World
Russia Contributes 35% of Global Arms Export to Africa—Envoy
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
Russia has been accused of not doing enough for the growth of Africa, especially since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
It was observed that Russia-African diplomacy had been marked by several bilateral agreements that are yet to be implemented.
According to official documents, 92 agreements worth a total of $12.5 billion were signed during the symbolic African leaders’ gathering in late October 2019, and Russia has done little to implement them since then.
The joint declaration is a comprehensive document that outlines the key objectives and tasks required to elevate the entire relationship to a new qualitative level.
Long before the summit, there were mountains of promises and pledges that were never fulfilled. Several meetings of various bilateral intergovernmental commissions have taken place in both Moscow and Africa.
According to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, over 170 Russian companies and organizations submitted 280 proposals relating to various projects and businesses in Africa.
As Russia prepares for the next summit, which will be held in St. Petersburg in July 2023, African leaders have indicated their willingness to actively participate, at the very least, to listen to rousing speeches, sign more new agreements, and finally pose for group photos.
However, many experts and top African diplomats question the substance of discussing additional opportunities and effective efforts to build and strengthen Russia-African relations.
The revival of Russia-Africa relations must address existing challenges while also taking a results-oriented approach to pressing African issues. Taking into account the views and opinions expressed by African politicians, businesspeople, experts, and diplomats about the situation in Africa is one of them.
In practice, while Russia reaffirms its desire to return to Africa, it has yet to demonstrate a visible long-term commitment to collaborating with appropriate institutions to advance sustainable development across the continent.
Professor Abdullahi Shehu, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to the Russian Federation with concurrent accreditation to the Republic of Belarus, delivered a lecture on “Africa-Russia Relations: Past, Present, and Future” to young diplomats and students of the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Federation in mid-October.
Ambassador Shehu talked a lot about African history. He focused on the effects of the times before, during, and after contact with European powers and the neo-colonization of African states that happened after that.
He also discussed Africa’s relations with the Soviet Union, which began in large part after the independence of several African states in the 1960s. He emphasized the contributions to Africa’s decolonization struggle, as well as the numerous areas of cooperation that have existed between Africa and Russia over the years.
Professor Shehu emphasized the existence of several bilateral agreements with African countries, saying between 2015 and 2019, Russia and African countries signed a total of 20 bilateral military cooperation agreements. Many Russian companies, including Lukoil, Gasprom, Rosatom, and Restec, are in Nigeria, Egypt, Angola, Algeria, and Ethiopia’s energy and power industries.
But on the other hand, Russia has performed dismally in Africa’s energy sector and many other important economic spheres over the years.
“Unfortunately, due to Rosneft’s lack of interest in doing business in Africa, these agreements have not materialized. Furthermore, Russia’s Rosatom has also signed nuclear energy agreements with 18 African countries, including Nigeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Rwanda, to meet those countries’ power needs but has not been successful in building nuclear plants in Africa.
“Despite the tidal wave of new Africa-Russian relations, there are still obstacles, as well as new economic conditions and geopolitical realities. Acceptance of these new realities is critical in order to properly manage Africa’s expectations from Russia, at least in the short term,” the envoy said.
On the indiscriminate export of arms and military equipment, Ambassador Shehu stated, “However, Russia’s increasing export of arms to the African continent may exacerbate insecurity and instability, as well as increase the level of crime and criminal proclivity. So, it is in Russia’s strategic interest to be very picky about which African countries it sells weapons to. The deployment of private Russian mercenary groups and other private military groups in African countries is of particular concern and strategic importance to Africa.”
Support for Africa’s democratic institutions and agencies will lead to a more stable Africa, which is in Russia’s overall long-term interest and positive image rather than immediate short-term economic and financial gain, he said in his lecture, adding that Russia contributes approximately 35% of global arms export to the African region.
Given the difficulties that most African countries face in providing adequate power and energy, the number of Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) signed by Rosatom, Russia’s nuclear power company, with at least 14 African countries, is encouraging. What will be more significant, however, is the extent to which the MOUs are implemented because, by definition, the construction and operation of nuclear plants are ventures with the potential for deepening long-term relationships, according to Nigeria’s top diplomat.
Brigadier General Nicholas Mike Sango, Zimbabwe’s ambassador to the Russian Federation, told me in an interview just before his final departure from Moscow that several issues could strengthen the relationship. Economic cooperation is an important direction. African diplomats have consistently persuaded Russian companies to use the Africa Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) as an opportunity for Russian companies to establish footprints on the continent. This viewpoint has not found favour with them, and it is hoped that it will work in the future.
Despite the government’s lack of pronounced incentives for businesses to set their sights on Africa, Russian businesses generally regard Africa as too risky for investment. He stated that Russia must establish a presence on the continent by exporting its competitive advantages in engineering and technological advancement in order to bridge the gap that is impeding Africa’s industrialization and development.
“Worse, there are too many initiatives by too many quasi-state institutions promoting economic cooperation with Africa, saying the same things in different ways but doing nothing tangible,” he explained during the lengthy pre-departure interview. From July 2015 to August 2022, he represented the Republic of Zimbabwe in the Russian Federation. He previously served as a military adviser in Zimbabwe’s Permanent Mission to the UN and as an international instructor in the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
Many former ambassadors have made several similar criticisms. According to former South African Ambassador Mandisi Mpahlwa, Sub-Saharan Africa has understandably been low on post-Soviet Russia’s priority list, given that Russia is not as reliant on Africa’s natural resources as other major economies. The reason for this was that Soviet-African relations, based on the fight to push back the borders of colonialism, did not always translate into trade, investment, and economic ties that would have continued seamlessly with post-Soviet Russia.
“Russia’s goal of elevating its bilateral relationship with Africa cannot be realized without close collaboration with the private sector. Africa and Russia are politically close but geographically separated, and people-to-people ties remain underdeveloped. This translates into a lack of understanding on both sides of what the other has to offer. In both countries, there may be a fear of the unknown, “Mpahlawa stated in an interview after completing his ambassadorial duties in Russia.
Professor Gerrit Olivier from the Department of Political Science, the University of Pretoria in South Africa, noted that there had been unprecedented frequent official working visits to and from, but with little visible impact. Russian by its global status, ought to be active in Africa as Western Europe, the European Union, the United States and China are, it is all but playing a negligible role, and at present, its diplomacy is dominated by a plethora of agreements signed – many of which the outcomes remain hardly discernible in African countries.
Several agreements signed are impressive, but it remains how these will be implemented in practice. That, however, obstacles to the broadening of Russian-Africa relations should be addressed. Be that as it may, the Kremlin has revived its interest in the African continent, and it will be realistic to expect that the spade work it is putting in now will at some stage show more tangible results, he said with optimism.
“Russian influence in Africa, despite efforts towards resuscitation, remains marginal. While prioritizing Africa, Russia has to do more with a result-oriented investment like other players in the continent. The official working visits are mainly moves and symbolic, and have little long-term concrete results,” Professor Olivier, who served as South African Ambassador to the Russian Federation from 1991 to 1996, wrote in an email comment from Pretoria, South Africa.
Russia’s African policy is riddled with flaws. According to reports, more than 90 agreements were signed at the conclusion of the first Russia-Africa summit. Thousands of bilateral agreements are still in the works, and century-old promises and pledges to support sustainable development with African countries are authoritatively renewed. Russia is flashing its geopolitical headlights in all directions on Africa, like a polar deer waking up from its deep slumber.
According to Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, several top-level bilateral meetings, memorandums of understanding, and bilateral agreements have occurred in recent years. In November 2021, a policy document titled the ‘Situation Analytical Report’ presented at the TASS News Agency’s headquarters was harshly critical of Russia’s current African policy.
That policy document was prepared by 25 Russian experts headed by Professor Sergey Karaganov, Honorary Chairman of the Council on Defense and Foreign Policy. While the number of high-level meetings has increased, the proportion of substantive issues and concrete outcomes on the agenda has remained small. It explicitly highlights the inconsistency of approaches in dealing with many critical development issues in Africa. Russia, on the other hand, lacks public outreach policies for Africa. Aside from the lack of a public strategy for the continent, there is a lack of coordination among the various state and non-state institutions that work with Africa.
Associate Professor Ksenia Tabarintseva-Romanova of Ural Federal University’s Department of International Relations recognizes significant existing challenges and possibly difficult conditions in Africa-Russia economic cooperation. The establishment of an African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is the most important modern tool for the economic development of Africa. This is unique in terms of exploring and becoming acquainted with the opportunities for business collaboration it provides.
She maintains, however, that successful implementation necessitates a sufficiently high level of economic development in the participating countries, logistical accessibility, and developed industry with the potential to introduce new technologies. This means that in order for the African Continental Free Trade Area to be effective, it must enlist the provision of long-term investment flows from outside. These funds should be used to build industrial plants and transportation corridors.
Tabarintseva-Romanova previously stated in an interview discussion that Russia already has extensive experience with the African continent, making it possible to make investments as efficiently as possible for both the Russian Federation and African countries. Potential African investors and exporters may also look into business collaboration and partnerships in Russia.
However, Russia must find effective exit strategies, abandon loud diplomatic rhetoric, and take the first steps toward strengthening economic engagement with Africa. It must go beyond the traditional rhetoric of Soviet assistance to Africa. Professor Abdullahi Shehu’s mid-October lecture at the Russian Diplomacy Academy suggested that Russia consider the following.
Professor Shehu proposed that Russia invest directly in Africa’s extractive and manufacturing sectors as a viable alternative and long-term option. As evidenced by the sanctions imposed on Russia by the United States and Europe, Africa holds a promising future for the viability and profitability of Russian manufacturing companies interested in relocating to Africa to take advantage of cheap African labour.
The establishment of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), the world’s largest of its kind, provides Africa with a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for intra-African trade, thereby empowering Africa’s own capacities and investments. Russia must broaden its view of the investment opportunities presented by this single continental market of 55 African countries with a combined population of over 1.3 billion people.
Professor Abdullahi Shehu also cited Joseph Siegle, the Director of Research for the African Centre for Strategic Studies, to back up his point that “Developing more mutually beneficial Africa relations necessitates changes in both substance and process. Such a shift would necessitate Russia establishing more traditional bilateral engagements with African institutions rather than individuals. These initiatives would prioritize trade, investment, technology transfer, and educational exchanges. Many Africans would welcome such Russian initiatives if they were transparently negotiated and implemented equitably.”
Despite setbacks in recent years, the search for effective project and business financing is still ongoing, according to official reports. “There is a lot of demanding work ahead,” Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said during a meeting of the Ministry’s Collegium. “Perhaps there is a need to pay attention to China’s experience, which provides its enterprises with state guarantees and subsidies, thus ensuring the ability of companies to work on a systematic and long-term basis.”
Previous meetings were a marketplace for fantastic ideas. Business leaders frequently discussed the lack of credit lines and guarantees as barriers, as well as a lack of knowledge of the business environment as a challenge. Lavrov stated in a message sent in mid-June that “In these difficult and critical times, Russia’s foreign policy has prioritized strategic partnership with Africa. Russia is encouraged by Africans’ willingness to expand economic cooperation.”
That is why Lavrov’s earlier suggestion, as early as 2019, of writing a chapter on China’s approach and methods in Africa is arguably important, particularly when discussing the issue of relationship-building in the context of the current global changes of the twenty-first century. Russia could follow China’s lead in financing various infrastructure and construction projects in Africa. Within the context of the emerging multipolar world and growing opposition to Western hegemony and neocolonialism, Russia must consider a broad-based approach to strengthening and sustaining impactful multifaceted relations with Africa.
In stark contrast to key global players such as the United States, China, the European Union, and many others, basic research findings show that Russia’s policies have little impact on African development paradigms. Russia’s policies have frequently ignored Africa’s long-term development concerns. Russia must adopt an action plan, a practical document that outlines concrete, substantive cooperation between summits. Finally, Russians must keep in mind that the African Union Agenda 2063 is Africa’s road map.
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
The Executive President of the Indian Business Alliance (IBA), Sammy Manoj Kotwani, discusses the landmark moment in deepening Russian-Indian collaboration. Kotwani explains the groundbreaking insights into President Vladimir Putin’s working visit to India, the emerging opportunities and pathways for future cooperation, especially for the two-sided economic collaboration. Follow Sammy Manoj Kotwani’s discussions here:
Interpretation of the latest development in Russian-Indian relations
From my viewpoint in Moscow, this visit has effectively opened a new operational chapter in what has always been described as a “Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership.” It did not just reaffirm political goodwill; it translated that goodwill into a structured economic roadmap through Programme 2030, a clear target to take bilateral trade to around USD 100 billion by 2030, and concrete sectoral priorities: energy, nuclear cooperation, critical minerals, manufacturing, connectivity, fertilizers, and labour mobility.
On the ground, the business community reads this summit as a strong signal that India and Russia are doubling down on strategic autonomy in a multipolar world order. Both sides are trying to de-risk their supply chains and payment systems from over-dependence on any single centre of power. This is visible in the focus on national currencies, alternative payment mechanisms, and efforts to stabilise Rupee–Ruble trade, alongside discussions on a Free Trade Agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union and the reinforcement of corridors like the INSTC and the Chennai–Vladivostok route.
In short, my interpretation is that this summit has moved the relationship from “politically excellent but structurally imbalanced” towards a more diversified, long-term economic framework in which companies are expected to co-produce, co-innovate, and invest, not just trade opportunistically.
Significance of the visit for Indian business in Russia and for the Indian Business Alliance (IBA)
For Indian business operating in the Russian Federation, the visit has three immediate effects: confidence, clarity, and continuity. Confidence, because Indian entrepreneurs now see that despite external pressure, New Delhi and Moscow have explicitly committed to deepening economic engagement—especially in energy, fertilizers, defence co-production, nuclear, and critical minerals—rather than quietly scaling it back.
Clarity, because the summit outcomes spell out where the real opportunities lie:
Energy & Petrochemicals: Long-term crude and LNG supply, but also downstream opportunities in refining, petrochemicals, and logistics, where Indian EPC and service companies can participate.
Pharmaceuticals & Medical Devices: Russia’s import substitution drive makes high-quality Indian generics, formulations, and even localized manufacturing extremely relevant.
IT, Digital & AI: There is growing appetite in Russia for Indian IT services, cybersecurity, and digital solutions that are not dependent on Western tech stacks.
Fertilizers, Agro & Food Processing: New joint ventures in fertilizers and agriculture supply chains were explicitly flagged during and around the summit, which is important for both food security and farm incomes.
Continuity, because the Programme 2030 framework and the expected EAEU FTA give businesses a medium-term policy horizon. Tariff reductions, improved market access and predictable regulation are precisely what Indian SMEs and mid-sized companies need to justify long-term investments in Russia.
For the Indian Business Alliance (IBA), this inevitably means more work and more responsibility. We already see increased incoming requests from Indian firms—from large listed companies to first-time exporters—asking very practical questions: Which Russian region should we enter? How do we navigate compliance under the sanctions environment? Which banks are still handling Rupee–Ruble or third-currency settlements? How can we structure joint ventures to align with Russia’s import substitution goals while protecting IP and governance standards?
IBA’s role, therefore, becomes that of economic diplomacy in action: translating high-level summit language into actual B2B meetings, sectoral delegations, regional partnerships, and deal-making platforms such as the India–Russia Business Dialogue in Moscow. This visit will undoubtedly stimulate and intensify IBA’s work as a bridge between the two ecosystems.
India’s current economic presence in the Russian Federation
If we look beyond the headline trade figures, India’s economic presence in Russia today is significant, but not yet commensurate with its potential. Bilateral trade has grown sharply since 2022, largely on the back of discounted Russian oil and coal, making India one of Russia’s top energy customers. However, the structure is still heavily skewed: Russian exports to India dominate, while Indian exports and investments in Russia remain relatively modest and under-diversified.
On the ground in Moscow and across the regions, we see several strong Indian footholds:
Pharmaceuticals: Indian pharma is well-established, respected for its affordability and quality, and poised to deepen localization in line with Russian import substitution policy.
Tea, Coffee, Spices & Food: Traditional segments with deep historical roots, now expanding into ready-to-eat, wellness, and ethnic food categories.
IT & Services: Still under-represented, but with growing interest as Russian entities look for non-Western software, integration, and outsourcing partners.
Diamonds, Textiles, Apparel, and Light Engineering: Present but fragmented, with enormous room to scale, especially if logistics and payment challenges are addressed.
Where India is still behind is on-the-ground investment and manufacturing presence compared to countries like China. Russian policymakers today are clearly favouring investors who help them achieve technological sovereignty and local value addition. For serious Indian companies willing to commit capital, adapt to Russian standards, and accept the complexities of the current environment, this is a period of unusual opportunity. For purely transactional players looking for quick arbitrage, it is becoming progressively harder.
So, I would characterise India’s economic presence as: strategically important, quickly growing in value, but still under-leveraged in terms of depth, diversification, and localization.
Geopolitical pressure from Washington and future predictions
Pressure from Washington—through sanctions, secondary sanctions risk, financial restrictions, and now even tariff measures linked to India’s energy purchases from Russia—is undoubtedly a real and continuing challenge. It affects everything from shipping insurance and dollar transactions to technology transfers and the risk appetite of global banks. In practical terms, it can complicate even a simple India–Russia trade deal if it touches a sanctioned bank, vessel, or technology.
However, my own assessment, based on 35 years of living and working in Russia, is that this pressure will not fundamentally derail India–Russia friendship, but it will reshape how the relationship functions. India’s foreign policy is anchored in strategic autonomy; it seeks strong ties with the United States and Europe, but not at the cost of abandoning a time-tested partner like Russia. Russia, for its part, sees India as a crucial Asian pole in an emerging multipolar world order and as a long-term market, technology partner, and political counterpart in forums like BRICS, SCO, and the G20.
Looking ahead, I see a few clear trends:
Normalization of alternative payment and logistics systems
We will see more institutionalised use of national currencies, alternative messaging systems, regional banks outside the direct sanctions line, and maybe even digital currencies for specific corridors. Rupee–Ruble trade mechanisms that are today seen as “workarounds” will gradually become part of the normal infrastructure of bilateral commerce.
Shift from pure trade to co-production and joint innovation
To reduce vulnerability to sanctions, both sides will push for manufacturing in India and Russia rather than simple exports: defence co-development, localized pharma and medical devices, high-tech and AI collaborations, and joint ventures in critical minerals and clean energy.
Greater role for regions and business associations
Regional governments in Russia (Far East, Arctic regions, industrial hubs) and Indian states will increasingly drive project-level cooperation, supported by platforms like IBA. This “bottom-up” economic diplomacy will make the relationship more resilient than if it relied only on central governments.
Managed balancing by India
India will continue to deepen technology and investment ties with the West while maintaining energy, defence and strategic cooperation with Russia. The challenge will be to manage U.S. and EU expectations without compromising its core national interests. My prediction is that India will stay firm on this course of balanced engagement, even if it means occasional friction with Washington.
In essence, external pressure may complicate the methods of Indo-Russian cooperation, but it is unlikely to overturn the foundations of trust, mutual interest, and long-term complementarity that have been built over decades.
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
After the expiration of bilateral agreement on trade, the US Congress as well as African leaders, highly recognizing its significance, has been pursuing the extension of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). The agreement, which allows duty-free access to American markets for African exporters, expired on September 30, 2025.
The US Congress is advancing a bill to revive and extend AGOA, but South Africa’s continued inclusion remains uncertain. The trade pact still has strong bipartisan support, with the House Ways and Means Committee approving it 37-3. However, US Trade Representative, Jamieson Greer, raised concerns about South Africa, citing tariffs and non-tariff barriers, and said the administration could consider excluding the country.
This threat puts at risk the duty-free access that has significantly benefited South African automotive, agricultural, and wine exports. The debate highlights how trade policy is becoming entangled with broader diplomatic tensions, casting uncertainty over a key pillar of US-Africa economic relations.
Nevertheless, South Africa continues to lobby for inclusion. South Africa trade summary records show that the US goods and services trade with South Africa estimated at $26.2 billion in 2024. The US and South Africa signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) as far back as in 2012.
The duty-free access for nearly 40 African countries has boosted development and fostered more equitable and sustainable growth in Africa. By design AGOA is a useful mechanism for improving accessibility to trade competitiveness, connectivity, and productivity. During these past 25 years, AGOA has been the cornerstone of US economic engagement with the countries of sub-Saharan Africa.
Key features and benefits of AGOA:
It’s worth reiterating here that during these past several years, AGOA has been the cornerstone of US economic engagement with the countries of sub-Saharan Africa. In this case, as AGOA is closely working with the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Secretariat and with the African Union (AU), trade professionals could primarily leverage various economic sectors and unwaveringly act as bridges between the United States and Africa.
* Duty-free Access: AGOA allows eligible products from sub-Saharan African countries to enter the US market without paying tariffs.
* Promotion of Economic Growth: The program encourages economic growth by providing incentives for African countries to open their economies and build free markets.
* Encouraging Economic Reforms: AGOA encourages economic and political reforms in eligible countries, including the rule of law and market-oriented policies.
* Increased Trade and Investment: The program aims to strengthen trade and investment ties between the United States and sub-Saharan Africa.
With the changing times, Africa is also building its muscles towards a new direction since the introduction of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which was officially launched in July 2019.
In practical terms, trading under the AfCFTA commenced in January 2021. And the United States has prioritized the AfCFTA as one mechanism through which to strengthen its long-term relations with the continent. In the context of the crucial geopolitical changes, African leaders, corporate executives, and the entire business community are optimistic over the extension of AGOA, for mutually beneficial trade partnerships with the United States.
Worthy to say that AGOA, to a considerable degree, as a significant trade policy has played a crucial role in promoting economic growth and development in sub-Saharan Africa.
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
Africa stands at the cusp of a transformative digital revolution. With the expansion of mobile connectivity, internet penetration, digital platforms, and financial technology, the continent’s digital economy is poised to become a significant driver of sustainable development, intra-Africa trade, job creation, and economic inclusion.
The African Union’s Agenda 2063, particularly Aspiration 1 (a prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development), highlights the importance of leveraging technology and innovation. The implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) has opened a new chapter in market integration, creating opportunities to unlock the full potential of the digital economy across all sectors.
Despite remarkable progress, challenges persist. These include limited digital infrastructure, disparities in digital literacy, fragmented regulatory frameworks, inadequate access to financing for tech-based enterprises, and gender gaps in digital participation. Moreover, Africa must assert its digital sovereignty, build local data ecosystems, and secure cyber-infrastructure to thrive in a rapidly changing global digital landscape.
Against this backdrop, the 16th African Union Private Sector Forum provides a timely platform to explore and shape actionable strategies for harnessing Africa’s digital economy to accelerate intra-Africa trade and sustainable development.
The 16th High-Level AU Private Sector forum is set to take place in Djibouti, from the 14 to 16 December 2025, under the theme “Harnessing Africa’s Digital Economy and Innovation for Accelerating Intra-Africa Trade and Sustainable Development”
The three-day Forum will feature high-level plenaries, expert panels, breakout sessions, and networking opportunities. Each day will spotlight a core pillar of Africa’s digital transformation journey.
Day 1: Digital Economy and Trade Integration in Africa
Focus: Leveraging digital platforms and technologies to enhance trade integration and competitiveness under AfCFTA.
Day 2: Innovation, Fintech, and the Future of African Economies
Focus: Driving economic inclusion through fintech, innovation ecosystems, and youth entrepreneurship.
Day 3: Building Policy, Regulatory Frameworks, and Partnerships for Digital Growth
Focus: Creating an enabling environment for digital innovation and infrastructure through effective policy, governance, and partnerships.
To foster strategic dialogue and action-oriented collaboration among key stakeholders in Africa’s digital ecosystem, with the goal of leveraging digital economy and innovation to boost intra-Africa trade, accelerate economic transformation, and support inclusive, sustainable development.
* Promote Digital Trade: Identify mechanisms and policy actions to enable seamless cross-border digital commerce and integration under AfCFTA.
* Foster Innovation and Fintech: Advance inclusive fintech ecosystems and support innovation-driven entrepreneurship, especially among youth and women.
* Policy and Regulatory Harmonization: Build consensus on regional and continental digital regulatory frameworks to foster trust, security, and interoperability.
* Encourage Investment and Public-Private Partnerships: Strengthen collaboration between governments, private sector, and development partners to invest in digital infrastructure, R&D, and skills development.
* Advance Digital Inclusion and Sustainability: Ensure that digital transformation contributes to environmental sustainability and the empowerment of marginalized communities.
The AU Private Sector Forum has held several forums, with key recommendations. These recommendations provide valuable insights into the challenges and opportunities facing the African private sector and offer guidance for policymakers on how to support its growth and development.
-
Feature/OPED6 years agoDavos was Different this year
-
Travel/Tourism9 years ago
Lagos Seals Western Lodge Hotel In Ikorodu
-
Showbiz3 years agoEstranged Lover Releases Videos of Empress Njamah Bathing
-
Banking7 years agoSort Codes of GTBank Branches in Nigeria
-
Economy3 years agoSubsidy Removal: CNG at N130 Per Litre Cheaper Than Petrol—IPMAN
-
Banking3 years agoFirst Bank Announces Planned Downtime
-
Banking3 years agoSort Codes of UBA Branches in Nigeria
-
Sports3 years agoHighest Paid Nigerian Footballer – How Much Do Nigerian Footballers Earn