Feature/OPED
National Contradictions Tinubu Must Resolve in 2024
By Michael Owhoko, PhD
Any Nigerian with a rational and open mind knows that the complexity of governance in Nigeria today is rooted in the country’s political system, which by any stretch of imagination and logic, is unsuitable for a heterogenous society like Nigeria with over 250 ethnic groups that is characterized by incompatible cultures, varied history, background and interests.
These ethnic groups were hitherto independent nations that ceded their sovereignty to the Nigerian state under federalism, a political system that took cognizance of their peculiarities and agreed upon by the country’s founding fathers.
But ever since this system was subverted and replaced with a unitary state structure, Nigeria has been embroiled with unending suspicion, distrust, disunity, disharmony, nepotism, hegemony and rivalry among the various ethnic nationalities, indicative of its inappropriateness.
The unsuitability of the unitary state structure, inequitable revenue sharing method, breach of the country’s secularity status, dishonest quota system and political location of industries are major national contradictions undermining Nigeria’s potential. Except to hide under cover of pretence, it is common knowledge that Nigeria’s progress is held down by these national paradoxes. They are aberrations and drawbacks that are fundamentally responsible for the country’s stunted growth. These are what President Tinubu must address in 2024 to set the tone for an equitable and prosperous Nigeria.
Efforts outside this trajectory amount to a sheer cosmetic administrative routine and a waste of valuable resources incapable of restoring hope. The Unitary system of government has become a Frankenstein monster that is pushing the country towards the precipice with diminished national and global stature. Until a more suitable political template is introduced, Nigeria will continue to drift in circles like a regional giant with no illuminating potential to inspire public confidence.
Federalism had been tested in Nigeria, and it worked. It is a system of government where all federating states and central government are financially independent, autonomous, interdependent and co-equal with neither the federal government nor the states inferior to each other. This is the political system that best suits the country’s cultural diversity and sociological complexities, capable of achieving equity, justice and balance.
In a plural society like Nigeria, the unitary system is a misfit, lacking the capacity to promote unity. It engenders acrimony, disaffection, nepotism, primordial nationalism and marginalization, owing to conflicting cultural aspirations. The emergence of separatist movements and other related self-determination groups are some of the challenges facing Nigeria today, justifying the need for Federalism to stem the tide. Otherwise, the country risks more ethnic nationalities surfacing to seek autonomy.
With about 68 items on the Exclusive list and 12 items on the Concurrent list, the 1999 Constitution is in structure, content and spirit, a Unitary constitution, where the destiny of the states and people are determined and centrally regulated, using revenue allocation as a tool for coercion and subservient corporatism. This Constitution has failed Nigerians. The states or geo-political zones want an independent hold of their future within the context of their distinct cultural aspirations.
As a way out, the concept of the 1963 Constitution should be invoked to allow states to take control of mineral deposits found in their domains. In other words, fiscal federalism with a derivation principle allowing retention of a 50 per cent minimum of accrued revenue found in or generated by the states, should be introduced. All states and geo-political areas in Nigeria are evidently endowed as God has provided every habitat with natural resources, including agricultural crops for subsistence. This will not only give states the necessary financial autonomy, but will encourage them to harness and optimize their potential, just as it will encourage hard work, healthy competition, and discourage indolence.
The government’s involvement in religion is also a national contradiction and aberration. Nigeria is a secular state as affirmed by Section 10 of the 1999 Constitution, which says that the Government of the federation or of a state shall not adopt any religion as state religion in Nigeria. However, the federal government’s behavioural disposition undermines this clause when viewed against the backdrop of its contribution and participation in religious matters.
By establishing the National Hajj Commission of Nigeria (NAHCON) and the Nigeria Christian Pilgrim Commission (NCPC) to oversee and facilitate the process for participation of Muslims in Hajj or Umra in Saudi Arabia and the pilgrimage of Christians to Jerusalem and other holy sites, the federal government has adopted Islam and Christianity as official religions, contrary to the intention of secularism.
Deception of Nigeria’s secularity status is further exposed by Nigeria’s membership of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), a religious body representing “the collective voice of the Muslim world”, and working “to safeguard the interests and ensure the progress and well-being of Muslims.” Nigeria’s membership is a tacit endorsement of the country as an Islamic state, as depicted by its commitment to dues obligation.
Religion is a personal affair, and individuals are at liberty to practice their faith as deemed appropriate, as long as it does not violate the rights of others. The huge amount expended by the federal government annually to fund NAHCON and NCPC, as well as meeting financial obligations in OIC, is an infringement on the right of Nigerians whose taxes are used to service these private interests.
After all, the government’s involvement in religion has not reduced moral decadence in Nigeria, as most beneficiaries of these pilgrimages to Hajj and Jerusalem are involved in corruption that has contributed to the country’s woes. Rather than waste the country’s resources on these unprofitable ventures, such money should be used to shore up decaying infrastructure across the country.
President Tinubu should therefore dissolve NAHCON and NCPC, and remove Nigeria from membership of OIC, as part of strategies to maintain the secularity of Nigeria. Any state government whosoever desires to fund its citizens to holy sites is free to do so at its own expense. The federal government must hand off religion to save taxpayers’ money.
The quota system is another national contradiction. It is part of Nigeria’s problems and a source of bureaucratic ineptitude that should be discarded for excellence. This system has been consistently abused and manipulated by government officials to serve primordial and entrenched interests. The system has also deprived millions of brilliant Nigerians of opportunities to serve their fatherland on account of their states of origin.
When merit is sacrificed on the altar of representation, what you have is incompetence and failure. Nigeria is currently paying the price of poor performance in government owing to quota application in the recruitment process in ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs). The outcome has been inefficiency and poor delivery output with no value addition.
Sadly, the quota system is applicable to the educational sector which is supposed to be the substratum of research and development. Unqualified students are admitted into federal unity schools and universities while brilliant ones are unable to secure placements. In some cases, the appointment of professors and award of PhD degrees are based on a quota system, leading to the production of quota scholars lacking the capacity for research and discovery. What an irony for a country that is striving to compete in global affairs!
The quota system is a recipe for failure and poor performance. It is not applicable in the private sector because of these gaps. This may have also informed why the powers that be have deliberately refused to introduce the system in the selection of players for the national team, the Super Eagles. They know that if the obnoxious quota is applied, the performance of the Super Eagles will be an outright tragedy for the country.
Another national contradiction is the political location of industries. Oil and gas companies involved in the exploration of crude oil in the Niger Delta should be compelled to relocate their administrative headquarters to areas where they have a minimum of 70 per cent of their operations. This will not only accelerate the development of the region but will help in resolving current poverty and frustration, resulting from negligence and degradation in the region. The Nigeria LNG Limited which moved its administrative headquarters from Lagos to Bonny Island, Rivers State, where its operational base is located, is enjoying support from its host communities. The company should be commended and emulated.
Therefore, to reset, reshape and reposition Nigeria for a stronger brand identity aimed at maximizing its full potential to achieve national progress, regional influence and global respect, President Bola Tinubu must address and nip these national contradictions in the bud by next year, 2024.
Dr Mike Owhoko, Lagos-based journalist and author, can be reached at www.mikeowhoko.com.
By Blaise Udunze
Daily, the world watches Nigeria through a familiar lens in what appears to be a gory situation. Especially in cases when the news headlines tell stories of farmer-herder clashes, bandit attacks, kidnappings, villages reduced to ashes or deserted by the dwellers, as thousands of Nigerians have been displaced across states such as Zamfara, Plateau, Benue, Niger, Kaduna and Nasarawa. Subliminally, this is about to become a similarly ugly occurrence in southwestern Nigeria, which is fast becoming obvious if not nipped in the bud quickly.
Recorded data have shown that bandits, Boko Haram, and others killed over 190,000 Nigerians in 17 years and displaced 3.7 million people.
A human rights organisation, the International Society for Civil Liberties and Rule of Law (Intersociety), in its fearful revelation, has said that no fewer than 190,150 Nigerians have been killed by bandits, Boko Haram insurgents, and suspected armed herdsmen between July 2009 and March 19, 2026, as this calls for concern.
The dominant explanations often point to ethnic tensions, religious divisions, climate change, shrinking grazing routes or weak security institutions. No doubt, those factors are certainly part of Nigeria’s complex security crisis. Yet another question deserves serious examination.
What if, in some locations, the violence is also serving another purpose? What if some of the territories experiencing repeated displacement are the same places sitting atop some of Nigeria’s most valuable mineral deposits? More importantly, if such a pattern exists, who benefits when communities disappear?
Of a truth, these questions are uncomfortable, but undeniably they deserve careful investigation rather than dismissal.
For ages, Nigeria has been naturally endowed, and it is estimated to be rich in enormous significant reserves of gold, lithium, uranium, tin, columbite and other strategic minerals increasingly sought after in the global transition to clean energy technologies. As international demand for battery minerals continues to rise, these resources have become far more valuable than they were only a decade ago.
If one overlays publicly available geological information with maps showing persistent violence, some observers argue that striking geographical overlaps appear in several regions. Such overlaps alone cannot establish causation. Correlation is not proof of conspiracy. However, they raise questions worthy of independent scrutiny.
One issue attracting increasing attention and adequately yearns for answer is whether prolonged insecurity may inadvertently or deliberately create conditions that make mineral extraction easier.
Under Nigeria’s Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act 2007, mineral resources belong to the Federal Government, while mining rights are granted through licences and leases. Community engagement and land access are expected to form part of the licensing process, although implementation varies depending on circumstances. This raises an important policy question.
What happens when the communities expected to participate in those processes have already fled because of violence?
Displacement changes the dynamics of land ownership, consent and access. While no evidence automatically proves that attacks are orchestrated to facilitate mining, the sequence of violence followed by renewed commercial activity in some locations deserves closer examination by regulators, lawmakers and investigative journalists.
In conflict studies, researchers have long observed that wars often generate economic winners alongside humanitarian losers. Could elements of Nigeria’s insecurity also be producing economic beneficiaries?
Reports over the years have documented concerns about illegal mining operations across parts of northern Nigeria. Government agencies themselves have repeatedly acknowledged that criminal networks profit from the country’s vast mineral wealth. The unresolved question is whether isolated criminality has, in some instances, evolved into more sophisticated alliances involving political influence, financial interests and international supply chains. If so, the implications extend far beyond Nigeria.
Invariably, it is clearly known that lithium has become one of the world’s most strategic commodities, powering electric vehicle batteries and renewable energy storage systems. Gold has always remained one of the safest global investment assets during periods of uncertainty. Meanwhile, it is well confirmed that the global appetite for these minerals creates enormous financial incentives.
Suppose violent displacement reduces resistance to extraction. Suppose shell companies subsequently acquire mining interests. Suppose minerals then leave Nigeria through legitimate-looking export documentation while their true value remains understated.
These scenarios remain allegations unless supported by verifiable evidence. Yet they outline a framework that investigators may wish to test rather than ignore. Financial crime experts frequently identify trade mis-invoicing as one of the most common methods of illicit financial flows worldwide.
Could Nigeria’s solid minerals sector be vulnerable to similar practices? If valuable lithium ore is deliberately but inaccurately described as lower-value material on export documents, substantial wealth could potentially leave the country without reflecting its true market value. Likewise, if unrefined gold exits through privileged channels with limited scrutiny, questions naturally arise about oversight, transparency and accountability over criminal activities which have continued to stunt and disrupt the country’s socio-economic growth and at the same time cause carnage.
Such possibilities are not accusations against any particular institution or company. Rather, they illustrate why stronger monitoring systems are increasingly essential. Another question concerns logistics.
With the high level of criminal activities, industrial mining requires heavy machinery, diesel supplies, transportation networks and specialised personnel. These are not operations that can remain invisible indefinitely.
If certain territories are genuinely too dangerous for security agencies, how do industrial-scale extraction activities reportedly continue in some remote locations? If they do, who protects those operations? Who authorises their movement? Who verifies what is extracted? Who ensures royalties and export revenues reach public coffers? These are governance questions that demand institutional answers.
Equally important is the international dimension. Minerals extracted in Nigeria ultimately enter global supply chains. Gold may pass through international refining hubs before entering financial markets. Lithium may become part of battery manufacturing destined for electric vehicles, which are being sold across Europe, North America and Asia.
One known fact is that consumers purchasing products containing these minerals rarely know the full story of where they originated.
Increasingly, however, investors and governments are demanding ethical sourcing standards that trace minerals from extraction to final manufacture.
A critical factor that must be taken into cognisance is that if insecurity is creating opportunities for illegal or unethical extraction anywhere in the world, multinational companies have responsibilities alongside national governments, of which the onus falls on the Nigerian government.
Transparency cannot stop at the mine gate. Nor should accountability end at national borders. Another issue requiring attention concerns beneficial ownership.
Across many jurisdictions, shell companies can obscure the identities of individuals ultimately controlling commercial assets. If politically exposed persons or powerful business interests are hidden behind complex corporate structures registered offshore, identifying beneficiaries becomes significantly more difficult. This challenge is hardly unique to Nigeria.
Findings showed that from Latin America to Central Africa and Southeast Asia, resistant corporate networks have frequently complicated efforts to combat corruption and illicit resource extraction. That is precisely why open corporate registries, beneficial ownership databases and transparent mining licence disclosures are becoming global governance priorities. For Nigeria, the stakes could hardly be higher.
The country stands at the centre of the world’s emerging critical minerals economy. The Nigerian government can’t feign ignorance of the fact that, when handled transparently, these resources could finance infrastructure, education, healthcare, and industrial development for generations.
In no way would the government claim not knowing that when handled poorly, they risk becoming another chapter in the well-documented “resource curse,” where extraordinary natural wealth coincides with persistent poverty, insecurity and institutional weakness.
The ultimate challenge, therefore, is not simply about mining. It is about governance. It is about whether public institutions possess both the independence and capacity to ensure that natural resources benefit citizens rather than narrow interests. It is about whether conflict zones receive genuine peacebuilding efforts instead of becoming forgotten frontiers. And it is about whether international markets demand accountability with the same enthusiasm they demand raw materials.
None of these questions should be answered through speculation. They require rigorous investigations, forensic financial analysis, satellite imagery, mining license audits, customs records, beneficial ownership disclosures and courageous journalism.
They require governments willing to open their books. They require international cooperation capable of tracing money across borders. Most importantly, they require asking questions that have too often remained unasked.
Perhaps Nigeria’s security crisis is exactly what it appears to be: a tragic convergence of historical grievances, weak institutions, criminality and environmental pressures. Or perhaps, in some places, another layer of economic incentive deserves closer scrutiny.
Until those questions are thoroughly investigated, one possibility will continue to linger. Maybe the world’s attention has been fixed on the blood spilt above ground, while too little attention has been paid to the extraordinary wealth lying beneath it.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: bl***********@***il.com
Feature/OPED
What Does Nigeria’s $51bn Reserves Milestone Mean if Most New Foreign Money Can Leave Quickly?
Nigeria’s foreign reserves have climbed to about $51 billion, a decade-plus high, according to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). EBC Financial Group (EBC) notes that this reflects stronger investor confidence, but the second half may show whether it holds, as the build rests on three cyclical drivers: oil earnings, short-term foreign money and a narrowing official-to-street naira gap.
Reserves rose from about $32 billion in April 2024, during a dollar shortage, to about $51 billion now, near the CBN’s target. Much came from two cyclical sources, strong oil earnings and money chasing high-yielding naira assets, so EBC expects the pace to slow or reverse. Fitch Ratings, a major international credit rating agency, expects a marginal decline to about $47 billion by the end of 2026, citing higher spending and external pressures.
David Precious, Senior Market Analyst at EBC Financial Group, said, “Nigeria’s reserve build is real but may not be durable yet, because nearly all of the new money is the kind that can leave quickly. Of the $10.37 billion that came in over the first quarter, the overwhelming majority was short-term portfolio funds rather than long-term investment, so a shift in oil prices, global interest rates or confidence in the naira might pull a large part of it straight back out.”
Most New Money Can Still Leave Quickly
The composition of the foreign inflows explains the caution over how long the build can last. The country attracted $10.37 billion in foreign investment in the first quarter of 2026, up 83.83 per cent year-on-year, according to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Of that, $9.86 billion or 95.09 per cent, was portfolio money, largely short-term naira debt such as Treasury bills that investors can sell at the next auction, while foreign direct investment, the long-term kind that builds factories and jobs, was $135.08 million, or 1.30 per cent. Put simply, of each dollar coming in, about 95 cents can leave quickly, and barely one cent stays.
That money supports reserves while it stays. Dollars brought in to buy naira assets add to market supply, letting the CBN hold more reserves and steady the naira. It leaves when conditions change. Nigeria earns most of its export dollars from oil and gas, so lower oil prices mean fewer dollars, and as a member of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), it cannot simply produce more, output capped by quota and reduced by theft and ageing fields. Higher global interest rates draw money toward safer returns abroad, and a weakening naira prompts investors to sell early. When oil fell in 2016 and 2020, foreign investors withdrew and could not convert naira to dollars as supply dried up, leaving the CBN to clear more than $7 billion in trapped obligations into 2024.
The Oil Boost is No Longer Certain
Oil looked like a dependable source of the dollars behind the reserves only months ago. Earlier in 2026, concern over disruption around the Strait of Hormuz lifted crude prices, and stronger receipts flowed in, with crude oil export earnings of $8.11 billion in the first quarter in the CBN’s balance-of-payments data. That support is now easing. The tension has subsided, and Brent traded near $72 on June 29, down about 24 per cent over the month, back to pre-conflict levels. With the price boost gone and output constrained, reserves are more exposed, leaning on non-oil earnings and investor patience rather than oil.
The Naira Still Trades at Two Prices
The naira has traded at two prices, an official rate and a higher parallel-market rate, and closing that gap into one trusted price is what many investors might watch most. Before committing funds, they may want assurance they can convert naira to dollars at a fair rate when they exit, and a wide gap revives the fear of being trapped that lingers from earlier shortages. The gap has narrowed to roughly N20 to N30, with the CBN’s official rate near N1,380 per dollar on June 26 against parallel-market quotes around N1,400. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2026 Article IV review urged Nigeria to depend less on this fast-moving portfolio money and to keep phasing out its multiple exchange-rate practices. The CBN’s Foreign Exchange Manual, in force from 1 June, is intended to make the market clearer, though such rules build confidence only once investors can freely trade dollars at the posted rate.
What could Make the Build Durable
A few signs that may show the build turning durable include a smaller gap between the official and street naira rates, more long-term foreign investment, and steadier oil earnings. A gap that stays small, now roughly N20 to N30, may mean investors trust the official rate and no longer need the street market. A clear rise in foreign direct investment, only $135 million last quarter against $9.86 billion of short-term money, might mean lasting capital is replacing funds that can leave at the next auction. Oil earnings that hold up, rather than sliding from the low $70s, should help keep reserves steady, since oil and gas bring in most of Nigeria’s export dollars.
“Reserves built on money chasing high yields can fall as fast as they rose, as they did after the last two oil shocks, when investors left, and the CBN spent years clearing a foreign-exchange backlog,” Precious added. “What holds through a downturn is slower money, direct investment, steady oil and non-oil export earnings and one credible naira rate, and that is the shift Nigeria has yet to make.”
By Olajumoke Bello
Across Nigeria, small and medium enterprises remain the backbone of economic activity. They drive trade, create jobs, and sustain millions of livelihoods. Yet, despite their importance, many SMEs continue to operate below their full potential due to persistent structural challenges.
Access to finance remains one of the most cited constraints. However, the issue today goes beyond the availability of capital. Many businesses struggle with financial readiness, weak documentation, and limited understanding of what lenders require. This often leads to missed opportunities, even when funding options exist.
At the same time, SMEs face gaps in market access and visibility. Business owners operate in highly localised environments, with limited exposure to broader networks that can unlock partnerships, new markets, and growth opportunities. This isolation can constrain scalability and reduce long-term competitiveness.
Equally important is the capability gap. Many entrepreneurs grow through resilience and experience but lack structured knowledge on critical areas such as financial management, export readiness, and digital adoption. Without this, even well-capitalised businesses can struggle to sustain growth.
These challenges point to a clear need for a more practical and integrated approach to SME support. It is no longer sufficient to offer standalone solutions. SMEs require ecosystems that combine knowledge, access, and direct engagement in ways that reflect how they actually operate.
A key shift is the move from centralised interventions to localised engagement. SMEs are deeply influenced by their immediate environments, whether markets, industrial clusters, or trade corridors. Solutions must therefore be brought closer to where these businesses function, allowing for more relevant support and stronger relationships.
Another important shift is from awareness to action. Business owners do not only need information; they need insights that they can apply immediately. This includes understanding how to structure their finances, how to access trade opportunities, and how to connect with the right partners to scale their operations.
There is also a growing need for continuity. Many SME-focused initiatives deliver strong initial impact but lack follow-through. For support to be effective, it must extend beyond one-off engagements into sustained relationships, with clear pathways for onboarding, advisory, and growth.
For financial institutions, this presents both responsibility and an opportunity. Supporting SMEs now requires moving beyond transactional banking to deeper partnership models. It requires understanding businesses at a granular level and co-creating solutions that evolve with their needs.
At Stanbic IBTC, this perspective continues to shape our approach to SME development. Our focus is on delivering practical support that translates into real business outcomes, helping enterprises grow, compete, and contribute more meaningfully to the economy.
As part of this commitment, we are extending our SME engagement to the regions through the Nigeria Business Summit Regional Tour. The tour will take structured, on-ground activations into key commercial hubs, where SMEs can access funding guidance, trade insights, advisory support, and direct engagement with financial experts.
The regional tour will take place across five strategic locations, bringing these solutions closer to business owners in Aba, Onitsha, Ibadan and Kano.
This approach reflects an important principle. When support moves closer to businesses and when solutions are delivered in ways that are practical and continuous, SMEs are better positioned to grow sustainably. In turn, this strengthens not only individual enterprises but the broader economy.
Olajumoke Bello is the Head of Enterprise Banking at Stanbic IBTC Bank
