World
Russian and African Legislators Meet, What Next?
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
The Russian Foreign Ministry and the State Duma (the lower Chamber of Parliamentarians) have agreed to hold the next International Parliamentary Conference, “Russia – Africa”, in March. In several official reports, this International Parliamentary Conference was considered an important stage and integral part of the preparation for the Russia-Africa summit planned for late July.
Under the chairmanship of Boris Vyacheslavovich Gryzlov, the first Russia-Africa Inter-Parliamentary Conference and a special business forum with the theme “Russia – Africa: Horizons of Cooperation” was held on June 15 -17, 2010. The Federation Council and the State Duma still remember the final joint declaration made at the end of the gathering. Absolutely nothing was pursued, and nothing was achieved after that conference in 2010.
Significant change only appeared when Vyacheslav Volodin became the Chairman of the State Duma. The urgent revival of the idea to bring together African parliamentarians appeared on the political scene – a prelude to the first Russia-Africa summit in 2019.
The State Duma then, with the Ambassadors of African countries in the Russian Federation, held a preparatory meeting to brainstorm for views and opinions for consolidating the future of Russia-Africa relations. The meeting was also aimed at preparing for the proposed Inter-Parliamentary Conference Russia-Africa planned in 2019.
Vyacheslav Volodin, Chairman of the State Duma, stressed the importance of regular meetings to shape the future relations between Russia and Africa. “We have great expectations for the inter-parliamentary conference Russia-Africa which we are planning to hold in 2019. In our opinion, it will serve as a stimulus and initiate some processes aimed at the development of relations between our parliaments,” said the Chairman of the State Duma, opening that meeting in April 2019.
“We are going to provide support through the parliamentary dimension for the development of inter-parliamentary contacts in terms of the preparation of the Russia-Africa conference. It was initiated by President Vladimir Vladimirovich during the 10th Anniversary BRICS Summit in Johannesburg in July,” the Chairman of the State Duma emphasized.
During that time, it was believed that such a format would allow for productively discussing the agenda on intensifying relations, bringing together approaches on a number of issues and contributing to the preparation of the conference in the framework of agreements reached the level of heads of state. Still, various agreements are undelivered, as noted in the authoritative report titled ‘Situation Analytical Report’ complied by 25 policy experts headed by Professor Sergei Karaganov. That report was presented publicly in November 2021.
Leonid Slutskiy, Chairman of the State Duma Committee on International Affairs, expressed the hope that two-sided parliamentarians’ meetings would become regular and would be constantly held in Moscow. With the primary aim of creating the basis of long-term cooperation and the intention of supporting the steadily growing interest of Africans in geopolitical developments, Russia now plans to invite heads of African parliaments in March 2023 to Moscow.
The parliamentary platform could be used to exchange views on common problems and common issues for the African continent and the Russian Federation. In addition, as it is always noted and a standard approach, the line-up of speeches and presentations is full of anti-Western and anti-Europe confrontation instead of concentrating on development-oriented and business initiatives with African countries.
The State Duma, through constructive discussions with African parliamentarians, could possibly increase the efficiency of interaction on issues requiring joint decisions, including sustainable development, international security, environmental protection, fighting poverty and inequality and countering terrorism.
The State Duma has to outline Russia’s priorities for mutual cooperation and further offer useful comprehensive programmes, and proposals for cooperation with African countries, with the regional economic blocs and with the pan-African Union. The majority of African countries are currently looking to improve their economies and are consequently ready to welcome potential external investors with adequate investment funds, regards of political underpinnings. Understandably, geopolitical neutrality is a pragmatic approach for not dispelling potential genuine external players.
As Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov noted in his speech delivered in July 2019 at a parliamentary forum held in the World Trade Center (WTC) overlooking the Krasnopresnenskaya Naberezhnaya in Moscow, the State Duma has to bring parliamentarians together for a common purpose of deliberating on the widest range of topical issues, such as global security, sustainable development, the fight against poverty and environmental problems.
Parliamentary diplomacy has to make significant and in-depth contributions to supporting trust and mutual understanding between countries in their search for compromises and balanced solutions to acute international problems, according to Foreign Minister Lavrov.
Interesting to note along these lines of our discussion that since that gathering in 2010, Russian and African parliamentarians have been interacting, mostly chatting over global and regional questions. Reports we have monitored show that many African legislators have visited Moscow. And in terms of reciprocity, Russian legislators have paid a number of working visits to Africa. That is highly commendable, but what African regions, what African countries and what were the results? What have been the achievements aside from raising collective voices against “neo-colonialism” and “hegemony” and further making numerous pledges and promises?
Concretely aiming at strengthening further mutual bilateral parliamentary relations, Federation Council Speaker Valentina Matviyenko headed a group of Russian senators on a reciprocal visit from May 30 – June 01, 2022, to Maputo, Mozambique. The Chairperson of the Federation Council delivered speeches to the deputies of the Assembly of the Republic of Mozambique and had a separate meeting with the Russia-Mozambique Parliamentary Friendship League.
She expressed satisfaction with the dynamic development of inter-parliamentary relations, the legal basis of which was the protocol on the development of inter-parliamentary cooperation between the Federation Council and the Assembly of the Republic of Mozambique.
“Today, we will take a new important step towards strengthening the legal framework and sign a full-fledged agreement on inter-parliamentary cooperation between the Federation Council and the Assembly of the Republic of Mozambique that meets modern realities. This will allow us to bring our inter-parliamentary contacts to a higher level and open up broad prospects for the exchange of experience in legislative activity,” Matviyenko emphasized.
In this context of bilateral economic cooperation, the Mozambican Head of State, however, expressed satisfaction with the openness that Russia has been showing high interest in expanding bilateral cooperation with Mozambique, especially in the economic and social sectors. Reports monitored from local Mozambican media as well as from both Russian and Mozambican government websites, indicated that Russia has still been looking for feasible and viable economic sectors to strengthen and broaden cooperation with Mozambique.
Speaker Valentina Matviyenko, during discussions with the Mozambican leader Filipe Nyusi, referred to the need to increase trade between Russia and Mozambique, which amounted to approximately $109 million, and described trade figure as well below its potential. Senator Matvienko then invited the Mozambican government to identify more priority areas in which cooperation could be expanded if Mozambique so agrees on this significant assignment or policy task.
After the Soviet collapse and throughout these three decades (30 years) of Russia-Mozambique relations, Russia and Mozambique have been appropriately described as “reliable and time-tested” partners in Africa. Reviewing the evolutionary processes of bilateral relations, it is about time to highlight development projects undertaken or currently in progress. But for the Highly Respected Speaker Valentina Matviyenko, requesting the Mozambican government to identify priority areas for expansion of cooperation, especially at this time in their bilateral history, seems completely out of place. Completely out, especially during the meeting with the President of Mozambique, Filipe Nyusi.
Long before the Russian delegation’s visit to Maputo, Mozambican leader Filipe Nyusi was in Kremlin in August 2019, held business talks with President Vladimir Putin and then went on to deliver and answered several questions during a special business meeting with Russian entrepreneurs at the World Trade Center. According to several reports, there again bilateral agreements were signed between Moscow and Maputo.
Earlier during the month of February 2020, the Chairperson of the Federation Council (the Upper House or the Senate), Valentina Matviyenko, headed a delegation of legislators on a three-day working visit aimed at strengthening parliamentary diplomacy with Namibia and Zambia. This visit showed Russia’s overwhelming commitment to pursuing its strategic interests and supporting its African allies.
According to an official release from the Federation Council, the visit was within the broad framework mechanism of parliamentary consultations between Russia and African countries. The key focus was on political dialogue, economic partnership and humanitarian spheres with Namibia and Zambia. In Zambia, there was an in-depth discussion construction of a nuclear plant.
The Zambian Government hopes that upon commissioning of this project, excess power generated from this plant could be made available for export to neighbouring countries under the Southern African Development Community Power Pool framework arrangement.
Under the agreement that was concluded in December 2016 on the construction of the nuclear plant was estimated at $10 billion. The processes of design, feasibility study and approvals regarding the project concluded. Russia was unprepared to make financial commitments, and Zambia lacks adequate funds to finance the project.
Russia and Zambia would find options for financing nuclear science and technology in the African country, Chairperson of Federation Council Matvienko said at a meeting with Zambian President Edgar Chagwa Lungu. “Now the start of the construction of a centre for nuclear science and technology has been suspended due to financial issues. I would like to say that the request submitted to the Russian president is being carefully considered by the ministries and departments. I’m confident that we will jointly find options to promote funding to roll out the construction of a centre for nuclear science and technology,” she reassured.
While the significance cannot be underestimated, it is also not worrisome that the trip, full of symbolism and promises, concluded without any new major policy announcement. On the other hand, it signals another bid by Moscow to boost relations with the southern African region. Without a doubt, both Namibia and Zambia still have full-fledged commitments to scaling up traditional diplomatic ties with the Russian Federation.
Despite its highly praised global status, Russia has still lagged far and far behind, in practical terms, in economic engagement in Africa. Moscow should begin to count its achievements in Africa rather than so loud on confrontation. This confrontation approach negatively impacts Africa’s dream of continental unity. Reports show that Africa is noticeably divided, and its “unity” largely seems unrealizable. Chinese have also emphasized that Africa is a field for “cooperation” and not for “confrontation” – this position has been reported in media over the world. Waging war on “neo-colonialism” should rather be actively demonstrating investment capabilities, especially in economic sectors in Africa.
For these few years, in strengthening and expanding relations with African parliaments et cetera, African representatives have, oftentimes, reminded that the relations between Russia and Africa have a long time-tested history, all that concerning Soviet-era assistance to Africa and lined up on the principles of equality and mutual respect and that Moscow supports the principle formulated by the African countries – “African solutions to African problems” – and yet Russia’s policy objectives seem far from the African Union Agenda 2063.
World
Reviewing the Dynamics of Indian–Russian Business Partnership
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
The Executive President of the Indian Business Alliance (IBA), Sammy Manoj Kotwani, discusses the landmark moment in deepening Russian-Indian collaboration. Kotwani explains the groundbreaking insights into President Vladimir Putin’s working visit to India, the emerging opportunities and pathways for future cooperation, especially for the two-sided economic collaboration. Follow Sammy Manoj Kotwani’s discussions here:
Interpretation of the latest development in Russian-Indian relations
From my viewpoint in Moscow, this visit has effectively opened a new operational chapter in what has always been described as a “Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership.” It did not just reaffirm political goodwill; it translated that goodwill into a structured economic roadmap through Programme 2030, a clear target to take bilateral trade to around USD 100 billion by 2030, and concrete sectoral priorities: energy, nuclear cooperation, critical minerals, manufacturing, connectivity, fertilizers, and labour mobility.
On the ground, the business community reads this summit as a strong signal that India and Russia are doubling down on strategic autonomy in a multipolar world order. Both sides are trying to de-risk their supply chains and payment systems from over-dependence on any single centre of power. This is visible in the focus on national currencies, alternative payment mechanisms, and efforts to stabilise Rupee–Ruble trade, alongside discussions on a Free Trade Agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union and the reinforcement of corridors like the INSTC and the Chennai–Vladivostok route.
In short, my interpretation is that this summit has moved the relationship from “politically excellent but structurally imbalanced” towards a more diversified, long-term economic framework in which companies are expected to co-produce, co-innovate, and invest, not just trade opportunistically.
Significance of the visit for Indian business in Russia and for the Indian Business Alliance (IBA)
For Indian business operating in the Russian Federation, the visit has three immediate effects: confidence, clarity, and continuity. Confidence, because Indian entrepreneurs now see that despite external pressure, New Delhi and Moscow have explicitly committed to deepening economic engagement—especially in energy, fertilizers, defence co-production, nuclear, and critical minerals—rather than quietly scaling it back.
Clarity, because the summit outcomes spell out where the real opportunities lie:
Energy & Petrochemicals: Long-term crude and LNG supply, but also downstream opportunities in refining, petrochemicals, and logistics, where Indian EPC and service companies can participate.
Pharmaceuticals & Medical Devices: Russia’s import substitution drive makes high-quality Indian generics, formulations, and even localized manufacturing extremely relevant.
IT, Digital & AI: There is growing appetite in Russia for Indian IT services, cybersecurity, and digital solutions that are not dependent on Western tech stacks.
Fertilizers, Agro & Food Processing: New joint ventures in fertilizers and agriculture supply chains were explicitly flagged during and around the summit, which is important for both food security and farm incomes.
Continuity, because the Programme 2030 framework and the expected EAEU FTA give businesses a medium-term policy horizon. Tariff reductions, improved market access and predictable regulation are precisely what Indian SMEs and mid-sized companies need to justify long-term investments in Russia.
For the Indian Business Alliance (IBA), this inevitably means more work and more responsibility. We already see increased incoming requests from Indian firms—from large listed companies to first-time exporters—asking very practical questions: Which Russian region should we enter? How do we navigate compliance under the sanctions environment? Which banks are still handling Rupee–Ruble or third-currency settlements? How can we structure joint ventures to align with Russia’s import substitution goals while protecting IP and governance standards?
IBA’s role, therefore, becomes that of economic diplomacy in action: translating high-level summit language into actual B2B meetings, sectoral delegations, regional partnerships, and deal-making platforms such as the India–Russia Business Dialogue in Moscow. This visit will undoubtedly stimulate and intensify IBA’s work as a bridge between the two ecosystems.
India’s current economic presence in the Russian Federation
If we look beyond the headline trade figures, India’s economic presence in Russia today is significant, but not yet commensurate with its potential. Bilateral trade has grown sharply since 2022, largely on the back of discounted Russian oil and coal, making India one of Russia’s top energy customers. However, the structure is still heavily skewed: Russian exports to India dominate, while Indian exports and investments in Russia remain relatively modest and under-diversified.
On the ground in Moscow and across the regions, we see several strong Indian footholds:
Pharmaceuticals: Indian pharma is well-established, respected for its affordability and quality, and poised to deepen localization in line with Russian import substitution policy.
Tea, Coffee, Spices & Food: Traditional segments with deep historical roots, now expanding into ready-to-eat, wellness, and ethnic food categories.
IT & Services: Still under-represented, but with growing interest as Russian entities look for non-Western software, integration, and outsourcing partners.
Diamonds, Textiles, Apparel, and Light Engineering: Present but fragmented, with enormous room to scale, especially if logistics and payment challenges are addressed.
Where India is still behind is on-the-ground investment and manufacturing presence compared to countries like China. Russian policymakers today are clearly favouring investors who help them achieve technological sovereignty and local value addition. For serious Indian companies willing to commit capital, adapt to Russian standards, and accept the complexities of the current environment, this is a period of unusual opportunity. For purely transactional players looking for quick arbitrage, it is becoming progressively harder.
So, I would characterise India’s economic presence as: strategically important, quickly growing in value, but still under-leveraged in terms of depth, diversification, and localization.
Geopolitical pressure from Washington and future predictions
Pressure from Washington—through sanctions, secondary sanctions risk, financial restrictions, and now even tariff measures linked to India’s energy purchases from Russia—is undoubtedly a real and continuing challenge. It affects everything from shipping insurance and dollar transactions to technology transfers and the risk appetite of global banks. In practical terms, it can complicate even a simple India–Russia trade deal if it touches a sanctioned bank, vessel, or technology.
However, my own assessment, based on 35 years of living and working in Russia, is that this pressure will not fundamentally derail India–Russia friendship, but it will reshape how the relationship functions. India’s foreign policy is anchored in strategic autonomy; it seeks strong ties with the United States and Europe, but not at the cost of abandoning a time-tested partner like Russia. Russia, for its part, sees India as a crucial Asian pole in an emerging multipolar world order and as a long-term market, technology partner, and political counterpart in forums like BRICS, SCO, and the G20.
Looking ahead, I see a few clear trends:
Normalization of alternative payment and logistics systems
We will see more institutionalised use of national currencies, alternative messaging systems, regional banks outside the direct sanctions line, and maybe even digital currencies for specific corridors. Rupee–Ruble trade mechanisms that are today seen as “workarounds” will gradually become part of the normal infrastructure of bilateral commerce.
Shift from pure trade to co-production and joint innovation
To reduce vulnerability to sanctions, both sides will push for manufacturing in India and Russia rather than simple exports: defence co-development, localized pharma and medical devices, high-tech and AI collaborations, and joint ventures in critical minerals and clean energy.
Greater role for regions and business associations
Regional governments in Russia (Far East, Arctic regions, industrial hubs) and Indian states will increasingly drive project-level cooperation, supported by platforms like IBA. This “bottom-up” economic diplomacy will make the relationship more resilient than if it relied only on central governments.
Managed balancing by India
India will continue to deepen technology and investment ties with the West while maintaining energy, defence and strategic cooperation with Russia. The challenge will be to manage U.S. and EU expectations without compromising its core national interests. My prediction is that India will stay firm on this course of balanced engagement, even if it means occasional friction with Washington.
In essence, external pressure may complicate the methods of Indo-Russian cooperation, but it is unlikely to overturn the foundations of trust, mutual interest, and long-term complementarity that have been built over decades.
World
United States Congress Pursuing AGOA Extension
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
After the expiration of bilateral agreement on trade, the US Congress as well as African leaders, highly recognizing its significance, has been pursuing the extension of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). The agreement, which allows duty-free access to American markets for African exporters, expired on September 30, 2025.
The US Congress is advancing a bill to revive and extend AGOA, but South Africa’s continued inclusion remains uncertain. The trade pact still has strong bipartisan support, with the House Ways and Means Committee approving it 37-3. However, US Trade Representative, Jamieson Greer, raised concerns about South Africa, citing tariffs and non-tariff barriers, and said the administration could consider excluding the country.
This threat puts at risk the duty-free access that has significantly benefited South African automotive, agricultural, and wine exports. The debate highlights how trade policy is becoming entangled with broader diplomatic tensions, casting uncertainty over a key pillar of US-Africa economic relations.
Nevertheless, South Africa continues to lobby for inclusion. South Africa trade summary records show that the US goods and services trade with South Africa estimated at $26.2 billion in 2024. The US and South Africa signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) as far back as in 2012.
The duty-free access for nearly 40 African countries has boosted development and fostered more equitable and sustainable growth in Africa. By design AGOA is a useful mechanism for improving accessibility to trade competitiveness, connectivity, and productivity. During these past 25 years, AGOA has been the cornerstone of US economic engagement with the countries of sub-Saharan Africa.
Key features and benefits of AGOA:
It’s worth reiterating here that during these past several years, AGOA has been the cornerstone of US economic engagement with the countries of sub-Saharan Africa. In this case, as AGOA is closely working with the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Secretariat and with the African Union (AU), trade professionals could primarily leverage various economic sectors and unwaveringly act as bridges between the United States and Africa.
* Duty-free Access: AGOA allows eligible products from sub-Saharan African countries to enter the US market without paying tariffs.
* Promotion of Economic Growth: The program encourages economic growth by providing incentives for African countries to open their economies and build free markets.
* Encouraging Economic Reforms: AGOA encourages economic and political reforms in eligible countries, including the rule of law and market-oriented policies.
* Increased Trade and Investment: The program aims to strengthen trade and investment ties between the United States and sub-Saharan Africa.
With the changing times, Africa is also building its muscles towards a new direction since the introduction of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which was officially launched in July 2019.
In practical terms, trading under the AfCFTA commenced in January 2021. And the United States has prioritized the AfCFTA as one mechanism through which to strengthen its long-term relations with the continent. In the context of the crucial geopolitical changes, African leaders, corporate executives, and the entire business community are optimistic over the extension of AGOA, for mutually beneficial trade partnerships with the United States.
Worthy to say that AGOA, to a considerable degree, as a significant trade policy has played a crucial role in promoting economic growth and development in sub-Saharan Africa.
World
Accelerating Intra-Africa Trade and Sustainable Development
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
Africa stands at the cusp of a transformative digital revolution. With the expansion of mobile connectivity, internet penetration, digital platforms, and financial technology, the continent’s digital economy is poised to become a significant driver of sustainable development, intra-Africa trade, job creation, and economic inclusion.
The African Union’s Agenda 2063, particularly Aspiration 1 (a prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development), highlights the importance of leveraging technology and innovation. The implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) has opened a new chapter in market integration, creating opportunities to unlock the full potential of the digital economy across all sectors.
Despite remarkable progress, challenges persist. These include limited digital infrastructure, disparities in digital literacy, fragmented regulatory frameworks, inadequate access to financing for tech-based enterprises, and gender gaps in digital participation. Moreover, Africa must assert its digital sovereignty, build local data ecosystems, and secure cyber-infrastructure to thrive in a rapidly changing global digital landscape.
Against this backdrop, the 16th African Union Private Sector Forum provides a timely platform to explore and shape actionable strategies for harnessing Africa’s digital economy to accelerate intra-Africa trade and sustainable development.
The 16th High-Level AU Private Sector forum is set to take place in Djibouti, from the 14 to 16 December 2025, under the theme “Harnessing Africa’s Digital Economy and Innovation for Accelerating Intra-Africa Trade and Sustainable Development”
The three-day Forum will feature high-level plenaries, expert panels, breakout sessions, and networking opportunities. Each day will spotlight a core pillar of Africa’s digital transformation journey.
Day 1: Digital Economy and Trade Integration in Africa
Focus: Leveraging digital platforms and technologies to enhance trade integration and competitiveness under AfCFTA.
Day 2: Innovation, Fintech, and the Future of African Economies
Focus: Driving economic inclusion through fintech, innovation ecosystems, and youth entrepreneurship.
Day 3: Building Policy, Regulatory Frameworks, and Partnerships for Digital Growth
Focus: Creating an enabling environment for digital innovation and infrastructure through effective policy, governance, and partnerships.
To foster strategic dialogue and action-oriented collaboration among key stakeholders in Africa’s digital ecosystem, with the goal of leveraging digital economy and innovation to boost intra-Africa trade, accelerate economic transformation, and support inclusive, sustainable development.
* Promote Digital Trade: Identify mechanisms and policy actions to enable seamless cross-border digital commerce and integration under AfCFTA.
* Foster Innovation and Fintech: Advance inclusive fintech ecosystems and support innovation-driven entrepreneurship, especially among youth and women.
* Policy and Regulatory Harmonization: Build consensus on regional and continental digital regulatory frameworks to foster trust, security, and interoperability.
* Encourage Investment and Public-Private Partnerships: Strengthen collaboration between governments, private sector, and development partners to invest in digital infrastructure, R&D, and skills development.
* Advance Digital Inclusion and Sustainability: Ensure that digital transformation contributes to environmental sustainability and the empowerment of marginalized communities.
The AU Private Sector Forum has held several forums, with key recommendations. These recommendations provide valuable insights into the challenges and opportunities facing the African private sector and offer guidance for policymakers on how to support its growth and development.
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