World
Mikhail Bogdanov’s Passion for Africa and the Critical Russia’s Policy Debates
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
Russian Presidential Special Representative for the Middle East and Africa, Mikhail Bogdanov, in an April interview with Interfax news agency, offered an insight into aspects of Russia’s policy objectives, initiatives and future prospects in Africa.
He highlighted a few obstacles to the Russian government’s inability in realizing its set goals and tasks during the past several years. But what is spectacularly interesting in the interview text concerns Soviet and Russian education for Africans.
Bogdanov authoritatively told the interviewer, Ksenia Baygarova, that Africa has always been an important region from the point of view of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation.
“This cooperation is very multi-dimensional. For instance, how many Africans have studied at our universities? Back at the end of the 1950s-1960s, the Soviet Union played the most important historical role for African peoples in getting their statehood and independence during their fight against colonial rule. Of course, these historical ties give a solid basis for cordial relationships. Many generations of politicians and diplomats have changed but it is good that continuity and solidarity between our country and Africa have been upheld,” he narrated about the past historical records.
Understandably, now is the time for creating the foundation for the restoration of Russia-African ties after a certain pause which was mainly linked to domestic problems in the country. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, other problems emerged and they pushed cooperation with Africa into the background. “Some of our embassies in African countries were closed. Regrettably, much has been lost over this period, and as they say, nature abhors a vacuum. Others, western countries, China, Turkey, and India, filled the vacuum that emerged after our ‘retreat’ from Africa,” he convincingly explained.
Monitoring, researching and analyzing the post-Soviet developments in Africa with information resources on official Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs website indicated that during the past years, there have been several top-level bilateral meetings. The overwhelming truth is that some of the information pointed to the signing of MoUs and bilateral agreements, at least during the past decade. In November 2021, a policy document titled the ‘Situation Analytical Report’ presented at the premises of TASS News Agency was very critical of Russia’s current policy towards Africa.
While the number of high-level meetings has increased, the share of substantive issues on the agenda remains small. There are few definitive results from such meetings. Apart from the absence of a public strategy for the continent, at the same time, there is a lack of coordination among various state and para-state institutions working with Africa. Many bilateral agreements, at the top and high political levels, have still not been implemented. A lot more important issues have received little attention since the first African leaders’ summit held in Sochi.
In addition to the above, our monitoring and research show Russia grossly lacks public outreach policies that could help form good perception and build an image, especially among the youth and the middle class that form the bulk of Africa’s 1.3 billion population.
Researchers have been making tangible contributions to the development of African studies in Russia. The Moscow-based Africa Studies Institute has a huge pack of research materials useful for designing an African agenda. In an interview, Professor Vladimir Shubin at the Institute for African Studies under the Russian Academy of Sciences reiterated that Russia is not doing enough to communicate to the broad sectors of the public, particularly in Africa, true information about its domestic and foreign policies as well as the accomplishments of Russia’s economy, science and technology to form a positive perception of Russia within the context of the current global changes of the 21st century.
Under the geopolitical changes and circumstances, Russia would have to open up more especially working with strategically chosen social groups and business associations in Africa. China has such a strategy and resultantly has excellent footprints. While Deputy Minister Mikhail Bogdanov still talking about the 1950s-1960s, and about the past Soviet Union education, China’s current focus is on different forms of education, ranging from short-term, requalification courses and academic fellowships to the regular intake of African students.
With far-sightedness and long-term strategy, Beijing is very desirous to win the hearts and minds of Africa’s future leaders and influencers by offering them educational opportunities in China. It is investing and exercising soft power in the education sector, and it is reported that China provided 12,000 scholarships to African students in 2021, despite the fact that it was during the Covid-19 pandemic period.
Besides that, China has been training African civil servants and runs the Confucius Institute in some 20 African countries. It has recently opened the first Party School and admitted the first batch of 120 participants from African ruling parties who are attending the workshop at the US$40 million facility in Tanzania funded by the Chinese Communist Party. There is now a total of 81,562 African students this 2022/23 academic year in China, according to the Chinese Ministry of Education.
The data from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics shows that Asian countries have become the second most popular destination for African students studying abroad with China being number one followed by the likes of India, Japan, Korea, and Israel, among others. Judging from our monitoring and research, India has also taken steps aimed at building a more practical partnership in a number of spheres in the continent. New Delhi has a new set of opportunities in human resources development, information technology and education.
While Indian companies rely more on African talent, they do capacity building for the local population. The Indian diaspora plays its own bridging role between India and Africa. As the world focuses on Africa’s fast-growing economies, India offers many academic fellowships and internship opportunities for young Africans, it has the traditional annual training programmes in various universities and institutes in India.
The United States and European countries are investing in the youth. These European and Western countries, which Russians often criticized, train thousands yearly, ranging from short-term courses to long-term academic disciplines. During the days of Barak Obama, the White House created the Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI). It brings 500 Africans to the White House in Washington and this YALI still runs various academic and training programmes for Africans. Before Covid-19, The Times Higher Education index indicated that approximately 43,000 Africans enrolled on American universities. There are many African universities and institutes with joint agreements running programs, including fellowships, together with Westerners and Europeans. That is compared to Russia’s annual scholarship of about 1,800.
The European Union (EU) has been focusing on the African youth. It embraces them with different kinds of training, fellowship programmes et cetera under its flagship policy on education. Many African countries have enormously benefited from educational initiatives during the past years. For instance, in August 2022, it offered postgraduate scholarships to over 200 young Nigerians in top European universities for the academic year. And if considering the whole of Africa, this is just the tip of the iceberg. The EU shows a consistent commitment to ramping up programmes and activities targeting vibrant young people from Africa.
France is a member of the European Union. France’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs together with the Ministry of Education is collaborating with French-speaking African countries to offer intensive orientation and educational training for 10,000 French teachers in Africa. The five-year training programme aims at strengthening France’s soft power.
Besides training French teachers, it has regular students intake from Africa. France, like any other foreign player, has been looking for effective ways of improving its public diplomacy, especially in French-speaking African countries.
From the Arab world and Gulf region, Turkey has been making inroads these years into Africa. It has shifted direction and now pursues a more diversified, multidimensional foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. Turkey was accorded observer status by the African Union. In a reciprocal move, the AU declared Turkey its strategic partner in 2008, and since then relations between Africa and Turkey are still gaining momentum. It trains more and more agricultural specialists for Africa.
In 2009, there were only 12 Turkish embassies in African countries, with five of them in North Africa. Now, there are 43. With tourism promotion at the hotspot, Turkish Airlines has flights to 60 different destinations in 39 countries on the continent while the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) has nearly 30 coordination centres throughout Africa.
Arguably, the Presidential Special Representative for the Middle East and Africa, Mikhail Bogdanov, most probably understands all these when he admittedly said in his Interfax interview that other foreign players are active and operating in Africa. Statistics on African students are, in fact, still staggering. Russia’s Ministry of Science and Higher Education, citing confidentiality, declined to give the current figure for Africa.
For the coming years, Russia needs a model template of social policy for Africa. With the emerging new world order which invariably incorporates in its fold education and cultural influence – the importance of soft power – for making alliances and inroads, networking and collaborating with institutions, in Africa. In a transcript posted to the State Duma’s official website, during the inter-parliamentary conference, Chairman of the State Duma, Viacheslav Volodin, was convinced that cultural and educational cooperation could be equally important areas needed to be developed and intensified in Russia-African relations.
Professor Vladimir Filippov, former Rector of the Russian University of People’s Friendship (RUDN), popularly referred to as Patrice Lumumba Friendship University, has underscored the fact that social attitudes toward foreigners first have to change positively, the need to create a multicultural learning environment, then the need to expand educational and scientific ties between Russia and Africa.
Established in 1960 to provide higher education to Third World students, it later became an integral part of the Soviet cultural offensive in non-aligned countries. His university has gained international popularity as an educational institution located in southwest Moscow.
“The present and the future of Russia-Africa relations is not about charity, it’s about co-development,” stated Evgeny Primakov, Head of the Russian Federal Agency for International Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo) and also a member of the Secretariat of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum.
The Secretariat of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum works under the Russian Foreign Ministry. It has, under its aegis, three coordination councils namely business, public and scientific councils. Primakov heads the humanitarian council that deals with education and humanitarian questions for the Foreign Ministry. While talking about initiatives especially in the sphere of education within the framework of the relationship between Russia and Africa, Primakov explicitly underlined the changing state of affairs in education and added that the number of Russian state scholarships for African citizens – for the whole continent made up of 54 African countries – has only increased from 1765 in 2019 to 1843 in 2020.
Primarily due to the coronavirus outbreak, Russian universities since then potential students have had difficulties with transportation, safety, and financing scholarships allocated through the budget. The Russian system of higher education needs to be adapted to the new realities so that it could gain more value on the international market, especially for Africa’s middle class whose kids could study on contracts in the Russian Federation. This is strictly not humanitarian aid as perceived by Mikhail Bogdanov and Evgeny Primakov.
Similarly at the Valdai Discussion Club, academic researchers from the Institute for African Studies and policy observers held discussions on current Russia’s policy, emerging opportunities and possibilities for partnerships in Africa. Quite interestingly, the majority of them acknowledged the need for Russia to be more prominent as it should be and work more consistently to achieve its strategic goals on the continent.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004 with the primary goal to promote dialogue between Russia and the rest of the world. It hosted an expert discussion themed “Russia’s Return to Africa: Interests, Challenges, Prospects” to brainstorm views on Africa. Officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Africa Department were present and noted that there have been developments in relations with Africa.
Russia claims to have substantial influence in the education sphere. It consistently claims to have trained thousands and thousands of Africans from the 1950s and 1960s as emphatically explained by Deputy Minister Bogdanov. But why currently are the African youth and the middle class, African NGOs and civil society, so remote in Russia’s policy towards Africa? Cultural issues are catastrophic, indeed! There is nothing African, except African diplomatic offices in the Russian Federation. Who runs public outreach programmes that could change perceptions in Africa?
With the youth’s education, experts are still critical. Gordey Yastrebov, a Postdoctoral Researcher and Lecturer at the Institute for Sociology and Social Psychology at the University of Cologne (Germany), argues in an email interview discussion that “education can be a tool for geopolitical influence in general, and for changing perceptions specifically, and Russia (just like any other country) could use it for that same purpose. However, Russia isn’t doing anything substantial on this front, at least there is no consistent effort with obvious outcomes that would make me think so. There are no large-scale investment programmes in education focusing on this.”
He explains that Russian education can become appealing these days, but given that Russia can no longer boast any significant scientific and technological achievements. Western educational and scientific paradigm embraces cooperation and critical independent thinking, whereas this is not the case with the Russian paradigm, which is becoming more isolationist and authoritarian. Obviously, by now, Africa should look up to more successful examples elsewhere, perhaps in the United States and Europe.
In an interview with Professor Natalia Vlasova, Deputy Rector at the Department of International Relations and Cooperation of the Ural State University of Economics (USUE) in Yekaterinburg, explained that many African countries are developing rapidly, and the African elites and the growing middle-class are great potentials for sponsoring their children’s education abroad. She explained the necessity to develop bilateral ties not only in the economic sphere but also in education and culture and to promote the exchange of people and ideas in the social sphere.
“We must use the full potential interest and mutual sympathy between the peoples of Russia and Africa, a great desire of Russians and Africans to visit each other to make friends, establish new connections. It will be of high appreciation to African countries when Russian authorities create a social platform towards strengthening Russian-African relations,” suggested Vlasova.
According to her, Russia could still offer credible alternative programmes bringing together Russians and Africans. She finally concluded: “In times of Soviet Union, African countries were strategic partners, and now we should reactivate these relations because in the nearest future they will have big economic and political power. This could, indeed, be a huge market and has a potential basis for future diversified business.”
Nevertheless, experts from the Moscow-based Center for Strategic Research acknowledged in an interview with this author that the percentage of Russian universities on the world market is considerably low. Due to this, there is a rare need to develop Russian education export opportunities, and take progressive measures to raise interest in Russian education among foreigners. This would raise the collaboration between Russia and Africa to a qualitatively new level and ultimately contribute to the economies and prosperity of both Africa and Russia.
As part of the renewed interest in Africa, Sergey Lavrov and Mikhail Bogdanov at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and top officials at the Ministry of Higher Education and related agencies have to work more on opportunities and diverse ways to increase the number of students, especially tuition paying agreements for children of the growing elite families and middle-class from African countries. It has to review its cultural component in its current foreign policy, undoubtedly, be directed at strengthening relations. It is certainly true that western and European systems classically appeal more to Africans. If Russia’s ultimate interest is to lead a fairer and more stable global system, then it is necessary to share these interests through the educational sphere in sub-Saharan Africa.
Rossiyskaya Gazeta, a widely circulated Russian daily newspaper, in the article also reported that Russia has to focus on the young population from developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. It has to target the elite and middle class in these markets for the export of education which has great potential. The Gazeta concluded that Africa’s fast-growing population is a huge potential market for knowledge transfer and export education.
Beyond all these trends in the Russia-African relations discussed above, it is necessary here to recall that President Vladimir Putin particularly noted the good dynamics of specialist training and education in Russian educational institutions for African countries. Putin, however, suggested to Russian and African participants map out broad initiatives in the sphere of education and culture during the first summit in Sochi. For the joint work, there was a final joint declaration, adopted at the end of the summit. The document outlines a set of goals and objectives for further development of Russia-African cooperation.
World
AFC Backs Future Africa, Lightrock in $100m Tech VC Funding Bet
By Adedapo Adesanya
Infrastructure solutions provider, Africa Finance Corporation (AFC), has committed parts of a $100 million investment to fund managers—Future Africa and Lightrock Africa—to boost African tech venture backing.
The commitment to Lightrock Africa Fund II and Future Africa Fund III is the first tranche of a broader deployment, AFC noted.
The corporation added that it is actively evaluating a pipeline of additional Africa-focused funds spanning a range of strategies and stages, with further commitments expected in the near term.
This is part of its efforts to plug a persistent gap in long-term institutional capital on the continent, which constrains the development and scaling of high-potential technology businesses across the continent, especially with a drop in foreign investments.
“Through this commitment, AFC will deploy catalytic capital in leading Africa-focused technology Funds and, in particular, African-owned fund managers,” it said in a statement on Monday.
AFC aims to address the underrepresentation of local capital in venture funding by catalysing greater participation from African institutional investors and deepening local ownership within the ecosystem.
Despite some success stories on the continent, local institutional capital remains significantly underrepresented across many fund cap tables, with the majority of venture funding continuing to flow from international sources.
AFC’s commitment is designed to shift that dynamic, according to Mr Samaila Zubairu, its chief executive.
“Across the continent, young Africans are not waiting for the digital economy to arrive; they are seizing the moment — adopting technology, creating markets and solving real economic problems faster than infrastructure has kept pace. That is the investment signal.
“AFC’s $100 million Africa-focused Technology Fund will accelerate the convergence of growing demand, rapid technology adoption, youthful demographics and the enabling infrastructure we are building.
“Digital infrastructure is now as fundamental to Africa’s transformation as roads, rail, ports and power — enabling productivity, payments, logistics, services, data and cross-border trade, while creating jobs and industrial scale.”
Mr Pal Erik Sjatil, Managing Partner & CEO, Lightrock, said: “We are delighted to welcome Africa Finance Corporation as an anchor investor in Lightrock Africa II, deepening a strong partnership shaped by our collaboration on high-impact investments across Africa, including Moniepoint, Lula, and M-KOPA.
“With aligned capital, a long-term perspective, and a shared focus on value creation, we are well positioned to support exceptional management teams and scale category-leading businesses that deliver attractive financial returns alongside measurable environmental and social outcomes,” he added.
Adding his input, Mr Iyin Aboyeji, Founding Partner, Future Africa, said: “By investing in AI-native skills, financing productive tools such as phones and laptops, and expanding energy, connectivity and compute infrastructure, we can convert Africa’s greatest asset — its people — into critical participants in the new global economy. AFC’s US$100 million commitment is the anchor this moment demands.
“As our first multilateral development bank partner, AFC is sending a clear signal that digital is as fundamental to Africa’s transformation as agriculture, manufacturing and physical infrastructure. We trust that other development finance institutions, insurers, reinsurers and pension funds will follow AFC’s lead.”
World
Africa ‘Reawakening’ In Emerging Multipolar World
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
In this interview, Gustavo de Carvalho, Programme Head (Acting): African Governance and Diplomacy, South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), discusses at length aspects of Africa’s developments in the context of shifting geopolitics, its relationships with external countries, and expected roles in the emerging multipolar world. Gustavo de Carvalho further underscores key issues related to transparency in agreements, financing initiatives, and current development priorities that are shaping Africa’s future. Here are the interview excerpts:
Is Africa undergoing the “second political re-awakening” and how would you explain Africans’ perceptions and attitudes toward the emerging multipolar world?
We should be careful not to overstate novelty. African states exercised real agency during the Cold War, too, from Bandung to the Non-Aligned Movement. What has actually shifted is the structure of the international system around the continent. The unipolar moment has faded, the menu of partners has widened, and a generation of policymakers under fifty operates without the inhibitions of either the Cold War or the immediate post-Cold War period. African publics, however, are more pragmatic than multipolar rhetoric assumes. Afrobarometer’s surveys across more than thirty countries consistently show citizens evaluating external partners on tangible outcomes such as infrastructure, jobs and security, rather than on civilisational narratives. China is generally associated with positive economic influence, the United States retains the strongest pull as a development model, and Russia, despite a louder political profile, registers a smaller and more geographically concentrated footprint. Multipolarity is not a destination Africans are arriving at. It is a working environment that creates more options and more risks at once.
Do you think it is appropriate to use the term “neo-colonialism” referring to activities of foreign players in Africa? By the way, who are the neo-colonisers in your view?
The term has analytical value when used carefully, and loses it when deployed selectively against whichever power one wishes to embarrass. Nkrumah’s 1965 formulation was precise: political independence accompanied by continued external control over economic and political life. The honest test is whether contemporary patterns reproduce that asymmetry, irrespective of the capital from which they originate. The structural picture is well documented. Africa still exports primary commodities and imports manufactured goods. Intra-African trade hovers around fifteen per cent of total trade, well below Asian or European levels. African sovereigns pay a measurable risk premium on debt that exceeds what fundamentals alone justify. Applied consistently, the lens directs attention to opaque resource-for-infrastructure contracts, security-for-mineral bargains, debt agreements with confidentiality clauses, and aid architectures that bypass African institutions. That description fits legacy French commercial arrangements in francophone Africa, Chinese mining concessions in the DRC, Russian-linked gold extraction in the Central African Republic and Sudan, Gulf-backed port and farmland deals along the Red Sea, and Western corporate practices that have not always met the standards their governments preach. Naming a single neo-coloniser tells us more about the speaker’s politics than about the structure.
How would you interpret the current engagement of foreign players in Africa? Do you also think there is geopolitical competition and rivalry among them?
Competition is real and intensifying, and the proliferation of Africa-plus-one summits is the clearest indicator. Russia has held two summits, in Sochi in 2019 and St Petersburg in 2023. The EU, Turkey, Japan, India, the United States, South Korea, Saudi Arabia and the UAE all host their own variants. Trade figures give a more honest sense of weight than diplomatic theatre. China-Africa trade reached around 280 billion dollars in 2023, United States-Africa trade sits in the 60 to 70 billion range, and Russia-Africa trade is roughly 24 billion, heavily concentrated in grain, fertiliser and arms. Describing the continent as a chessboard, however, understates how African states themselves are shaping these dynamics, sometimes through skilful diversification and sometimes through security bargains that entail longer-term costs. The Sahel illustrates the latter starkly. Between 2020 and 2023, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger expelled French forces, downgraded their relationships with ECOWAS and the UN stabilisation mission, and welcomed Russian security contractors. ACLED data shows civilian fatalities from political violence rising rather than falling across the same period. Substituting providers without strengthening domestic institutions does not produce sovereignty. It changes the terms of dependence.
Do you think much depends on African leaders and their people (African solutions to African problems) to work toward long-term, sustainable development?
The principle is correct, and it is regularly weaponised in two unhelpful directions. External actors invoke it to justify withdrawing from responsibilities they continue to hold, particularly over financial flows and arms transfers that pass through their own jurisdictions. Some African leaders invoke it to deflect legitimate scrutiny of governance failings, repression or corruption. Genuine African agency requires more than rhetoric. The AU’s operating budget remains modest in absolute terms, and external partners still cover a significant share of programmatic activities, which shapes what gets funded. The African Standby Force, conceived in 2003, remains only partially operational more than two decades on. The African Continental Free Trade Area, in force since 2021, has rolled out more slowly than drafters hoped because the political will to lower national barriers lags the speeches. Long-term development depends on African leaders financing more of their own security and development priorities, on publics holding them accountable, and on a clearer-eyed view of what foreign forces can deliver. Whether the actors are Russian-linked contractors in the Sahel and Central African Republic, Western counter-terrorism deployments, or others, external security providers tend to address symptoms while leaving the political and economic drivers of insecurity intact.
Often described as a continent with huge, untapped natural resources and large human capital (1.5 billion), what then specifically do African leaders expect from Europe, China, Russia and the United States?
Expectations differ across the three relationships, and that differentiation is itself a marker of agency. From China, leaders expect infrastructure financing, sustained commodity demand, and a partnership that does not condition itself on domestic governance reforms. FOCAC commitments have delivered visible results in ports, railways and power generation, though Beijing itself has shifted toward smaller, more selective lending since around 2018. From Russia, expectations are narrower because the economic footprint is. Moscow’s offer is political backing in multilateral forums, arms transfers, grain and fertiliser supply, civilian nuclear cooperation in a handful of cases, and security partnerships, including those involving private military formations. The record of those security arrangements in the Central African Republic, Mali, Sudan and Mozambique deserves a sober assessment on its own terms, because the human and political costs are documented and uneven. From the United States, leaders look for market access through instruments such as AGOA, whose post-2025 future has generated significant uncertainty, alongside private capital, technology partnerships and a posture that treats the continent as more than a counter-terrorism theatre. The priorities across all three relationships are essentially the same: transparency in the terms of agreements, arrangements that preserve future policy space, and partnerships that build domestic productive capacity rather than substitute for it. The continent’s leverage in this multipolar moment is real, but it is not permanent. It will be squandered if used to rotate among external dependencies rather than reduce them.
World
Africa Startup Deals Activity Rebound, Funding Lags at $110m in April 2026
By Adedapo Adesanya
Africa’s startup ecosystem showed tentative signs of recovery in April 2026, with deal activity picking up after a subdued March, though funding volumes remained weak by recent standards, Business Post gathered from the latest data by Africa: The Big Deal.
In the review month, a total of 32 startups across the continent announced funding rounds of at least $100,000, raising a combined $110 million through a mix of equity, debt and grant deals, excluding exits. The figure represents a notable rebound from the 22 deals recorded in March, suggesting renewed investor engagement after a slow start to the second quarter.
However, the recovery in deal count did not translate into stronger capital inflows. April’s $110 million total marks the lowest monthly funding volume since March 2025, when startups raised $52 million, and falls significantly short of the previous 12-month average of $275 million per month.
The data highlights a growing divergence between investor activity and cheque sizes, with more deals being completed but at smaller ticket values.
The data showed that, despite this, looking at the numbers on a month-to-month basis does not tell the whole story of venture funding cycles as a broader 12-month rolling view presents a more stable picture of Africa’s startup ecosystem.
Based on this, over the 12 months to April 2026 (May 2025–April 2026), startups across the continent raised a total of $3.1 billion, excluding exits – largely in line with the range observed since August 2025. The figure has hovered around $3.1 billion, with only marginal deviations of about $90 million, indicating relative stability despite recent monthly dips.
A closer breakdown shows that equity financing accounted for $1.7 billion of the total, while debt funding contributed $1.4 billion, alongside approximately $30 million in grants. This composition underscores the growing role of debt in sustaining overall funding levels.
The data suggests that while headline monthly figures may point to short-term weakness, the broader funding environment remains resilient, supported in large part by continued activity in debt financing, even as equity investments show signs of moderation.
The report said if April’s total amount was lower than March’s overall, it was higher on equity: $74 million came as equity and $36 million as debt, while March had been overwhelmingly debt-led ($55 million equity, $96 million debt).
In the review month, the deals announced include Egyptian fintech Lucky raising a $23 million Series B, while Gozem ($15.2 million debt) and Victory Farms ($15 milliomn debt) did most of the heavy lifting on the debt side. Ethiopia-based electric mobility start-up Dodai announced $13m ($8m Series A + $5m debt).
April also saw two exits as Nigeria’s Bread Africa was acquired by SMC DAO as consolidation continues in the country’s digital asset sector, and Egypt’s waste recycling start-up Cyclex was acquired by Saudi-Egyptian investment firm Edafa Venture.
Year-to-Date (January to April), startups on the continent have raised a total of $708 million across 124 deals of at least $100,000, excluding exits. The funding mix was almost evenly split, with $364 million in equity (51.4 per cent) and $340 million in debt (48.0 per cent), alongside a small contribution from grants (0.6 per cent). This is an early sign that funding startups is taking a different shape compared to what the ecosystem witnessed in 2025.
For instance, in the first four months of last year, startups raised a higher $813 million across a significantly larger 180 deals. More notably, last year’s funding was heavily skewed toward equity, which accounted for $652 million (80.1 per cent) compared to just $138 million in debt (16.9 per cent).
The year-on-year comparison points to two clear trends: a contraction in deal activity as evidenced by a 31 per cent drop, and a 13 per cent decline in total funding. At the same time, the composition of capital has shifted meaningfully, with debt now playing a much larger role in sustaining funding volumes.
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