By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh

From Africa’s perspectives on attaining economic sovereignty, Tanzania, located in East Africa, has seriously begun showing the investment model as Russia pledges tremendous support during the meeting of the Russian-Tanzanian intergovernmental commission in Arusha, in mid-May 2026. Russia is undertaking various development projects as well as addressing bilateral issues relating to investment, trade and innovation on the African continent, and described Tanzania as the gateway to the broader East African region.

Step 1:  Gazprom is interested in implementing comprehensive gas projects in Tanzania, according to the report issued by the Ministry of Economic Development. It says Gazprom, in addition to selling natural gas, LNG, and petrochemical products, is ready to supply technologies and equipment for gas production, processing, transportation, and sales. It says Gazprom is continuing its work on a pilot project launched last year to supply two mobile gas tankers to Tanzania.

NOVATEK has also indicated its preparedness to participate in natural gas exploration and production projects in Tanzania, and for now, the staff are awaiting information on the date of the fifth round of license allocation for exploration blocks, as well as on the acquisition of blocks outside the tender process—specifically, at the Ntorya field. “Tanzania has significant resource potential, and the economy’s growing demand for electricity and fuel opens up significant opportunities for joint projects. The current situation in the Strait of Hormuz compels us to seek new solutions to ensure that it does not reduce economic growth on the African continent, and particularly in Tanzania,” said Maxim Reshetnikov, head of the Ministry of Economic Development, speaking at a meeting of the Russian-Tanzania intergovernmental commission in Arusha.

Step 2: Russia and Tanzania plan to sign a memorandum of cooperation in tourism in Moscow. In June, as part of the “Travel!” forum in Moscow (June 10-14), the Tanzanian delegation was already given the invitation to participate, noted Reshetnikov while further explaining that Russia is interested in launching direct air service between the two countries, which would “give a powerful boost to tourism development.”

Air Tanzania’s initiative to launch flights from Moscow to Dar es Salaam, with high hopes that Russia and Tanzania will complete the necessary procedures for the entry into force of the new air traffic agreement as quickly as possible. In particular, officials are awaiting notification from the Tanzanian side regarding the entry into force of this agreement.

Air Tanzania will begin flights from Dar es Salaam, Tanzania’s largest city, on May 28. According to the online flight information at the capital’s Vnukovo Airport, flights on this route will include a stopover on the island of Zanzibar. Flights will operate three times a week, on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays. The program will run until October 24.

Step 3: Tanzanian President Samia Suluhu Hassan is expected on an official state visit to Russia in June, and that will boost bilateral trade and investment, and provide an additional impetus to developing mutual cooperation.

“In preparation for the upcoming high-level meeting, I propose discussing both promising areas and specific projects… and identifying key areas for further cooperation. In addition to trade, these include energy, transport, industry, agriculture, tourism, science, and education,” Reshetnikov said.

The Tanzanian delegation is expected to participate in the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, which will be held from June 3 to 6.  Usually, at the St. Petersburg forum, the African agenda is of great importance. The programme includes the Russia-Africa Business Dialogue, which, since 2016, has been the annual meeting place for representatives of Russian and African business and official communities. Roscongress Foundation organises it.

By Adedapo Adesanya

Infrastructure solutions provider, Africa Finance Corporation (AFC), has committed parts of a $100 million investment to fund managers—Future Africa and Lightrock Africa—to boost African tech venture backing.

The commitment to Lightrock Africa Fund II and Future Africa Fund III is the first tranche of a broader deployment, AFC noted.

The corporation added that it is actively evaluating a pipeline of additional Africa-focused funds spanning a range of strategies and stages, with further commitments expected in the near term.

This is part of its efforts to plug a persistent gap in long-term institutional capital on the continent, which constrains the development and scaling of high-potential technology businesses across the continent, especially with a drop in foreign investments.

“Through this commitment, AFC will deploy catalytic capital in leading Africa-focused technology Funds and, in particular, African-owned fund managers,” it said in a statement on Monday.

AFC aims to address the underrepresentation of local capital in venture funding by catalysing greater participation from African institutional investors and deepening local ownership within the ecosystem.

Despite some success stories on the continent, local institutional capital remains significantly underrepresented across many fund cap tables, with the majority of venture funding continuing to flow from international sources.

AFC’s commitment is designed to shift that dynamic, according to Mr Samaila Zubairu, its chief executive.

“Across the continent, young Africans are not waiting for the digital economy to arrive; they are seizing the moment — adopting technology, creating markets and solving real economic problems faster than infrastructure has kept pace. That is the investment signal.

“AFC’s $100 million Africa-focused Technology Fund will accelerate the convergence of growing demand, rapid technology adoption, youthful demographics and the enabling infrastructure we are building.

“Digital infrastructure is now as fundamental to Africa’s transformation as roads, rail, ports and power — enabling productivity, payments, logistics, services, data and cross-border trade, while creating jobs and industrial scale.”

Mr Pal Erik Sjatil, Managing Partner & CEO, Lightrock, said: “We are delighted to welcome Africa Finance Corporation as an anchor investor in Lightrock Africa II, deepening a strong partnership shaped by our collaboration on high-impact investments across Africa, including Moniepoint, Lula, and M-KOPA.

“With aligned capital, a long-term perspective, and a shared focus on value creation, we are well positioned to support exceptional management teams and scale category-leading businesses that deliver attractive financial returns alongside measurable environmental and social outcomes,” he added.

Adding his input, Mr Iyin Aboyeji, Founding Partner, Future Africa, said: “By investing in AI-native skills, financing productive tools such as phones and laptops, and expanding energy, connectivity and compute infrastructure, we can convert Africa’s greatest asset — its people — into critical participants in the new global economy. AFC’s US$100 million commitment is the anchor this moment demands.

“As our first multilateral development bank partner, AFC is sending a clear signal that digital is as fundamental to Africa’s transformation as agriculture, manufacturing and physical infrastructure. We trust that other development finance institutions, insurers, reinsurers and pension funds will follow AFC’s lead.”

By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh

In this interview, Gustavo de Carvalho, Programme Head (Acting): African Governance and Diplomacy, South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), discusses at length aspects of Africa’s developments in the context of shifting geopolitics, its relationships with external countries, and expected roles in the emerging multipolar world. Gustavo de Carvalho further underscores key issues related to transparency in agreements, financing initiatives, and current development priorities that are shaping Africa’s future. Here are the interview excerpts:

Is Africa undergoing the “second political re-awakening” and how would you explain Africans’ perceptions and attitudes toward the emerging multipolar world?

We should be careful not to overstate novelty. African states exercised real agency during the Cold War, too, from Bandung to the Non-Aligned Movement. What has actually shifted is the structure of the international system around the continent. The unipolar moment has faded, the menu of partners has widened, and a generation of policymakers under fifty operates without the inhibitions of either the Cold War or the immediate post-Cold War period. African publics, however, are more pragmatic than multipolar rhetoric assumes. Afrobarometer’s surveys across more than thirty countries consistently show citizens evaluating external partners on tangible outcomes such as infrastructure, jobs and security, rather than on civilisational narratives. China is generally associated with positive economic influence, the United States retains the strongest pull as a development model, and Russia, despite a louder political profile, registers a smaller and more geographically concentrated footprint. Multipolarity is not a destination Africans are arriving at. It is a working environment that creates more options and more risks at once.

Do you think it is appropriate to use the term “neo-colonialism” referring to activities of foreign players in Africa? By the way, who are the neo-colonisers in your view?

The term has analytical value when used carefully, and loses it when deployed selectively against whichever power one wishes to embarrass. Nkrumah’s 1965 formulation was precise: political independence accompanied by continued external control over economic and political life. The honest test is whether contemporary patterns reproduce that asymmetry, irrespective of the capital from which they originate. The structural picture is well documented. Africa still exports primary commodities and imports manufactured goods. Intra-African trade hovers around fifteen per cent of total trade, well below Asian or European levels. African sovereigns pay a measurable risk premium on debt that exceeds what fundamentals alone justify. Applied consistently, the lens directs attention to opaque resource-for-infrastructure contracts, security-for-mineral bargains, debt agreements with confidentiality clauses, and aid architectures that bypass African institutions. That description fits legacy French commercial arrangements in francophone Africa, Chinese mining concessions in the DRC, Russian-linked gold extraction in the Central African Republic and Sudan, Gulf-backed port and farmland deals along the Red Sea, and Western corporate practices that have not always met the standards their governments preach. Naming a single neo-coloniser tells us more about the speaker’s politics than about the structure.

How would you interpret the current engagement of foreign players in Africa? Do you also think there is geopolitical competition and rivalry among them?

Competition is real and intensifying, and the proliferation of Africa-plus-one summits is the clearest indicator. Russia has held two summits, in Sochi in 2019 and St Petersburg in 2023. The EU, Turkey, Japan, India, the United States, South Korea, Saudi Arabia and the UAE all host their own variants. Trade figures give a more honest sense of weight than diplomatic theatre. China-Africa trade reached around 280 billion dollars in 2023, United States-Africa trade sits in the 60 to 70 billion range, and Russia-Africa trade is roughly 24 billion, heavily concentrated in grain, fertiliser and arms. Describing the continent as a chessboard, however, understates how African states themselves are shaping these dynamics, sometimes through skilful diversification and sometimes through security bargains that entail longer-term costs. The Sahel illustrates the latter starkly. Between 2020 and 2023, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger expelled French forces, downgraded their relationships with ECOWAS and the UN stabilisation mission, and welcomed Russian security contractors. ACLED data shows civilian fatalities from political violence rising rather than falling across the same period. Substituting providers without strengthening domestic institutions does not produce sovereignty. It changes the terms of dependence.

Do you think much depends on African leaders and their people (African solutions to African problems) to work toward long-term, sustainable development?

The principle is correct, and it is regularly weaponised in two unhelpful directions. External actors invoke it to justify withdrawing from responsibilities they continue to hold, particularly over financial flows and arms transfers that pass through their own jurisdictions. Some African leaders invoke it to deflect legitimate scrutiny of governance failings, repression or corruption. Genuine African agency requires more than rhetoric. The AU’s operating budget remains modest in absolute terms, and external partners still cover a significant share of programmatic activities, which shapes what gets funded. The African Standby Force, conceived in 2003, remains only partially operational more than two decades on. The African Continental Free Trade Area, in force since 2021, has rolled out more slowly than drafters hoped because the political will to lower national barriers lags the speeches. Long-term development depends on African leaders financing more of their own security and development priorities, on publics holding them accountable, and on a clearer-eyed view of what foreign forces can deliver. Whether the actors are Russian-linked contractors in the Sahel and Central African Republic, Western counter-terrorism deployments, or others, external security providers tend to address symptoms while leaving the political and economic drivers of insecurity intact.

Often described as a continent with huge, untapped natural resources and large human capital (1.5 billion), what then specifically do African leaders expect from Europe, China, Russia and the United States?

Expectations differ across the three relationships, and that differentiation is itself a marker of agency. From China, leaders expect infrastructure financing, sustained commodity demand, and a partnership that does not condition itself on domestic governance reforms. FOCAC commitments have delivered visible results in ports, railways and power generation, though Beijing itself has shifted toward smaller, more selective lending since around 2018. From Russia, expectations are narrower because the economic footprint is. Moscow’s offer is political backing in multilateral forums, arms transfers, grain and fertiliser supply, civilian nuclear cooperation in a handful of cases, and security partnerships, including those involving private military formations. The record of those security arrangements in the Central African Republic, Mali, Sudan and Mozambique deserves a sober assessment on its own terms, because the human and political costs are documented and uneven. From the United States, leaders look for market access through instruments such as AGOA, whose post-2025 future has generated significant uncertainty, alongside private capital, technology partnerships and a posture that treats the continent as more than a counter-terrorism theatre. The priorities across all three relationships are essentially the same: transparency in the terms of agreements, arrangements that preserve future policy space, and partnerships that build domestic productive capacity rather than substitute for it. The continent’s leverage in this multipolar moment is real, but it is not permanent. It will be squandered if used to rotate among external dependencies rather than reduce them.