Feature/OPED
Working Institutions; The Fictions & Facts
By Oremade Oyedeji
The Nigerian ecosystem is still often referred to as poor and is characterised by weak government institutions and weak civil societies.
Poor people tend to have weaker or sometimes no access to public institutions and the services they provide. Have you had a reason to deal with the Nigeria Police for example, where the complainants are asked to pay for petitioning, or asked to fund the police officer to do their jobs or even asked to pay for fuelling or provide your own vehicle (complainant) for an operation or make an arrest? It is that bad.
There are about 506 parastatals of government in Nigeria with more terrible example perhaps.
I saw an interview The Chat with Mani Onumonu on Channels TV with Dr Ajoritsedere Awosika. Mani quoted her on her remark that seems to be generating debate. She said the public sector is better than the private sector in Nigeria. Hmm, that may be hard to comprehend. She is perhaps the highest authority permitted to say so, being the current Chairperson of Access Bank and has risen through public sector as former Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Power and Science & Technology.
Mani asked her, is public sector better than private sector? Many would have thought it’s the other way round.
Dr Dere (as she is also called) said both sectors should be symbiotic to the other. She further said in public sector, rules and regulations are the order of the day, but to those who want to obey them.
In a public sector, you serve a larger entity, while in a private sector, everyone is narrowed down to their objective, Dr Dere continued.
Mani: Which is the most challenging among the ministry you worked?
Power, she said. Why? In her words, the then President Goodluck Jonathan asked her why there’s no power and she responded that ‘I don’t understand it.’ When all the parameters to have power are there, she said we can have power if Nigerians want to and Mani asked why? And she said because it is people driven.
Paradoxically, Dr Dere admitted her happiest assignment was the private sector (what a twist!). She described the private sector as more focused, saying anyone can be fired for non-performance and the best hands can be hired.
Me: Smiling.
Fictions on Public Sector Vs Private Sector Institutions
Once was an imaginative assembly of over 506 parastatals of government in Nigeria and top working private institutions, together with civil societies, including all the weakly constituted political parties all seated in the dissipated auditorium of the National Art Theatre.
First to speak was the office of Head of Civil Service (HOS). In his eloquent voice, he said public sector is better than the private sector. We have a work life balance compare to work life imbalance private sector (cutting in was ICSL, which is notorious for providing contract and outsourcing staff to banks and other sectors of the economy), saying with due respect, the civil service is made of weak talents, I mean we run a very smart organisation and most of our dissatisfied supply of contract staff and disgruntle employees who can’t fight their way up the corporate ladder end up as social employees in civil services.
Like it seems HOS has been provoked. Please don’t interrupt me smallie (referring to ICSL as a small institution) and mind you, the public sector is not made up of weak or disgruntle talents from private sector. We have also been hiring top quality staff from the private sector too. We have once had one of private sector brightest brains, Steven Orasanye for example, who was hired from the big four to civil service (he said with pride and smile on his face) and in fact, he rose to become the Head of Civil Service and was the advocate for rationalisation and restructuring of civil service. (This he said with smile all over like an award-winning public servant).
It was one Access Bank Barrister, Aig, that wanted to clarify the point and he innocently said … oh you mean that accountant allegedly prosecuted for N2 billion fraud in 2019?
Now, the HOS got even angrier with a red eye and he rudely responded will you keep quiet! Merger, merger bank. Is that not a bank with strong organic growth seated quietly beside you (referring to GTBank)? Abi is that not UBA behind you there, all making impact through Tony Elumelu Entrepreneurship Program? Value, you are not adding, be there swallowing all your mate like shark. Trust me, we will address your matter when we set up a working institution to address monopoly and unfair takeovers. (HOS said angrily).
The situation even got more tensed when NNPC stood up to speak and someone whispered from the crowd king of corruption. NNPC’s thoughts and countenance changed as if he’s drunk, saying, you see our problem in NNPC is the private sector and some people echoed how? He asked is the troubled report indicting everyone and himself not from your prestigious private sector Deloitte? Immediately, it was one “Oyinbo” (Caucasian) that immediately interrupted. Gentlemen, please let me clear the air. That report you are insinuating about was done by Akintola Williams & Co., our trading name is now Deloitte & Touche in Nigeria… me smiling, whatever that means, that statement didn’t go down well with one ZO Osoyanya & Co (one of the oldest indigenous firms from Ibadan), who jumped up with anger speaking with deep Ibadan dialect. How dare you mention the name of Doyen of Accountancy like that? pointing at “Oyinbo”. That is how you people cause problem everywhere…
Then another white man stood up, it was NNPC’s forensic auditor later to that event, he said, you can’t blame private sector auditors, especially for NNPC troubles and other parastatals as well. I mean, what is the role of the office of the Auditor General? then everyone sighed … and on one corner, was the Office of the Auditor General, so sober covering himself in shame. Then Akintola William spoke, asking the office of the auditor general to say something and then said sir, my office is not independent (he said, Sober). .
THE FACT
According to one of the institutions, National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) in its latest report for March, 2020, foreign trade in Goods Statistics Report, the value of total trade rose by 10.15% to N10.12 trillion in Q4 2019 over the value recorded in Q3.
NBS said the value of private institutions’ export dropped by 9.79% to N4.77 trillion in Q4 compare to Q3 while the import component increased by 37.20% to N5.35 trillion. It said the value of imports stood at N16.96 trillion, while exports were valued at N19.19 trillion, resulting in a trade balance of N2.23 trillion.
In the midst of Nigeria’s weak public institutions, double digit inflation, and poor per capital income, Nigeria is now the biggest economy in Africa on which exchange rate you use for it (N306 official rates or N360 market rates). Both rates now put Nigeria on $402 billion and $476 billion respectively.
Projection shows that Nigeria’s economy will continue to grow faster, while IMF cuts its forecast for 2020 growth to 2% from 2.5% previously predicted last month, due to lower oil price.
In conclusions, I think the extent of the working institutions does not end with government and private economy alone, according to one schools of thought. Completing the Five Social working institutions circle will include the efficiency of these three others which are; Family, Religion and Education.
Like the most basic institution- serves as training ground for live in society
Religion teaches moral standards of right and wrong education for people who will work in government, there is no doubt our religious institutions are strong at least compared with their foreign counterpart in my opinion.
The real question is considering why our strong religious institutions has not helped solved the problems of our corruption-wrecked public institutions? How come the religion has little or no participation in political parties and its structure, yes, I mean parties like APC and PDP? If they are saying APC is Islamising Nigeria, then let PDP too Christianise Nigeria and let’s have morally functioning political parties.
The Fact about Strong religious Institution in Nigeria:
Nigeria has far more Muslims (75 million) than Saudi Arabia (22 million).
There are more Muslims in Nigeria than there are in other African countries
The world’s largest Christian gathering is Holy Ghost Festival of the Redeem Christian Church of God.
The world’s largest church auditorium is The Dunamis Abuja.
The largest church in the diaspora; UK, Ukraine, Kenya, Tanzania are owned by Nigerians
By Blaise Udunze
Daily, the world watches Nigeria through a familiar lens in what appears to be a gory situation. Especially in cases when the news headlines tell stories of farmer-herder clashes, bandit attacks, kidnappings, villages reduced to ashes or deserted by the dwellers, as thousands of Nigerians have been displaced across states such as Zamfara, Plateau, Benue, Niger, Kaduna and Nasarawa. Subliminally, this is about to become a similarly ugly occurrence in southwestern Nigeria, which is fast becoming obvious if not nipped in the bud quickly.
Recorded data have shown that bandits, Boko Haram, and others killed over 190,000 Nigerians in 17 years and displaced 3.7 million people.
A human rights organisation, the International Society for Civil Liberties and Rule of Law (Intersociety), in its fearful revelation, has said that no fewer than 190,150 Nigerians have been killed by bandits, Boko Haram insurgents, and suspected armed herdsmen between July 2009 and March 19, 2026, as this calls for concern.
The dominant explanations often point to ethnic tensions, religious divisions, climate change, shrinking grazing routes or weak security institutions. No doubt, those factors are certainly part of Nigeria’s complex security crisis. Yet another question deserves serious examination.
What if, in some locations, the violence is also serving another purpose? What if some of the territories experiencing repeated displacement are the same places sitting atop some of Nigeria’s most valuable mineral deposits? More importantly, if such a pattern exists, who benefits when communities disappear?
Of a truth, these questions are uncomfortable, but undeniably they deserve careful investigation rather than dismissal.
For ages, Nigeria has been naturally endowed, and it is estimated to be rich in enormous significant reserves of gold, lithium, uranium, tin, columbite and other strategic minerals increasingly sought after in the global transition to clean energy technologies. As international demand for battery minerals continues to rise, these resources have become far more valuable than they were only a decade ago.
If one overlays publicly available geological information with maps showing persistent violence, some observers argue that striking geographical overlaps appear in several regions. Such overlaps alone cannot establish causation. Correlation is not proof of conspiracy. However, they raise questions worthy of independent scrutiny.
One issue attracting increasing attention and adequately yearns for answer is whether prolonged insecurity may inadvertently or deliberately create conditions that make mineral extraction easier.
Under Nigeria’s Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act 2007, mineral resources belong to the Federal Government, while mining rights are granted through licences and leases. Community engagement and land access are expected to form part of the licensing process, although implementation varies depending on circumstances. This raises an important policy question.
What happens when the communities expected to participate in those processes have already fled because of violence?
Displacement changes the dynamics of land ownership, consent and access. While no evidence automatically proves that attacks are orchestrated to facilitate mining, the sequence of violence followed by renewed commercial activity in some locations deserves closer examination by regulators, lawmakers and investigative journalists.
In conflict studies, researchers have long observed that wars often generate economic winners alongside humanitarian losers. Could elements of Nigeria’s insecurity also be producing economic beneficiaries?
Reports over the years have documented concerns about illegal mining operations across parts of northern Nigeria. Government agencies themselves have repeatedly acknowledged that criminal networks profit from the country’s vast mineral wealth. The unresolved question is whether isolated criminality has, in some instances, evolved into more sophisticated alliances involving political influence, financial interests and international supply chains. If so, the implications extend far beyond Nigeria.
Invariably, it is clearly known that lithium has become one of the world’s most strategic commodities, powering electric vehicle batteries and renewable energy storage systems. Gold has always remained one of the safest global investment assets during periods of uncertainty. Meanwhile, it is well confirmed that the global appetite for these minerals creates enormous financial incentives.
Suppose violent displacement reduces resistance to extraction. Suppose shell companies subsequently acquire mining interests. Suppose minerals then leave Nigeria through legitimate-looking export documentation while their true value remains understated.
These scenarios remain allegations unless supported by verifiable evidence. Yet they outline a framework that investigators may wish to test rather than ignore. Financial crime experts frequently identify trade mis-invoicing as one of the most common methods of illicit financial flows worldwide.
Could Nigeria’s solid minerals sector be vulnerable to similar practices? If valuable lithium ore is deliberately but inaccurately described as lower-value material on export documents, substantial wealth could potentially leave the country without reflecting its true market value. Likewise, if unrefined gold exits through privileged channels with limited scrutiny, questions naturally arise about oversight, transparency and accountability over criminal activities which have continued to stunt and disrupt the country’s socio-economic growth and at the same time cause carnage.
Such possibilities are not accusations against any particular institution or company. Rather, they illustrate why stronger monitoring systems are increasingly essential. Another question concerns logistics.
With the high level of criminal activities, industrial mining requires heavy machinery, diesel supplies, transportation networks and specialised personnel. These are not operations that can remain invisible indefinitely.
If certain territories are genuinely too dangerous for security agencies, how do industrial-scale extraction activities reportedly continue in some remote locations? If they do, who protects those operations? Who authorises their movement? Who verifies what is extracted? Who ensures royalties and export revenues reach public coffers? These are governance questions that demand institutional answers.
Equally important is the international dimension. Minerals extracted in Nigeria ultimately enter global supply chains. Gold may pass through international refining hubs before entering financial markets. Lithium may become part of battery manufacturing destined for electric vehicles, which are being sold across Europe, North America and Asia.
One known fact is that consumers purchasing products containing these minerals rarely know the full story of where they originated.
Increasingly, however, investors and governments are demanding ethical sourcing standards that trace minerals from extraction to final manufacture.
A critical factor that must be taken into cognisance is that if insecurity is creating opportunities for illegal or unethical extraction anywhere in the world, multinational companies have responsibilities alongside national governments, of which the onus falls on the Nigerian government.
Transparency cannot stop at the mine gate. Nor should accountability end at national borders. Another issue requiring attention concerns beneficial ownership.
Across many jurisdictions, shell companies can obscure the identities of individuals ultimately controlling commercial assets. If politically exposed persons or powerful business interests are hidden behind complex corporate structures registered offshore, identifying beneficiaries becomes significantly more difficult. This challenge is hardly unique to Nigeria.
Findings showed that from Latin America to Central Africa and Southeast Asia, resistant corporate networks have frequently complicated efforts to combat corruption and illicit resource extraction. That is precisely why open corporate registries, beneficial ownership databases and transparent mining licence disclosures are becoming global governance priorities. For Nigeria, the stakes could hardly be higher.
The country stands at the centre of the world’s emerging critical minerals economy. The Nigerian government can’t feign ignorance of the fact that, when handled transparently, these resources could finance infrastructure, education, healthcare, and industrial development for generations.
In no way would the government claim not knowing that when handled poorly, they risk becoming another chapter in the well-documented “resource curse,” where extraordinary natural wealth coincides with persistent poverty, insecurity and institutional weakness.
The ultimate challenge, therefore, is not simply about mining. It is about governance. It is about whether public institutions possess both the independence and capacity to ensure that natural resources benefit citizens rather than narrow interests. It is about whether conflict zones receive genuine peacebuilding efforts instead of becoming forgotten frontiers. And it is about whether international markets demand accountability with the same enthusiasm they demand raw materials.
None of these questions should be answered through speculation. They require rigorous investigations, forensic financial analysis, satellite imagery, mining license audits, customs records, beneficial ownership disclosures and courageous journalism.
They require governments willing to open their books. They require international cooperation capable of tracing money across borders. Most importantly, they require asking questions that have too often remained unasked.
Perhaps Nigeria’s security crisis is exactly what it appears to be: a tragic convergence of historical grievances, weak institutions, criminality and environmental pressures. Or perhaps, in some places, another layer of economic incentive deserves closer scrutiny.
Until those questions are thoroughly investigated, one possibility will continue to linger. Maybe the world’s attention has been fixed on the blood spilt above ground, while too little attention has been paid to the extraordinary wealth lying beneath it.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: bl***********@***il.com
Feature/OPED
What Does Nigeria’s $51bn Reserves Milestone Mean if Most New Foreign Money Can Leave Quickly?
Nigeria’s foreign reserves have climbed to about $51 billion, a decade-plus high, according to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). EBC Financial Group (EBC) notes that this reflects stronger investor confidence, but the second half may show whether it holds, as the build rests on three cyclical drivers: oil earnings, short-term foreign money and a narrowing official-to-street naira gap.
Reserves rose from about $32 billion in April 2024, during a dollar shortage, to about $51 billion now, near the CBN’s target. Much came from two cyclical sources, strong oil earnings and money chasing high-yielding naira assets, so EBC expects the pace to slow or reverse. Fitch Ratings, a major international credit rating agency, expects a marginal decline to about $47 billion by the end of 2026, citing higher spending and external pressures.
David Precious, Senior Market Analyst at EBC Financial Group, said, “Nigeria’s reserve build is real but may not be durable yet, because nearly all of the new money is the kind that can leave quickly. Of the $10.37 billion that came in over the first quarter, the overwhelming majority was short-term portfolio funds rather than long-term investment, so a shift in oil prices, global interest rates or confidence in the naira might pull a large part of it straight back out.”
Most New Money Can Still Leave Quickly
The composition of the foreign inflows explains the caution over how long the build can last. The country attracted $10.37 billion in foreign investment in the first quarter of 2026, up 83.83 per cent year-on-year, according to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Of that, $9.86 billion or 95.09 per cent, was portfolio money, largely short-term naira debt such as Treasury bills that investors can sell at the next auction, while foreign direct investment, the long-term kind that builds factories and jobs, was $135.08 million, or 1.30 per cent. Put simply, of each dollar coming in, about 95 cents can leave quickly, and barely one cent stays.
That money supports reserves while it stays. Dollars brought in to buy naira assets add to market supply, letting the CBN hold more reserves and steady the naira. It leaves when conditions change. Nigeria earns most of its export dollars from oil and gas, so lower oil prices mean fewer dollars, and as a member of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), it cannot simply produce more, output capped by quota and reduced by theft and ageing fields. Higher global interest rates draw money toward safer returns abroad, and a weakening naira prompts investors to sell early. When oil fell in 2016 and 2020, foreign investors withdrew and could not convert naira to dollars as supply dried up, leaving the CBN to clear more than $7 billion in trapped obligations into 2024.
The Oil Boost is No Longer Certain
Oil looked like a dependable source of the dollars behind the reserves only months ago. Earlier in 2026, concern over disruption around the Strait of Hormuz lifted crude prices, and stronger receipts flowed in, with crude oil export earnings of $8.11 billion in the first quarter in the CBN’s balance-of-payments data. That support is now easing. The tension has subsided, and Brent traded near $72 on June 29, down about 24 per cent over the month, back to pre-conflict levels. With the price boost gone and output constrained, reserves are more exposed, leaning on non-oil earnings and investor patience rather than oil.
The Naira Still Trades at Two Prices
The naira has traded at two prices, an official rate and a higher parallel-market rate, and closing that gap into one trusted price is what many investors might watch most. Before committing funds, they may want assurance they can convert naira to dollars at a fair rate when they exit, and a wide gap revives the fear of being trapped that lingers from earlier shortages. The gap has narrowed to roughly N20 to N30, with the CBN’s official rate near N1,380 per dollar on June 26 against parallel-market quotes around N1,400. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2026 Article IV review urged Nigeria to depend less on this fast-moving portfolio money and to keep phasing out its multiple exchange-rate practices. The CBN’s Foreign Exchange Manual, in force from 1 June, is intended to make the market clearer, though such rules build confidence only once investors can freely trade dollars at the posted rate.
What could Make the Build Durable
A few signs that may show the build turning durable include a smaller gap between the official and street naira rates, more long-term foreign investment, and steadier oil earnings. A gap that stays small, now roughly N20 to N30, may mean investors trust the official rate and no longer need the street market. A clear rise in foreign direct investment, only $135 million last quarter against $9.86 billion of short-term money, might mean lasting capital is replacing funds that can leave at the next auction. Oil earnings that hold up, rather than sliding from the low $70s, should help keep reserves steady, since oil and gas bring in most of Nigeria’s export dollars.
“Reserves built on money chasing high yields can fall as fast as they rose, as they did after the last two oil shocks, when investors left, and the CBN spent years clearing a foreign-exchange backlog,” Precious added. “What holds through a downturn is slower money, direct investment, steady oil and non-oil export earnings and one credible naira rate, and that is the shift Nigeria has yet to make.”
By Olajumoke Bello
Across Nigeria, small and medium enterprises remain the backbone of economic activity. They drive trade, create jobs, and sustain millions of livelihoods. Yet, despite their importance, many SMEs continue to operate below their full potential due to persistent structural challenges.
Access to finance remains one of the most cited constraints. However, the issue today goes beyond the availability of capital. Many businesses struggle with financial readiness, weak documentation, and limited understanding of what lenders require. This often leads to missed opportunities, even when funding options exist.
At the same time, SMEs face gaps in market access and visibility. Business owners operate in highly localised environments, with limited exposure to broader networks that can unlock partnerships, new markets, and growth opportunities. This isolation can constrain scalability and reduce long-term competitiveness.
Equally important is the capability gap. Many entrepreneurs grow through resilience and experience but lack structured knowledge on critical areas such as financial management, export readiness, and digital adoption. Without this, even well-capitalised businesses can struggle to sustain growth.
These challenges point to a clear need for a more practical and integrated approach to SME support. It is no longer sufficient to offer standalone solutions. SMEs require ecosystems that combine knowledge, access, and direct engagement in ways that reflect how they actually operate.
A key shift is the move from centralised interventions to localised engagement. SMEs are deeply influenced by their immediate environments, whether markets, industrial clusters, or trade corridors. Solutions must therefore be brought closer to where these businesses function, allowing for more relevant support and stronger relationships.
Another important shift is from awareness to action. Business owners do not only need information; they need insights that they can apply immediately. This includes understanding how to structure their finances, how to access trade opportunities, and how to connect with the right partners to scale their operations.
There is also a growing need for continuity. Many SME-focused initiatives deliver strong initial impact but lack follow-through. For support to be effective, it must extend beyond one-off engagements into sustained relationships, with clear pathways for onboarding, advisory, and growth.
For financial institutions, this presents both responsibility and an opportunity. Supporting SMEs now requires moving beyond transactional banking to deeper partnership models. It requires understanding businesses at a granular level and co-creating solutions that evolve with their needs.
At Stanbic IBTC, this perspective continues to shape our approach to SME development. Our focus is on delivering practical support that translates into real business outcomes, helping enterprises grow, compete, and contribute more meaningfully to the economy.
As part of this commitment, we are extending our SME engagement to the regions through the Nigeria Business Summit Regional Tour. The tour will take structured, on-ground activations into key commercial hubs, where SMEs can access funding guidance, trade insights, advisory support, and direct engagement with financial experts.
The regional tour will take place across five strategic locations, bringing these solutions closer to business owners in Aba, Onitsha, Ibadan and Kano.
This approach reflects an important principle. When support moves closer to businesses and when solutions are delivered in ways that are practical and continuous, SMEs are better positioned to grow sustainably. In turn, this strengthens not only individual enterprises but the broader economy.
Olajumoke Bello is the Head of Enterprise Banking at Stanbic IBTC Bank
