World
Brazil Steps Down as BRICS Chairman After Six Months
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
The BRICS group—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—has uniquely emerged as a geopolitical player. Since its establishment, it has transformed into an informal association, struggling to re-shape the global architecture. Noticeably the world is rapidly changing from rules-based unipolar to multipolar, which can be attributed to BRICS leadership. Under Russia’s chairmanship, it had seen several activities throughout 2024, and currently Brazil, despite escalating challenges rooted at home, still managed through with innovative strategies and with robust multilateral collaborations. Brazil hands over its presidency in July (from Jan. 2025 to July 2025) after taking the baton during the BRICS Summit in Kazan, Tatarstan. Comparatively Kazan witnessed more engaging BRICS programmes and activities, both from the public and private sectors, than under Brazil’s half-a-year (six-months) leadership. The was, historically, the first time in terms of leadership duration.
At the request of Brazil, Russia headed BRICS in 2024. Brazil had proposed and Russia assumed this role in 2024. In turn, Brazil leads, but only half-way into the chairmanship in 2025. “Brazil has formally asked Russia to change the order of the BRICS presidency as an exception to Brazil’s plans to lead the G20 in 2024. Of course, we have responded positively to the Brazilian partners’ request. The agreement was supported by other members of the bloc and secured through an exchange of diplomatic notes,” the Russian ministry explained at that time.
Under Russia in 2024, significant developments, in the first place, was the expansion of BRICS, with the inclusion of Ethiopia, Egypt, Iran, and United Arab Emirates. And the re-titling BRICS+ (BRICS Plus). Reports indicated that over 30 countries were interested in joining BRICS. Russia’s chairmanship emphasized advancing multifaceted cooperation, promoting the idea of a unified BRICS financial system and a new digital currency to rival the US dollar. Despite a few controversies, the group adopted the final declaration.
In an entirely different geopolitical context, Brazil’s presidency of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) abruptly ends in July due to multitude of internal economic and political hurdles that need to smart attention. After making unique headlines these past months, Brazil indicated the necessity to undertake explicit blend of economic reforms to preserve its political status and adopt grassroots innovation to save further nation-wide depreciation. The negative economic narratives combined with an increasing social discontent among the population also show the growing political complexities on its landscape. The assertive, and at the same time, contradictory message relates to disillusionment over unexpected handing over of BRICS chairmanship midway of the scheduled one-year period and the scaling back of admirable tasks including development priorities and future policies for BRICS set at the end of its historic administration by Russia in December 2024.
With tectonic symbolism, Brazil took over, for the fourth time, the baton of BRICS chairmanship from January 2025, pledged to assertively work towards a broader equitable economic cooperation. The leadership rotates annually among member countries. It is done in a set order, promoting equal representation and participation. The leadership transition is significant for shaping the agenda and priorities of the group. Brazil, like other BRICS members, repetitively spoken to end dollar dominance, create a single BRICS currency, express passion for dealing with critical challenges and build a multipolar world. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, both in tone and policy approach, have made a few changes, rolled back the association’s aggressive promotion of its laid down posture in building strategic common objectives.
For the past six months, Brazil at the helm of BRICS, has observed the ‘status quo’ – leveraged on the traditional main stream of operations including pushing for reforms in global governance and made attempts, mostly with official rhetoric, promoting sustainable development. Right from the initial stage, this ambitious agenda raised a fundamental question: whether the alliance would advance its alternative global governance vision, or would it remain primarily a forum for economic cooperation Recollecting the facts in the documents, one particular focus was set at strengthening cooperation among Global South countries. Under the theme is “Strengthening Cooperation in the Global South for More Inclusive and Sustainable Governance”, Brazilian leader, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, has pursued various activities within the existing constraints. In the latest, and most possibly, the last activity, as part of steps toward July’s handover, Brazil hosted from June 30 to July 7 one key event BRICS+ Open Science Week, — the Decade of Science and Technology declared by President Vladimir Putin in Russia. It was within the framework of the federal project Popularization of Science and Technology of the Scientific and Technological Development of the Russian Federation State Programme. The project aimed at promoting scientific and technical knowledge among the general public and helping people discover the wonderful world of science and establish a community of science popularizers. The main themes relate to the priority spheres of BRICS activities, namely, food security and agriculture, energy security and sovereignty, healthcare, sustainable development, AI technologies, and space exploration.
As stipulated in its documents, BRICS has set one more of the primary goals as counteracting rules-based order and western hegemony, dismantle the political and economic architecture of the United States and Europe. The group’s remarkable growing attraction and unwavering commitment to reshaping the global economic landscape offer the basis for south-south alliance. At, least, majority of the developing countries in the south are, more or less, rattles that rhetoric in theory, but in practical terms are seemingly ready to strengthen cooperation with United States and Europe.
The Global South have devoted extensive attention to food security issues, underlined cooperation with non-Western countries as a guarantors of food stability. Experts however emphasized this goal of ensuring food security is rather distinctively marked by food imports, especially developing countries including Africa. Sustainable alliances and new principles of cooperation are emerging, but developing countries are trapped in the multilateral financial networks such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank.
Reading further through media reports in June, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has outlined comprehensive future vision for BRICS, sounded consistently optimistic over collective collaboration based on mutual interests and equality, contrasting it with Western organizations lacking fair rules and genuine consensus. Then also the establishment of a BRICS Pay system for settlements in national currencies between the group’s members represented one more step in its economic architecture. This includes the possibility of creating a cross-border payment system and an electronic depository and clearance system (BRICS Clear), and a unified mechanism for exchanging trade and economic information.
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has his own interpretation to BRICS expansion. He advocated for a little pause in further expansion, in order to accommodate the work and the new composition of BRICS − so that the group can smoothly get into the new situation with increased membership. According to Lavrov this was the common opinion. “The aspirations of many countries were taken into account when the category of partner countries was established and it is understood that the partner countries would be priority candidates for full membership,” explained Lavrov, summing up the outcomes of the BRICS Foreign Ministers Council meeting, Rio de Janeiro, April 29, 2025.
At the Kazan summit, BRICS leaders emphasized the possibility of expanding the membership of the New Development Bank (NDB). They also proposed bank’s operational portfolio. The NDB has transformed into an institution for mobilization of resources for infrastructure and sustainable development in its member countries and other emerging economies. The NDB has made some impact, but there is much room for improvement and for strengthening its model of operations.
The latest developments concerning the NDB’s operations were discussed on the sidelines of the St Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in June 2025. Russian President Vladimir Putin held a working discussion with Dilma Rousseff, President of the New Development Bank (NDB). That discussion pointed out a few challenges and, at the same, underlined the pathways into the future. According to official reports made available by the Kremlin, Putin urged the bank to consider seriously the adoption of new financial payment systems and the possibility of settlements in national currencies. Putin further underlined the state of operations, stated that the NDB has, so far, financed approximately 120 projects worth US$39 billion.
Established in 2015 by the BRICS leaders, the New Development Bank (NDB) has since faced multitude of challenges, especially now with geopolitical changes and emerging economic hurdles. “Of course, we face a number of challenges,” Dilma Rousseff replied in her brief response. Rousseff, in addition, referred to the second very important issue, that is the expansion of membership and stakeholders, partners of the bank. As at June 2025, two countries were selected as new members: Uzbekistan and Colombia. And two more countries are still under consideration: Ethiopia and Indonesia.
According to media reports, other multilateral development institutions, including the World Bank, have expressed an intention to work together with the NDB. In May 2023, Saudi Arabia expressed its intention to join the NDB. The bank is headquartered in Shanghai, China. The first regional office of the bank was opened in Johannesburg, South Africa in 2016. Subsequently, regional offices were established in São Paulo in Brazil, Ahmedabad in India and Moscow in the Russian Federation.
Its historical records show that Brazil, Russia, India, and China held their first leaders’ summit in Yekaterinburg, Russia, in June 2009 under the name BRIC. Then South Africa joined the group in 2010. That however, Ethiopia, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates were invited to the 2024 summit in Russia. With the second expansion in Kazan, the acronym BRICS+ (in its expanded form BRICS Plus) is currently used reflecting newly transformed membership. In addition, it has 13 countries in the ‘partner state’ category, boosting its numerical strength and collective power.
Unbelievably the potential of BRICS has benefited greatly from expansion. The BRICS countries represent nearly half of the world’s population, and their aggregate GDP makes up about 40 percent of global GDP in terms of purchasing power parity, more than that of the G7, which means that the Global South is becoming a new pillar of support for growth. On the other side, and it must be noted that more than 60% of the population of these BRICS members have unimagineable levels of poverty, despite the enormous resources both human capital and natural resources. Considering this, it stands to reason that BRICS continues to attract the Global South and Global East countries that seek mutually beneficial partnerships and jointly raised the level of development and standard of living. Hopes are still rising high that after the 17th BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro on July 6-7, the Global South and Global East countries continue steadfastly to contribute to the collective efforts of BRICS association in the coming years ahead, and new leadership (with its three key strategic partnership areas: politics and security, the economy and finances, culture and the humanitarian ties) would broadly create new prospects, uphold the tenets of multilateralism and open new horizons for BRICS+ group—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.
Kestér Kenn Klomegâh has a diverse work experience in the field of business intelligence and consultancy. His focused research interest includes geopolitical changes, foreign relations and economic development related questions in Africa with external countries. Klomegâh has media publications, policy monographs and e-handbooks
World
Abebe Selassie to Retire as Director of African Department at IMF
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has announced the retirement of its director of the African department, Abebe Aemro Selassie, on May 1, 2026. Since his appointment in 2016, Abebe Selassie has served in this position for a decade. During his tenure, IMF added a 25th chair to its Executive Board, increasing the voice of sub-Saharan Africa.
As a director for Africa, he has overseen the IMF’s engagement with 45 countries across sub-Saharan Africa. Abebe and his team work closely with the region’s leaders and policymakers to improve economic and development outcomes. This includes oversight of the IMF’s intensified engagement with the region in recent years, including some $60 billion in financial support the institution has provided to countries since 2020. Reports indicated that under his leadership, his department generally reinforces the organization’s role as a trusted partner to many African countries.
Abebe Selassie has worked with both the regional economic blocs and the African Union (AU) as well as individual African states. The key focus has been the strategic articulation of Africa’s development priorities in reshaping economic governance, mobilizing sustainable investments, and addressing systemic financial challenges.
It is important noting that the IMF has funded diverse infrastructure projects that facilitated either export-led growth or import substitution industrialization models of development. Further to that, African states have also made numerous loans and benefited from much-needed debt relief.
Summarizing the IMF’s key focus areas, among others, for Africa: (i) reforming the global financial architecture in an effort to improve the structure, institutions, rules, and processes that govern international finance in order to make the global economy more stable, equitable, and resilient.
Concessional financing to counter rising borrowing costs, with Africa paying up to 5 times more in interest than advanced economies (AfDB, 2023). Fair representation, pushing for IMF quota reforms to reflect Africa’s $3.4 trillion collective GDP—yet the continent holds less than 5% of voting shares in Bretton Woods institutions.
(ii) Unlocking Investments for Jobs and Sustainable Growth. With Africa’s working-age population set to double to 1 billion by 2050, the African states spotlight: The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), projected to boost intra-African trade by 52% and create 30 million jobs by 2035 (World Bank, 2024). Infrastructure partnerships, targeting sectors such as renewable energy, where Africa receives only 2% of global clean energy investments despite its vast solar and wind potential (IEA, 2024).
(iii) Climate Finance and Debt Relief for Resilience: Africa contributes less than 4% of global emissions but bears the brunt of climate shocks, losing 5–15% of GDP per capita to climate-related disasters annually (African Development Bank, 2024). These are strictly in alignment with Agenda 2063’s aspirations for inclusive growth, maximizing multilateral cooperation and enhancing global engagement with the continent.
“I am deeply grateful for Abe’s visionary leadership, dedication to the Fund’s mission, and unwavering commitment to the members in the region,” Ms. Kristalina Georgieva, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). “The legacy he leaves on the Fund’s work in Africa is one of alignment with the aspirations of people, especially the youth, for good governance, strong economies and lasting prosperity. His trusted advice has been invaluable to me personally, and his leadership has strengthened our mission.”
“A national of Ethiopia, Selassie first joined the IMF in 1994. Over his remarkable 32-year career, he held senior positions including Deputy Director in AFR, Mission Chief for Portugal and South Africa, Division Chief of the Regional Studies Division, and Senior Resident Representative in Uganda. Earlier, he contributed to programs in Turkey, Thailand, Romania, and Estonia, and worked on policy, operational review, and economic research.”
Under his ten-year leadership and as director of the African Department (AFR), Abebe Selassie helped to reinforce the Fund’s role as a trusted partner with sub-Saharan African members. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is an international organization that promotes global economic growth and financial stability, encourages international trade, and reduces poverty.
World
Africa Squeezed between Import Substitution and Dependency Syndrome
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
Squeezed between import substitution and dependency syndrome, a condition characterized by a set of associated economic symptoms—that is rules and regulations—majority of African countries are shifting from United States and Europe to an incoherent alternative bilateral partnerships with Russia, China and the Global South.
By forging new partnerships, for instance with Russia, these African countries rather create conspicuous economic dependency at the expense of strengthening their own local production, attainable by supporting local farmers under state budget. Import-centric partnership ties and lack of diversification make these African countries committed to import-dependent structures. It invariably compounds domestic production challenges. Needless to say that Africa has huge arable land and human resources to ensure food security.
A classical example that readily comes to mind is Ghana, and other West African countries. With rapidly accelerating economic policy, Ghana’s President John Dramani Mahama ordered the suspension of U.S. chicken and agricultural products, reaffirming swift measures for transforming local agriculture considered as grounds for ensuring sustainable food security and economic growth and, simultaneously, for driving job creation.
President John Dramani Mahama, in early December 2025, while observing Agricultural Day, urged Ghanaians to take up farming, highlighting the guarantee and state support needed for affordable credit and modern tools to boost food security. According to Mahama, Ghana spends $3bn yearly on basic food imports from abroad.
The government decision highlights the importance of leveraging unto local agriculture technology and innovation. Creating opportunities to unlock the full potential of depending on available resources within the new transformative policy strategy which aims at boosting local productivity. President John Dramani Mahama’s special initiatives are the 24-Hour Economy and the Big Push Agenda. One of the pillars focuses on Grow 24 – modernising agriculture.
Despite remarkable commendations for new set of economic recovery, Ghana’s demand for agricultural products is still high, and this time making a smooth shift to Russia whose poultry meat and wheat currently became the main driver of exports to African countries. And Ghana, noticeably, accepts large quantity (tonnes) of poultry from Russia’s Rostov region into the country, according to several media reports. The supplies include grains, but also vegetable oils, meat and dairy products, fish and finished food products have significant potential for Africa.
The Agriculture Ministry’s Agroexport Department acknowledges Russia exports chicken to Ghana, with Ghanaian importers sourcing Russian poultry products, especially frozen cuts, to meet significant local demand that far outstrips domestic production, even after Ghana lifted a temporary 2020 avian flu-related ban on Russian poultry.
Moreover, monitoring and basic research indicated Russian producers are actively increasing poultry exports to various African countries, thus boosting trade, although Ghana still struggles to balance imports with local industry needs.
A few details indicate the following:
Trade Resumed: Ghana has lifted its ban on Russian poultry imports since April 2021, allowing poultry trade to resume. Russian regions have, thus far, consistently exported these poultry meat and products into the country under regulatory but flexible import rules on a negotiated bilateral agreement.
Significant Market: In any case, Ghana is a key African market for Russian poultry, with exports seeing substantial growth in recent years, alongside Angola, Benin, Cote d’Voire, Nigeria and Sierra Leone.
Demand-Driven: Ghana’s large gap between domestic poultry production and national demand necessitates significant imports, creating opportunities for foreign suppliers like Russia.
Major Exporters: Russia poultry companies are focused on increasing generally their African exports, with Ghana being a major destination. The basic question: to remain as import dependency or strive at attaining food sufficiency?
Product Focus: Exports typically include frozen chicken cuts (legs and meat) very vital for supplementing local supply. But as the geopolitical dynamics shift, Ghana and other importing African countries have to review partnerships, particularly with Russia.
Despite the fact that challenges persist, Russia strongly remains as a notable supplier to Ghana, even under the supervision of John Mahama’s administration, dealing as a friendly ally, both have the vision for multipolar trade architecture, ultimately fulfilling a critical role in meeting majority of African countries’ large consumer demand for poultry products, and with Russia’s trade actively expanding and Ghana’s preparedness to spend on such imports from the state budget.
Following two high-profile Russia–Africa summits, cooperation in the area of food security emerged as a key theme. Moscow pledged to boost agricultural exports to the continent—especially grain, poultry, and fertilisers—while African leaders welcomed the prospect of improved food supplies.
Nevertheless, do these African governments think of prioritising agricultural self-sufficiency. At a May 2025 meeting in St. Petersburg, Russia’s Economic Development Minister, Maxim Reshetnikov, underlined the fact that more than 40 Russian companies were keen to export animal products and agricultural goods to the African region.
Russia, eager to expand its economic footprint, sees large-scale agricultural exports as a key revenue generator. Estimates suggest the Russian government could earn over $15 billion annually from these agricultural exports to African continent.
Head of the Agroexport Federal Center, Ilya Ilyushin, speaking at the round table “Russia-Africa: A Strategic Partnership in Agriculture to Ensure Food Security,” which was held as part of the international conference on ensuring the food sovereignty of African countries in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) on Nov. 21, 2025, said: “We see significant potential in expanding supplies of Russian agricultural products to Africa.”
Ilya Ilyushin, however, mentioned that the Agriculture Ministry’s Agroexport Department, and the Union of Grain Exporters and Producers, exported over 32,000 tonnes of wheat and barley to Egypt totaling nearly $8 million during the first half of 2025, Kenya totaling over $119 million.
Interfax media reports referred to African countries whose markets are of interest for Russian producers and exporters. Despite existing difficulties, supplies of livestock products are also growing, this includes poultry meat, Ilyushin said. Exports of agricultural products from Russia to African countries have more than doubled, and third quarter of 2025 reached almost $7 billion.
The key buyers of Russian grain on the continent are Egypt, Algeria, Kenya, Libya, Tunisia, Nigeria, Morocco, South Africa, Tanzania and Sudan, he said. According to him, Russia needs to expand the geography of supplies, increasing exports to other regions of the continent, increase supplies in West Africa to Benin, Cameroon, Ghana, Liberia and the French-speaking Sahelian States.
Nevertheless, Russian exporters have nothing to complain. Africa’s dependency dilemma still persists. Therefore, Russia to continue expanding food exports to Africa explicitly reflects a calculated economic and geopolitical strategy. In the end of the analysis, the debate plays out prominently and the primary message: Africa cannot and must not afford to sacrifice food sovereignty for colourful symbolism and geopolitical solidarity.
With the above analysis, Russian exporters show readiness to explore and shape actionable strategies for harnessing Africa’s consumer market, including that of Ghana, and further to strengthen economic and trade cooperation and support its dynamic vision for sustainable development in the context of multipolar friendship and solidarity.
World
Coup Leader Mamady Doumbouya Wins Guinea’s 2025 Presidential Election
By Adedapo Adesanya
Guinea’s military leader Mamady Doumbouya will fully transition to its democratic president after he was elected president of the West African nation.
The former special forces commander seized power in 2021, toppling then-President Alpha Conde, who had been in office since 2010.
Mr Doumbouya reportedly won 86.72 per cent of the election held on December 28, an absolute majority that allows him to avoid a runoff. He will hold the forte for the next seven years as law permits.
The Supreme Court has eight days to validate the results in the event of any challenge. However, this may not be so as ousted Conde and Mr Cellou Dalein Diallo, Guinea’s longtime opposition leader, are in exile.
The election saw Doumbouya face off a fragmented opposition of eight challengers.
One of the opposition candidates, Mr Faya Lansana Millimono claimed the election was marred by “systematic fraudulent practices” and that observers were prevented from monitoring the voting and counting processes.
Guinea is the world leader in bauxite and holds a very large gold reserve. The country is preparing to occupy a leading position in iron ore with the launch of the Simandou project in November, expected to become the world’s largest iron mine.
Mr Doumbouya has claimed credit for pushing the project forward and ensuring Guinea benefits from its output. He has also revoked the licence of Emirates Global Aluminium’s subsidiary Guinea Alumina Corporation following a refinery dispute, transferring the unit’s assets to a state-owned firm.
In September, rating agency, Standard & Poor’s (S&P), assigned an inaugural rating of “B+” with a “Stable” outlook to the Republic of Guinea.
This decision reflects the strength of the country’s economic fundamentals, strong growth prospects driven by the integrated mining and infrastructure Simandou project, and the rigor in public financial management.
As a result, Guinea is now above the continental average and makes it the third best-rated economy in West Africa.
According to S&P, between 2026 and 2028, Guinea could experience GDP growth of nearly 10 per cent per year, far exceeding the regional average.
-
Feature/OPED6 years agoDavos was Different this year
-
Travel/Tourism9 years ago
Lagos Seals Western Lodge Hotel In Ikorodu
-
Showbiz3 years agoEstranged Lover Releases Videos of Empress Njamah Bathing
-
Banking8 years agoSort Codes of GTBank Branches in Nigeria
-
Economy3 years agoSubsidy Removal: CNG at N130 Per Litre Cheaper Than Petrol—IPMAN
-
Banking3 years agoFirst Bank Announces Planned Downtime
-
Banking3 years agoSort Codes of UBA Branches in Nigeria
-
Sports3 years agoHighest Paid Nigerian Footballer – How Much Do Nigerian Footballers Earn










