World
Africa Transcending into BRICS+ Orbit
By Professor Maurice Okoli and Professor Chinedu Ochinanwata
After the historic 16th BRICS summit held in October 2024, three African States Algeria, Nigeria and Uganda, among others in Europe (Belarus and Turkey), Asia and Latin America, recognizably became BRICS+ partner states. In total, 13 countries received BRICS partner status, according to declaration reports by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This category of ‘partner states’ was primarily designated as part of the distinctive-focused leeway towards acquiring full membership status in the determined future.
The legitimate implications for being in this category are quite notable and provide colourful heterogeneity to the BRICS+ association. It also encompasses a growing influence, the bubbling upliftment of these countries on another level of the global stage. Of course, these cannot be underestimated in discussing BRICS+, especially in the era of shifting economic architecture and geopolitical situations.
Together, the BRICS members encompass nearly a third of the world’s land surface and almost half of the world’s population. BRICS is an informal association of emerging economies, comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, with the latest additions Ethiopia, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Argentina declined to join at the last moment.
Despite various criticisms raised against a number of countries that ascended into the category of ‘partner states’ for BRICS+, each has its strategic dimension. In assessing particularly African countries – Algeria (North Africa), Nigeria (West Africa) and Uganda (East Africa) – BRICS+ now, has, in the first place, a wider geographical representation across Africa. It is important to reiterate here that Ethiopia, Egypt and South Africa are full-fledged BRICS members.
Ethiopia, by all standards, is a reputable country in East Africa. The continental organisation African Union (AU) is headquartered in its capital, Addis Ababa. Egypt, considered to be a regional power, also plays invaluable roles within the Arab world, specifically in North Africa and in the Middle East region. Without much doubt, the new ‘partner states’ – Algeria, Nigeria and Uganda have indicated their collective commitment to the multifaceted ideals in the declaration adopted in Kazan, Tatarstan Republic.
BRICS’ numerical expansion and quality transformation in January 2024, and the creation of ‘partner states’ in October 2024, both under Russia’s BRICS+ chairmanship have undoubtedly opened doors to new partnership opportunities for Africa.
The strongest question centred on how BRICS’ African partnering states, Algeria, Nigeria and Uganda can strategically position themselves to benefit from the evolving dynamics within BRICS+ while, in this new geopolitical reality, simultaneously navigating for competing geopolitical interests in Africa. There are emerging challenges, but BRICS’s influence is growing and provides an impetus for strengthening relations and working systematically for economic growth, especially in the processes of reshaping economic architecture in this fast-rising multipolar world.
Nigeria and Uganda, as potential partners in the BRICS, could engage in several collaborative initiatives to enhance their economic political and social developments, including trade and investment.
For instance, Nigeria, with its natural resources and increasingly large market, and Uganda, with its agricultural potential, can collaborate to boost intra-BRICS trade and that of intra-Africa trade. In addition to this, exploring investment opportunities in sectors such as manufacturing, production innovation and technology has a clean basis to add value to the raw materials and transform them into exportable products.
Closing related to the above, are pertinent questions of ensuring energy security and infrastructure (transport logistics). Nearly all African countries are griffing for support in technology transfer, and fintech – these largely depend on sustainable energy supply. Consequently, joint initiatives could harness the capabilities of BRICS members, particularly China, India and Russia in these sectors.
By leveraging their respective strengths and, with a focused approach, Nigeria and Uganda could address these shortfalls and deficits, and further down extend assistance across West Africa, and in East Africa. One key advantage is that Uganda has Ethiopia and Egypt as BRICS members, a ready-made basis for BRICS collaboration despite the differences and persistent conflicts in the region. The basic requirement here is to find a common understanding and distinctive focused sectors for collaboration.
Comparatively, there is much-proven evidence and features, including its size of economic power and wealth, its leadership in Africa as an energy power, and its abundant supply of natural resources. This West African country ranks third behind Egypt and South Africa, and Nigeria is qualified for a full-fledged BRICS membership.
Nigeria is often referred to as the Giant of Africa by its citizens due to its large population (estimated at 220m) with a large economy and is considered to be an emerging market by the World Bank. It is, however, believed Nigeria’s foreign relations with the Western powers may be a major reason the country has not yet subscribed to BRICS membership.
Despite this identified political complexity authorities, however, maintain a concrete decision to be made over the next two years, Nigeria’s expected role in BRICS+ could augment Africa’s capability to influence regional trade, economics and politics.
Reports monitored indicated that Nigeria runs a deliberative democratic system. As part of a new foreign policy push to have its voice heard in important global organisations, the Federal Executive Council, and even the National Assembly have to make deliberations and official majority decisions towards joining the BRICS+ association.
Meanwhile, Nigeria is currently in the well-meaning and clearly defined ‘partner states’ category which guarantees collaboration and partnership with BRICS+ members. In addition, it has the possibility of balancing its national interests with the collective goals of the BRICS.
South Africa which ascended to BRICS more than a decade ago has noticeably benefited from its membership. Ethiopia, which was granted BRICS membership status in January 2024 along with Egypt, has significant working relations with China, Russia and India. Based on its strong partnership, China has financed the 20-story office complex, which is one of the most prominent political buildings in Addis Ababa. It was fully funded, designed, built, and furnished by China as a $200m gift to Africa. While India’s case need not be over-emphasized and reiterated, Russia has also followed suit by exploring and making economic investments in Ethiopia.
In November 2022, Algeria officially applied for membership in BRICS. But its official application for BRICS+ membership, at first, attracted debates, and experts raised controversial points in connection with its role with neighbouring Morocco and particularly the Sahel States, including Mali and Niger which are currently undergoing some tectonic political changes and reforms.
Algeria, located in the Maghreb region of North Africa, has strategic importance for external powers such as the United States, Europe, China and Russia as well as those in the Middle East. Its capital and largest city Algiers, situated in the far north on the Mediterranean coast, is considered as a gateway into North Africa, by foreign players. It has a budget of €15.4 billion and provides the bulk of funding through some programmes, as it is included in the European Union’s European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) which aims at bringing the EU and its neighbours closer.
After studying various reports, Algeria has passed through a chequered journey, in fact handling it as a potential opportunity to balance its Maghreb regional position, at least, by obtaining BRICS ‘partner status’ in October 2024. There were serious reports that India vetoed Algeria’s BRICS+ entry at France’s request.
Tension arose over Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger geopolitical crisis in the region, Algeria opposed an ECOWAS military operation in Niger and emphasized the role of diplomacy in bringing about a peaceful solution to the crisis, and refused permission for French military aircraft to fly over Algerian airspace. It was further explained that Paris reportedly pushed New Delhi into using its veto as ‘revenge’ against Algiers for its growing influence in the Sahel and Maghreb region, and as a way to slow down burgeoning ties between Algeria and China.
Nonetheless, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva also opposed Algeria’s entry, according to Anadolu Agency. But while Algeria surpasses Ethiopia in the size of the economy and oil production and, Ethiopia and Egypt in terms of the volume of gas exports, China backed by Russia pushed Algeria to be accepted for partnership status in BRICS+, with the future possibility of attaining full membership. China sees great potential due to its strategic location between Europe and sub-Saharan Africa. China is funding the rehabilitation of the strategic Port of El Hamdania, as Algeria remains an essential part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
On the sidelines of the ninth annual meeting of the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) held in Cape Town, Algeria was authorized to become a member of this financial entity. With its ‘partner status’, Algeria intended to buy shares in the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) for $1.5 billion. In the opinion of Dilma Vana Rousseff, Chair of the New Development Bank, the move to join the bank would mark Algeria’s integration into the global financial system as the ninth member of the multilateral development institution.
On the other hand, Algeria plans to use its fast-tracked initiatives and its ‘partner status’ to ultimately attract BRICS+ members to invest in the free industrial zone with Mauritania and Niger, and then with Tunisia and Libya. Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune underlined this to have massive geopolitical ramifications and could be important to the emerging multipolar goals in the Global South.
Furthermore, Tebboune outlined his government’s plans for economic development over the next 12 months, including the possibility of boosting investments, improving human development, and shifting towards a more advanced export structure relying less on hydrocarbons to qualify for membership into BRICS. With this high desire to be in BRICS+, Algeria still considers Western countries as important partners in trade, security, and other economic areas.
Lately, the BRICS countries have been getting more involved in Africa. The New Development Bank (NDB) was set up to help fund infrastructure and sustainable development projects, not just in BRICS countries but now in other growing economies too. It’s seen as an alternative to big players like the IMF and the World Bank.
The NDB, founded in 2015 by the BRICS countries—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—aims to mobilize resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in emerging economies. It complements the work of existing multilateral and regional financial institutions in promoting global economic growth. In 2021, the bank expanded its membership to include Bangladesh, Egypt, the UAE, and Uruguay.
Despite multiple obstacles within the Arab Maghreb Union, specifically persistent conflict between Algeria and Morocco, in August 2021, Algeria ultimately announced the break of diplomatic relations with Morocco. Besides this, Algeria’s relations are not very cordial with Ethiopia and Egypt which are BRICS members.
As a result, its request to join BRICS was slightly opposed by Ethiopia and Egypt. And of course, Ethiopia and Egypt have conflicts over the Grand Renaissance Dam (GERD) and the Nile River. While Algeria remains an inescapable candidate for BRICS+, both African and foreign experts have argued that with the completion of the Trans-Saharan Highway, it is well positioned to develop BRICS-Sub-Saharan trade. The possibilities are immense, and their sponsorship would make Algeria a truly indispensable member of the BRICS.
In June 2024, the World Bank’s 2024 report marks a turning point for Algeria, which joins the select club of upper-middle-income countries. This economic rise, the result of an ambitious development strategy, places the country in the same category as emerging powers such as China, Brazil and Turkey.
In recent years, the Algerian government has halted the privatization of state-owned industries and imposed restrictions on imports and foreign involvement in its economy. These restrictions would prevent them from benefiting largely from the BRICS+ trade and investment platform created during the summit in Kazan.
That, however, China and Russia have comparatively less practical investment than the Gulf States. For instance, Turkish direct investments have accelerated in Algeria, with total value reaching $5 billion. As of 2022, the number of Turkish companies present in Algeria has reached 1,400, far lower than Russia and China, and any other BRICS+ in an anticipated positive direction. Algeria has the 10th largest reserves of natural gas in the world and is the 6th largest gas exporter. Despite its huge natural resources, the majority of the country’s population (an estimated 45.6 million) is still noticeably impoverished, the overall rate of unemployment was 11.8% in 2023.
South Africa, Ethiopia and Egypt (full members of BRICS+), and Algeria, Nigeria and Uganda (as partner states) have the potential to bring various multifaceted economic and social advantages to the African continent and to a new level at the side of BRICS+ association. In many areas, the partnership could be delivered that are beneficial to Africa, although African members of BRICS+ need to utilize the partnership to the fullest in terms of the potential of the available resources, the potential usefulness of African Continental Free Trade (AfCFTA) and the emerging business opportunities. Last but not least, there is also the need to align these different kinds of partnerships to the common strategic objectives of the African Union.
Professor Maurice Okoli is a fellow at the Institute for African Studies and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences. He is also a fellow and lecturer at the North-Eastern Federal University of Russia. He serves as an expert at the Roscongress Foundation and the Valdai Discussion Club.
As an academic researcher and economist with a keen interest in current geopolitical changes and the emerging world order, Maurice Okoli frequently contributes articles for publication in reputable media portals on different aspects of the interconnection between developing and developed countries, particularly in Asia, Africa, and Europe. With comments and suggestions, he can be reached via email: markolconsult (at) gmail (dot) com.
Professor Chinedu Ochinanwata is a Nigerian academic and serial entrepreneur. He is a professor of digital economy and innovation, and is currently serving as pioneer director at Nasarawa State University, Keffi Enterprise Centre.
Vice President of African Development Institute of Research Methodology (ADIRM). Email: chineduochi (at) yahoo (dot) com.
By Aduragbemi Omiyale
Accessing the US Dollar in the East Africa region has now been made easier with the expansion of the stablecoin settlement infrastructure of SCRYPT.
This development enables banks, payment providers and corporate treasury teams to move value into and out of the continent in real time.
Businesses paying international suppliers frequently have to convert local currency into USD before purchasing stablecoins for settlement, incurring FX conversions and spreads before any payment is made.
But SCRYPT is eliminating this intermediate conversion by enabling direct settlement corridors for local African currencies into stablecoins.
This development allows businesses to move from local currency to stablecoin settlement in a single licensed transaction, without first sourcing rationed bank dollars, as stablecoins are increasingly becoming settlement infrastructure rather than an investment product.
The expansion adds settlement support across four African currencies: the Kenyan shilling (KES), Tanzanian shilling (TZS), Rwandan franc (RWF) and Ugandan shilling (UGX). Each corridor is delivered through the same full-stack infrastructure our clients already use for trading, custody and treasury operations.
Speaking on this, the chief executive of SCRYPT, Norman Wooding, said, “Across Africa, stablecoin adoption is driven by economic need, not speculation.
“Businesses here are not chasing yield; they are trying to pay suppliers and manage treasury without losing margin to a banking system that rations dollars. Licensed, fair-rate dollar access is the clearest proof of what this infrastructure is for.”
Also commenting, the Managing Director of Markets & Trading at SCRYPT, Mr Gabriel Titopoulos, said, “Until now, reaching stablecoins from local African currencies meant buying scarce dollars and incurring several layers of conversion costs.
“SCRYPT removes this friction. Firms and payment providers can now settle straight from local currencies through live corridors, with local partners.”
World
African Graduates Association Promoting Multifaceted Initiatives With Russian Educational Institutions
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
In preparations for the third Russia-Africa Summit, scheduled for late October 2026, Dr Francois Ngan, deputy chairman of the Union of Associations of African Graduates of Soviet and Russian Universities, during an official working visit, has held a consultative meeting with Professor Vladimir Filippov, the President of the Russian University of Peoples’ Friendship (RUDN), and former Minister of Higher Education of Russia, Chairman of the National Commission for Accreditation of Higher Education.
RUDN is an educational institution established in 1960, primarily to provide higher education to Third World students. It has now become a popular multidisciplinary spot for many students, especially from developing countries. The university offers various academic programmes and has research infrastructure that comprises laboratories and interdisciplinary centres. The university is named after the former Congolese leader, Patrice Lumumba.
Dr Francois Ngan and Professor Filippov discussed the importance of the Graduates Association as a continental platform dedicated to strengthening unity, cooperation, and promoting shared progress among African graduates who studied in the former Soviet Union and in the Russian Federation. They also reviewed multifaceted initiatives that could bring together alumni associations from across Africa, whose members obtained education and professional training, and cultural experiences in Soviet and Russian institutions of higher learning.
Professor Filippov expressed optimism in addressing emerging challenges as a result of shifting geopolitical changes, emphasised strategic cooperation in the educational sphere with Africa, in general, and with the Republic of Cameroon, in particular, and further about the integration of African students during their studies in the Russian Federation.
The meeting also touched on academic and scientific work, the possibility of rewriting a scientific thesis, and the official organisation of transferring versions translated into six languages for the library of RUDN. Significant questions relating to Russia’s educational opportunities, collaborations and partnerships involving African countries were thoroughly discussed.
The Union of Associations of African Graduates of Soviet and Russian Universities was created under one continental umbrella to promote friendship, for professional networking, to engage in cultural exchange, and with particular emphasis on forging strategic cooperation between Africa and Russia.
World
Russia to Support Industrial Growth, Technological Advancement and Supply Chain Resilience across Africa
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
With the heightening of geopolitical rivalry and competition, a new Russia-Africa working group has emerged as a significant institutional mechanism and plans to focus on facilitating and monitoring strategic investments, industrialisation, and infrastructural development—the Strategic Action Plan 2023-2026—that was outlined during the second Russia-Africa summit, in St.Petersburg, the second largest city in the Russian Federation.
While substantial progress has, largely, lagged on the multidimensional economic front with Africa primarily due to its internal difficulties and the complexity of relations with its former Soviet neighbours, Russian officials believe there still remains huge untapped potential in strengthening bilateral cooperation. As planned, President Vladimir Putin has already signed an executive order that directs Moscow to host the forthcoming third Russia-Africa summit in October 2026.
On June 30, a regular meeting of the Business Council on Africa was held under the chairmanship of the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry. It was dedicated to issues of trade, economic and investment cooperation with Africa. The group discussed the current state and prospects for the implementation of policy initiatives with an emphasis on assisting the countries of the continent, strengthening their economic, energy, technological and food sovereignty, as well as training specialists for Africa.
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has reiterated that Russia-Africa relations primarily depend on an understanding of the importance of collective action based on the principles of equality, mutual respect and resolving common tasks. In the past few years, Russia-Africa cooperation has been noticeably strengthening. “We are deepening political dialogues, developing bilateral contacts with African countries, promoting cordial cooperation between ministries and departments, and expanding humanitarian exchanges. We are also continuing the structural diversification of trade partnerships and economic dimensions.”
“Next on the agenda is the launch of diplomatic missions in The Gambia, Liberia, Togo, and the Union of the Comoros,” Lavrov said at a meeting of the Business Council under the Russian foreign minister. Lavrov noted that Russian embassies began operating in three other African countries in 2025: Niger, Sierra Leone, and South Sudan. A new Department for Partnership with Africa was also established. According to the top diplomat, “expanding Russia’s diplomatic presence on the continent contributes to developing relations.”
There are already 45 Russian embassies operating in Africa. The Russian foreign minister noted that Moscow is quickly rebuilding its presence in African countries, which sharply declined during the collapse of the Soviet Union. “There will be literally four or five countries left where we still need to establish full-fledged embassies, and then, we will have 100 per cent coverage of the entire African continent with our diplomatic presence,” Lavrov emphasised.
After the first summit in October 2019, the Foreign Ministry also created the Secretariat of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum. Its main tasks include controlling the roadmap to Africa’s multidimensional cooperation and guiding potential Russian investors to the continent. This also underscored the priority and post-Soviet solidarity Russia currently attaches to its policy towards Africa, within the growing framework of the emerging new architecture of multipolarity in the Global South.
In an interview in June 2026, the director of the Department of Partnership with Africa at the Foreign Ministry, Tatyana Dovgalenko, shared a few insights in the lead-up to the third summit. Furthermore, Dovgalenko explained that Russia would move away from security to concentrate more on economic issues, especially to team up with African colleagues to streamline mechanisms for implementing projects that will ensure food security and agriculture, and help Africa in installing processing facilities to support its self-sufficiency. She also emphasised energy and vital infrastructures, and the third direction was to simultaneously work more coherently with sub-regional organisations.
Over the past few years, bilateral relations have been increasing. There are positive dynamics in trade turnover, estimated at $30 billion. Steps are being taken to build payment systems, preferably in national currencies, while Russia looks to open four more diplomatic offices, bringing the total to 48 across Africa. Russia is currently training 37,000 African students, but only approximately 1/3 on state scholarships in Russia’s educational institutions. “We are ready to share valuable experiences of building a sovereign development model with African partners to achieve self-reliant economic growth based on their own resources and capabilities. Russia aims at creating processing capabilities and localising production, and provides access to advanced technological solutions,” underlined Dovgalenko in her interview with New Eastern Outlook.
For African countries that have endured difficult decades on the path to political independence, it is now important to take full control over the untapped resources, direct income and revenue toward stimulating the national economic sector, rather than paying for the well-being of the Western “golden billion” during this changing geopolitical era, according to Dovgalenko.
According to reports, the forthcoming Russia-Africa summit will have an economic agenda, including the digital economy, technology, artificial intelligence, healthcare, investment, and settlements in global trade. Of course, the agenda will also cover Africa’s political aspects. But if African friends bring along any specific ideas, Russia will give them serious attention. In addition, with continuity and consistency, pay increased attention to expanding ties with Africa’s regional integration associations.
Going forward, the focus will be on translating strong trade relations into deeper investment partnerships, fostering technology collaboration, strengthening industrial linkages and contributing towards the shared objectives set by the leadership of both African countries and Russia. At the third summit, the above-mentioned specific initiatives will be further designed. In this regard, the key document, the new action plan for the next three-year period (2027-2029), is intended to reflect dynamic realities in the future relations of Russia and Africa
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