World
Besides Mali, Russia Keenly Interest in Five-Nation Sahel Group
By Kester Kenn Klomegah
Russia’s alleged involvement in the political change on August 18 in Mali, a former French colony with the fractured economy and breeding field for armed Islamic jihadist groups (some of which are reportedly aligned with Al Qaeda and ISIS), demonstrates the first drastic step towards penetrating into the G5 Sahel in West Africa. The G5 Sahel are Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger.
Despite this widely published allegation, Moscow officially said it was seriously concerned about the developments in Bamako and further urged “all Malian public and political forces to settle the situation peacefully at the negotiating table”.
Russian Foreign Ministry said on its website that on August 21, at the invitation of the leaders of the military group, who seized power in Mali, Russian Ambassador in Bamako Igor Gromyko met with the leader of the National Committee for the Salvation of the People, Colonel Assimi Goita, at the military base in the town of Katiа located not far from the capital.
The statement said: “At his own initiative, Assimi Goita informed the Russian Ambassador about the reasons that prompted the military to remove President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita and the Malian Government from power, as well as about the committee’s priority steps to restore order in the country and set up the operation of government bodies.
“The leaders of the National Committee for the Salvation of the People held similar meetings with the ambassadors of several other countries, including China and France.”
According to several reports, Ibrahim Keita was overthrown following mass protests against his rule over deep-rooted corruption, mismanagement of the economy and a dispute over legislative elections.
In addition to socio-economic problems, Mali is now facing the task of protecting its territorial integrity and combating the terrorist threat.
Internal unrest in the country has greatly undermined Malians’ ability to contribute to the collective efforts of the Sahara-Sahel countries, including the G5 Sahel group of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger, which is focused on combating terrorism.
While updating the implications of the recent coup, in Mali on the entire G5 Sahel region, it is important to know more about the leaders of the coup, and the foreign countries and players who might have aided the army to topple the democratic and legitimate government of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita. The Economist article of August 19, titled What next for Mali?, which is enclosed here:
The narratives are that the coup led by Malick Diaw and Sadio Camara, two army colonels who hold top positions at the Kati military base, are reportedly very close friends. The two colonels spent most of this year training in Russia before returning to Mali and to topple the government, which could imply that most probably they might have hatched and organized the coup whilst in Russia (read), and this implied that the Russians might have known about their political plans in Mali.
Many experts say Russia has its own distinctive style and approach, set out to battle against exploitation of resources, or better still what is often phrased “the scramble for resources” in Africa.
Besides dealing with the French, Russia is keenly interested in the uphill fight against “neo-colonial tendencies” exhibited by the US (read), EU (read), and Chinese (read) interests and influence in Africa.
As already showcased in Mali, experts told IDN that as Russia looks for “strategic allies” in the continent, so working to remove African leaders loyal to former colonial masters fits squarely into Russia’s renewed interest and strategy in Africa.
Research Professor Irina Filatova at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow explains to IDN that media reports have linked the developments to Russia, that however “people who are now in power will be friendlier with Russia than the previous government. The Russians are not seriously interested in democratic institutions, they are interested in people who are close to it.”
In the short term or better still in the long term, it is hard to be optimistic for Mali, among the fragile countries in the Sahel, especially the importance of seeking stability, building the infrastructure and improving the economy. The region is experiencing the spread of Islamic extremist insurgency and rapidly-eroding state legitimacy.
On the other hand, Mali’s challenges are almost the same throughout Africa: deep-seated corruption, heightened nepotism, ethnic violence and economic malaise. The African leaders lust for power in spite of bad governance. Civil society platforms have meanwhile called for deep reforms, especially on electoral laws and the administrative machinery in Mali.
Mali, home to nearly 20 million people, is a landlocked country located on rivers Senegal and Niger in West Africa. As a former French colony, it persistently faces serious development challenges primarily due to its landlocked position and it is the eighth-largest country in Africa.
Over the years, reform policies have had little impact on the living standards, majority highly impoverished in the country. As a developing country, it ranks at the bottom of the United Nations Development Index (2018 report).
Russia is broadening its geography of diplomacy covering poor African countries and especially fragile states that need Russia’s military assistance.
Niger, for example, has been on its radar. Russia, meanwhile, sees some potential there – as a possible gateway into the Sahel. In order to realize this, Russia has been working on the official visit for Mahamadou Issoufou who has been the President of Niger since April 2011. Before that, Issoufou was the Prime Minister of Niger from 1993 to 1994.
Last year, on September 19, when Niger’s Foreign Minister Kalla Ankourao paid a working visit to Moscow, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov pointed to two basic facts.
The first was “the Russian Federation looks forward to stepping up cooperation in all spheres, and international matters and crisis resolution on the African continent are also very much relevant for us.”
The second was that “the meeting has special significance since in the next two years Niger is a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. Russia and Niger hope to work closely together within this important international body.”
Since Niger holds a non-permanent seat at the UN Security Council in 2020-2021, Sergey Lavrov and Kalla Ankourao have been focusing on in-depth discussions on matters relating to the fight against terrorism and extremism in the context of collective efforts to root out these threats, particularly within the G5 Sahel region in Africa.
As Russia pushes to strengthen its overall profile in the G5 Sahel region, in July 2019, Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov held talks with the President of Burkina Faso, Christian Kaboré and further discussed military-technical cooperation with the Minister of National Defense and Veteran Affairs, Moumina Sheriff Sy. He also had business talks with Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Burkina Faso, Alpha Barry, and Vice-President of the National Assembly of Burkina Faso, K. Traore.
Last year in August, Bogdanov attended the inauguration of Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Ghazouani. The President of Mauritania was elected on Jun 22, 2019. Both discussed ways for strengthening the existing relations. Moscow and Nouakchott look for additional dynamics to the development of mutually beneficial cooperation in various fields.
According to the official information posted to the ministry’s website, Bogdanov described his meetings “providing the impetus to explore opportunities for effective collaboration in the Sahel region.”
Vedomosti, a Russian daily Financial and Business newspaper, reported that Russia is interested in offering Mali and the Sahel countries military equipment. The Malian government and Russian state-owned arms trader Rosoboronexport could soon sign contracts on the delivery of Russian-made combat and transport helicopters, armoured personnel carriers, small arms and ammunition to the African country, the Vedomosti newspaper reported.
The Russian weapons requested by Mali’s government will be given to its soldiers in the north of the country, where the Malian Armed Forces, as well as soldiers from France and a number of African states, are fighting Islamist militants, a Rosoboronexport source told Vedomosti.
“The French side is highly unlikely to object to equipping the Malian Army with Russian-made weapons because these weapons are more familiar to the Malian Army, where some 7,000 people serve in the Land Forces and another 400 in the Air Force,” the source said. It also that the fight “against international terrorist groups, whose growing activity is seen in the Sahara Sahel region.”
Russian Foreign Ministry has explained in a statement released on its website, that Russia’s military-technical cooperation with African countries is primarily directed at settling regional conflicts and preventing the spread of terrorist threats and to fight the growing terrorism in the continent. Worth noting here that Russia, in its strategy on Africa is reported to be also looking into building military bases in the continent.
Over the past years, strengthening military-technical cooperation has been part of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. Russia has signed bilateral military-technical cooperation agreement nearly with all African countries. Researchers say further that it plans to build military bases as this article explicitly reported, among others.
Edward Lozansky, President of the American University in Moscow and professor of World Politics at Moscow State University, told IDN in an email that “there has not been too much information about Russia’s activities in Africa, but the Western media is saturated with the scary stories about Russia’s efforts to bolster its presence in at least 13 countries across Africa by building relations with existing rulers, striking military deals, and grooming a new generation of leaders and undercover agents.”
Further to the narratives, Russia has now embarked on fighting “neo-colonialism” which it considers as a stumbling block on its way to regain a part of the Soviet-era multifaceted influence in Africa. Russia has sought to convince Africans over the past years of the likely dangers of neocolonial tendencies perpetrated by the former colonial countries and the scramble for resources on the continent. But all such warnings largely seem to fall on deaf ears as African leaders choose development partners with funds to invest in the economy.
Experts suspected that Russia’s plan to bring about regime change in Mali could see Russia-friendly new leaders taking over the country from the French-friendly President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita and his government, thereby dealing a severe blow to French influence and interests not just in Mali but throughout the Sahel region.
Research Professor Irina Filatova at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow explains to IDN that “Russia’s influence in the Sahel has been growing just as French influence and assistance has been dwindling, particularly in the military sphere. It is for the African countries to choose their friends, but it would be better to deal directly with the government, than with (mercenaries of the Russian) Wagner, which group, whose connection with the government was barely recognized.”
In very particular cases, she unreservedly suggested: “If they wanted the Russians to come and fight Islamist groups, it would be much better to ask the government to send regular troops. Wagner’s vigilantes are not responsible to anybody, and the Russian government may refuse to take any responsibility for whatever they do in case something goes wrong.”
While the African Union (AU), regional blocs and African leaders remain indifferent, Russia has expressed concern and takes the task to fight “neocolonialism” in Africa. It has sought to convince Africans over the past years of the likely dangers of neocolonial tendencies perpetrated by the former colonial countries and the scramble for resources on the continent. But all such warnings largely seem to fall on deaf ears as African leaders choose development partners with funds to invest in the economy.
But these have different interpretations as African leaders still show loyalty to their former colonizers. Neocolonialism can be seen as a new form of domination, plunder and exploitation using clandestine and economic statecraft.
Of course, there could be some hints or pointers to neocolonial tendencies, but such claims should be levelled on case by case basis, and there has to be concrete evidence to suggest that way, explains Dr. Frangton Chiyemura, a lecturer in International Development at the School of Social Sciences and Global Studies, Open University in the United Kingdom.
In his objective opinion, Chiyemura further believes “as there is no free lunch in the world, African countries should enter into partnerships based on their strategic interests and an understanding of what the partners can provide or deliver.”
Secondly, every African country should do a comprehensive evaluation of the structure and, the terms and conditions of their engagements with foreign powers. By so doing, this will eliminate the chances for the emergence of claims of neocolonialism. Instead of extending the blame to someone elsewhere, Africa needs to do its homework especially on the implementation and monitoring aspects of the deals. Africa has some of the best regulations and standards, but the problem lies in implementation and monitoring, the development expert suggested in an e-mailed discussion with IDN.
Interestingly, Sochi hosted the first summit in October 2019 devoted to interaction between Russia and Africa. That event opened up a new page in the history of Russia’s relations with African countries, President Vladimir Putin told the gathering: “We are ready to continue working together to strengthen mutually beneficial cooperation. But we are also aware of the host of problems facing Africa that need to be settled.”
In his view, “this new stage and this new quality of our relations should be based on common values. We are at one in our support for the values of justice, equality and respect for the rights of African states to, independently choose their future. It is within this framework that we will continue to coordinate our positions at international platforms and joint efforts in the interests of stability on the African continent.”
Russia-Africa relations is based on long-standing traditions of friendship and solidarity created when the Soviet Union supported the struggle of the peoples of Africa against colonialism, racism and apartheid, protected their independence and sovereignty, and helped establish statehood, and build the foundations of the national economy, according to historical documents available at the website of Kremlin.
The African Union, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and foreign organizations such as the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) have requested a quick transition to a civilian government. They further urged that efforts are taken to resolve outstanding issues relating to sustainable development and observing strictly principles of democracy.
All these organizations have utterly denounced the coup. What follows now will be negotiations over the transitional arrangements and the timetable for new elections. This will not be straightforward. Although the opposition was united in their demand for Keita’s resignation there is little consensus on what to do next, while the UN Security Council and ECOWAS are divided on how to respond beyond initial condemnation.
United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, spoke out against the coup as well saying that the situation should be returned to normal under the elected civilian government in Mali. In addition, an official statement was issued by the AU Commission Chair on the situation in Mali. It says in part: “The AU Chairperson calls on the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the United Nations and the entire international community to combine collective efforts to oppose any use of force as a means to end the political crisis in Mali.”
Beyond condemning developments in Mali, the African Union and the regional blocs have to consistently remind African leaders to prioritize sustainable development goals and understand the basic principle through which they were elected: the electorate and the people. That makes it utterly necessary to engage them in development decision-making processes and use available resources to improve their communities – these are the drivers of the expected lasting change needed in Africa.
Kester Kenn Klomegah writes frequently about Russia, Africa and BRICS. This article was first and originally published by IndepthNews.
World
TikTok Signs Deal to Avoid US Ban
By Adedapo Adesanya
Social media platform, TikTok’s Chinese owner ByteDance has signed binding agreements with United States and global investors to operate its business in America.
Half of the joint venture will be owned by a group of investors, including Oracle, Silver Lake and the Emirati investment firm MGX, according to a memo sent by chief executive, Mr Shou Zi Chew.
The deal, which is set to close on January 22, 2026 would end years of efforts by the US government to force ByteDance to sell its US operations over national security concerns.
It is in line with a deal unveiled in September, when US President Donald Trump delayed the enforcement of a law that would ban the app unless it was sold.
In the memo, TikTok said the deal will enable “over 170 million Americans to continue discovering a world of endless possibilities as part of a vital global community”.
Under the agreement, ByteDance will retain 19.9 per cent of the business, while Oracle, Silver Lake and Abu Dhabi-based MGX will hold 15 per cent each.
Another 30.1 per cent will be held by affiliates of existing ByteDance investors, according to the memo.
The White House previously said that Oracle, which was co-founded by President Trump’s supporter Larry Ellison, will license TikTok’s recommendation algorithm as part of the deal.
The deal comes after a series of delays.
Business Post reported in April 2024 that the administration of President Joe Biden passed a law to ban the app over national security concerns, unless it was sold.
The law was set to go into effect on January 20, 2025 but was pushed back multiple times by President Trump, while his administration worked out a deal to transfer ownership.
President Trump said in September that he had spoken on the phone to China’s President Xi Jinping, who he said had given the deal the go ahead.
The platform’s future remained unclear after the leaders met face to face in October.
The app’s fate was clouded by ongoing tensions between the two nations on trade and other matters.
World
United States, Russia Resolving Trade Issues, Seeking New Business Opportunities
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
Despite the complexities posed by Russia-Ukraine crisis, United States has been taking conscious steps to improve commercial relations with Russia. Unsurprisingly, Russia, on the other hand, is also moving to restore and normalise its diplomacy, negotiating for direct connections of air-routes and passionate permission to return its diplomats back to Washington and New York.
In the latest developments, Kirill Dmitriev, Chief Executive Officer of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), has been appointed as Russian President’s Special Envoy to United States. This marked an important milestone towards raising bilateral investment and economic cooperation. Russian President Vladimir Putin tasked him to exclusively promote business dialogue between the two countries, and further to negotiate for the return of U.S. business enterprises. According to authentic reports, United States businesses lost $300+ bn during this Russia-Ukraine crisis, while Russia’s estimated 1,500 diplomats were asked to return to Moscow.
Strategically in late November 2025, the American Chamber of Commerce in Russia (AmCham) has awarded Kirill Dmitriev, praised him for calculated efforts in promoting positive dialogue between the United States and Russia within the framework decreed by President Vladimir Putin. Chief Executive Officer of Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev is the Special Representative of the Russian President for Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries. Since his appointment, his primary focus has been on United States.
“Received an American Chamber of Commerce award ‘For leadership in fostering the US-Russia dialogue,’” Dmitriev wrote on his X page, in late November, 2025. According to Dmitriev, more than 150 US companies are currently operating in Russia, with more than 70% of them being present on the Russian market for over 25 years.
In addition, Chamber President Sergey Katyrin and American Chamber of Commerce in Russia (AmCham) President Robert Agee have also been discussing alternatives pathways to raise bilateral business cooperation. Both have held series of meetings throughout this year, indicating the the importance of sustaining relations as previously. Expectedly, the Roscongress Foundation has been offered its platforms during St. Petersburg International Economic (SPIEF) for the American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham).
On December 9, Sergey Katyrin and Robert Agee noted that, despite existing problems and non-economic obstacles, the business communities of Russia and the United States proceed from the necessity of maintaining professional dialogue. Despite the worsening geopolitical conditions, Sergey Katyrin and Robert Agee noted the importance of preserving stable channels of trade and pragmatic prospects for economic cooperation. These will further serve as a stabilizing factor and an instrument for building mutual trust at the level of business circles, industry associations, and the expert community.
The American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) will be working in the system of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCI) in the Russian Federation, which currently comprises 57,000 legal entities, 130 regional chambers and a combined network of representative offices covering more than 350 points of presence.
According to reports obtained by this article author from the AmCham, promising sectors for Russian-American economic cooperation include healthcare and the medical industry, civil aviation, communications/telecom, natural resource extraction, and energy/energy equipment. The United States and Russia have, more or less, agreed to continue coordinating their work to facilitate the formation of a more favorable environment for Russian and American businesses, reduce risks, and strengthen business ties. Following the American-Russian Dialogue, a joint statement and working documents were adopted.
World
Reviewing the Dynamics of Indian–Russian Business Partnership
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
The Executive President of the Indian Business Alliance (IBA), Sammy Manoj Kotwani, discusses the landmark moment in deepening Russian-Indian collaboration. Kotwani explains the groundbreaking insights into President Vladimir Putin’s working visit to India, the emerging opportunities and pathways for future cooperation, especially for the two-sided economic collaboration. Follow Sammy Manoj Kotwani’s discussions here:
Interpretation of the latest development in Russian-Indian relations
From my viewpoint in Moscow, this visit has effectively opened a new operational chapter in what has always been described as a “Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership.” It did not just reaffirm political goodwill; it translated that goodwill into a structured economic roadmap through Programme 2030, a clear target to take bilateral trade to around USD 100 billion by 2030, and concrete sectoral priorities: energy, nuclear cooperation, critical minerals, manufacturing, connectivity, fertilizers, and labour mobility.
On the ground, the business community reads this summit as a strong signal that India and Russia are doubling down on strategic autonomy in a multipolar world order. Both sides are trying to de-risk their supply chains and payment systems from over-dependence on any single centre of power. This is visible in the focus on national currencies, alternative payment mechanisms, and efforts to stabilise Rupee–Ruble trade, alongside discussions on a Free Trade Agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union and the reinforcement of corridors like the INSTC and the Chennai–Vladivostok route.
In short, my interpretation is that this summit has moved the relationship from “politically excellent but structurally imbalanced” towards a more diversified, long-term economic framework in which companies are expected to co-produce, co-innovate, and invest, not just trade opportunistically.
Significance of the visit for Indian business in Russia and for the Indian Business Alliance (IBA)
For Indian business operating in the Russian Federation, the visit has three immediate effects: confidence, clarity, and continuity. Confidence, because Indian entrepreneurs now see that despite external pressure, New Delhi and Moscow have explicitly committed to deepening economic engagement—especially in energy, fertilizers, defence co-production, nuclear, and critical minerals—rather than quietly scaling it back.
Clarity, because the summit outcomes spell out where the real opportunities lie:
Energy & Petrochemicals: Long-term crude and LNG supply, but also downstream opportunities in refining, petrochemicals, and logistics, where Indian EPC and service companies can participate.
Pharmaceuticals & Medical Devices: Russia’s import substitution drive makes high-quality Indian generics, formulations, and even localized manufacturing extremely relevant.
IT, Digital & AI: There is growing appetite in Russia for Indian IT services, cybersecurity, and digital solutions that are not dependent on Western tech stacks.
Fertilizers, Agro & Food Processing: New joint ventures in fertilizers and agriculture supply chains were explicitly flagged during and around the summit, which is important for both food security and farm incomes.
Continuity, because the Programme 2030 framework and the expected EAEU FTA give businesses a medium-term policy horizon. Tariff reductions, improved market access and predictable regulation are precisely what Indian SMEs and mid-sized companies need to justify long-term investments in Russia.
For the Indian Business Alliance (IBA), this inevitably means more work and more responsibility. We already see increased incoming requests from Indian firms—from large listed companies to first-time exporters—asking very practical questions: Which Russian region should we enter? How do we navigate compliance under the sanctions environment? Which banks are still handling Rupee–Ruble or third-currency settlements? How can we structure joint ventures to align with Russia’s import substitution goals while protecting IP and governance standards?
IBA’s role, therefore, becomes that of economic diplomacy in action: translating high-level summit language into actual B2B meetings, sectoral delegations, regional partnerships, and deal-making platforms such as the India–Russia Business Dialogue in Moscow. This visit will undoubtedly stimulate and intensify IBA’s work as a bridge between the two ecosystems.
India’s current economic presence in the Russian Federation
If we look beyond the headline trade figures, India’s economic presence in Russia today is significant, but not yet commensurate with its potential. Bilateral trade has grown sharply since 2022, largely on the back of discounted Russian oil and coal, making India one of Russia’s top energy customers. However, the structure is still heavily skewed: Russian exports to India dominate, while Indian exports and investments in Russia remain relatively modest and under-diversified.
On the ground in Moscow and across the regions, we see several strong Indian footholds:
Pharmaceuticals: Indian pharma is well-established, respected for its affordability and quality, and poised to deepen localization in line with Russian import substitution policy.
Tea, Coffee, Spices & Food: Traditional segments with deep historical roots, now expanding into ready-to-eat, wellness, and ethnic food categories.
IT & Services: Still under-represented, but with growing interest as Russian entities look for non-Western software, integration, and outsourcing partners.
Diamonds, Textiles, Apparel, and Light Engineering: Present but fragmented, with enormous room to scale, especially if logistics and payment challenges are addressed.
Where India is still behind is on-the-ground investment and manufacturing presence compared to countries like China. Russian policymakers today are clearly favouring investors who help them achieve technological sovereignty and local value addition. For serious Indian companies willing to commit capital, adapt to Russian standards, and accept the complexities of the current environment, this is a period of unusual opportunity. For purely transactional players looking for quick arbitrage, it is becoming progressively harder.
So, I would characterise India’s economic presence as: strategically important, quickly growing in value, but still under-leveraged in terms of depth, diversification, and localization.
Geopolitical pressure from Washington and future predictions
Pressure from Washington—through sanctions, secondary sanctions risk, financial restrictions, and now even tariff measures linked to India’s energy purchases from Russia—is undoubtedly a real and continuing challenge. It affects everything from shipping insurance and dollar transactions to technology transfers and the risk appetite of global banks. In practical terms, it can complicate even a simple India–Russia trade deal if it touches a sanctioned bank, vessel, or technology.
However, my own assessment, based on 35 years of living and working in Russia, is that this pressure will not fundamentally derail India–Russia friendship, but it will reshape how the relationship functions. India’s foreign policy is anchored in strategic autonomy; it seeks strong ties with the United States and Europe, but not at the cost of abandoning a time-tested partner like Russia. Russia, for its part, sees India as a crucial Asian pole in an emerging multipolar world order and as a long-term market, technology partner, and political counterpart in forums like BRICS, SCO, and the G20.
Looking ahead, I see a few clear trends:
Normalization of alternative payment and logistics systems
We will see more institutionalised use of national currencies, alternative messaging systems, regional banks outside the direct sanctions line, and maybe even digital currencies for specific corridors. Rupee–Ruble trade mechanisms that are today seen as “workarounds” will gradually become part of the normal infrastructure of bilateral commerce.
Shift from pure trade to co-production and joint innovation
To reduce vulnerability to sanctions, both sides will push for manufacturing in India and Russia rather than simple exports: defence co-development, localized pharma and medical devices, high-tech and AI collaborations, and joint ventures in critical minerals and clean energy.
Greater role for regions and business associations
Regional governments in Russia (Far East, Arctic regions, industrial hubs) and Indian states will increasingly drive project-level cooperation, supported by platforms like IBA. This “bottom-up” economic diplomacy will make the relationship more resilient than if it relied only on central governments.
Managed balancing by India
India will continue to deepen technology and investment ties with the West while maintaining energy, defence and strategic cooperation with Russia. The challenge will be to manage U.S. and EU expectations without compromising its core national interests. My prediction is that India will stay firm on this course of balanced engagement, even if it means occasional friction with Washington.
In essence, external pressure may complicate the methods of Indo-Russian cooperation, but it is unlikely to overturn the foundations of trust, mutual interest, and long-term complementarity that have been built over decades.
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