietly in the background. In larger companies, whole departments handle this work. In small businesses, the same burden has traditionally fallen on one or two people. When these processes run reliably without constant attention, a business with 10 employees can manage busier periods without rushed outsourcing or slipping service standards.
The point is not to replace staff, but to reduce the operational drag that limits what small teams can deliver. Structured workflows give SMEs a level of steadiness they have rarely had the time or money to build themselves.
Using better data to make better decisions
A second constraint facing SMEs is disorganised information. When customer details are lost in email, sales notes in chat groups, stock figures in spreadsheets and queries in separate systems, decisions depend on whatever information happens to be at hand. Forecasting becomes guesswork, and early warning signs are easy to miss.
Putting all this information in a single place changes the quality of decision-making. When sales, service and stock data can be viewed together, patterns become easier to spot: which products are moving, which customers are becoming less active, where delays tend to occur, and which periods consistently drive higher demand.
Importantly, SMEs do not need corporate analytics teams for this. Modern CRM platforms can organise information automatically and surface basic trends. For retailers preparing for 2026, this can help avoid over – or under – stocking. For service businesses, it can highlight customers who may be at risk of leaving, prompting earlier intervention. In competitive markets, having clearer information is a practical advantage.
Building a foundation before the pressure arrives
Rapid growth can be as destabilising for SMEs as an economic downturn. When orders increase, manual processes quickly reach their limit. Errors are more likely, staff become overwhelmed and the customer experience suffers. Many small businesses only upgrade their systems once these problems appear, by which time the cost, both financial and reputational, is already significant.
Putting basic workflow tools and a unified customer record in place early provides a useful buffer. Tasks follow the same steps every time, reducing inconsistency. Customers reach the right person more quickly. Staff spend less time checking or re-entering information and more time on work that matters. These small operational gains compound over time, especially during busy periods.
This is not about chasing every new technology. It is about avoiding a common pattern in the SME sector: when demand rises, systems buckle, and growth becomes more difficult.
Confidence matters as much as capability
Smaller companies understandably worry about risk when adopting new systems. Data protection, monitoring, and compliance can feel daunting without an IT department. The advantage of modern platforms is that many of these protections, like encryption, audit trails, and event monitoring, are built in. Transparent design also helps SMEs understand how automated decisions are made and how customer data is handled.
This reassurance is important because SMEs should not have to choose between improving their operations and protecting their customers’ information.
2026 will reward readiness
Technology will not replace the qualities that give SMEs their edge: personal service, flexibility, and the ability to respond quickly to customer needs. What it can do is relieve the administrative load that prevents those strengths from being fully used.
SMEs that invest in simple automation and better data practices now will enter 2026 with greater capacity and clearer insight. They won’t be competing with larger companies by matching their resources, but by removing the disadvantages that have traditionally held them back.
In the year ahead, the most competitive businesses will not be the biggest; they’ll be the ones that prepared early for the year ahead.
Linda Saunders is the Country Manager & Senior Director Solution Engineering for Africa at Salesforce
Feature/OPED
Why Africa Requires Homegrown Trade Finance to Boost Economic Integration
By Cyprian Rono
Africa’s quest to trade with itself has never been more urgent. With the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) gaining momentum, governments are working to deepen intra-African commerce. The idea of “One African Market” is no longer aspirational; it is emerging as a strategic pathway for economic growth, job creation, and industrial competitiveness. Yet even as infrastructure and regulatory reforms advance, one fundamental question remains; how will Africa finance its cross-border trade, across markets with diverse currencies, regulations, and standards?
Today, only 15 to 18 percent of Africa’s internal trade happens within the continent, compared to 68 percent in Europe and 59 percent in Asia. Closing this gap is essential if AfCFTA is to deliver prosperity to Africa’s 1.3 billion people.
A major constraint is the continent’s huge trade finance deficit, which exceeds USD 81 billion annually, according to the African Development Bank. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which provide more than 80 percent of the continent’s jobs, are the most affected. Many struggle with insufficient collateral, stringent risk profiling and compliance requirements that mirror international banking standards rather than the realities of African business.
To build integrated value chains, exporters and importers must operate within trusted, predictable, and interconnected financial systems. This requires strong pan-African financial institutions with both local knowledge and continental reach.
Homegrown trade finance is therefore indispensable. Pan-African banks combine deep domestic roots with extensive regional reach, making them the most credible engines for financing trade integration. By retaining financial activity within the continent, homegrown lenders reduce exposure to external shocks and keep liquidity circulating locally. They also strengthen existing regional payment infrastructure such as the Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS), developed by the Africa Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) and backed by the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Secretariat, enabling faster, cheaper and seamless cross-border payments across the continent.
Digital transformation amplifies this advantage. Real-time payments, seamless Know-Your-Customer (KYC) verification, automated credit scoring and consistent service delivery across markets are essential for intra-African trade. Institutions such as Ecobank, operating in 34 African countries with integrated core banking systems, demonstrate how such digital ecosystems can enable continent-wide commerce.
Platforms such as Ecobank’s Omni, Rapidtransfer and RapidCollect, together with digital account-opening services, make it much easier for traders to operate across borders. Rapidtransfer enables instant, secure payments across Ecobank’s 34-country network, reducing delays in regional trade, while RapidCollect gives cross-border enterprises the ability to receive payments from multiple African countries into a single account with real-time confirmation and automated reconciliation. Together, these solutions create an integrated digital ecosystem that lowers friction, accelerates payments, and strengthens intra-African commerce.
Trust, however, remains a significant barrier. Cross-border commerce depends on the confidence that partners will honour contracts, deliver goods as promised, pay on time, and present authentic documentation. Traders often lack reliable information on potential partners, operate under different regulatory regimes, and exchange documents that are difficult to verify across borders. This heightens the risk of fraud, non-payment, and contractual disputes, discouraging businesss from expanding beyond familiar markets.
Technology is closing this trust gap. Artificial Intelligence enables lenders to assess risk using alternative data for SMEs without formal credit histories. Distributed ledger tools make shipping documents, certificates of origin, and inspection reports tamper-proof. In addition, supply-chain visibility platforms enable real-time tracking of goods and cross-border digital KYC ensures that both buyers and sellers are verified before any transaction occurs.
Ecobank’s Single Trade Hub embodies this trust infrastructure by offering a secure digital marketplace where buyers and sellers can trade with confidence, even in markets where no prior relationships exist. The platform’s Trade Intelligence suite provides customers instant access to market data from customs information and product classification tools across 133 countries.
Through its unique features such as the classification of best import/export markets, over 25,000 market and industry reports, customs duty calculators, and local and universal customs classification codes, businesses can accurately assess market opportunities, anticipate trends, reduce compliance risks, and optimise supply chains, ultimately helping them compete and grow in regional and global markets.
SMEs need more than financing. Many operate in cash-heavy cycles where suppliers and logistics providers require upfront payment. Lenders can support these businesses with advisory services, business intelligence, compliance guidance, and platforms for secure partner verification, contract negotiation, and secure settlement of payments. Trade fairs, industry forums, and partnerships with chambers of commerce further build the trust networks needed for cross-border trade.
Ultimately, Africa’s path toward meaningful trade integration begins with financial integration. AfCFTA’s promise will only be realised when enterprises can trade with confidence, knowing that payments will be honoured, partners verified, and disputes resolved. This requires collaboration between banks, regulators, and trade institutions, alongside harmonised financial regulations, interoperable payment systems, and continent-wide verification networks.
Africa can no longer rely on external actors to finance its trade. Its economic transformation depends on strong, trusted, and digitally enabled African financial institutions that understand Africa’s unique risks and opportunities. By building an African-led trade finance ecosystem, the continent can unlock liquidity, reduce dependence on external currencies, empower SMEs, and retain more value locally. Africa’s trade revolution will accelerate when its financing is driven by African institutions, African systems, and African ambition.
Cyprian Rono is the Director of Corporate and Investment Banking for Kenya and EAC at Ecobank Kenya
Feature/OPED
Tax Reform or Financial Exclusion? The Trouble with Mandatory TINs
By Blaise Udunze
It is not only questionable but an aberration that a nation where over 38million Nigerians remain financially excluded, where trust in institutions is fragile, and where citizens are pressured under the weight of rising living costs, the use of Tax Identification Number (TIN) has been specified as the only option for their bank accounts operation from January 1, 2026 by the Federal Government of Nigeria.
In practice, the policy spearheaded by Taiwo Oyedele, Chairman of the Presidential Committee on Fiscal Policy and Tax Reforms, is rooted in the Nigerian Tax Administration Act (NTAA), and the intention can be understood in the areas of improving tax compliance, widening the tax net, and formalizing economic activities. But in practice, the directive risks becoming yet another well-meaning reform that punishes the wrong people, disrupts financial inclusiveness, and potentially destabilises an already stressed economy.
Yes, Nigeria needs tax reforms. Yes, the country must broaden its tax base. And yes, public revenues must increase to address fiscal pressures.
But compelling citizens to obtain TINs as a condition for operating bank accounts is the wrong tool for the right objective.
Below are five core arguments against the directive, and sustainable alternatives that actually strengthen tax compliance without endangering banking access or punishing informal earners.
The Directive Risks Deepening Financial Exclusion
Nigeria still struggles with financial inclusion. According to several official assessments, over 38 million adults remain outside the formal financial system. Many of them operate small, irregular businesses, survive through subsistence earnings, or depend on cash-based livelihoods.
The Federal Government’s compulsory TIN-for-bank-accounts policy is built on the assumption that every banked Nigerian is structured, organised, and tax-ready. This is false.
For instance, the rural market woman with N30,000 in rotating savings, the okada rider who deposits cash once a week, the petty trader using a mobile POS agent account, the retiring pensioner managing a small monthly income, and the migrant worker sends small remittances to their family. These are not tax evaders; they are survivalists.
Most operate bank accounts not because they run formal businesses, but because those accounts are essential to modern financial life: receiving transfers, accessing loans, participating in digital commerce, saving against emergencies, and avoiding the risks of moving cash in insecure environments.
By creating an additional bureaucratic barrier, the directive risks pushing millions back into a cash-dominant shadow economy, precisely the opposite outcome of what Nigeria’s financial-sector reforms are trying to achieve.
Bank Accounts Are Not Proof of Taxable Income
The NTAA clarifies that the TIN requirement applies only to taxable persons, individuals engaged in trade, employment, or income-generating activities.
But herein lies the problem: banks cannot determine who is “taxable” and who is not. Banks only see deposits and withdrawals. They do not audit the source or consistency of income. They are not tax authorities.
A student may run a small online clothing resale gig. A retiree may occasionally rent out farmland.
A dependent may receive cash support from a relative abroad. A job seeker may get intermittent gifts from family.
Who decides which of these scenarios qualifies as taxable? Banks? FIRS? Or will citizens be expected to self-declare under threat of account restrictions?
The result will be confusion, over-compliance, and mass panic with banks indiscriminately demanding TINs from everyone to avoid regulatory penalties.
This not only contradicts the spirit of the law but also exposes ordinary Nigerians to harassment and arbitrary compliance requirements.
The Policy Could Trigger Disruption, Panic Withdrawals, and Cash Hoarding
Whenever Nigerians perceive threats to their access to funds, the natural reaction is withdrawal and hoarding. We saw it during:
– the 2023 Naira redesign crisis,
– the 2016 TSA-bank consolidation tightening, and multiple periods of financial instability.
Telling citizens that bank accounts may face “operational restrictions” if they do not obtain a TIN creates a predictable behavioural response: people will rush to withdraw money.
This would be disastrous for a banking system already pressured by:
– high interest rates,
– inflation eroding deposits,
– rising loan defaults, and
– declining public trust.
Any government policy that unintentionally creates an incentive for citizens to flee the formal banking system is counterproductive.
The TIN Requirement Will Become a Bureaucratic Nightmare
Even if millions of Nigerians want to comply, the system is not ready. Nigeria’s administrative infrastructure does not have the capacity to process tens of millions of TIN registrations within months without:
– long queues,
– delays,
– data mismatches,
– duplicate records, and
– systemic errors.
The National Identity Number (NIN)-SIM registration experience is a painful reminder of what happens when ambitious policy meets weak execution capacity.
– Citizens spent months in overcrowded enrolment centres.
– Millions were blocked from services.
– Data inconsistencies persisted.
– The economy suffered productivity losses.
If Nigeria could not seamlessly synchronise NIN and SIM data, how will it synchronise NIN, BVN, and TIN at a national scale without dislocation?
Forcing TIN Adoption Ignores the Real Problem: Nigeria’s Broken Tax Culture
The Federal Government’s real challenge is not that citizens lack TINs, but that they lack trust in how taxes are used.
A government cannot widen the tax net when:
– tax leakages remain widespread,
– citizens feel services do not match taxation,
– corruption perceptions are high,
– government spending lacks transparency, and
– taxpayers do not feel seen, heard, or valued.
Coercion does not build a tax culture. Engagement does. Policy does not create legitimacy. Accountability does.
If the Federal Government wants Nigerians to freely participate in the tax system, it must earn legitimacy first, not mandate compliance through financial restrictions.
What the Government Should Do Instead: A Smarter Path to Tax Reform
Instead of enforcing a policy that may backfire economically and socially, the Federal Government can adopt four smarter, people-centred alternatives.
– Automatic TIN Issuance Linked to NIN and BVN
Rather than forcing Nigerians to apply manually, the government should:
- auto-generate TINs for all existing BVN/NIN holders,
- send the TINs via SMS, email, and bank alerts,
- allow self-activation only when needed for tax obligations.
This eliminates queues, delays, and confusion.
– Build a Voluntary Tax Compliance Culture Through Transparency and Incentives
Tax morale improves when citizens see value. Government should:
- publish annual audited reports of tax revenue use,
- incentivise compliant taxpayers with benefits (priority access to government grants, credit scoring, etc.),
- simplify tax filings for small businesses.
People comply more when they feel respected, not coerced.
– Target High-Value Tax Evaders, Not Low-Income Account Holders
Nigeria’s real tax leakages come from:
- large corporations shifting profits,
- politically exposed persons,
- illicit financial flows,
- multinational tax avoidance strategies,
- the informal “big money” class operating outside the banking system.
Instead of threatening small depositors, the government should strengthen:
- FIRS intelligence and investigation units,
- inter-agency data integration (CAC, Customs, Immigration),
- beneficial ownership transparency enforcement.
The fight against tax evasion should focus on those hiding billions, not those depositing thousands.
– Strengthen Digital Tax Platforms for Easy Self-Registration and Compliance
If tax registration becomes as easy as opening a social media account, compliance will rise naturally. The government should build:
- a mobile-first tax app,
- simplified online TIN retrieval,
- one-click tax filing for gig workers and small traders.
Digital convenience can achieve what regulatory coercion cannot.
Reform Should Not Punish the Public
No doubt, tax reforms are needed urgently, but they must come with a human face, an intelligent, equitable, and aligned with the realities of ordinary Nigerians.
The TIN-for-bank-accounts policy, while well-intentioned, risks undermining financial inclusion, triggering economic instability, and imposing unnecessary burdens on millions who are not tax evaders but survival-based earners.
Good tax policy is built on trust, not fear. On transparency, not threats. On civic legitimacy, not administrative compulsion.
If the Federal Government truly wants to modernise Nigeria’s tax system, it must focus not on restricting citizens’ access to their own money, but on:
- repairing tax trust,
- digitising compliance,
- targeting the real evaders, and
- making participation easier, not harder.
Financial inclusion took Nigeria decades to build. We cannot afford a policy that carelessly reverses these gains.
A better tax system is possible, but it must start with the people, not with their bank accounts.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos, can be reached via: [email protected]
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