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The Second Russia-Africa Summit: A Continent at a Crossroads

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Samir Bhattacharya Russia-Africa Summit

By Samir Bhattacharya

From 27-28 July 2023, the second Russia-Africa Summit took place in Russia’s St Petersburg. Initially, the summit was scheduled in Addis Ababa in October 2022. However, the summit got postponed, most likely due to complications emerging from Russia’s war against Ukraine. Despite the presence of 49 out of 54 African nations, there were Ministers from only twenty-seven countries: 17 Heads of state and 10 Prime Ministers. This is in high contrast with the 2019 summit, where 43 African Heads of state and two vice presidents were in attendance, along with 109 ministers and the Heads of the African Union (AU) Commission, the African Export–Import Bank and several regional economic communities.

Similar to the last summit, the agenda of this year’s summit included technology transfer and development of industry and critical infrastructure in Africa, developing power engineering, agriculture and mineral extraction, and ensuring food and energy security. As the 2023 edition expanded to include a humanitarian element, a Russia-Africa Economic and Humanitarian Forum also took place in parallel. Additionally, there were exhibitions and a platform for holding business meetings.

At the end of the summit, both parties agreed upon a 74-point joint Declaration for collaboration on security, trade, and the environment. However, with the frequent use of words such as neo-colonialism, neo-Nazism, neo-fascism, Russophobia, illegal sanctions, import substitution, and traditional values, the document appears to be an implicit African endorsement of Russia’s justification for its war against Ukraine. Indeed, the 4,000-plus words document contains multiple statements subtly used to encourage Africa to back Moscow’s position in the war.

In the wake of the summit, ever-deteriorating food security was the key concern for African policymakers. On 17 July, nearly one year after it was signed in Istanbul, Russian President Vladimir Putin decided to withdraw from the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI). The BSGI was intended to ease the Russian blockade, thus allowing Ukraine to export grain to Africa. During the summit, Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi of Egypt, and five other leaders who were part of the African Peace initiative urged President Putin to change his mind. But their request was firmly rejected. Instead, the declaration attributed the entire blame for the food shortages to Western sanctions.

Definitely, the pledge from President Putin to deliver 25,000 to 50,000 tons of free grains to six countries, namely Burkina Faso, Zimbabwe, Mali, Somalia, Central African Republic and Eritrea, is encouraging for these poor nations. However, it will not be done immediately but within three or four months- too little for a continent of 54 countries.

Decoding the summit’s achievement: Advantage Russia

Africa presently imports five times as much as it exports to Russia, resulting in a $12 billion trade imbalance. Following the 2019 Russia-Africa Summit, President Putin planned to increase Russia’s trade with Africa from roughly $16.8 billion to $40 billion annually within five years. Instead, it is now stuck at approximately $18 billion annually or about 2% of all trade on the continent. Moreover, 70 per cent of the total trade is restricted to only four countries: Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and South Africa. During the first summit, the organisers subsequently boasted of dozens of agreements that were signed, worth an estimated $15 billion, but according to some reports, most of those were memorandums of understanding (MOU) and not legally binding. Further, Russia’s direct investment in Africa is currently about 1 per cent of the total inflow.

Indeed, Russia has waived off a large part of its debt to different African nations worth $23 billion. This is almost 90% of the total African debt. According to President Putin, this leaves Africa with no more “direct” debts for Russia but some financial obligations. However, given Russian loan to Africa is only a tiny part, this will have minimal impact on this highly indebted continent. Putin added that his government would also provide over $90 million for development purposes at the request of African countries. Last but not least, Russia announced that it will spend about US$13 million on “large-scale assistance” to healthcare systems in Africa.

Indeed, Russia lacks the resources to compete with the US, France, Germany and Japan or China as a bilateral development donor. However, it does have some cards to play. Last year it was Africa’s largest source of fertiliser, supplying 500,000 tonnes. It is also a significant power in oil, gas and mining. Another significant effort by Russia to strengthen ties with Africa is its commitment to education. In 2023, Russia offered a record 4,700 scholarships to African students, a considerable increase from the 1,900 scholarships awarded in 2019. Currently, there are about 35,000 African students in Russia, and about 6,000 of them are on different government scholarships.

Arms trade consists the most successful pillar of Russia’s conventional trade with Africa, which is mostly managed by state-controlled Rosoboronexport. Currently, Russia accounts for 44 per cent of major arms imports to the continent between 2017 and 2021, surpassing other major players like the US (17 per cent), China (10 per cent), and France (6.1 per cent). Alrosa, which manages diamond projects in Angola and is exploring possibilities in Zimbabwe; Rusal, which mines bauxite in Guinea; and Rosatom, which is constructing a nuclear power station in Egypt, are some other Russian companies with substantial interests in Africa. During the latest summit, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe signed nuclear development contracts with Rosatom.

In addition to importing weapons, many African nations have hired Russian mercenaries. These Russian mercenaries in Africa work under the Wagner Group, a company connected to Yevgeny Prigozhin, a personal friend of Vladimir Putin. About the future of the Wagner group in Africa, particularly in the backdrop of mutiny by the Wagner group, both Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin, in separate statements, have clarified that the group will continue to operate in parts of Africa. And the cameo appearance of Prigozhin during the summit and his celebratory statements on the coup in Niger make it clear that Wagner will continue to expand in Africa.

An evaluation in lieu of a conclusion

Russia has shown a remarkable commitment to engaging with Africa, with Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov making three visits to the continent this year. These diplomatic efforts underscore the increasing importance Moscow places on support from African countries. Clearly, Russia wanted to demonstrate its strong support base of many old and loyal allies from Africa in its fight against Western hegemony.  And from that perspective, the gathering served the Russian purpose. And for Africa, except for some of these garden-variety announcements, African leaders have very little concrete to take home from the event.

However, it was also crucial for African leaders to demonstrate to other foreign powers that they were open to hearing various points of view. African leaders are used to foreign leaders making bold promises but falling short of keeping them. The low attendance at the summit may also suggest that African leaders are readjusting their place in the multipolar world.

And they realised that in the new age of multilateralism, jeopardising their relationships with either the West or Russia is not the best diplomacy. Almost all African nations are nonaligned, eschewing global power blocs and resenting Western pressure. This is also probably why the Heads of State and Ministers stayed away but sent their representatives. Africa’s representation in the summit can be hailed as a statement from Africa: blind loyalty to one state is no longer the norm. Therefore, Africa had gained nothing from the conference mirrors Macbeth’s half-truth instrument of darkness: it is neither a simple fact nor a deliberate lie.

Samir Bhattacharya, Senior Research Associate with the Vivekananda International Foundation

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CBN’s New Cash Policy: A Welcome Liberalisation or a Risky Retreat?

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CBN’s $1trn Mirage

By Blaise Udunze

On December 2, 2025, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) announced a policy that significantly departs from the cash-restriction measures Nigerians have faced lately. The apex bank abolished restrictions on cash deposits. Increased the weekly cash withdrawal limits to N500,000 for individuals and N5 million for corporates while substituting the earlier monthly limits of N5 million and N10 million respectively. These modifications, which will be effective from January 1, 2026, represent what the CBN describes as the necessity to “streamline provisions to reflect present-day realities.”

Authorized by the Director of Financial Policy & Regulation, Dr. Rita I. Sike, the policy overhaul aims to lower cash-management expenses, improve security, and lessen money-laundering threats related to Nigeria’s significant dependence on physical cash. Daily ATM withdrawal limits stay fixed at N100,000 and count toward the total cap. Withdrawals exceeding the limits incur charges of three percent for individuals and five percent for companies, with the revenues divided: 40 percent to the CBN and 60 percent to the banks.

This update comes three years following the disputed 2022-2023 cash redesign crisis at a time characterized by extreme cash deficits, extended lines at banks, and devastating impacts on the informal economy. Consequently, the newest order generates responses: praise from individuals who consider it delayed aid, disapproval from those perceiving it as a bewildering backtrack, and concern from those apprehensive about potential enduring hazards.

Experts Applaud a More Realistic Modification

For economists, in a publication by Nairametrics showed that the action taken by the CBN signifies much-needed practicality. Dr. Salisu Ahmed, an economist based in Abuja, refers to the updated limits as “a step,” praising the CBN for gaining a clearer insight into “cash management practices in a predominantly informal economy.”

He stated that the changes will alleviate the difficulties faced by families and small enterprises due to restrictions. Rigid withdrawal caps had limited transactions, made small-scale commerce more difficult, and caused numerous businesses to experience cash-flow problems. “This adjustment signifies a response from the CBN recognizing the challenges Nigerians face daily and easing rules that previously hindered commerce and individual management,” he clarified.

Banking analyst, David Omale, echoes this view, seeing the CBN’s action as a sign of responsiveness. He points out that higher limits could “enhance liquidity for firms facing challenges from inflation, supply-chain issues and unpredictable cash flows.”

In an economy in which over 60 percent of trade is informal and where the adoption of digital payments varies across different socio-economic groups, experts suggest the updated limits correspond more accurately to real-world conditions. These limits offer businesses flexibility to reinstate transactional liberty and may help recover public confidence diminished by previous cash shortages.

Critics Caution About Continuing Disparities and New Threats

However, the praise is not universally shared. Numerous specialists and industry participants contend that the modifications, although appreciated, are inadequate or might even be detrimental.

Financial strategist Nnenna Okafor contends that the updated limits are insufficient for traders and micro-businesses that depend largely on cash to sustain their operations amid challenges. Due to increasing product prices, logistical difficulties, and unreliable digital banking services in regions, she asserts that numerous Nigerians will still need more liquidity than the new thresholds to stay viable.

Within PoS operators’ players, in Nigeria’s payment system, the response is notably divided.

PoS Operators Split

Certain PoS agents appreciate the modifications, anticipating that they will:

–       Reduce friction with banks over “flagged” transactions

–       Facilitate processes for clients requiring withdrawals

–       Rebuild trust after months of cash shortages

Others convey concern. A PoS operator in Lagos cautions that greater cash availability could hinder the adoption of payments. “While easier access to cash can address problems, it may also decrease dependence on PoS terminals and other digital payment solutions that provide long-term security and efficiency,” she remarked.

She argues that if the CBN does not combine the policy with targeted incentives to encourage payment uptake, Nigeria runs the risk of regressing into deep-rooted reliance on cash.

Another operator in Abuja points out a different issue that has to do with unstable cash supply at numerous commercial banks. He insists that simply boosting withdrawal limits does not automatically fix supply shortages. “If banks cannot consistently provide cash, raising limits fails to solve the issue,” he stated.

Other operators also caution that the new setting might push fintech firms out of the market, which possibly allows monopolies to form since only big payment firms can endure the transition back to increased cash usage.

Experts in Security Alert to Increasing Threats, from Crime

Apart from operational issues, security experts have expressed concerns about the dangers linked to greater cash flow.

Abas Ogendengbe, a security expert at Anold Consulting Ltd., warns that increased access to amounts without strict controls “opens up risks for theft, fraud and money laundering.” He contends that without improvements in surveillance transaction tracking and reporting frameworks by banks, criminal groups might take advantage of the restrictions.

Nigeria continues to confront:

–       High rates of petty theft

–       Organised criminal cash-for-goods networks

–       Ransom-based criminality

–       Fraudulent cash-flow manipulation

He contends that a policy boosting the amount of currency in circulation should consequently be accompanied by enhanced institutional protections, rather than diminished ones.

Advantages of the New Policy: Relief, Liquidity, and Business Freedom

Although it has faced criticism, the CBN’s decision carries benefits:

  1. Increased Liquidity for the Informal Sector

Small-scale merchants, farm producers, haulers, craftsmen, and market participants relying significantly on cash will experience ease in transferring money, purchasing stock, and expanding their businesses.

  1. Reduced Transaction Friction

Companies that once faced limiting restrictions now recover agility, enhancing business continuity and lowering administrative challenges.

  1. Restoration of Public Trust

After the trauma of the cash scarcity era, easing restrictions may slowly rebuild confidence in the banking system and encourage more people to save and transact through formal channels.

  1. Policy Simplicity

The updated limits, while still restricted, are more straightforward and less administrative compared to the special-authorization system.

The Disadvantages: Policy Volatility, Inflationary Risks, and Stunted Digitalisation

Nonetheless, the policy change is also accompanied by drawbacks:

  1. Weakening of Monetary Policy Credibility

Regular significant reversals indicate instability and undermine confidence. A central bank needs to be consistent and foreseeable; Nigeria’s policy environment has shifted in the contrary.

  1. Potential for More Money Laundering

Unlimited cash deposits and increased withdrawal limits are inconsistent with standards for preventing illegal financial transactions.

  1. Undermining Digital Payment Growth

The increase in fintech was expedited amidst cash availability. A return to reliance on cash might hinder innovation. Dampen the use of safer trackable digital methods.

  1. Increased Risk of Robbery and Cash-Based Crime

An increased amount of cash in use results in tangible currency to be stolen additional opportunities for criminals and amplified operational difficulties for the police.

  1. Higher Costs of Cash Management

The processes of currency production, circulation, and safeguarding place financial strains on the banking sector and the CBN.

Policy Details and Operational Complexities

The CBN’s circular offers instructions for operations:

–       Excess withdrawal charges:

3 percent for individuals

5 percent for corporates

–       Revenue sharing:

40 percent to CBN, 60 percent to banks

–       Withdrawals from ATMs and PoS terminals contribute to the limit, highlighting the importance for customers to monitor where their withdrawals originate.

–       ATMs can now be loaded with all denominations, although third-party cheque cashing is still limited to N100,000.

–       Exemptions are maintained for government revenue accounts, microfinance banks, and primary mortgage banks.

–       The removal of exemptions for embassies and donor agencies is a move that some parties consider diplomatically risky.

The CBN frames this policy change as a balance, boosting liquidity while still maintaining the nation’s goal of a cashless economy. Nevertheless, its effectiveness depends on the ability of the government and financial institutions to encourage payments while addressing the security challenges posed by greater cash circulation.

A Relief Today, a Question Mark Tomorrow

The CBN’s updated cash-policy structure provides support for families, small enterprises, and the informal sector. It addresses some of the severe effects of previous policies and shows a readiness, though delayed, to adjust to practical realities.

However, the enduring consequences are complex. The policy creates openings, as money laundering hampers progress in payments, increases security threats, and shows a regulatory environment grappling with achieving stability and trustworthiness.

Nigeria is at an intersection. While cash can relieve hardships, it cannot shape the future economic landscape. The current task is to apply this policy without hindering progress, undermining financial integrity, or jeopardizing monetary stability.

The question of whether this constitutes a liberalisation or an expensive withdrawal will in the end hinge on a single element, the CBN’s ability to pair increased liquidity with stronger oversight, steadfast policy direction, and sustained digital-payment incentives.

Only then can Nigeria avoid sliding backward and instead build a financial system that truly reflects the realities of its people, its economy, and its future.

Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos, can be reached via: [email protected]

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When Stability Matters: Gauging Gusau’s Quiet Wins for Nigerian Football

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NFF President Ibrahim Musa Gusau

By Barr. Adefila Kamal

Football in Nigeria has never been just a sport. It is emotion, argument, nationalism, and sometimes heartbreak wrapped into ninety minutes. That passion is a gift, but it often comes with a tendency to shout down progress before it has the chance to grow. In the middle of this noise sits the Nigeria Football Federation under the leadership of Ibrahim Musa Gusau, a man who has chosen steady hands over loud speeches, structure over drama, and long-term rebuilding over chasing instant applause.

When Gusau took office in 2022, he understood one thing clearly: the only way to fix Nigerian football is to repair its foundations. He said it openly during the 2025 NNL monthly awards ceremony — you cannot build an edifice from the rooftop. And true to that conviction, his tenure has taken shape quietly through structural investments that don’t trend on social media but matter where the future of the game is built. The construction of a players’ hostel and modern training pitches at the Moshood Abiola Stadium is one of the clearest signs of this shift. Nigeria has gone decades without basic infrastructure for its national teams, especially youth and age-grade squads. Gusau’s administration broke that pattern by delivering the first dedicated national-team hostel in our history, a project that signals an understanding that success is not luck — it is preparation.

The same thread runs through grassroots football. The maiden edition of the FCT FA Women’s Inter-Area Councils Football Tournament emerged under this administration, giving young female players a structured platform instead of the token attention they usually receive. These initiatives are not flashy. They do not dominate headlines. But they form the bedrock of any footballing nation that wants to be taken seriously.

Gusau’s leadership has also focused on lifting the domestic leagues out of years of decline. The NFF has revamped professional and semi-professional competitions, working to create consistent scheduling, fair officiating, and marketable competition structures. The growing number of global broadcasting partnerships — something unheard of in the old NPFL era — has brought more eyes, more credibility and more opportunities for clubs and players. Monthly awards for players, coaches and referees have introduced a culture of performance and merit, something our domestic game has needed for years. These are reforms that reshape the culture of football far beyond one season.

Internationally, Nigeria regained a powerful seat at the table when Gusau was elected President of the West African Football Union (WAFU B). This is not a ceremonial achievement. In football politics, influence determines opportunities, hosting rights, development grants, international appointments and the respect with which nations are treated. For too long, Nigeria’s voice in the region was inconsistent. Gusau’s emergence changes that, and it places Nigeria in a position where its administrative competence cannot be dismissed.

His administration has also made it clear that women’s football, youth development and academy systems are no longer side projects. There is a renewed intention to repair the broken pathways that once produced global stars with almost predictable frequency. If Nigeria is going to remain a powerhouse, development must become a machine, not an afterthought.

Still, for many observers, none of this seems to matter because the yardstick is always a single match, a single tournament or a single disappointing moment. Public criticism often grows louder than the facts. Fans want instant results, and when they don’t come, the instinct is to blame whoever is in office at the moment. But this approach has repeatedly sabotaged Nigerian football. Constant leadership changes wipe out institutional memory and scatter reform efforts before they mature. No nation becomes great by resetting its football house every time tempers flare.

Gusau’s leadership is unfolding at a time when FIFA and CAF are tightening their expectations for professionalism, financial transparency and infrastructure. Nigeria cannot afford scandals, disarray or combative politics. We need the kind of administrative consistency that global football bodies can trust — and this is exactly the lane Gusau has chosen. He has not been perfect; no administrator is. But he has been consistent, measured and focused. In an ecosystem that often rewards noise, this is rare.

For progress to hold, Nigeria must shift from the culture of outrage to a culture of constructive contribution. The media, civil society, ex-players, club owners, fan groups — everyone has a role. The truth is that Nigerian football’s biggest enemy has never been the NFF president, whoever he might be at the time. The real enemies are impatience, instability and emotional decision-making. They derail strategy. They kill reforms. They weaken institutions. And they turn football — our greatest cultural asset — into a battlefield of blame.

Gusau’s effort to reposition the NFF is a reminder that real development is rarely glamorous. It is slow, disciplined and often misunderstood. But it is the only route that leads to the future we claim to want: a football system built on structure, modern governance, infrastructure, youth development and global influence. Nigeria will flourish when we start protecting our institutions instead of tearing them down after every misstep.

If we truly want Nigerian football to rise, we must recognise genuine work when we see it. We must support continuity when it is clearly producing a roadmap. And we must resist the temptation to substitute outrage for analysis. Ibrahim Musa Gusau’s tenure is not defined by noise. It is defined by groundwork — the kind that elevates nations long after the shouting stops.

Barr. Adefila Kamal is a legal practitioner and development specialist. He serves as the National President of the Civil Society Network for Good Governance (CSNGG), with a long-standing commitment to transparency, institutional reform and sports governance in Nigeria

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Unlocking Capital for Infrastructure: The Case for Project Bonds in Nigeria

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Taiwo Olatunji Project Bonds in Nigeria

By Taiwo Olatunji, CFA

Nigeria’s infrastructure ambition is not constrained by vision, but by the financing architecture. The public sector balance sheet, which has been the primary source of financing, has become very tight, while financing from the private sector is available and increasing, with a focus on long-term, naira-denominated assets. Hence, the challenge lies in effectively connecting this capital to bankable projects at scale and with discipline. Project bonds, created, structured and distributed by investment banks, are the instruments required to bridge the country’s infrastructure needs.

The scale of the need is clear. Nigeria’s Revised NIIMP (2020–2043) estimates ~US$2.3 trillion, about US$100bn, a year is required annually for the next 30 years to lift infrastructure to 70% of GDP. Africa’s pensions, insurers and sovereign funds already hold over US$1.1 trillion that can be mobilised for this purpose, but they require new and innovative approaches to enhance their participation in addressing this challenge.

What is broken with the status quo?

Nigeria continues to finance inherently long-dated assets through the issuance of local currency public bonds, Sukuk and Eurobonds. This approach creates a heavy burden on the government’s balance sheet while sometimes causing refinancing risk and FX exposures, where naira cash flows service dollar liabilities. It has also led to the slow conversion of the pipeline of identified projects because many infrastructure projects have not been prepared, appraised and structured to attract the private sector.

Why project bonds and where they sit in the stack

Project bonds are debt securities issued by project SPVs and serviced from project cash flows, typically secured by concessions, offtake agreements, or availability payments. Unlike typical bonds (corporate or government), which are backed by the sponsor’s balance sheets, project bonds are backed by the cash flow generated by the financed project. They often have longer duration, are tradeable, aligned with the long operating life of infrastructure projects and best suited for pension and insurance investors.

Globally, this type of instrument has been used to finance major projects such as toll roads, power plants, and social infrastructure. For example, in Latin America, transportation and energy projects have been financed through project bonds from local and international investors, through the 144A market, a U.S. framework that allows companies to access large institutional investors without going through a full public offering. Similarly, in India, rupee-denominated project bonds have benefited from partial credit guarantees provided by institutions like Crédit Agricole Corporate and Investment Bank, which help lower investment risk and attract more investors.

In practice, project bonds can be structured in two ways: (i) as a take-out instrument, refinancing bank or DFI construction loans once an asset has reached operational stability; or (ii) as a bond issued from day one for brownfield or late-stage greenfield projects where revenue visibility is high, often supported by credit enhancements such as guarantees.

In both cases, the instrument achieves the same outcome: aligning long-term, project cash flows with the long-term liabilities of domestic institutional investors.

The enabling ecosystem is already emerging

1. Nigeria is not starting from zero. Regulatory infrastructure is already in place. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has issued detailed rules governing Project Bonds and Infrastructure Funds, creating standardized issuance structures aligned with global best practice and familiar to institutional investors. The SEC is also mulling the inclusion of the proposed rules on Credit Enhancement Service Providers in the existing rules of the Commission.

2. Market benchmarks are already available. The sovereign yield curve, published by the Debt Management Office (DMO) through its regular monthly auctions, provides a transparent reference point for pricing. This curve serves as the base risk-free rate, against which project bond spreads can be calibrated to reflect construction, operating, and sector-specific risks.

3. The National Pension Commission (PenCom) has revised its Regulation on the investment of Pension Fund Assets, increasing the amount of the country’s N25.9 trillion pension assets to be allocated to infrastructure.

4. InfraCredit has established a robust local-currency guarantee framework, supporting an aggregate guaranteed portfolio of approximately ₦270 billion. The portfolio carries a weighted average tenor of ~8 years, with demonstrated capacity to extend maturities up to 20 years. (InfraCredit 2025)

Why merchant banks should lead

Merchant banks sit at the nexus of origination, structuring, underwriting, and distribution, and they need to work with projects sponsors, financiers and government to develop a pipeline of bankable infrastructure projects. A pipeline of bankable infrastructure projects is important to attract investors as they prefer to invest in an economy with a recognizable pipeline. A pipeline also suggests that a structured and well-thought-out approach was adopted, and the projects would have identified all the major risks and the proposed mitigants to address the identified risks.

This “banks-as-catalysts” model, an economic framework that states banks can play an active and creative role in promoting industrialization and economic development, particularly in emerging markets, can be adopted to structure and mobilise domestic private finance into Infrastructure projects.

Coronation Merchant Bank’s role and vision

At Coronation, we believe the identification, structuring and testing of bankable infrastructure projects are the constraints to mobilization of private capital into the infrastructure space. We bring an integrated platform across Financial Advisory, Capital Mobilization, Commercial Debt, Private Debt and Alternative Financing to identify, structure, underwrite and distribute infrastructure debt into domestic institutions. The Bank works with DFIs, guarantee providers and other banks to scale issuance. Our franchise has supported infrastructure debt issuances via the capital markets, likewise Nigerian corporates and the Government.

From Insight to Execution

If you are considering the issuance of a project bond or you want to discuss pipeline readiness, kindly contact [email protected] or call 020-01279760.

Taiwo Olatunji, CFA is the Group Head of  Investment Banking at Coronation Merchant Bank

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