World
Exploring Russia’s Support of Africa’s Coupists
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
In this insightful interview, Professor Sergiu Mișcoiu at the Faculty of European Studies, Babes-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca (Romania), where he serves as a Director of the Centre for International Cooperation and as Director of the Centre for African Studies, discusses the political situation in the French-speaking West African countries, the existing multiple challenges and Russia’s diplomacy within the context of current geopolitical changes and the scramble for influence in Africa. Here are the interview excerpts:
To begin with, what are your arguments that Russia supports military coup plotters (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger et cetera) in Africa?
The logic behind backing the coups is quite evident and relates to the strategy of Russia to fight against the West and to (re)entrench itself in Africa. As the former presidents of the three countries have been supported by the United States, the European Union, and above all, France, the only strategic option of a Russian re-emerging empire opposing the West was to back all the anti-Western forces wherever they might act and whoever they would be.
Since the late 2000s, Russia has been increasingly preoccupied with preparing the ground for anti-Western operations. The progressive entrenchment of the Kremlin-guided paramilitary groups (starting with the infamously Groupe Wagner) in the Central African Republic, then in Mali and to a lesser extent in other parts of Central and Western Africa, has only been the visible peak of the iceberg.
More effective were the troll farms populating the sub-continent with pro-Russian influencers and deploying campaigns of disinformation, which targeted especially the French and UN contingents deployed to fight the jihadist groups. These campaigns contributed to turning the public opinions of those states against the West and more importantly against their presidents, who were denounced as being the “Occident’s puppets”.
While the operations of the coups themselves were most probably not directly coordinated by Russia, the attitude of the national military forces and of the mass of demonstrators who backed the coups was shaped by Russia. The fact that the new juntas in power immediately made declarations and gestures (such as state visits) of rapprochement towards Russia testifies once more of a mechanical convergence of interests between the new strongmen in Bamako, Ouagadougou and Niamey, to which Russia has abundantly contributed over the last decade.
As it explicitly shows, Russia is seemingly interested in military governance in Africa. Does that set the precedence for future military takeovers in Africa?
The outcome of the coups in the three Sahel states encouraged Russia to pursue its strategy in other African countries. Nonetheless, the dismantlement of the Wagner Group and the difficult reorganization of its remaining elements made the Kremlin’s task more difficult, as some axes of penetration into the decision-making and military milieus of the African countries have been strongly shaken, although the new high responsible for the operations, Vladimir Alexeyev, makes substantive efforts to regain control over the remaining networks.
Moreover, the amplitude of Dimitri Prigozhin’s finally aborted rebellion against the Kremlin raised some questions in the minds of many African political, business and military supporters of Moscow. Among those questions, the most important is the following: If the Russian regime itself was on the verge of facing a military attack against its capital, how could it guarantee our support in the eventual case we will try to conduct coups similar to those in the Sahel countries? Consequently, the other would-be putschists’ enthusiasm for following the Sahelian coups’ path has naturally diminished.
Do transitions from democratic governance to military governments have any meaning for fighting growing trends of neo-colonialism in Africa?
Neo-colonialism in Africa has been a growing reality since the end of the Cold War and reached a pinnacle by the early 2000s. Then, the combined effects of September 11 and the anti-neocolonial activism of some leaders such as Laurent Gbagbo in the Ivory Coast rebalanced the power relations making the West increasingly dependent on the strategic support of the “friendly” African heads of state.
More salient in the case of the former French colonies, this process could be suggestively described by the transformation of the “Françafrique” into the “Afrique-France”, with Gabon’s historical leader Omar Bongo gaining unprecedented leverage, going so far as he was able to influence the composition of the French governments of those times. But once again, this page was turned with the world economic crisis of 2008-2011 and with the considerable growth of the jihadist attacks, leading to the destabilization of Mali and the risk of generalization over the entire Sahelian region.
The French-led anti-jihadist operations Serval and then Barkhane, deployed in Mali and reshaped later on into an international security task force with a wider focus on the Sahel, have implicitly deprived to some extent the democratically elected presidents of Niger, Burkina and Mali of their autonomy in matters related to national security and political strategy. This was seen by many as the ultimate proof of the return to colonialism. As the results of the fight against Islamist terrorism have been increasingly modest, especially after 2019, the contestation of the Western-backed presidents has become widespread at different levels of society, of the institutions and of the security forces. This explains the popular support for the series of coups perpetrated in the three countries and shows the important potential that anti-neo-colonialism has as a galvanizer of the discontented peoples of Africa.
Despite the above narratives, do you think the 15-member regional economic bloc, must be firm with the ‘Silence-the-Guns’ policy adopted several years ago by the African Union?
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was caught in the trap of its transformation from a quasi-economic organization to a semipolitical one. If by 2010, the policy of sanctions against illegitimate governments and the direct interventions it operated (like the one in The Gambia against the former president Yahya Jammeh, who refused to leave power after losing the elections in 2017) encountered a relative success, the more recent policies proved inefficacious, culminating with the July 2023 postponed and ultimately cancelled intervention against the putsch in Niger. The legitimacy of ECOWAS has been strongly contested by the new military regimes. At the same, the ‘Silence-the-Guns’ AU-inspired policy has proved idealist, especially when it comes to the conflicts in the Sahel that multiplied “under the watch” of the two organizations.
A research report from the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) describes Russia as ‘a virtual investor’ in Africa, most of its limitless pledges and several bilateral agreements largely aimed at luring (woo-ing) African states and leaders to support its ‘special military operation’ in neighbouring Ukraine. What are your expert views and arguments here?
Vladimir Putin has intended to restore the mightiness of the Soviet Union, including its influence over the African continent. But unlike the USSR, Russia didn’t and doesn’t dispose of the financial and logistic resources needed to massively invest in the key sectors. To compensate for its economic debility, the
The Kremlin inaugurates almost insignificant but ostentatious investment projects and at the same aggressively promotes the anti-Western discourse (“Russia helps, the West takes”).
Moreover, it uses the dependence of several African countries on Russian cereals to “adjust” their positions about the illegal Russian war against Ukraine, especially when it comes to votes taken in the UN General Assembly. A strategy of combination between the Russian para-military presence and massive resource grabbing was applied in the Central African Republic (CAR), where President Faustin-Archange Touadéra saved his seat by relying on a Russian praetorian guard, while in exchange he accepted to formally or informally grant extended rights of exploitation of many gem mines to the companies led by Kremlin-friendly oligarchs, who are the new de facto rulers of the respective mining areas and implicitly of some wider regions in the CAR. Seen as a “laboratory” for the further expansion of this toxic model, the CAR is praised by the Russian military-business elites, who suffer because of the international sanctions, as an Eldorado, proving once again the particularly aggressive neocolonial strategy that Moscow is implementing while criticizing the West.
In practical terms and compared to China, do you think Russia has made a visible impact on the economy and infrastructure development in the continent since the collapse of the Soviet era in 1991?
China has disposed of important financial resources and has been at least between the 1990s and the end of the 2010s incomparably less violent than Russia in spreading its influence all over the African continent. Being led by a regime that spoused the “state capitalist” system, China was capable of using most opportunities provided by the intensive globalization process to extend its presence and consolidate its soft economic power. It succeeded in impressing via its investments in the road and railway infrastructures, in ports, in some major public buildings and other sectors. As compared to China, Russia made almost no difference through its modest investments and bet its entire strategy on this mixture of, on one hand, the renewal of the former USSR networks and the reification of the Soviet past, and on the other, the direct intrusion in the domestic conflicts of the most vulnerable African states.
Can we conclude this discussion with the significance of peace, justice and strong state institutions (UN SDG 16), what has been achieved over the past few years, the challenges and the way forward in West Africa?
Unfortunately, SDG 16 is an untouchable horizon for most African states at this stage. The return of the jihadist threat in several regions of the Sahel, Western Sahara, but also Central and Western Africa, with the extension of the operations of various groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda, ISIS or Boko Haram has engendered an important security crisis that crucially affected the stability of the African states.
The series of coup d’états and unconstitutional replacements of the former or acting leaders (in Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad and Niger) was a response to the ineptitude of the democratic institutional settings to guarantee the basic rights of the citizens, starting with the rights to live and security. The new geopolitical thick division caused by the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine contributed to the aggravation of the security context, especially in terms of food and human security, and deprived many African governments of their capacity to negotiate with multiple actors at different levels, as they are now constrained to pick sides and to act accordingly, like during the Cold War era. If the actual trends continue, I am not optimistic at all about the possibility of getting closer to meeting this SDG.
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
At the St Petersburg International Economic Forum 2026, the traditional “Russia-Africa Business Dialogue”, which was initiated in 2016, will deliberate aspects of forging economic cooperation between Russia and African countries. For a decade since its creation, this platform has practically discussed most pertinent roadblocks, highlighted the economic sectors, and outlined the prospects. The significant issues have also been treated at the first and second Russia-Africa summits.
As Moscow prepares to hold the next Russia-Africa summit in October, it is quite clear that Russia has still not worked out financial mechanisms to support its investments across Africa. Generally, the federal strategy for this area has been mapped out, Russian investors understand where to invest in Africa, but lacks extremely the financial motivation and approach to integrate young people into the business environment. Other constraining factors include a lack of financial support instruments the suitable environment for experience sharing and collaboration. At the same time, there are reports that point to a broad range of factors that hinder the development of youth entrepreneurship.
Historically, Russia–Africa relations have evolved through distinct phases after phases. The latest phase began from the first Russia-Africa summit through the second, and is currently moving to the third summit in October. As part of the strategic preparations, Tanzanian President Samia Suluhu Hassan was the guest of Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin. Russia and Tanzania have had good relations, but it has been more than a century since the last state visit of a Tanzanian leader to Russia. From the historical records, Mwalimu Nyerere visited in 1969. As a result, Samia Hassan’s official working visit had a special historic significance for the bilateral relations. “We see this as a very positive sign,” noted Putin. Further to that, Samia Hassan was decorated with an honorary doctorate degree (Doctor Honoris Causa) at the Russian Peoples Friendship University, expressed gratitude for the political solidarity, and underlined Russia for the great contribution which it provided during the African political liberation in the 60s.
Tanzania’s Distinctive Profile
Sergei Kiriyenko, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration who oversees the department, visited Tanzania after the November 2025 elections. In addition, Putin’s aide Yuri Ushakov called Tanzania “one of the key partners on the African continent,” recalling that it is home to approximately 70 million people. Samia’s visit to Russia is a victory for Russian diplomacy in Africa, as Tanzania is one of those allies that strengthen Moscow, says Andrey Maslov, Director of the HSE Centre for African Studies. According to the expert, cooperation is based on mutual benefit, and Tanzania does not require assistance. The country is among the continent’s economic leaders, distinguished by high growth rates, a stable political system, and a friendly attitude towards Russia. Russia’s interest in Tanzania is largely due to its geographic location and access to the Indian Ocean. The port of Dar es Salaam is considered a key transport hub in East Africa, serving transit routes to the East African Community (EAC) countries, along with the Kenyan port of Mombasa. Given Tanzania’s population, the EAC’s combined market represents over 300 million people, and the potential for expanding trade lies primarily in agricultural products, fertilisers, and basic industrial goods.
Africa’s participation at the St Petersburg 29th forum is very unique, with the majority from East and Southern Africa. The Director General of the Tanzania Investment and Special Economic Zones Authority (TISEZA), Gilead J. Teri, noted that the Tanzanian delegation has a unique opportunity to advance its agenda and strengthen bilateral relations. The forum gave a powerful boost to trade and economic cooperation. Tanzania presented its investment potential to the Russian business community. Therefore, it could be said that bilateral relations between Russia and Tanzania are flourishing and developing dynamically today.
Eastern and Southern Africa’s Dimensions
While it envisages strengthening ties in a broad range of fields, targeting the Eastern and Southern regions by utilising Tanzania as the gateway, Russia shows that the key partners in that part of Africa. Russia’s attributes for raising investment relations are clear: stability, untapped resources and human capital.
Putin’s meeting with Tanzania’s Samia Hassan, aiming at lifting up bilateral cooperation, which symbolises a new qualitative stage or a new chapter in the relations between Russia, Tanzania and the entire SADC. “Africa is an important partner for Russia, a participant in the emerging and sustainable polycentric architecture of the world order. Our relations with the states of that continent are valuable in their own right and should not be subject to the fluctuations on the international arena,” Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov also said long time ago at the Russia-Africa civil/public gathering held in 2018, in attendance was Stergomena Lawrence Tax, who headed the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
“We are aware that our African friends hold the same views. Relying on the accumulated experience of productive cooperation, Russian diplomats seek to pursue a consistent policy for deepening the range of Russia-Africa relations,” he added. Lavrov said it is necessary to maximise the potential of public, cultural and business diplomacy in the interests of strengthening and expanding the mutually beneficial ties between Russia and African states while invariably adhering to the principle of African solutions to African problems, formulated by the Africans themselves.
Stergomena Lawrence, however, observed that Russia has not been that visible in the region as compared to China, India or Brazil. But it is encouraging that Russia has made the decision to reposition itself as a major partner with Southern Africa. She expressed gratitude that Russia has launched a plan aimed at improving direct trade with the continent/region beyond the traditional sectors like mining, seeking to invest in areas like agriculture, industrial production, high technology and transport.
The Russian Federation’s priorities are also in line with SADC priorities, as evidenced by the priorities of the Foreign Economic Strategy in the region, as indicated below:
Prospecting, mining, oil, construction and mining, purchasing gas, oil, uranium, and bauxite assets (Angola, Namibia and South Africa);
Construction of power facilities—hydroelectric power plants on the River Congo (Angola, Namibia and Zambia) and nuclear power plants (South Africa);
Creating a floating nuclear power plant, and South African participation in the international project to build a nuclear enrichment centre in Russia;
Railway Construction (Angola);
Creation of Russian trade houses for the promotion and maintenance of Russian engineering products (South Africa).
Participation of Russian companies in the privatisation of industrial assets, including those created with technical assistance from the former Soviet Union (Angola).
In the Russian Federation, 10 SADC member countries have their diplomatic offices, namely: Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
Final Words of Wisdom
In pursuit of following Putin’s policy to strengthen ties with the Global South, including Africa, Russia has to re-strategise and take up the existing critical challenges. Despite a noticeable increase in activity, Russia’s strategy on the continent faces several persistent structural limitations that require thoughtful responses. As geopolitical changes heat up, Russia has to understand the necessity to move ahead, back away from tectonic rhetoric and symbolism of diplomacy. By 2025–2026, the African continent had firmly established itself as a key area of global competition and, simultaneously, one of the most important reserves of economic growth. For Russia, this is important to change the very logic of its African ties. It is logical to walk the talk. In other words, Russia’s relations with African countries have to shift from historical rhetoric to a more practical architecture of interests.
On December 19–20, 2025, the second ministerial conference of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum was held in Cairo, with the Roscongress Foundation acting as the operator on the Russian side. The conference was attended by the heads of the African foreign ministries and the leaders of the continent’s integration associations. That conference has been defined as a key stage in the preparations for the third Russia-Africa summit, scheduled for October 2026. As noted by Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova, the meeting is intended to “give additional impetus to the development of the Russian-African partnership and the strengthening of its truly strategic nature.”
For Moscow, institutionalising the format is crucial given the overall transformation of global politics. And ultimately, Africa is becoming a space where external players’ ability to not only declare respect for sovereignty but also propose practical mechanisms for cooperation is being tested. Russia’s strategy is built on combining political rhetoric about multipolarity with concrete areas of cooperation—from trade to energy, and food security to personnel training and military-technical cooperation. Economic spheres and building infrastructures are important for Africa, which is ready for foreign investors with adequate funds and not just geopolitical rhetoric. It has to be noted that Africa is a space of competition between external players.
The continent is an arena of intense competition, with China, the European Union, the United States, Turkey, India, and the Gulf states all operating simultaneously, each offering its models of interaction: from large-scale infrastructure financing to military cooperation and religious and cultural influence. African states are becoming increasingly pragmatic and multi-vector—they are consistently expanding their foreign policy space, weighing the conditions, benefits, and political costs.
In such an environment, the sustainability of Russia’s presence is determined by its ability to offer a concrete and replicable set of advantages. Anti-colonial rhetoric and appeals to historical legacy remain important, but they no longer provide a long-term advantage on their own. Each competitive proposition must be backed by institutional support.
At the St. Petersburg forum, there was a genuine international community of like-minded partners practically united by a common goal: networking and developing business cooperation. “The continued participation confirms the demand for building relationships of business trust and confidence with foreign partners from different regions, including the United States, Europe, the Middle East, Latin America, Asia and Africa,” said Alexander Stuglev, Chairman of the Board and CEO of the Roscongress Foundation. The Roscongress Foundation held the 29th St Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) from 3 to 6 June 2026.
By Adedapo Adesanya
CANAL+ has expressed confidence in its ability to turn around the fortunes of struggling broadcaster MultiChoice as it marks a milestone by becoming the first French company listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE).
The secondary listing of CANAL+ signals strong international confidence in South Africa’s capital markets and reinforces the JSE’s role as a conduit between global capital and African growth opportunities, it said in a statement.
CANAL+ enhances the JSE’s sectoral diversity and provides local investors with direct, rand-denominated exposure to a globally diversified media and entertainment business with a significant African footprint. CANAL+ listed on the London Stock Exchange in December 2024.
The group’s listing on the JSE aligns with its long-term strategy to expand its presence in high-growth markets, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, where rising connectivity, a young and growing population (expected to increase by 800 million by 2050), strong GDP growth (4.5 per cent growth expected between 2026 and 2030) and accelerating demand for content and connectivity continue to drive sector growth.
The JSE listing will increase CANAL+ liquidity and enable African investors to benefit from CANAL+ growth.
According to Mr Maxime Saada, CEO of CANAL+ said, “Joining the Johannesburg Stock Exchange is a statement of our ambition and illustrates our belief in Africa’s future and its creative industry.
“We are proud to become the first French company ever to list in Johannesburg and the only global media and entertainment company listed on the exchange.
“Following our listing on the London Stock Exchange 18 months ago, this dual listing reinforces our ambition to be a bridge between Europe and Africa and anchors our dual-continental approach, consolidating our unique position in the global media and entertainment industry,” he said.
He noted that CANAL+ serves more than 40 million subscribers and generates €9bn in annual revenue.
“Africa will be our growth engine for years to come, and we are dedicated to creating value on the continent and sharing it with our African partners, investors and the creative community. By welcoming African investors, we deepen our roots, diversify our investor base and lay the foundation for the next phase of our growth.”
Commenting on the listing, Ms Valdene Reddy, Group CEO of the JSE, said, “We are proud to welcome CANAL+ to the JSE and to mark the first listing of a French company on our exchange.
By Adedapo Adesanya
The President of the African Development Bank (AfDB), Mr Sidi Ould Tah, says more African countries are likely to regain or achieve investment-grade credit ratings by next year as reforms begin to deliver results and economic growth accelerates.
Several African sovereigns have already been upgraded in recent months, including Nigeria. However, Nigeria is not yet near investment-grade status.
In May, S&P Global Ratings upgraded Nigeria’s sovereign credit ratings to ‘B’ with a stable outlook, citing structural reforms under President Bola Tinubu and key drivers like higher oil production and improved fiscal revenue.
The country is still five notches from investment-grade. Under S&P’s rating scale, the progression follows— B → B+ → BB- → BB → BB+ → BBB- (investment grade).
S&P raised Morocco to investment grade last year and increased South Africa by one level to BB in November. Ghana, Zambia, the Ivory Coast and Kenya have also benefited from positive rating action linked to fiscal, debt and economic reforms.
“We’re quite confident that the continent will continue to grow very strongly and that African countries will be better rated in the coming years,” Mr Ould Tah said in an interview with Bloomberg.
“We’ve seen Morocco receive investment grade during the last few months, and we expect other countries by next year to get toward that,” he added.
The outlook reflects improving fiscal positions and reforms implemented across countries on the continent, even as the conflict in the Middle East threatens to slow economic growth and raise costs for energy-importing nations. Better credit ratings can help countries borrow at lower rates and fund development projects.
The AfDB projects the continent’s gross domestic product expansion will accelerate to 4.4 per cent next year, if the conflict in the Middle East does not extend for a longer period. It expects the continent to slow to 4.2 per cent this year.
The war in Iran has benefited oil producers such as Nigeria, Angola and Gabon, while exerting pressure on the fiscal positions of net energy importers such as South Africa, Kenya, Ghana and Senegal.
Mr Ould Tah said the bank is ready to support countries facing budget constraints and high debt burdens due to the impact of the Iran crisis, including increasing credit lines to them.
“The board of directors of the bank will examine in the coming days how the bank can increase the volume of resources it will provide to its member countries in this specific situation,” he said.
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