By Kestér Kenn  Klomegâh

Squeezed between import substitution and dependency syndrome, a condition characterized by a set of associated economic symptoms—that is rules and regulations—majority of African countries are shifting from United States and Europe to an incoherent alternative bilateral partnerships with Russia, China and the Global South.

By forging new partnerships, for instance with Russia, these African countries rather create conspicuous economic dependency at the expense of strengthening their own local production, attainable by supporting local farmers under state budget. Import-centric partnership ties and lack of diversification make these African countries committed to import-dependent structures. It invariably compounds domestic production challenges. Needless to say that Africa has huge arable land and human resources to ensure food security.

A classical example that readily comes to mind is Ghana, and other West African countries. With rapidly accelerating economic policy, Ghana’s President John Dramani Mahama ordered the suspension of U.S. chicken and agricultural products, reaffirming swift measures for transforming local agriculture considered as grounds for ensuring sustainable food security and economic growth and, simultaneously, for driving job creation.

President John Dramani Mahama, in early December 2025, while observing Agricultural Day, urged Ghanaians to take up farming, highlighting the guarantee and state support needed for affordable credit and modern tools to boost food security. According to Mahama, Ghana spends $3bn yearly on basic food imports from abroad.

The government decision highlights the importance of leveraging unto local agriculture technology and innovation. Creating opportunities to unlock the full potential of depending on available resources within the new transformative policy strategy which aims at boosting local productivity. President John Dramani Mahama’s special initiatives are the 24-Hour Economy and the Big Push Agenda. One of the pillars focuses on Grow 24 – modernising agriculture.

Despite remarkable commendations for new set of economic recovery, Ghana’s demand for agricultural products is still high, and this time making a smooth shift to Russia whose poultry meat and wheat currently became the main driver of exports to African countries. And Ghana, noticeably, accepts large quantity (tonnes) of poultry from Russia’s Rostov region into the country, according to several media reports. The supplies include grains, but also vegetable oils, meat and dairy products, fish and finished food products have significant potential for Africa.

The Agriculture Ministry’s Agroexport Department acknowledges Russia exports chicken to Ghana, with Ghanaian importers sourcing Russian poultry products, especially frozen cuts, to meet significant local demand that far outstrips domestic production, even after Ghana lifted a temporary 2020 avian flu-related ban on Russian poultry.

Moreover, monitoring and basic research indicated Russian producers are actively increasing poultry exports to various African countries, thus boosting trade, although Ghana still struggles to balance imports with local industry needs.

A few details indicate the following:

Trade Resumed: Ghana has lifted its ban on Russian poultry imports since April 2021, allowing poultry trade to resume. Russian regions have, thus far, consistently exported these poultry meat and products into the country under regulatory but flexible import rules on a negotiated bilateral agreement.

Significant Market: In any case, Ghana is a key African market for Russian poultry, with exports seeing substantial growth in recent years, alongside Angola, Benin, Cote d’Voire, Nigeria and Sierra Leone.

Demand-Driven: Ghana’s large gap between domestic poultry production and national demand necessitates significant imports, creating opportunities for foreign suppliers like Russia.

Major Exporters: Russia poultry companies are focused on increasing generally their African exports, with Ghana being a major destination. The basic question: to remain as import dependency or strive at attaining food sufficiency?

Product Focus: Exports typically include frozen chicken cuts (legs and meat) very vital for supplementing local supply. But as the geopolitical dynamics shift, Ghana and other importing African countries have to review partnerships, particularly with Russia.

Despite the fact that challenges persist, Russia strongly remains as a notable supplier to Ghana, even under the supervision of John Mahama’s administration, dealing as a friendly ally, both have the vision for multipolar trade architecture, ultimately fulfilling a critical role in meeting majority of African countries’ large consumer demand for poultry products, and with Russia’s trade actively expanding and Ghana’s preparedness to spend on such imports from the state budget.

Following two high-profile Russia–Africa summits, cooperation in the area of food security emerged as a key theme. Moscow pledged to boost agricultural exports to the continent—especially grain, poultry, and fertilisers—while African leaders welcomed the prospect of improved food supplies.

Nevertheless, do these African governments think of prioritising agricultural self-sufficiency. At a May 2025 meeting in St. Petersburg, Russia’s Economic Development Minister, Maxim Reshetnikov, underlined the fact that more than 40 Russian companies were keen to export animal products and agricultural goods to the African region.

Russia, eager to expand its economic footprint, sees large-scale agricultural exports as a key revenue generator. Estimates suggest the Russian government could earn over $15 billion annually from these agricultural exports to African continent.

Head of the Agroexport Federal Center, Ilya Ilyushin, speaking at the round table “Russia-Africa: A Strategic Partnership in Agriculture to Ensure Food Security,” which was held as part of the international conference on ensuring the food sovereignty of African countries in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) on Nov. 21, 2025, said: “We see significant potential in expanding supplies of Russian agricultural products to Africa.”

Ilya Ilyushin, however, mentioned that the Agriculture Ministry’s Agroexport Department, and the Union of Grain Exporters and Producers, exported over 32,000 tonnes of wheat and barley to Egypt totaling nearly $8 million during the first half of 2025, Kenya totaling over $119 million.

Interfax media reports referred to African countries whose markets are of interest for Russian producers and exporters. Despite existing difficulties, supplies of livestock products are also growing, this includes poultry meat, Ilyushin said. Exports of agricultural products from Russia to African countries have more than doubled, and third quarter of 2025 reached almost $7 billion.

The key buyers of Russian grain on the continent are Egypt, Algeria, Kenya, Libya, Tunisia, Nigeria, Morocco, South Africa, Tanzania and Sudan, he said. According to him, Russia needs to expand the geography of supplies, increasing exports to other regions of the continent, increase supplies in West Africa to Benin, Cameroon, Ghana, Liberia and the French-speaking Sahelian States.

Nevertheless, Russian exporters have nothing to complain. Africa’s dependency dilemma still persists. Therefore, Russia to continue expanding food exports to Africa explicitly reflects a calculated economic and geopolitical strategy. In the end of the analysis, the debate plays out prominently and the primary message: Africa cannot and must not afford to sacrifice food sovereignty for colourful symbolism and geopolitical solidarity.

With the above analysis, Russian exporters show readiness to explore and shape actionable strategies for harnessing Africa’s consumer market, including that of Ghana, and further to strengthen economic and trade cooperation and support its dynamic vision for sustainable development in the context of multipolar friendship and solidarity.

By Adedapo Adesanya

Guinea’s military leader Mamady Doumbouya will fully transition to its democratic president after he was elected president of the West African nation.

The former special forces commander seized power in 2021, toppling then-President Alpha Conde, who had been in office since 2010.

Mr Doumbouya reportedly won 86.72 per cent of the election held on December 28, an absolute majority that allows him to avoid a runoff. He will hold the forte for the next seven years as law permits.

The Supreme Court has eight days to validate the results in the event of any challenge. However, this may not be so as ousted Conde and Mr Cellou Dalein Diallo, Guinea’s longtime opposition leader, are in exile.

The election saw Doumbouya face off a fragmented opposition of eight challengers.

One of the opposition candidates, Mr Faya Lansana Millimono claimed the election was marred by “systematic fraudulent practices” and that observers were prevented from monitoring the voting and counting processes.

Guinea is the world leader in bauxite and holds a very large gold reserve. The country is preparing to occupy a leading position in iron ore with the launch of the Simandou project in November, expected to become the world’s largest iron mine.

Mr Doumbouya has claimed credit for pushing the project forward and ensuring Guinea benefits from its output. He has also revoked the licence of Emirates Global Aluminium’s subsidiary Guinea Alumina Corporation following a refinery dispute, transferring the unit’s assets to a state-owned firm.

In September, rating agency, Standard & Poor’s (S&P), assigned an inaugural rating of “B+” with a “Stable” outlook to the Republic of Guinea.

This decision reflects the strength of the country’s economic fundamentals, strong growth prospects driven by the integrated mining and infrastructure Simandou project, and the rigor in public financial management.

As a result, Guinea is now above the continental average and makes it the third best-rated economy in West Africa.

According to S&P, between 2026 and 2028, Guinea could experience GDP growth of nearly 10 per cent per year, far exceeding the regional average.

By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh

For decades, Russia has spoken loudly about its intentions in Africa but acted softly when it comes to real financial commitments. Unlike China, the United States, and even India, Russia has consistently failed to back its diplomatic gestures with the credit lines, concessionary loans, and financing guarantees that drive actual development projects.

Nigeria, Africa’s largest economy and most populous country, provides perhaps the clearest example of Russia’s economic inertia. Despite more than 60 years of diplomatic relations and repeated declarations of “strategic partnership,” Moscow’s presence in Abuja’s economic landscape remains marginal. The absence of real financing has left most Russian-Nigerian agreements as empty communiqués, in sharp contrast to the railways, roads, and ports China has built across the country, or the oil trade and financial services integration offered by the United States.

The Obasanjo Era: A Case Study in Missed Opportunities

When President Olusegun Obasanjo returned to power in 1999, Nigeria was repositioning itself after years of military dictatorship. Abuja sought new economic partnerships beyond its traditional ties with the West. Russia—still recovering from the collapse of the Soviet Union—saw an opportunity to reassert itself in Africa.

During Obasanjo’s tenure (1999–2007), Moscow pledged sweeping cooperation with Nigeria in energy, steel, and defense. The crown jewel of this diplomatic push was the proposed revival of the Ajaokuta Steel Complex, Nigeria’s most ambitious industrial project, which had stalled for decades despite billions of dollars in investments. Russia, through its state-owned firms and technical experts, promised to provide financing, technology, and training to bring Ajaokuta back to life.

Yet two decades later, Ajaokuta remains in ruins. The Russian commitment never translated into cash, and Abuja was left to restart talks with new partners. Similarly, plans for joint oil exploration ventures and expanded defense cooperation fizzled out after initial memoranda of understanding.

Obasanjo’s government signed a number of documents with Moscow, but few projects ever moved beyond the paper stage. Nigerian officials who participated in those negotiations later admitted that Russia’s biggest weakness was its lack of financing. Unlike China, which came armed with Exim Bank loans and turnkey contractors, Russia offered expertise but no capital.

The lesson was clear: without structured financial support, Russian promises could not compete with the billions China was already pouring into Nigerian infrastructure.

Nigeria’s Trade Reality: Russia as a Minor Player

The absence of financing is not just anecdotal—it shows in the numbers.

Nigeria’s Trade with Russia vs. China and the US

Partner Nigeria’s Exports (USD) Nigeria’s Imports (USD) Balance / Impact

Russia ~$1.5 million (2024) ~$2.09 billion (2024) Negligible exports; deficit, no capital inflows

China ~$2.03 billion (2024) ~$17 billion+ annually Infrastructure-backed deficit (rail, power, ports)

United States ~$4.4 billion (2022) Balanced imports & services More stable, diversified cooperation

Russia accounts for less than 1% of Nigeria’s trade, and the structure of that trade is unbalanced. Nigeria imports wheat, fertilizers, and some machinery from Russia, but exports almost nothing back. By contrast, China has become Nigeria’s largest trading partner, financing and building railways, power plants, and free trade zones. The U.S., though less visible in physical infrastructure, remains Nigeria’s biggest crude oil buyer while providing access to financial services and technology.

Despite Russia’s frequent declarations of friendship, Abuja does not see Moscow among its top ten trading partners.

Why Russia Keeps Missing the Mark

Several factors explain why Russia’s Africa strategy remains symbolic rather than substantive:

1. No financial institutions to support deals

• China’s Exim Bank and policy lenders ensure African projects come with credit lines.
• The U.S. offers development financing through agencies like OPIC (now DFC).
• Russia, by contrast, has no institutional mechanism to provide African governments with the capital needed to implement deals.

2. Global sanctions and liquidity crunch

• Since 2014, and especially after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russia has faced severe financial sanctions.
• Its banks are largely cut off from the international system, making it difficult to provide long-term credit abroad.

3. Legacy of distrust

• The failure to deliver on projects like Ajaokuta has left Nigerian policymakers skeptical.
• Moscow’s record of unfulfilled promises weakens its credibility compared to Beijing or Washington.

4. Strong competition

• China and India bring financing, technology, and workers.
• The U.S. leverages its markets and financial systems.
• Russia lacks the same competitive edge, leaving it with little more than symbolic gestures.

Nigeria’s Perspective: Choosing Real Partners Over Rhetoric

From Abuja’s standpoint, the comparison is stark. China may saddle Nigeria with debt, but it also delivers tangible assets: modern railways, airport terminals, and industrial parks. The U.S. offers not just oil trade but also investment in services, banking, and security.

Russia, by contrast, offers friendship, rhetoric, and occasional defense hardware sales. While these may have symbolic value, they do little to advance Nigeria’s long-term development goals.

A Nigerian economist summarized the dilemma bluntly: “Russia brings words; China builds rails; America buys oil. We can’t run an economy on words.”

For policymakers in Abuja, the choice is not ideological but practical. Nigeria needs financing, infrastructure, and technology transfer. Any partner unable to provide those tools risks being sidelined.

Lessons from the Past Two Decades

Looking back, Nigeria’s engagement with Russia since the Obasanjo era highlights three major lessons:

• Agreements must be tied to financing. Without money, MoUs are meaningless.
• Geopolitics without economics is hollow. Russia may seek allies against Western sanctions, but Nigeria’s priority is development.
• Partnerships must deliver measurable outcomes. China’s rail projects may be debt-heavy, but at least they exist. Russia’s projects remain in the realm of rhetoric.

The Broader African Picture

Nigeria is not alone in this experience. Across Africa, Russia has announced major investments in mining, energy, and defense. Yet very few projects have been completed. The exceptions—such as nuclear power cooperation with Egypt or arms deals with Algeria—are driven more by geopolitics than development financing.

In 2023, Russia hosted its second Russia-Africa Summit in St. Petersburg, promising billions in investment. But African leaders quietly noted the absence of clear financing mechanisms. The pledges, like those made to Nigeria, remain aspirational.

By contrast, the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit and China-Africa Cooperation Forum both provide detailed financing frameworks that African governments can rely on.

Can Russia Still Catch Up?

Despite its current weakness, Russia still has avenues to remain relevant:

• Agriculture: Russia is a key wheat supplier to Nigeria and could expand into broader agribusiness cooperation.
• Energy: With Nigeria seeking to monetize gas reserves, Russia’s expertise in LNG could be valuable—if backed by financing.
• Technology: Russia’s defense and space industries could offer niche partnerships if they include funding.

But without addressing its financing gap, these opportunities will remain out of reach.

Final Thoughts: What Nigeria Must Do

For Nigeria, the key lesson is simple: measure diplomacy by delivery. Symbolic alliances may have value in global forums, but they cannot replace capital, infrastructure, and trade. Abuja must continue to diversify its partners, but prioritize those who provide tangible results.

Two decades after Obasanjo sought to revive Ajaokuta with Russian help, Nigeria must accept a sobering reality: Russia, for now, is more of a rhetorical ally than a financial partner. Unless Moscow restructures its economic diplomacy with real financing instruments, it will remain a marginal player in Africa’s transformation.

As Africa’s largest economy, Nigeria cannot afford another decade of promises without projects. The future of its development lies with partners who not only shake hands and group photographs but also ability to write the checks. Nigeria and many other African States are desirous to partner with potential foreign investors with adequate funds for investment in the continent. The second ‘re-awakening’ must feature noticeable improvement in the living standards of the estimated 1.4 billion people.