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Russia’s Renewed Interest in Africa is to Restore Previous Influence—Shinn

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By Kester Kenn Klomegah

In this special Eurasia Review interview, David Shinn, an adjunct professor at the Elliott School of International Affairs, a former U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia and Burkina Faso, and served previously as a Director of the Office of East African Affairs in Washington, explained some aspects of Russia’s engagement with Africa as well as the upcoming Russia-Africa summit planned this October in Sochi. a southern coastal city of Russia.

Professor David Shinn spoke recently with Kester Kenn Klomegah from Eurasia Review and here are the interview excerpts:

How do White House administration and American politicians interpret currently Russia’s intensified re-engagement with Africa?

There has been minimal public comment by both the U.S. executive branch and U.S. Congress on Russia’s effort to intensify relations with Africa. Having said that, Africa has seldom arisen as a topic for discussion in the Trump administration. The U.S. national security policy under the Trump administration treats China and Russia as a global strategic competitor and this includes U.S. policy in Africa. The administration’s focus has been, however, on China and not much on Russia.

The United States is concerned about Russian activities in Africa, especially in the Central African Republic (CAR) where the private Wagner Group, which reportedly has close ties to the Russian leadership, has assigned about 400 mercenaries in support of the government. General Thomas D. Waldhauser, U.S. Commander of AFRICOM, told the U.S. Congress in March that “Russia is also a growing challenge and has taken a more militaristic approach in Africa.”

He added that “Russia has bolstered its influence with increased military cooperation including donations of arms, with which it has gained access to markets and mineral extraction rights. With minimal investment, Russia leverages private military contracts, such as the Wagner Group, and in return receives political and economic influence beneficial to them.”

Last March, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, John J. Sullivan, at an investment luncheon in Angola commented that “Russia often utilizes coercive, corrupt and covert means to attempt to influence sovereign states, including their security and economic partnerships.” These quotations give you an indication of the degree to which the United States is skeptical of Russia’s role in Africa.

What could be the driving forces behind the new re-engagement, western and European sanctions or efforts to regain geopolitical influence in Africa?

I think Russia’s renewed interest in Africa is due to a desire to restore its previous influence and to build allies as it experiences growing criticism by Western countries. As China’s relationship with Russia strengthens, I will be watching for China-Russia collaboration in African countries. Really, I don’t think any non-African country “owes” Africa, but it is in the interest of all developed countries to support the economic development of Africa.

With other questions such as the practice of democracy, Russia does support whatever regime is in power. While this makes its policy predictable, it does not encourage good governance and democratic practices in those countries that are severely challenged in these areas. Many other countries follow this practice and even countries like the United States, which often do speak out forcefully on behalf of good governance, are not always consistent.

In practical terms, how is Russia cooperating with African leaders on sustainable development issues?

In its own way, Russia is trying to help Africa develop in a sustainable fashion, but it seems to want to make a profit in the process. Russian aid, trade, and investment in Africa, especially Sub-Saharan Africa, are modest. Russia’s relationship with North Africa is more significant. Nevertheless, Russia apparently wants to maximize the business relationship rather than the aid relationship. It is difficult to judge the degree of Russian cooperation with African leaders on these issues.

Russia already has plethoria of post-Soviet bilateral agreements that it is now implementing, with some degree of limitations, in various African countries. What ii your view about this?

It is easy to sign agreements, especially those that follow a similar format across the continent, but it is much more difficult to make them meaningful. Many countries follow this practice. If a country signs too many of these kinds of agreements, they lose all meaning.

How could African exporters and business people be encouraged to explore emerging opportunities in the Russian Federation?

Here Africa-Russia trade is not complementary. This is a problem for Africa, which has a lot of oil, gas, and minerals, which also exist in large quantities in Russia. According to the International Monetary Fund, Russian exports to Africa have been growing modestly and reached $18.5 billion in 2017. Russian imports from Africa have been flat and totaled only $2.1 billion in 2017. This was well below Turkey’s trade with Africa in 2017. Russian trade is heavily concentrated in North Africa, especially with Egypt. The problem is that Africa has little that Russia wants to buy. The best marketing strategy in the world will not change significantly this situation.

What could be the mutual benefits of the new relationship for both Africa and in Russia? Is Russia seen as a closed market for Africa?

The question is here that we assume African political and business elites have an open and positive mind concerning the benefits of this new relationship that Russia is trying to develop. Most of the burden is, however, on Russia. It will have to demonstrate that it can offer African countries more than it has done since the end of the Cold War. Russia is the largest seller of arms to Africa and is willing to sell to any country.

This gives it a certain advantage as many Western countries prohibit arms sales to a few countries. Russia has shown strength in Africa in niche sectors such as nuclear power development, launching African satellites, and constructing energy and mining projects. It may have to identify more sectors like this rather than compete head-to-head in a wide range of sectors with European Union countries, China, the United States, India, and others.

What could be the practical expectations when African leaders and corporate business people finally gather for the first Russia-Africa summit in Sochi, Russia?

It’s clear that Russia might not make any public financial commitment as many foreign countries have done over the years. But Russia needs to demonstrate that it has a plan to engage in Africa in a significantly greater way than it has in recent years. Over the past decade, there have been a number of high-level Russian visits to Africa that raised expectations only to be followed by little new engagement. I doubt that warm hospitality and good Russian food at Sochi will have much impact. If Russia fails to get beyond warm hospitality and good food, African leaders will probably make clear that they expect more from Russia’s intensified re-engagement. This could be a make or break opportunity for Russia in Africa.

Source: Eurasia Review

Modupe Gbadeyanka is a fast-rising journalist with Business Post Nigeria. Her passion for journalism is amazing. She is willing to learn more with a view to becoming one of the best pen-pushers in Nigeria. Her role models are the duo of CNN's Richard Quest and Christiane Amanpour.

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Abebe Selassie to Retire as Director of African Department at IMF

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Abebe Aemro Selassie

By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has announced the retirement of its director of the African department, Abebe Aemro Selassie, on May 1, 2026. Since his appointment in 2016, Abebe Selassie has served in this position for a decade. During his tenure, IMF added a 25th chair to its Executive Board, increasing the voice of sub-Saharan Africa.

As a director for Africa, he has overseen the IMF’s engagement with 45 countries across sub-Saharan Africa. Abebe and his team work closely with the region’s leaders and policymakers to improve economic and development outcomes. This includes oversight of the IMF’s intensified engagement with the region in recent years, including some $60 billion in financial support the institution has provided to countries since 2020. Reports indicated that under his leadership, his department generally reinforces the organization’s role as a trusted partner to many African countries.

Abebe Selassie has worked with both the regional economic blocs and the African Union (AU) as well as individual African states. The key focus has been the strategic articulation of Africa’s development priorities in reshaping economic governance, mobilizing sustainable investments, and addressing systemic financial challenges.

It is important noting that the IMF has funded diverse infrastructure projects that facilitated either export-led growth or import substitution industrialization models of development. Further to that, African states have also made numerous loans and benefited from much-needed debt relief.

Summarizing the IMF’s key focus areas, among others, for Africa: (i) reforming the global financial architecture in an effort to improve the structure, institutions, rules, and processes that govern international finance in order to make the global economy more stable, equitable, and resilient.

Concessional financing to counter rising borrowing costs, with Africa paying up to 5 times more in interest than advanced economies (AfDB, 2023). Fair representation, pushing for IMF quota reforms to reflect Africa’s $3.4 trillion collective GDP—yet the continent holds less than 5% of voting shares in Bretton Woods institutions.

(ii) Unlocking Investments for Jobs and Sustainable Growth. With Africa’s working-age population set to double to 1 billion by 2050, the African states spotlight: The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), projected to boost intra-African trade by 52% and create 30 million jobs by 2035 (World Bank, 2024).  Infrastructure partnerships, targeting sectors such as renewable energy, where Africa receives only 2% of global clean energy investments despite its vast solar and wind potential (IEA, 2024).

(iii) Climate Finance and Debt Relief for Resilience: Africa contributes less than 4% of global emissions but bears the brunt of climate shocks, losing 5–15% of GDP per capita to climate-related disasters annually (African Development Bank, 2024). These are strictly in alignment with Agenda 2063’s aspirations for inclusive growth, maximizing multilateral cooperation and enhancing global engagement with the continent.

“I am deeply grateful for Abe’s visionary leadership, dedication to the Fund’s mission, and unwavering commitment to the members in the region,” Ms. Kristalina Georgieva, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). “The legacy he leaves on the Fund’s work in Africa is one of alignment with the aspirations of people, especially the youth, for good governance, strong economies and lasting prosperity. His trusted advice has been invaluable to me personally, and his leadership has strengthened our mission.”

“A national of Ethiopia, Selassie first joined the IMF in 1994. Over his remarkable 32-year career, he held senior positions including Deputy Director in AFR, Mission Chief for Portugal and South Africa, Division Chief of the Regional Studies Division, and Senior Resident Representative in Uganda. Earlier, he contributed to programs in Turkey, Thailand, Romania, and Estonia, and worked on policy, operational review, and economic research.”

Under his ten-year leadership and as director of the African Department (AFR), Abebe Selassie helped to reinforce the Fund’s role as a trusted partner with sub-Saharan African members. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is an international organization that promotes global economic growth and financial stability, encourages international trade, and reduces poverty.

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Africa Squeezed between Import Substitution and Dependency Syndrome

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Dependency Syndrome

By Kestér Kenn  Klomegâh

Squeezed between import substitution and dependency syndrome, a condition characterized by a set of associated economic symptoms—that is rules and regulations—majority of African countries are shifting from United States and Europe to an incoherent alternative bilateral partnerships with Russia, China and the Global South.

By forging new partnerships, for instance with Russia, these African countries rather create conspicuous economic dependency at the expense of strengthening their own local production, attainable by supporting local farmers under state budget. Import-centric partnership ties and lack of diversification make these African countries committed to import-dependent structures. It invariably compounds domestic production challenges. Needless to say that Africa has huge arable land and human resources to ensure food security.

A classical example that readily comes to mind is Ghana, and other West African countries. With rapidly accelerating economic policy, Ghana’s President John Dramani Mahama ordered the suspension of U.S. chicken and agricultural products, reaffirming swift measures for transforming local agriculture considered as grounds for ensuring sustainable food security and economic growth and, simultaneously, for driving job creation.

President John Dramani Mahama, in early December 2025, while observing Agricultural Day, urged Ghanaians to take up farming, highlighting the guarantee and state support needed for affordable credit and modern tools to boost food security. According to Mahama, Ghana spends $3bn yearly on basic food imports from abroad.

The government decision highlights the importance of leveraging unto local agriculture technology and innovation. Creating opportunities to unlock the full potential of depending on available resources within the new transformative policy strategy which aims at boosting local productivity. President John Dramani Mahama’s special initiatives are the 24-Hour Economy and the Big Push Agenda. One of the pillars focuses on Grow 24 – modernising agriculture.

Despite remarkable commendations for new set of economic recovery, Ghana’s demand for agricultural products is still high, and this time making a smooth shift to Russia whose poultry meat and wheat currently became the main driver of exports to African countries. And Ghana, noticeably, accepts large quantity (tonnes) of poultry from Russia’s Rostov region into the country, according to several media reports. The supplies include grains, but also vegetable oils, meat and dairy products, fish and finished food products have significant potential for Africa.

The Agriculture Ministry’s Agroexport Department acknowledges Russia exports chicken to Ghana, with Ghanaian importers sourcing Russian poultry products, especially frozen cuts, to meet significant local demand that far outstrips domestic production, even after Ghana lifted a temporary 2020 avian flu-related ban on Russian poultry.

Moreover, monitoring and basic research indicated Russian producers are actively increasing poultry exports to various African countries, thus boosting trade, although Ghana still struggles to balance imports with local industry needs.

A few details indicate the following:

Trade Resumed: Ghana has lifted its ban on Russian poultry imports since April 2021, allowing poultry trade to resume. Russian regions have, thus far, consistently exported these poultry meat and products into the country under regulatory but flexible import rules on a negotiated bilateral agreement.

Significant Market: In any case, Ghana is a key African market for Russian poultry, with exports seeing substantial growth in recent years, alongside Angola, Benin, Cote d’Voire, Nigeria and Sierra Leone.

Demand-Driven: Ghana’s large gap between domestic poultry production and national demand necessitates significant imports, creating opportunities for foreign suppliers like Russia.

Major Exporters: Russia poultry companies are focused on increasing generally their African exports, with Ghana being a major destination. The basic question: to remain as import dependency or strive at attaining food sufficiency?

Product Focus: Exports typically include frozen chicken cuts (legs and meat) very vital for supplementing local supply. But as the geopolitical dynamics shift, Ghana and other importing African countries have to review partnerships, particularly with Russia.

Despite the fact that challenges persist, Russia strongly remains as a notable supplier to Ghana, even under the supervision of John Mahama’s administration, dealing as a friendly ally, both have the vision for multipolar trade architecture, ultimately fulfilling a critical role in meeting majority of African countries’ large consumer demand for poultry products, and with Russia’s trade actively expanding and Ghana’s preparedness to spend on such imports from the state budget.

Following two high-profile Russia–Africa summits, cooperation in the area of food security emerged as a key theme. Moscow pledged to boost agricultural exports to the continent—especially grain, poultry, and fertilisers—while African leaders welcomed the prospect of improved food supplies.

Nevertheless, do these African governments think of prioritising agricultural self-sufficiency. At a May 2025 meeting in St. Petersburg, Russia’s Economic Development Minister, Maxim Reshetnikov, underlined the fact that more than 40 Russian companies were keen to export animal products and agricultural goods to the African region.

Russia, eager to expand its economic footprint, sees large-scale agricultural exports as a key revenue generator. Estimates suggest the Russian government could earn over $15 billion annually from these agricultural exports to African continent.

Head of the Agroexport Federal Center, Ilya Ilyushin, speaking at the round table “Russia-Africa: A Strategic Partnership in Agriculture to Ensure Food Security,” which was held as part of the international conference on ensuring the food sovereignty of African countries in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) on Nov. 21, 2025, said: “We see significant potential in expanding supplies of Russian agricultural products to Africa.”

Ilya Ilyushin, however, mentioned that the Agriculture Ministry’s Agroexport Department, and the Union of Grain Exporters and Producers, exported over 32,000 tonnes of wheat and barley to Egypt totaling nearly $8 million during the first half of 2025, Kenya totaling over $119 million.

Interfax media reports referred to African countries whose markets are of interest for Russian producers and exporters. Despite existing difficulties, supplies of livestock products are also growing, this includes poultry meat, Ilyushin said. Exports of agricultural products from Russia to African countries have more than doubled, and third quarter of 2025 reached almost $7 billion.

The key buyers of Russian grain on the continent are Egypt, Algeria, Kenya, Libya, Tunisia, Nigeria, Morocco, South Africa, Tanzania and Sudan, he said. According to him, Russia needs to expand the geography of supplies, increasing exports to other regions of the continent, increase supplies in West Africa to Benin, Cameroon, Ghana, Liberia and the French-speaking Sahelian States.

Nevertheless, Russian exporters have nothing to complain. Africa’s dependency dilemma still persists. Therefore, Russia to continue expanding food exports to Africa explicitly reflects a calculated economic and geopolitical strategy. In the end of the analysis, the debate plays out prominently and the primary message: Africa cannot and must not afford to sacrifice food sovereignty for colourful symbolism and geopolitical solidarity.

With the above analysis, Russian exporters show readiness to explore and shape actionable strategies for harnessing Africa’s consumer market, including that of Ghana, and further to strengthen economic and trade cooperation and support its dynamic vision for sustainable development in the context of multipolar friendship and solidarity.

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Coup Leader Mamady Doumbouya Wins Guinea’s 2025 Presidential Election

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Mamady Doumbouya

By Adedapo Adesanya

Guinea’s military leader Mamady Doumbouya will fully transition to its democratic president after he was elected president of the West African nation.

The former special forces commander seized power in 2021, toppling then-President Alpha Conde, who had been in office since 2010.

Mr Doumbouya reportedly won 86.72 per cent of the election held on December 28, an absolute majority that allows him to avoid a runoff. He will hold the forte for the next seven years as law permits.

The Supreme Court has eight days to validate the results in the event of any challenge. However, this may not be so as ousted Conde and Mr Cellou Dalein Diallo, Guinea’s longtime opposition leader, are in exile.

The election saw Doumbouya face off a fragmented opposition of eight challengers.

One of the opposition candidates, Mr Faya Lansana Millimono claimed the election was marred by “systematic fraudulent practices” and that observers were prevented from monitoring the voting and counting processes.

Guinea is the world leader in bauxite and holds a very large gold reserve. The country is preparing to occupy a leading position in iron ore with the launch of the Simandou project in November, expected to become the world’s largest iron mine.

Mr Doumbouya has claimed credit for pushing the project forward and ensuring Guinea benefits from its output. He has also revoked the licence of Emirates Global Aluminium’s subsidiary Guinea Alumina Corporation following a refinery dispute, transferring the unit’s assets to a state-owned firm.

In September, rating agency, Standard & Poor’s (S&P), assigned an inaugural rating of “B+” with a “Stable” outlook to the Republic of Guinea.

This decision reflects the strength of the country’s economic fundamentals, strong growth prospects driven by the integrated mining and infrastructure Simandou project, and the rigor in public financial management.

As a result, Guinea is now above the continental average and makes it the third best-rated economy in West Africa.

According to S&P, between 2026 and 2028, Guinea could experience GDP growth of nearly 10 per cent per year, far exceeding the regional average.

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