World
Exploring Russia’s Support of Africa’s Coupists
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
In this insightful interview, Professor Sergiu Mișcoiu at the Faculty of European Studies, Babes-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca (Romania), where he serves as a Director of the Centre for International Cooperation and as Director of the Centre for African Studies, discusses the political situation in the French-speaking West African countries, the existing multiple challenges and Russia’s diplomacy within the context of current geopolitical changes and the scramble for influence in Africa. Here are the interview excerpts:
To begin with, what are your arguments that Russia supports military coup plotters (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger et cetera) in Africa?
The logic behind backing the coups is quite evident and relates to the strategy of Russia to fight against the West and to (re)entrench itself in Africa. As the former presidents of the three countries have been supported by the United States, the European Union, and above all, France, the only strategic option of a Russian re-emerging empire opposing the West was to back all the anti-Western forces wherever they might act and whoever they would be.
Since the late 2000s, Russia has been increasingly preoccupied with preparing the ground for anti-Western operations. The progressive entrenchment of the Kremlin-guided paramilitary groups (starting with the infamously Groupe Wagner) in the Central African Republic, then in Mali and to a lesser extent in other parts of Central and Western Africa, has only been the visible peak of the iceberg.
More effective were the troll farms populating the sub-continent with pro-Russian influencers and deploying campaigns of disinformation, which targeted especially the French and UN contingents deployed to fight the jihadist groups. These campaigns contributed to turning the public opinions of those states against the West and more importantly against their presidents, who were denounced as being the “Occident’s puppets”.
While the operations of the coups themselves were most probably not directly coordinated by Russia, the attitude of the national military forces and of the mass of demonstrators who backed the coups was shaped by Russia. The fact that the new juntas in power immediately made declarations and gestures (such as state visits) of rapprochement towards Russia testifies once more of a mechanical convergence of interests between the new strongmen in Bamako, Ouagadougou and Niamey, to which Russia has abundantly contributed over the last decade.
As it explicitly shows, Russia is seemingly interested in military governance in Africa. Does that set the precedence for future military takeovers in Africa?
The outcome of the coups in the three Sahel states encouraged Russia to pursue its strategy in other African countries. Nonetheless, the dismantlement of the Wagner Group and the difficult reorganization of its remaining elements made the Kremlin’s task more difficult, as some axes of penetration into the decision-making and military milieus of the African countries have been strongly shaken, although the new high responsible for the operations, Vladimir Alexeyev, makes substantive efforts to regain control over the remaining networks.
Moreover, the amplitude of Dimitri Prigozhin’s finally aborted rebellion against the Kremlin raised some questions in the minds of many African political, business and military supporters of Moscow. Among those questions, the most important is the following: If the Russian regime itself was on the verge of facing a military attack against its capital, how could it guarantee our support in the eventual case we will try to conduct coups similar to those in the Sahel countries? Consequently, the other would-be putschists’ enthusiasm for following the Sahelian coups’ path has naturally diminished.
Do transitions from democratic governance to military governments have any meaning for fighting growing trends of neo-colonialism in Africa?
Neo-colonialism in Africa has been a growing reality since the end of the Cold War and reached a pinnacle by the early 2000s. Then, the combined effects of September 11 and the anti-neocolonial activism of some leaders such as Laurent Gbagbo in the Ivory Coast rebalanced the power relations making the West increasingly dependent on the strategic support of the “friendly” African heads of state.
More salient in the case of the former French colonies, this process could be suggestively described by the transformation of the “Françafrique” into the “Afrique-France”, with Gabon’s historical leader Omar Bongo gaining unprecedented leverage, going so far as he was able to influence the composition of the French governments of those times. But once again, this page was turned with the world economic crisis of 2008-2011 and with the considerable growth of the jihadist attacks, leading to the destabilization of Mali and the risk of generalization over the entire Sahelian region.
The French-led anti-jihadist operations Serval and then Barkhane, deployed in Mali and reshaped later on into an international security task force with a wider focus on the Sahel, have implicitly deprived to some extent the democratically elected presidents of Niger, Burkina and Mali of their autonomy in matters related to national security and political strategy. This was seen by many as the ultimate proof of the return to colonialism. As the results of the fight against Islamist terrorism have been increasingly modest, especially after 2019, the contestation of the Western-backed presidents has become widespread at different levels of society, of the institutions and of the security forces. This explains the popular support for the series of coups perpetrated in the three countries and shows the important potential that anti-neo-colonialism has as a galvanizer of the discontented peoples of Africa.
Despite the above narratives, do you think the 15-member regional economic bloc, must be firm with the ‘Silence-the-Guns’ policy adopted several years ago by the African Union?
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was caught in the trap of its transformation from a quasi-economic organization to a semipolitical one. If by 2010, the policy of sanctions against illegitimate governments and the direct interventions it operated (like the one in The Gambia against the former president Yahya Jammeh, who refused to leave power after losing the elections in 2017) encountered a relative success, the more recent policies proved inefficacious, culminating with the July 2023 postponed and ultimately cancelled intervention against the putsch in Niger. The legitimacy of ECOWAS has been strongly contested by the new military regimes. At the same, the ‘Silence-the-Guns’ AU-inspired policy has proved idealist, especially when it comes to the conflicts in the Sahel that multiplied “under the watch” of the two organizations.
A research report from the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) describes Russia as ‘a virtual investor’ in Africa, most of its limitless pledges and several bilateral agreements largely aimed at luring (woo-ing) African states and leaders to support its ‘special military operation’ in neighbouring Ukraine. What are your expert views and arguments here?
Vladimir Putin has intended to restore the mightiness of the Soviet Union, including its influence over the African continent. But unlike the USSR, Russia didn’t and doesn’t dispose of the financial and logistic resources needed to massively invest in the key sectors. To compensate for its economic debility, the
The Kremlin inaugurates almost insignificant but ostentatious investment projects and at the same aggressively promotes the anti-Western discourse (“Russia helps, the West takes”).
Moreover, it uses the dependence of several African countries on Russian cereals to “adjust” their positions about the illegal Russian war against Ukraine, especially when it comes to votes taken in the UN General Assembly. A strategy of combination between the Russian para-military presence and massive resource grabbing was applied in the Central African Republic (CAR), where President Faustin-Archange Touadéra saved his seat by relying on a Russian praetorian guard, while in exchange he accepted to formally or informally grant extended rights of exploitation of many gem mines to the companies led by Kremlin-friendly oligarchs, who are the new de facto rulers of the respective mining areas and implicitly of some wider regions in the CAR. Seen as a “laboratory” for the further expansion of this toxic model, the CAR is praised by the Russian military-business elites, who suffer because of the international sanctions, as an Eldorado, proving once again the particularly aggressive neocolonial strategy that Moscow is implementing while criticizing the West.
In practical terms and compared to China, do you think Russia has made a visible impact on the economy and infrastructure development in the continent since the collapse of the Soviet era in 1991?
China has disposed of important financial resources and has been at least between the 1990s and the end of the 2010s incomparably less violent than Russia in spreading its influence all over the African continent. Being led by a regime that spoused the “state capitalist” system, China was capable of using most opportunities provided by the intensive globalization process to extend its presence and consolidate its soft economic power. It succeeded in impressing via its investments in the road and railway infrastructures, in ports, in some major public buildings and other sectors. As compared to China, Russia made almost no difference through its modest investments and bet its entire strategy on this mixture of, on one hand, the renewal of the former USSR networks and the reification of the Soviet past, and on the other, the direct intrusion in the domestic conflicts of the most vulnerable African states.
Can we conclude this discussion with the significance of peace, justice and strong state institutions (UN SDG 16), what has been achieved over the past few years, the challenges and the way forward in West Africa?
Unfortunately, SDG 16 is an untouchable horizon for most African states at this stage. The return of the jihadist threat in several regions of the Sahel, Western Sahara, but also Central and Western Africa, with the extension of the operations of various groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda, ISIS or Boko Haram has engendered an important security crisis that crucially affected the stability of the African states.
The series of coup d’états and unconstitutional replacements of the former or acting leaders (in Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad and Niger) was a response to the ineptitude of the democratic institutional settings to guarantee the basic rights of the citizens, starting with the rights to live and security. The new geopolitical thick division caused by the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine contributed to the aggravation of the security context, especially in terms of food and human security, and deprived many African governments of their capacity to negotiate with multiple actors at different levels, as they are now constrained to pick sides and to act accordingly, like during the Cold War era. If the actual trends continue, I am not optimistic at all about the possibility of getting closer to meeting this SDG.
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
One year after launching a continental initiative designed to make excellence in public governance the foundation of a new drive to transform Africa, LEAD, the Africa CEO Forum’s pan-African leadership programme, takes stock of its first cohort and announces the launch of its second class. Built around a community of senior public decision-makers committed to modernising the state and to the continent’s digital transformation, this new cohort gathers for three days, from 28 to 30 August 2026, on the campus of Mohammed VI Polytechnic University (UM6P) in Rabat, Morocco.
A second cohort that confirms the programme’s durability
For its second class, LEAD brings together 50 fellows, senior public decision-makers engaged in the design and implementation of the continent’s economic and social policies. Over three days, participants take part in collective and collaborative working sessions, peer exchanges and meetings with figures from the public, business and academic spheres, in order to compare their practices and build shared responses to the major challenges of governance.
Speakers include Mehdi Jomaa, former Head of Government of Tunisia, Donald Kaberuka, Managing Partner & Founder, SouthBridge Group, and former President of the African Development Bank, Serge Ekue, President of the West African Development Bank (BOAD), Sanjay Jain, co-creator of India Stack and Director of Digital Public Infrastructure, Gates Foundation, and Mauricio Cardenas, Professor of Professional Practice in Global Leadership, Columbia SIPA, and former Finance Minister of Colombia (2012-2018).
They share their reform experience, their public policy trade-offs and their view of continental priorities. Throughout the programme, the cohort benefits from the dedicated support of Mohammed VI Polytechnic University, Asafo & Co, BOAD, BCG and the African Development Bank, LEAD partners that have chosen to invest in the transformation of African public action.
LEAD, a pan-African community serving public action
Created by the AFRICA CEO FORUM, LEAD is a leadership programme whose ambition is to reposition Africa’s administrative elite as a driver of reform, of performance and of dialogue with all the continent’s stakeholders.
Designed for senior African public decision-makers, LEAD sets out to build a lasting community of public officials able to share their experience, compare their practices and build common solutions to the major economic, technological and institutional transformations under way in Africa. That community is structured around three pillars: modernizing the state, improving public services, and strengthening cooperation between governments, development institutions and private-sector players.
From fellows to alumni: a long-term initiative
Made up of 36 fellows drawn from a range of administrations and institutions and representing 24 countries across the continent, LEAD’s first cohort demonstrated the quality and the potential of this community from its very first year. In less than twelve months, six of its members have taken a significant step forward: two have been appointed ministers, two have moved into strategic positions at the highest level of the state and two have been promoted to chief executive roles. These moves, which account for 16.7% of the first class, show the role LEAD plays as an accelerator of impact within African administrations.
By bringing together a new cohort of fellows every year, each of them joining the LEAD alumni community, the initiative follows a long-term trajectory: in time, to unite several hundred African public decision-makers around a shared culture of transparency, performance and regional cooperation.
A first year devoted to public service and digital public infrastructure
Throughout the year, the fellows devoted their work to strengthening African public action, to make excellence in public governance a central lever of transformation. An awareness campaign, run as part of Africa Public Service Day, brought to light those who, within the continent’s administrations and institutions, are concretely transforming public policy and improving the services offered to citizens.
Members of the cohort also took part in a special round table held in Kigali during the ACF 2026, in order to carry their thinking to a wider community of public and private leaders. That forum reinforced LEAD’s role as a platform for dialogue between the administrative elite and the continent’s economic players. Digital public infrastructure (DPI) formed the main thread of this first year of work.
Discussions covered issues at the heart of the digital sovereignty of African states: digital identity, payments, secure data exchange, interoperability, governance and the protection of citizens. This work examined the conditions under which African states are developing, in some cases, and can develop, in others, shared, open infrastructure robust enough to improve the quality of public services while supporting local innovation and preserving the capacity of public authorities to set the rules of the game.
A white paper to move from consuming technology to creating value
This year of work concludes with the publication, in collaboration with BCG, LEAD’s Knowledge Partner, of a white paper on Africa’s place in the digital economy and in artificial intelligence. With the digital economy still accounting for around 5% of African GDP, against close to 15% worldwide, the paper calls on the continent to shift from a logic of technology consumption to one of value creation.
The white paper identifies three structuring priorities for African public actors:
- Building shared digital infrastructure that serves as the backbone of public services and private innovation.
- Pooling investment in order to reach critical mass and avoid the fragmentation of efforts across the continent.
- Favouring open and interoperable architectures, with trust and governance built in by design, so as to protect citizens while stimulating the entrepreneurial ecosystem.
The white paper is available here to all public decision-makers, technical partners and institutions concerned.
“LEAD’s first cohort confirms a simple conviction: Africa already has the women and men capable of profoundly transforming public action. Our responsibility, either with our partners, is to give them, at pan-African level, a space in which to compare experience, build common solutions and bring forward a new generation of public policy. With this second cohort, we want to accelerate the move from ambition to execution, in particular on digital public infrastructure and artificial intelligence, two decisive issues for sovereignty, for the effectiveness of the state and for value creation across the continent,” says Amir Ben Yahmed, President of the Africa CEO Forum.
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
Africa is set to make history as it hosts the World Public Summit for the first time, with Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, welcoming global leaders and changemakers from July 29–30, 2026, for the landmark gathering under the theme “New World: Africa in Shaping a Shared Future.”
The inaugural African edition of the World Public Summit marks a significant milestone in the continent’s growing role in shaping international dialogue on governance, sustainable development, human-centred leadership and global cooperation.
Hosted by the World Peoples Assembly in partnership with African and international organisations, the summit will convene government officials, diplomats, business leaders, academics, journalists, youth representatives, civil society organisations and cultural leaders from across Africa and around the world.
According to Andrey Belyaninov, General Secretary of the World Peoples Assembly, “the Summit is not just a meeting—it is a space for unity. A space where the ‘values that unite us’ come to life: respect for people, openness to the world, responsibility for the future, and a commitment to creation.
“Today, we understand more clearly than ever: the future cannot be built alone. It is born in dialogue, in trust, in the ability to listen to one another and to act together.”
The programme begins on July 29 with a series of high-level roundtables and expert discussions covering Pan-African economic integration, civil society, education, scientific cooperation, cultural diplomacy and humanitarian partnerships.
The opening plenary, “Values, Development and Partnership as the Basis of a Sustainable and Just World,” will explore how African values—including Ubuntu—can help shape a more inclusive and sustainable global future. Discussions will also focus on youth leadership, innovation, civil society, ethical AI, public initiatives and international partnerships.
The summit will also showcase Africa’s creativity and innovation through the “Innovations for the Future” exhibition, the contemporary African art exhibition “Unity,” and the international exhibition “The World Paints Happiness.”
Another featured initiative is “The Zambezi River: Economy, Society, Soul,” an international interdisciplinary project exploring the river’s socioeconomic importance across Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe, highlighting the shared heritage and development potential of one of Africa’s most important waterways.
The event will conclude with the adoption of the African Communiqué, reflecting the summit’s shared vision for stronger international cooperation, sustainable development and people-centred leadership.
Tsegaye Chama, General Secretary of the Global Black Centre, promised that, “The Summit will be delivered with exceptional distinction, reflecting the magnitude and spirit of the World Peoples Assembly. It embodies a unity that is not transactional, but purposeful and conscious, a unity that shapes new contours for a world that works for all peoples of the World.”
As delegates prepare to arrive in Addis Ababa, anticipation continues to build for what promises to be one of Africa’s most significant international gatherings of 2026—one that will place the continent firmly at the centre of global conversations about the future.
By Adedapo Adesanya
Nigeria regained its position as Africa’s leading destination for equity startup investment in the first half of 2026, raising $214 million in equity financing and a total of $254 million across equity and debt, according to the latest Africa: The Big Deal report.
The report, titled H1 2026: Mapping the Money, showed that Nigeria ranked second on the continent in total funding, behind Egypt, which attracted $327 million, while Kenya and South Africa followed with $126 million and $83 million, respectively.
However, the report noted that Egypt’s top position was largely driven by a single fundraising by electric mobility company Spiro, which secured $327 million, including $270 million in equity and $57 million in debt. Excluding debt financing, Nigeria emerged as Africa’s largest equity funding market in the first six months of the year.
According to the breakdown by Africa: The Big Deal, Nigeria’s equity funding of $214 million was higher than Egypt’s $183 million, while South Africa and Kenya attracted $66 million and $46 million, respectively.
Beyond funding value, Nigeria also led the continent in the number of startups that raised at least $100,000 during the review period, reclaiming the top spot after what the report described as an “underwhelming” second half of 2025.
The publication observed that Nigeria’s fundraising performance has remained relatively stable over the past few years and exceeded the $250 million mark for the first time since 2022, pointing to renewed investor confidence in the country’s startup ecosystem.
It also found that while the Big Four startup markets—Nigeria, Egypt, Kenya and South Africa—continued to dominate Africa’s investment landscape, their combined share of total funding stood at 58 per cent in the first half of 2026.
“Zooming back on the Big Four (110 out of 190 $100k+ deals, i.e. 58%), Nigeria is head and shoulders above its peers, with Egypt and Kenya almost tying, and South Africa in fourth position again,” the report noted.
The report highlighted contrasting performances among the continent’s largest startup ecosystems. While Nigeria and Egypt maintained strong funding momentum, Kenya recorded its weakest funding performance since early 2021 after a strong second half of 2025, and South Africa failed to attract $100 million in funding during the period despite leading the continent a year earlier.
Africa: The Big Deal also noted a broader shift in investor behaviour, with funding increasingly concentrated in larger transactions while early-stage investments continued to decline. According to the publication, the drop in smaller funding rounds reflects growing concerns about limited capital available for early-stage startups across Africa.
