World
Exploring Russia’s Support of Africa’s Coupists
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
In this insightful interview, Professor Sergiu Mișcoiu at the Faculty of European Studies, Babes-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca (Romania), where he serves as a Director of the Centre for International Cooperation and as Director of the Centre for African Studies, discusses the political situation in the French-speaking West African countries, the existing multiple challenges and Russia’s diplomacy within the context of current geopolitical changes and the scramble for influence in Africa. Here are the interview excerpts:
To begin with, what are your arguments that Russia supports military coup plotters (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger et cetera) in Africa?
The logic behind backing the coups is quite evident and relates to the strategy of Russia to fight against the West and to (re)entrench itself in Africa. As the former presidents of the three countries have been supported by the United States, the European Union, and above all, France, the only strategic option of a Russian re-emerging empire opposing the West was to back all the anti-Western forces wherever they might act and whoever they would be.
Since the late 2000s, Russia has been increasingly preoccupied with preparing the ground for anti-Western operations. The progressive entrenchment of the Kremlin-guided paramilitary groups (starting with the infamously Groupe Wagner) in the Central African Republic, then in Mali and to a lesser extent in other parts of Central and Western Africa, has only been the visible peak of the iceberg.
More effective were the troll farms populating the sub-continent with pro-Russian influencers and deploying campaigns of disinformation, which targeted especially the French and UN contingents deployed to fight the jihadist groups. These campaigns contributed to turning the public opinions of those states against the West and more importantly against their presidents, who were denounced as being the “Occident’s puppets”.
While the operations of the coups themselves were most probably not directly coordinated by Russia, the attitude of the national military forces and of the mass of demonstrators who backed the coups was shaped by Russia. The fact that the new juntas in power immediately made declarations and gestures (such as state visits) of rapprochement towards Russia testifies once more of a mechanical convergence of interests between the new strongmen in Bamako, Ouagadougou and Niamey, to which Russia has abundantly contributed over the last decade.
As it explicitly shows, Russia is seemingly interested in military governance in Africa. Does that set the precedence for future military takeovers in Africa?
The outcome of the coups in the three Sahel states encouraged Russia to pursue its strategy in other African countries. Nonetheless, the dismantlement of the Wagner Group and the difficult reorganization of its remaining elements made the Kremlin’s task more difficult, as some axes of penetration into the decision-making and military milieus of the African countries have been strongly shaken, although the new high responsible for the operations, Vladimir Alexeyev, makes substantive efforts to regain control over the remaining networks.
Moreover, the amplitude of Dimitri Prigozhin’s finally aborted rebellion against the Kremlin raised some questions in the minds of many African political, business and military supporters of Moscow. Among those questions, the most important is the following: If the Russian regime itself was on the verge of facing a military attack against its capital, how could it guarantee our support in the eventual case we will try to conduct coups similar to those in the Sahel countries? Consequently, the other would-be putschists’ enthusiasm for following the Sahelian coups’ path has naturally diminished.
Do transitions from democratic governance to military governments have any meaning for fighting growing trends of neo-colonialism in Africa?
Neo-colonialism in Africa has been a growing reality since the end of the Cold War and reached a pinnacle by the early 2000s. Then, the combined effects of September 11 and the anti-neocolonial activism of some leaders such as Laurent Gbagbo in the Ivory Coast rebalanced the power relations making the West increasingly dependent on the strategic support of the “friendly” African heads of state.
More salient in the case of the former French colonies, this process could be suggestively described by the transformation of the “Françafrique” into the “Afrique-France”, with Gabon’s historical leader Omar Bongo gaining unprecedented leverage, going so far as he was able to influence the composition of the French governments of those times. But once again, this page was turned with the world economic crisis of 2008-2011 and with the considerable growth of the jihadist attacks, leading to the destabilization of Mali and the risk of generalization over the entire Sahelian region.
The French-led anti-jihadist operations Serval and then Barkhane, deployed in Mali and reshaped later on into an international security task force with a wider focus on the Sahel, have implicitly deprived to some extent the democratically elected presidents of Niger, Burkina and Mali of their autonomy in matters related to national security and political strategy. This was seen by many as the ultimate proof of the return to colonialism. As the results of the fight against Islamist terrorism have been increasingly modest, especially after 2019, the contestation of the Western-backed presidents has become widespread at different levels of society, of the institutions and of the security forces. This explains the popular support for the series of coups perpetrated in the three countries and shows the important potential that anti-neo-colonialism has as a galvanizer of the discontented peoples of Africa.
Despite the above narratives, do you think the 15-member regional economic bloc, must be firm with the ‘Silence-the-Guns’ policy adopted several years ago by the African Union?
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was caught in the trap of its transformation from a quasi-economic organization to a semipolitical one. If by 2010, the policy of sanctions against illegitimate governments and the direct interventions it operated (like the one in The Gambia against the former president Yahya Jammeh, who refused to leave power after losing the elections in 2017) encountered a relative success, the more recent policies proved inefficacious, culminating with the July 2023 postponed and ultimately cancelled intervention against the putsch in Niger. The legitimacy of ECOWAS has been strongly contested by the new military regimes. At the same, the ‘Silence-the-Guns’ AU-inspired policy has proved idealist, especially when it comes to the conflicts in the Sahel that multiplied “under the watch” of the two organizations.
A research report from the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) describes Russia as ‘a virtual investor’ in Africa, most of its limitless pledges and several bilateral agreements largely aimed at luring (woo-ing) African states and leaders to support its ‘special military operation’ in neighbouring Ukraine. What are your expert views and arguments here?
Vladimir Putin has intended to restore the mightiness of the Soviet Union, including its influence over the African continent. But unlike the USSR, Russia didn’t and doesn’t dispose of the financial and logistic resources needed to massively invest in the key sectors. To compensate for its economic debility, the
The Kremlin inaugurates almost insignificant but ostentatious investment projects and at the same aggressively promotes the anti-Western discourse (“Russia helps, the West takes”).
Moreover, it uses the dependence of several African countries on Russian cereals to “adjust” their positions about the illegal Russian war against Ukraine, especially when it comes to votes taken in the UN General Assembly. A strategy of combination between the Russian para-military presence and massive resource grabbing was applied in the Central African Republic (CAR), where President Faustin-Archange Touadéra saved his seat by relying on a Russian praetorian guard, while in exchange he accepted to formally or informally grant extended rights of exploitation of many gem mines to the companies led by Kremlin-friendly oligarchs, who are the new de facto rulers of the respective mining areas and implicitly of some wider regions in the CAR. Seen as a “laboratory” for the further expansion of this toxic model, the CAR is praised by the Russian military-business elites, who suffer because of the international sanctions, as an Eldorado, proving once again the particularly aggressive neocolonial strategy that Moscow is implementing while criticizing the West.
In practical terms and compared to China, do you think Russia has made a visible impact on the economy and infrastructure development in the continent since the collapse of the Soviet era in 1991?
China has disposed of important financial resources and has been at least between the 1990s and the end of the 2010s incomparably less violent than Russia in spreading its influence all over the African continent. Being led by a regime that spoused the “state capitalist” system, China was capable of using most opportunities provided by the intensive globalization process to extend its presence and consolidate its soft economic power. It succeeded in impressing via its investments in the road and railway infrastructures, in ports, in some major public buildings and other sectors. As compared to China, Russia made almost no difference through its modest investments and bet its entire strategy on this mixture of, on one hand, the renewal of the former USSR networks and the reification of the Soviet past, and on the other, the direct intrusion in the domestic conflicts of the most vulnerable African states.
Can we conclude this discussion with the significance of peace, justice and strong state institutions (UN SDG 16), what has been achieved over the past few years, the challenges and the way forward in West Africa?
Unfortunately, SDG 16 is an untouchable horizon for most African states at this stage. The return of the jihadist threat in several regions of the Sahel, Western Sahara, but also Central and Western Africa, with the extension of the operations of various groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda, ISIS or Boko Haram has engendered an important security crisis that crucially affected the stability of the African states.
The series of coup d’états and unconstitutional replacements of the former or acting leaders (in Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad and Niger) was a response to the ineptitude of the democratic institutional settings to guarantee the basic rights of the citizens, starting with the rights to live and security. The new geopolitical thick division caused by the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine contributed to the aggravation of the security context, especially in terms of food and human security, and deprived many African governments of their capacity to negotiate with multiple actors at different levels, as they are now constrained to pick sides and to act accordingly, like during the Cold War era. If the actual trends continue, I am not optimistic at all about the possibility of getting closer to meeting this SDG.
World
Essent Slashes Contact Centre Technology Costs by 50%
By Modupe Gbadeyanka
The Netherlands’ largest energy provider, Essent, has cut the technology costs of its contact centre infrastructure by half.
The organisation, which serves 2.5 million customers, recorded zero critical incidents post-migration and improved agent workplace satisfaction by 36 per cent.
The migration was delivered in partnership with AI-first customer experience transformation specialists, Sabio Group, and was completed in under 12 weeks for an operation spanning over 1,000 agents across two locations.
Agents were forced to juggle multiple disconnected screens simultaneously — a workflow that was as inefficient as it was stressful.
“Our agents were constantly working with different screens — multiple chat instances open at once, multiple agent desktop instances. It was messy, and in some cases, quite stressful,” SAFe Product Manager for Customer Interaction, Omnichannel and Digital Transformation at Essent, Michiel Kouijzer, stated.
“A lot of colleagues were saying I was mad for even suggesting this approach. It kind of feels like a victory on a personal level that it did work out. You just have to be a little ambitious — and have the right expert partner who can make it work,” Kouijzer added.
With stable cloud infrastructure now firmly in place, Essent is turning its attention to the capabilities that were impossible in its legacy environment: AI-powered call summarisation, agentic customer self-service, and next-generation workforce optimisation.
Rather than a reckless ‘big bang’ cutover that could have affected service to millions of households, Sabio engineered a phased migration strategy — beginning with Essent’s SME segment to validate technical readiness before scaling to the full enterprise operation.
“This project showcases Sabio’s unique position in the contact centre technology landscape. We’re not just moving Essent to the cloud — we’re establishing a foundation for continuous improvement in their customer experience delivery,” the Country Manager for Sabio Group Benelux, Wouter Bakker, commented.
World
Africa: A New Market for Russian Business
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
On April 11, the presentation of the book “Africa: a new market for Russian business” took place, which aroused lively diverse interests among business representatives, entrepreneurs and employees of federal structures of Russia. The event was dedicated to discussing the prospects of Russian companies entering the African market and became a platform for the exchange of views and experiences.
Participating guests, packed in the small hall, included:
– representatives of business circles,
– entrepreneurs interested in new directions of development,
– employees of federal agencies curating foreign economic activity.
The presentation was held in a constructive and friendly atmosphere. The author of the book, Serge Fokas Odunlami, detailed the key ideas and conclusions presented in the publication. Particular attention was paid to the practical aspects of operating in the African market, as well as the analysis of opportunities and risks for Russian companies.
During the lively discussion, participants asked questions, shared their experiences and made suggestions for developing cooperation with African countries. This format allowed not only to get acquainted with the content of the book, but also to discuss topical issues of expanding business relations.
Meaning of the book: The publication, “Africa: a new market for Russian business” offers readers not only analytical, but also practical recommendations on investment and market trends, and how to enter the African market. The book will be a useful tool for those considering Africa as a promising destination for investment and business development.
The presentation of the book became a significant event for the Russian business community interested in expanding cooperation with Africa. Serge Fokas Odunlami introduced the participants to the new edition, which is a comprehensive business guide that gives an impetus for dialogue and implementation of joint entrepreneurial projects and corporate initiatives across Africa.
World
Ryan Collyer Reveals Reasons Behind Africa’s Significant Energy Deficit
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
Perhaps Russia’s state nuclear corporation, Rosatom, is at the frontline, shaping Africa’s energy security. And African countries are also accelerating coordinated efforts to build nuclear power plants primarily to supply their energy, which will drive industrialisation and boost power capacity for domestic utilisation.
Energy experts say adopting nuclear can further support a diverse energy mix, reduce reliance on fossil fuels, and help across the continent. Over the past two decades, Russia has been collaborating with African countries, adopting energy initiatives to provide power to approximately half the continent’s population, and making it an important component of Africa’s future energy strategy and solutions. At this point, however, it is necessary to underline the irreversible fact that Russia’s ultimate goal is to ensure long-term African energy security.
In this interview, Rosatom’s Chief Executive Director for Central and Southern Africa, Ryan Collyer, reiterates the strategic importance of Russia-Africa’s energy cooperation through strengthening bilateral agreements on collaboration on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Collyer explains that the Russian approach is its ability to offer an integrated solution, from technology and financing to training and localisation. According to him, partnerships must be built on mutual benefit and on the principle of transparency. Here follows the interview excerpts:
What are the expectations, specifically in the nuclear energy sphere, for Africa during the forthcoming Russia–Africa Summit scheduled for 2026?
The expectation is a clear shift from dialogue to delivery. Over the past few years, we have built a strong foundation through agreements, feasibility discussions and partnerships. The 2026 Russia–Africa Summit is an opportunity to demonstrate tangible progress.
In practical terms, I would expect greater focus on implementation readiness. That includes regulatory development, human capital, financing models and localisation strategies. We also expect to see more structured cooperation in areas like small modular reactors, which are particularly relevant for many African grids, as well as stronger emphasis on education and training partnerships. Ultimately, the success of the Summit will be measured by how many initiatives move from concept to execution.
Why, despite many bilateral agreements, is Africa still experiencing a significant energy deficit?
Africa’s energy deficit is not a result of a lack of ambition or agreements. It is primarily a question of scale, financing and infrastructure readiness. Energy projects, especially large-scale ones, require long-term investment, stable policy frameworks and strong institutional capacity. Many countries are working under fiscal constraints, and at the same time, demand is growing rapidly due to population growth and urbanisation. So, even when progress is made, it can be outpaced by rising demand.
It is also important to understand that many agreements are not meant to deliver immediate infrastructure. They are part of a longer preparation cycle, including feasibility studies, regulatory development and workforce training. Nuclear projects in particular are long-term by nature, and while this can be perceived as slow progress, it is actually a reflection of the level of diligence required.
How do you assess the contribution of nuclear energy to climate change mitigation and technological development in Africa?
Nuclear energy plays a dual role in Africa’s development, both as a clean energy source and as a driver of technological advancement. From a climate perspective, nuclear provides reliable, low-carbon electricity at scale. Africa needs a significant expansion of its energy capacity to support economic growth, and this growth must be both stable and sustainable.
Nuclear allows countries to increase power generation without increasing emissions, while ensuring a consistent baseload supply. At the same time, its impact goes beyond electricity. Nuclear technologies support medicine, agriculture, water management and industrial processes. Across Africa, they are already used in areas such as cancer treatment, food preservation and environmental monitoring, making nuclear a broader platform for sustainable development.
In this context, Rosatom offers integrated solutions across the full nuclear value chain. This includes large-scale and small modular reactors, as well as advanced non-power applications such as nuclear medicine and irradiation technologies. Our focus is on delivering practical, tailored solutions that support long-term development and local capacity building.
Is Africa unprepared to deal with nuclear waste, as some critics suggest?
I would say that preparedness varies across countries, but it would be inaccurate to suggest that the issue is being ignored. Responsible nuclear programmes require a comprehensive approach to waste management from the very beginning. This includes legal frameworks, regulatory oversight, storage solutions and long-term planning. These elements are part of international best practice and are supported by organisations such as the IAEA. What is true is that this topic is often undercommunicated in the public space. It should be discussed more openly, because transparency builds trust.
Countries that are serious about nuclear energy understand that waste management is not optional. It is a core component of the programme, and it is addressed in parallel with all other aspects of development. Rosatom offers comprehensive solutions for spent fuel and radioactive waste management. These include technologies for safe storage, transportation, reprocessing and recycling of nuclear materials. In fact, advanced reprocessing solutions allow for the reuse of valuable components of spent fuel, significantly reducing the volume of waste and improving the overall sustainability of the nuclear cycle.
Nuclear power remains controversial. Why do you believe it is important for Africa, and what role does it play in the energy mix?
Africa needs a balanced and pragmatic energy strategy. The conversation should not be about choosing one technology over another, but about building an energy mix that is reliable, affordable and sustainable. Renewables will play a critical role and are already expanding rapidly. However, they are variable by nature. For industrialisation, countries also need stable, continuous power that is baseload. This is where nuclear can make a meaningful contribution. A diversified energy mix that includes renewables, nuclear, hydropower and other sources allows countries to reduce risk, improve energy security and support long-term economic growth.
Nuclear is not the only solution, but it is an important part of a resilient system, especially for countries with growing industrial ambitions. In this context, Rosatom is able to support countries with integrated energy solutions that combine reliability, sustainability and long-term partnership models, tailored to national development priorities.
How can we shift public perception, given the legacy of Chornobyl and Fukushima?
We cannot rewrite history, and we should not try to. Events like Chornobyl and Fukushima shaped public perception for a reason. The starting point is respect for those concerns, not dismissal. At the same time, what is often missing in the conversation is what happened after those events. Chornobyl, in particular, fundamentally reshaped the entire philosophy of nuclear safety. It led to a complete rethinking of reactor design, emergency response, and regulatory oversight. Independent regulators were strengthened, safety responsibilities were clearly separated from operators, and safety culture became not just a principle but a legal requirement supported by continuous drills and probabilistic risk assessments.
Technologically, the industry also changed dramatically. Modern reactors are designed to withstand even worst-case scenarios, with multi-layered “defence-in-depth” systems, core melt traps, and passive safety mechanisms that rely on natural physical processes rather than human intervention. These are not incremental improvements. They are the direct result of lessons learned at a very high cost. But facts alone do not change perception. People do not build trust through reports. They build it through experience and transparency. That is why our approach in Africa is deliberately open.
We create opportunities for students, young professionals and journalists to visit nuclear facilities, research centres and training programmes. When people can see how systems operate, how safety is managed, and how seriously it is taken, the conversation becomes more grounded and less abstract. There is also an important human dimension that is often overlooked.
The history of Chornobyl is not only a story of tragedy. It is also a story of professionalism, responsibility and the people who managed the crisis and generated the knowledge that made today’s safety standards possible. Acknowledging that the full picture helps move the discussion away from fear alone toward understanding. At the same time, we need to broaden the narrative. Nuclear is not only about power generation. It is about cancer treatment, food security, water management and high-skilled employment. When communities begin to connect nuclear technology with real benefits in their own lives, it stops being an abstract risk and starts becoming a practical solution. Ultimately, perception does not change through persuasion. It changes through consistency. Through transparency, long-term engagement, and real-world impact.
What are your final thoughts on Russia’s preparedness to support Africa’s nuclear ambitions?
Russia has demonstrated that it is committed to long-term partnerships in Africa, particularly in the nuclear sector. We are already seeing concrete examples of cooperation in areas such as project development, education and skills transfer. The key strength of the Russian approach is its ability to offer an integrated solution, from technology and financing to training and localisation. Partnerships must be built on mutual benefit and transparency. Africa’s priorities are clear: energy security, economic development and local capacity building. Any partner that is ready to contribute to these goals consistently and practically will have a meaningful role to play. If we look country by country, the picture becomes even more interesting.
Take Ethiopia. This is a country thinking long-term about energy security and industrialisation. It has strong hydropower, but also understands the need to diversify. Ethiopia is prepared to take a big step towards nuclear energy. In Rwanda, the approach is different. It is focused on innovation and speed. There is a strong interest in small and flexible nuclear technologies, alongside active use of nuclear science in healthcare and agriculture. What stands out is the clarity of vision and pace of implementation.
Then, there is Namibia. As a major uranium producer, the question is how to move up the value chain. Partnerships can help connect resources to technology, skills and future energy applications. So, Russia’s role is not one-size-fits-all.
The real strength lies in adapting to each country’s strategy. If that continues, nuclear cooperation becomes not just about energy, but about shaping long-term technological development. Rosatom is one of the few global players capable of delivering the entire nuclear value chain. This includes reactor technologies, fuel supply, waste management solutions, including reprocessing, as well as long-term operational support and human capital development. This comprehensive capability is what allows us to move projects from concept to reality in a structured and sustainable way.
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