World
COMESA Competition Commission Unveils Draft Guidelines
By Lerisha Naidu and Zareenah Rasool
The COMESA Competition Commission published draft guidelines to the COMESA Competition Regulations, 2004 (Regulations) for public comment on October 19, 2021.
The guidelines aim to provide clarity on the commission’s policies and procedures and to foster transparency and certainty in the administration and enforcement of the Regulations.
These draft guidelines are based on international best practices and policy approaches of key regulators, including the European Commission.
They address three fundamental areas of regulatory enforcement – the determination of fines and administrative penalties, settlement procedures and hearing procedures.
The determination of fines and administrative penalties
To ensure proportionality and fairness in imposing sanctions for antitrust violations, the commission has devised a two-step methodology for calculating penalties under the Regulations. The two-step methodology will entail computing a “base amount” and increasing or decreasing it according to aggravating or mitigating considerations, on a case-by-case basis.
Base Amount: The commission will set the base amount for a fine based on the undertaking’s turnover within the common market in the financial year preceding the infringement.
The proposed starting point for determining the base amount for specific infringements is a proportion of the infringing entity’s revenue. By way of example, the base proportion of turnover would be 5% for cartel conduct, 3% for abuse of dominance, and 2% for gun-jumping. To compute the final base amount, the commission will consider the nature, gravity, and duration of the infringement, as well as the number of affected consumers.
Adjustments: The base amount may be adjusted upward based on aggravating factors such as repeat offences, refusal to cooperate and/or being characterized as an “initiator” of the conduct concerned.
Conversely, the base amount may be adjusted downward based on mitigating factors such as full cooperation, efficiency justifications for the conduct, extent of involvement, and even negligence in engaging in the alleged conduct.
Ultimately, the fine imposed shall not be in excess of 10% of the infringing entity’s annual turnover. To establish a sufficiently deterrent effect, the Commission may increase the fine by up to 1% of the total turnover, subject to the 10% cap. Importantly, fines imposed may exceed the infringement‑related gains.
The commission may also levy a “symbolic fine” in specific instances. The draft guidelines do not define a “symbolic fine”, the manner in which it will be computed, or under what circumstances it may be imposed.
It appears that such a fine would not be computed in accordance with the above two-step methodology. This will involve the exercise of the authority’s discretion and may result in a lack of certainty and clarity, for which additional guidance may be necessary.
Settlement procedures
Procuring settlements is crucial to effective antitrust enforcement, and increases procedural efficiency, thus reducing time and financial resources spent on proceedings. To that end, the draft guidelines are intended to provide direction on the Commission’s approach to settlement proceedings in relation to antitrust infringements.
The guidelines state that no admission of infringement or culpability is required for authorisation proceedings under Article 20 of the Regulations (in terms of which the commission may grant authorization to an entity to enter and/or give effect to an agreement if its public benefits outweigh any anticompetitive effects), which is in line with the Regulations. However, certain settlement proceedings require an admission of liability – these settlement proceedings are those relating to Article 19 abuse of dominance, Article 21 determination of anticompetitive conduct on request (by any person who believes that activity by a firm located in a Member State has the effect, or is likely to have the effect, of restricting competition in the Common Market), and Article 22 determination of anticompetitive conduct at the Commission’s own initiative (where the Commission has reason to believe that business conduct by an undertaking restrains competition in the Common Market). Many jurisdictions take a similar approach. The non-imposition of admissions of guilt clauses may go some way towards fostering parties’ willingness to enter into settlement agreements.
The draft guidelines further state that joint representatives must be appointed by the parties when the Commission commences settlement proceedings against two or more parties within a single economic unit. The appointment of joint representatives is simply to ease the settlement discussions.
According to the guidelines, the committee responsible for initial determinations would be vested with the power to confirm or withhold its confirmation of a settlement reached between the Commission and infringing parties. Withholding confirmation would occur in circumstances of “blatant and unfair settlement terms”.
It is unclear whether the committee would have the discretion to either refer the settlement agreement back to the Commission for renegotiation or with proposed changes, or the Committee would have the legal power to make the appropriate changes prior to confirmation of the settlement agreement. Arguably, the former would be a sensible approach to allow the parties to comment on any proposed changes.
Hearing procedures
These rules provide broad guidance on the elements of any hearing, including notice timelines, when hearings may be held, evidence testing, and the conduct of proceedings. The Regulations allow hearings in three situations – during the investigative process, before the publication of notice of compulsory recall of defective goods, and before the Committee for initial determination of cases.
Hearings may also be requested by a party under investigation. A COVID-friendly inclusion into the guidelines states that hearings can be conducted in private or in public, either via video conference, physical attendance, or both.
The rules specify that if the Committee issues a breach order, it may direct parties to discuss a remedy. If the parties cannot agree on a remedy, the Committee would issue an order without further consultation. Parties would still be able to review and/or appeal the order on the merits.
Lastly, the guidelines note that the determination of the Committee for initial determinations would be published in its official publication. However, parties would be allowed to object to such publication based on legitimate business interests.
Interested parties have been invited to submit their comments on these draft guidelines by no later than Friday, November 12, 2021, by emailing the Registrar of the Commission, Meti Demissie Disasa at md*****@****sa.int or co*****@****sa.int.
Lerisha Naidu is a Partner at Sphesihle Nxumalo, Associate, while Zareenah Rasool is a Candidate Attorney, Competition & Antitrust Practice at Baker McKenzie Johannesburg
By Aduragbemi Omiyale
Accessing the US Dollar in the East Africa region has now been made easier with the expansion of the stablecoin settlement infrastructure of SCRYPT.
This development enables banks, payment providers and corporate treasury teams to move value into and out of the continent in real time.
Businesses paying international suppliers frequently have to convert local currency into USD before purchasing stablecoins for settlement, incurring FX conversions and spreads before any payment is made.
But SCRYPT is eliminating this intermediate conversion by enabling direct settlement corridors for local African currencies into stablecoins.
This development allows businesses to move from local currency to stablecoin settlement in a single licensed transaction, without first sourcing rationed bank dollars, as stablecoins are increasingly becoming settlement infrastructure rather than an investment product.
The expansion adds settlement support across four African currencies: the Kenyan shilling (KES), Tanzanian shilling (TZS), Rwandan franc (RWF) and Ugandan shilling (UGX). Each corridor is delivered through the same full-stack infrastructure our clients already use for trading, custody and treasury operations.
Speaking on this, the chief executive of SCRYPT, Norman Wooding, said, “Across Africa, stablecoin adoption is driven by economic need, not speculation.
“Businesses here are not chasing yield; they are trying to pay suppliers and manage treasury without losing margin to a banking system that rations dollars. Licensed, fair-rate dollar access is the clearest proof of what this infrastructure is for.”
Also commenting, the Managing Director of Markets & Trading at SCRYPT, Mr Gabriel Titopoulos, said, “Until now, reaching stablecoins from local African currencies meant buying scarce dollars and incurring several layers of conversion costs.
“SCRYPT removes this friction. Firms and payment providers can now settle straight from local currencies through live corridors, with local partners.”
World
African Graduates Association Promoting Multifaceted Initiatives With Russian Educational Institutions
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
In preparations for the third Russia-Africa Summit, scheduled for late October 2026, Dr Francois Ngan, deputy chairman of the Union of Associations of African Graduates of Soviet and Russian Universities, during an official working visit, has held a consultative meeting with Professor Vladimir Filippov, the President of the Russian University of Peoples’ Friendship (RUDN), and former Minister of Higher Education of Russia, Chairman of the National Commission for Accreditation of Higher Education.
RUDN is an educational institution established in 1960, primarily to provide higher education to Third World students. It has now become a popular multidisciplinary spot for many students, especially from developing countries. The university offers various academic programmes and has research infrastructure that comprises laboratories and interdisciplinary centres. The university is named after the former Congolese leader, Patrice Lumumba.
Dr Francois Ngan and Professor Filippov discussed the importance of the Graduates Association as a continental platform dedicated to strengthening unity, cooperation, and promoting shared progress among African graduates who studied in the former Soviet Union and in the Russian Federation. They also reviewed multifaceted initiatives that could bring together alumni associations from across Africa, whose members obtained education and professional training, and cultural experiences in Soviet and Russian institutions of higher learning.
Professor Filippov expressed optimism in addressing emerging challenges as a result of shifting geopolitical changes, emphasised strategic cooperation in the educational sphere with Africa, in general, and with the Republic of Cameroon, in particular, and further about the integration of African students during their studies in the Russian Federation.
The meeting also touched on academic and scientific work, the possibility of rewriting a scientific thesis, and the official organisation of transferring versions translated into six languages for the library of RUDN. Significant questions relating to Russia’s educational opportunities, collaborations and partnerships involving African countries were thoroughly discussed.
The Union of Associations of African Graduates of Soviet and Russian Universities was created under one continental umbrella to promote friendship, for professional networking, to engage in cultural exchange, and with particular emphasis on forging strategic cooperation between Africa and Russia.
World
Russia to Support Industrial Growth, Technological Advancement and Supply Chain Resilience across Africa
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
With the heightening of geopolitical rivalry and competition, a new Russia-Africa working group has emerged as a significant institutional mechanism and plans to focus on facilitating and monitoring strategic investments, industrialisation, and infrastructural development—the Strategic Action Plan 2023-2026—that was outlined during the second Russia-Africa summit, in St.Petersburg, the second largest city in the Russian Federation.
While substantial progress has, largely, lagged on the multidimensional economic front with Africa primarily due to its internal difficulties and the complexity of relations with its former Soviet neighbours, Russian officials believe there still remains huge untapped potential in strengthening bilateral cooperation. As planned, President Vladimir Putin has already signed an executive order that directs Moscow to host the forthcoming third Russia-Africa summit in October 2026.
On June 30, a regular meeting of the Business Council on Africa was held under the chairmanship of the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry. It was dedicated to issues of trade, economic and investment cooperation with Africa. The group discussed the current state and prospects for the implementation of policy initiatives with an emphasis on assisting the countries of the continent, strengthening their economic, energy, technological and food sovereignty, as well as training specialists for Africa.
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has reiterated that Russia-Africa relations primarily depend on an understanding of the importance of collective action based on the principles of equality, mutual respect and resolving common tasks. In the past few years, Russia-Africa cooperation has been noticeably strengthening. “We are deepening political dialogues, developing bilateral contacts with African countries, promoting cordial cooperation between ministries and departments, and expanding humanitarian exchanges. We are also continuing the structural diversification of trade partnerships and economic dimensions.”
“Next on the agenda is the launch of diplomatic missions in The Gambia, Liberia, Togo, and the Union of the Comoros,” Lavrov said at a meeting of the Business Council under the Russian foreign minister. Lavrov noted that Russian embassies began operating in three other African countries in 2025: Niger, Sierra Leone, and South Sudan. A new Department for Partnership with Africa was also established. According to the top diplomat, “expanding Russia’s diplomatic presence on the continent contributes to developing relations.”
There are already 45 Russian embassies operating in Africa. The Russian foreign minister noted that Moscow is quickly rebuilding its presence in African countries, which sharply declined during the collapse of the Soviet Union. “There will be literally four or five countries left where we still need to establish full-fledged embassies, and then, we will have 100 per cent coverage of the entire African continent with our diplomatic presence,” Lavrov emphasised.
After the first summit in October 2019, the Foreign Ministry also created the Secretariat of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum. Its main tasks include controlling the roadmap to Africa’s multidimensional cooperation and guiding potential Russian investors to the continent. This also underscored the priority and post-Soviet solidarity Russia currently attaches to its policy towards Africa, within the growing framework of the emerging new architecture of multipolarity in the Global South.
In an interview in June 2026, the director of the Department of Partnership with Africa at the Foreign Ministry, Tatyana Dovgalenko, shared a few insights in the lead-up to the third summit. Furthermore, Dovgalenko explained that Russia would move away from security to concentrate more on economic issues, especially to team up with African colleagues to streamline mechanisms for implementing projects that will ensure food security and agriculture, and help Africa in installing processing facilities to support its self-sufficiency. She also emphasised energy and vital infrastructures, and the third direction was to simultaneously work more coherently with sub-regional organisations.
Over the past few years, bilateral relations have been increasing. There are positive dynamics in trade turnover, estimated at $30 billion. Steps are being taken to build payment systems, preferably in national currencies, while Russia looks to open four more diplomatic offices, bringing the total to 48 across Africa. Russia is currently training 37,000 African students, but only approximately 1/3 on state scholarships in Russia’s educational institutions. “We are ready to share valuable experiences of building a sovereign development model with African partners to achieve self-reliant economic growth based on their own resources and capabilities. Russia aims at creating processing capabilities and localising production, and provides access to advanced technological solutions,” underlined Dovgalenko in her interview with New Eastern Outlook.
For African countries that have endured difficult decades on the path to political independence, it is now important to take full control over the untapped resources, direct income and revenue toward stimulating the national economic sector, rather than paying for the well-being of the Western “golden billion” during this changing geopolitical era, according to Dovgalenko.
According to reports, the forthcoming Russia-Africa summit will have an economic agenda, including the digital economy, technology, artificial intelligence, healthcare, investment, and settlements in global trade. Of course, the agenda will also cover Africa’s political aspects. But if African friends bring along any specific ideas, Russia will give them serious attention. In addition, with continuity and consistency, pay increased attention to expanding ties with Africa’s regional integration associations.
Going forward, the focus will be on translating strong trade relations into deeper investment partnerships, fostering technology collaboration, strengthening industrial linkages and contributing towards the shared objectives set by the leadership of both African countries and Russia. At the third summit, the above-mentioned specific initiatives will be further designed. In this regard, the key document, the new action plan for the next three-year period (2027-2029), is intended to reflect dynamic realities in the future relations of Russia and Africa
