Feature/OPED
Debt Trap and Incoming Administrations
By Jerome-Mario Chijioke Utomi
It is no longer news that some of the first-term governors-elect will face many months of unpaid workers’ salaries and mounting pension liabilities, as well as agitation for the implementation of the nationally agreed minimum wage, rising inflation, escalating prices of goods and services, and dwindling purchasing power.
These incoming governors, about 17 of them, according to reports, will have a difficult time boosting the economies of their individual states because they will take over at least N2.1 trillion in domestic debt and $1.9 billion in foreign debt from their predecessors.
It is equally common knowledge that in January 2023, Ms Patience Oniha, the Director-General of the Debt Management Office (DMO), while fielding questions from journalists at the public presentation and breakdown of the highlights of the 2023 appropriation act in Abuja, noted that the incoming federal government would inherit about N77 trillion as debt by the time President Muhammadu Buhari’s tenure ends in May.
Aside from being an indication that Nigerians should expect a tough time ahead or, better still, may not anticipate a superlative performance from the incoming administrations as they will, from inception, be overburdened by debt, what is, however, ‘newsy’ is that each time the present federal government went for these loans, Nigerians were usually told that the loan seeks to stimulate the national economy, making it more competitive by focusing on infrastructural development, delivery of inclusive growth and prioritizing the welfare of Nigerians to safeguard lives and property; equipping farmers with high tools, technology and techniques; empowering and enabling mines to operate in a safe and secured environment and training of our youths through the revival of our vocational institutions to ensure they are competitive enough to seize the opportunities that will arise for this economic revival.”
From the above, it is evident that the nation did not arrive at its present state of indebtedness by accident but through a well-programmed plan of actions and inactions that engineered national poverty and bred indebtedness. The state of affairs dates back to so many years in the life of the present federal government.
To explain, for years, we were as a nation warned with mountains of evidence that this was coming, it was also pointed out that under the present condition of indebtedness, it may be thought audacious to talk of creating a better society while the country battles with the problems of battered economy arising from indebtedness, yet, our leaders who are never ready to serve or save the citizens ignored the warnings describing it as a prank. Now we have learnt a very ‘’useful’’ lesson that we can no longer ignore.
In 2019, the country’s rising debt profile dominated discussion when the Senate opened debate on the general principles of the 2019 Appropriation Bill. Most of the contributors to the referenced debate asked the executive to exercise some level of caution on its borrowing plan in order not to return the country to a heavily indebted nation it exited in 2005 through Paris Club debt relief.
Senate Leader, Mr Ahmed Lawan (as he then was) kicked off the debate when he read “A Bill for an Act to authorize the issue from the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation the total sum of N8,826,636,578,915 only, of which N492,360,342,965 only is for Statutory Transfers, N2,264,014,113,092 only, is for Debt Service, N4,038,557,664,767 only, is for Recurrent (Non-Debt) Expenditure while the sum of N2,031,754,458,902 only is for contribution to the Development Fund for capital Expenditure for the year ending on 31st day of December 2019.”
While noting that the budget deficit will be funded through borrowing, Lawan, among other things, stated, “About 89% of the deficit (N1.65 trillion) will be financed through new borrowings while about N210 billion is expected from the proceeds of privatization of some public enterprises. Debt Service/Revenue Ratio, which was high as 69% in 2017, has led to concerns being raised about the sustainability of the nation’s debt.”
Reacting to Lawan’s words, many Nigerians raised the alarm about the country’s rising debt profile. They noted that though the budget estimates should be given expeditious consideration and passage in view of the time already lost, the borrowing plan contained in the Bill should be properly scrutinized. They insisted that scrutinizing the borrowing plan became necessary to prevent the country from exceeding its borrowing limit when juxtaposed with the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio.
Even some Senators, in their submissions, frowned at the nation’s increased borrowing proposals on our yearly budget, which they described as becoming unbearable.
“Yes, money must be sought by any government to fund infrastructure, but it must not be solely anchored on borrowing, which in the long run, will take the country back to a problem it had earlier solved.
“Besides, there are other creative ways of funding such highly needed infrastructure.”
Others at that time were particularly not happy that the debt profile of the country would soon rise to $60 billion from less than $20 billion it was before the present government came to power in 2015. While they noted that the components of the $60 billion debt profile include $23 billion external debt and $20 billion local debts, these concerned Nigerians observed with dissatisfaction that another $12 billion was already being processed for presentation to the National Assembly to finance Port Harcourt to Maiduguri rail lines.
Still on the 2019 budget borrowing proposal, it noted that “Nigeria is gradually turning to a chartered borrowing nation under this government all in the name of funding infrastructure. “This must be stopped because the future of the country and in particular, lives of generations yet unborn are being put in danger.” Even with the high level of indebtedness of the country, “the government in power is planning to further devalue the Naira to about N500 to one US dollar.”
Similarly, in February 2022, economic experts going by media reports urged the Federal Government to seek a debt moratorium and reduce the cost of governance to reduce funds expended on debt servicing, as it stands as the best available option.
This, according to them, will enable the government to suspend payment for now and re-strategize – particularly, the government cannot continue to service its rising debt profile at the expense of meeting the competing needs of the people, Economic analysts recently handed a similar expert warning that the federal government’s soaring borrowings could eventually suffocate the country if not mitigated.
In the first quarter of 2022, while speaking in Akure, Ondo State capital, at the 32nd annual Seminar for Finance Correspondents and Business Editors themed: ‘Exchange Rate Management and Economic Diversification in Nigeria: The Pave Option,’ the experts hinted that the government’s plans a fresh N6.3 trillion debt might be added to the current debt stock of N39.556 trillion ($95.779 billion as at December 31, 2021) to ultimately push the country’s total debt stock to N45.86 trillion by December 2022.
Notwithstanding this unhealthy trend, they argued it was high time the country invested more in boosting local production and export-oriented infrastructure before the huge debt burden sank the country.
Indeed, from the above torrents of explanation/concern expressed by these experts, this piece clearly agrees that ‘Nigeria’s debt stock has finally become an issue that calls for a more drastic approach to support the fiscal and monetary authorities to tow the nation’s economy out of the doldrums.
Qualifying the above sad account as a bad commentary is the awareness that despite these prophecies of foreknowledge which deals with what is certain to come, and prophesy of denunciation, which on its part, tells what is to come if the present situation is not changed; both acting as information and warning respectively, the President Muhammadu Buhari led federal government has become even more entrenched in borrowing, ignoring these warning signals.
In 2020, one of the reputable national newspapers in Nigeria, in its editorial comment, among other observations, noted that Nigeria would be facing another round of fiscal headwinds this year with the mix of $83 billion debt, rising recurrent expenditure, increased cost of debt servicing; sustained fall in revenue; and about $22 billion debt plan waiting for legislative approval. It may be worse if the anticipated shocks from the global economy, like Brexit, the United States-China trade war and the interest rate policy of the Federal Reserve Bank, go awry.
The nation’s debt stock, currently at $83 billion, comes with a huge debt service provision in excess of N2.1 trillion in 2019, but set to rise in 2020. This challenge stems from the country’s revenue crisis, which has remained unabating in the last five years, while the borrowings have persisted, an indication that the economy has been primed for recurring tough outcomes, the report concluded.
The situation says something else.
Another news report within the same time frame indicated that the federal government made a total of N3.25 trillion in 2020, out of which it spent N2.34 trillion on debt servicing within the year. The report underlined that 72 per cent of the government’s revenue was spent on debt servicing. It also puts the government’s debt servicing to revenue ratio at 72 per cent.
It was in the news that PricewaterhouseCoopers, a global professional services network of firms operating as partnerships under the PwC brand, in a report entitled; ‘Nigeria Economic Alert: Assessing the 2021 FGN Budget’, warned that the increasing cost of servicing the debt would continue to weigh on the federal government’s revenue profile.
It said, “Actual debt servicing cost in 2020 stood at N3.27 trillion and represented about 10 per cent over the budgeted amount of N2.95 trillion. This puts the debt-to-revenue ratio at approximately 83 per cent, nearly double the 46 per cent that was budgeted.
This implies that about N83 out of every N100, the federal government earned was used to settle interest payments for outstanding domestic and foreign debts within the reference period. In 2021, the FG planned to spend N3.32 trillion to service its outstanding debt. This is slightly higher than the N2.95 trillion budgeted in 2020.”
Today, such fears raised cannot be described as unfounded, just as this author doesn’t need to be an economist to know that as a nation, we have become a high-risk borrower.
Looking at the above facts, this piece holds the opinion that the present debt profile presently crushing the country may not have occurred by accident.
And, even as the nation goes on a borrowing spree and speeds on the ‘borrowing lane’, and at a time the World Bank indicates that “almost half of the poor people in Sub-Saharan Africa live in just five countries: and they are in this order, namely; Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Madagascar, the situation becomes more painful when one remembers that no one, not even the federal government can truly explain the objective of these loans and whether they were utilized in the masses best interest.
It would have been understandable if these loans were taken to build a standard rail system in the country that would assist the poor village farmers in Benue/Kano and other remote villages situated in the landlocked parts of the country, moving their produce to the food disadvantaged cities in the south in ways that will help the poor farmers earn more money, contribute to lower food prices in Lagos and other cities through the impact on the operation of the market, increase the welfare of household both in Kano, Benue, Lagos and others while improving food security in the country, reduce stress/pressure daily mounted on Nigerian roads by articulated/haulage vehicles and drastically reduce road accidents on our major highways.
Again, it would have been pardonable if the loan were deployed to revitalise the nation’s electricity sector, to re-introduce a sustainable power roadmap that will erase the epileptic power challenge in the country and restore the health and vitality of the nation’s socioeconomic life while improving small and medium scale business in the country.
What about the nation’s refineries?
This piece recalls now with nostalgia that one of the popular demands during the fuel subsidy removal protest in January 2012, under President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan’s administration, was that the federal government should take measures to strengthen corporate governance in the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) Limited, as well as in the oil and gas sector as a whole. This is because of the belief that weak structures made it possible for endemic corruption in the management of both the downstream and upstream sectors of the oil and gas industry.
The present administration as part of its campaign promise in 2015, agreed to ensure a better deal for Nigerians, but eight years after such demand was made and Jonathan gone, the three government-owned refineries in the country have not been able to function at full capacity as promised by the present administration.
Today, if there is anything that Nigerians wish that the FG should accomplish quickly, it is getting the refineries to function optimally as well as make the NNPC more accountable to the people. What happened under President Jonathan has become child’s play when compared with the present happenings in Nigeria’s oil/gas and electricity sectors.
What the above tells us as a country is that more work needs to be done, and more reforms need to be made; that as a nation, we are poor not because of our geographical location or due to the absence of mineral/natural resources but because our leaders fail to take decisions that engineer prosperity. And we cannot solve our socio-economic challenges with the same thinking we used when we created it.
Definitely, this piece may not unfold the answers to these challenges completely, but there are a few sectors that the incoming administration must start from.
The first that comes to mind is the urgent need for diversification of the nation’s revenue sources. Revenue diversification, from what development experts are saying, will provide options for the nation to reduce financial risks and increase national economic stability, as a decline in a particular revenue source might be offset by an increase in other revenue sources.
Finally, within this period of economic vulnerability, a new awareness that must not be allowed to go with political winds is the expert warning that accumulated debt can hinder a country’s development, especially when most of the revenue generated is used to service debt.
Jerome-Mario is the programme coordinator (Media and Public Policy) for Social and Economic Justice Advocacy (SEJA). He can be reached via Je*********@***oo.com/08032725374
By Blaise Udunze
Daily, the world watches Nigeria through a familiar lens in what appears to be a gory situation. Especially in cases when the news headlines tell stories of farmer-herder clashes, bandit attacks, kidnappings, villages reduced to ashes or deserted by the dwellers, as thousands of Nigerians have been displaced across states such as Zamfara, Plateau, Benue, Niger, Kaduna and Nasarawa. Subliminally, this is about to become a similarly ugly occurrence in southwestern Nigeria, which is fast becoming obvious if not nipped in the bud quickly.
Recorded data have shown that bandits, Boko Haram, and others killed over 190,000 Nigerians in 17 years and displaced 3.7 million people.
A human rights organisation, the International Society for Civil Liberties and Rule of Law (Intersociety), in its fearful revelation, has said that no fewer than 190,150 Nigerians have been killed by bandits, Boko Haram insurgents, and suspected armed herdsmen between July 2009 and March 19, 2026, as this calls for concern.
The dominant explanations often point to ethnic tensions, religious divisions, climate change, shrinking grazing routes or weak security institutions. No doubt, those factors are certainly part of Nigeria’s complex security crisis. Yet another question deserves serious examination.
What if, in some locations, the violence is also serving another purpose? What if some of the territories experiencing repeated displacement are the same places sitting atop some of Nigeria’s most valuable mineral deposits? More importantly, if such a pattern exists, who benefits when communities disappear?
Of a truth, these questions are uncomfortable, but undeniably they deserve careful investigation rather than dismissal.
For ages, Nigeria has been naturally endowed, and it is estimated to be rich in enormous significant reserves of gold, lithium, uranium, tin, columbite and other strategic minerals increasingly sought after in the global transition to clean energy technologies. As international demand for battery minerals continues to rise, these resources have become far more valuable than they were only a decade ago.
If one overlays publicly available geological information with maps showing persistent violence, some observers argue that striking geographical overlaps appear in several regions. Such overlaps alone cannot establish causation. Correlation is not proof of conspiracy. However, they raise questions worthy of independent scrutiny.
One issue attracting increasing attention and adequately yearns for answer is whether prolonged insecurity may inadvertently or deliberately create conditions that make mineral extraction easier.
Under Nigeria’s Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act 2007, mineral resources belong to the Federal Government, while mining rights are granted through licences and leases. Community engagement and land access are expected to form part of the licensing process, although implementation varies depending on circumstances. This raises an important policy question.
What happens when the communities expected to participate in those processes have already fled because of violence?
Displacement changes the dynamics of land ownership, consent and access. While no evidence automatically proves that attacks are orchestrated to facilitate mining, the sequence of violence followed by renewed commercial activity in some locations deserves closer examination by regulators, lawmakers and investigative journalists.
In conflict studies, researchers have long observed that wars often generate economic winners alongside humanitarian losers. Could elements of Nigeria’s insecurity also be producing economic beneficiaries?
Reports over the years have documented concerns about illegal mining operations across parts of northern Nigeria. Government agencies themselves have repeatedly acknowledged that criminal networks profit from the country’s vast mineral wealth. The unresolved question is whether isolated criminality has, in some instances, evolved into more sophisticated alliances involving political influence, financial interests and international supply chains. If so, the implications extend far beyond Nigeria.
Invariably, it is clearly known that lithium has become one of the world’s most strategic commodities, powering electric vehicle batteries and renewable energy storage systems. Gold has always remained one of the safest global investment assets during periods of uncertainty. Meanwhile, it is well confirmed that the global appetite for these minerals creates enormous financial incentives.
Suppose violent displacement reduces resistance to extraction. Suppose shell companies subsequently acquire mining interests. Suppose minerals then leave Nigeria through legitimate-looking export documentation while their true value remains understated.
These scenarios remain allegations unless supported by verifiable evidence. Yet they outline a framework that investigators may wish to test rather than ignore. Financial crime experts frequently identify trade mis-invoicing as one of the most common methods of illicit financial flows worldwide.
Could Nigeria’s solid minerals sector be vulnerable to similar practices? If valuable lithium ore is deliberately but inaccurately described as lower-value material on export documents, substantial wealth could potentially leave the country without reflecting its true market value. Likewise, if unrefined gold exits through privileged channels with limited scrutiny, questions naturally arise about oversight, transparency and accountability over criminal activities which have continued to stunt and disrupt the country’s socio-economic growth and at the same time cause carnage.
Such possibilities are not accusations against any particular institution or company. Rather, they illustrate why stronger monitoring systems are increasingly essential. Another question concerns logistics.
With the high level of criminal activities, industrial mining requires heavy machinery, diesel supplies, transportation networks and specialised personnel. These are not operations that can remain invisible indefinitely.
If certain territories are genuinely too dangerous for security agencies, how do industrial-scale extraction activities reportedly continue in some remote locations? If they do, who protects those operations? Who authorises their movement? Who verifies what is extracted? Who ensures royalties and export revenues reach public coffers? These are governance questions that demand institutional answers.
Equally important is the international dimension. Minerals extracted in Nigeria ultimately enter global supply chains. Gold may pass through international refining hubs before entering financial markets. Lithium may become part of battery manufacturing destined for electric vehicles, which are being sold across Europe, North America and Asia.
One known fact is that consumers purchasing products containing these minerals rarely know the full story of where they originated.
Increasingly, however, investors and governments are demanding ethical sourcing standards that trace minerals from extraction to final manufacture.
A critical factor that must be taken into cognisance is that if insecurity is creating opportunities for illegal or unethical extraction anywhere in the world, multinational companies have responsibilities alongside national governments, of which the onus falls on the Nigerian government.
Transparency cannot stop at the mine gate. Nor should accountability end at national borders. Another issue requiring attention concerns beneficial ownership.
Across many jurisdictions, shell companies can obscure the identities of individuals ultimately controlling commercial assets. If politically exposed persons or powerful business interests are hidden behind complex corporate structures registered offshore, identifying beneficiaries becomes significantly more difficult. This challenge is hardly unique to Nigeria.
Findings showed that from Latin America to Central Africa and Southeast Asia, resistant corporate networks have frequently complicated efforts to combat corruption and illicit resource extraction. That is precisely why open corporate registries, beneficial ownership databases and transparent mining licence disclosures are becoming global governance priorities. For Nigeria, the stakes could hardly be higher.
The country stands at the centre of the world’s emerging critical minerals economy. The Nigerian government can’t feign ignorance of the fact that, when handled transparently, these resources could finance infrastructure, education, healthcare, and industrial development for generations.
In no way would the government claim not knowing that when handled poorly, they risk becoming another chapter in the well-documented “resource curse,” where extraordinary natural wealth coincides with persistent poverty, insecurity and institutional weakness.
The ultimate challenge, therefore, is not simply about mining. It is about governance. It is about whether public institutions possess both the independence and capacity to ensure that natural resources benefit citizens rather than narrow interests. It is about whether conflict zones receive genuine peacebuilding efforts instead of becoming forgotten frontiers. And it is about whether international markets demand accountability with the same enthusiasm they demand raw materials.
None of these questions should be answered through speculation. They require rigorous investigations, forensic financial analysis, satellite imagery, mining license audits, customs records, beneficial ownership disclosures and courageous journalism.
They require governments willing to open their books. They require international cooperation capable of tracing money across borders. Most importantly, they require asking questions that have too often remained unasked.
Perhaps Nigeria’s security crisis is exactly what it appears to be: a tragic convergence of historical grievances, weak institutions, criminality and environmental pressures. Or perhaps, in some places, another layer of economic incentive deserves closer scrutiny.
Until those questions are thoroughly investigated, one possibility will continue to linger. Maybe the world’s attention has been fixed on the blood spilt above ground, while too little attention has been paid to the extraordinary wealth lying beneath it.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: bl***********@***il.com
Feature/OPED
What Does Nigeria’s $51bn Reserves Milestone Mean if Most New Foreign Money Can Leave Quickly?
Nigeria’s foreign reserves have climbed to about $51 billion, a decade-plus high, according to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). EBC Financial Group (EBC) notes that this reflects stronger investor confidence, but the second half may show whether it holds, as the build rests on three cyclical drivers: oil earnings, short-term foreign money and a narrowing official-to-street naira gap.
Reserves rose from about $32 billion in April 2024, during a dollar shortage, to about $51 billion now, near the CBN’s target. Much came from two cyclical sources, strong oil earnings and money chasing high-yielding naira assets, so EBC expects the pace to slow or reverse. Fitch Ratings, a major international credit rating agency, expects a marginal decline to about $47 billion by the end of 2026, citing higher spending and external pressures.
David Precious, Senior Market Analyst at EBC Financial Group, said, “Nigeria’s reserve build is real but may not be durable yet, because nearly all of the new money is the kind that can leave quickly. Of the $10.37 billion that came in over the first quarter, the overwhelming majority was short-term portfolio funds rather than long-term investment, so a shift in oil prices, global interest rates or confidence in the naira might pull a large part of it straight back out.”
Most New Money Can Still Leave Quickly
The composition of the foreign inflows explains the caution over how long the build can last. The country attracted $10.37 billion in foreign investment in the first quarter of 2026, up 83.83 per cent year-on-year, according to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Of that, $9.86 billion or 95.09 per cent, was portfolio money, largely short-term naira debt such as Treasury bills that investors can sell at the next auction, while foreign direct investment, the long-term kind that builds factories and jobs, was $135.08 million, or 1.30 per cent. Put simply, of each dollar coming in, about 95 cents can leave quickly, and barely one cent stays.
That money supports reserves while it stays. Dollars brought in to buy naira assets add to market supply, letting the CBN hold more reserves and steady the naira. It leaves when conditions change. Nigeria earns most of its export dollars from oil and gas, so lower oil prices mean fewer dollars, and as a member of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), it cannot simply produce more, output capped by quota and reduced by theft and ageing fields. Higher global interest rates draw money toward safer returns abroad, and a weakening naira prompts investors to sell early. When oil fell in 2016 and 2020, foreign investors withdrew and could not convert naira to dollars as supply dried up, leaving the CBN to clear more than $7 billion in trapped obligations into 2024.
The Oil Boost is No Longer Certain
Oil looked like a dependable source of the dollars behind the reserves only months ago. Earlier in 2026, concern over disruption around the Strait of Hormuz lifted crude prices, and stronger receipts flowed in, with crude oil export earnings of $8.11 billion in the first quarter in the CBN’s balance-of-payments data. That support is now easing. The tension has subsided, and Brent traded near $72 on June 29, down about 24 per cent over the month, back to pre-conflict levels. With the price boost gone and output constrained, reserves are more exposed, leaning on non-oil earnings and investor patience rather than oil.
The Naira Still Trades at Two Prices
The naira has traded at two prices, an official rate and a higher parallel-market rate, and closing that gap into one trusted price is what many investors might watch most. Before committing funds, they may want assurance they can convert naira to dollars at a fair rate when they exit, and a wide gap revives the fear of being trapped that lingers from earlier shortages. The gap has narrowed to roughly N20 to N30, with the CBN’s official rate near N1,380 per dollar on June 26 against parallel-market quotes around N1,400. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2026 Article IV review urged Nigeria to depend less on this fast-moving portfolio money and to keep phasing out its multiple exchange-rate practices. The CBN’s Foreign Exchange Manual, in force from 1 June, is intended to make the market clearer, though such rules build confidence only once investors can freely trade dollars at the posted rate.
What could Make the Build Durable
A few signs that may show the build turning durable include a smaller gap between the official and street naira rates, more long-term foreign investment, and steadier oil earnings. A gap that stays small, now roughly N20 to N30, may mean investors trust the official rate and no longer need the street market. A clear rise in foreign direct investment, only $135 million last quarter against $9.86 billion of short-term money, might mean lasting capital is replacing funds that can leave at the next auction. Oil earnings that hold up, rather than sliding from the low $70s, should help keep reserves steady, since oil and gas bring in most of Nigeria’s export dollars.
“Reserves built on money chasing high yields can fall as fast as they rose, as they did after the last two oil shocks, when investors left, and the CBN spent years clearing a foreign-exchange backlog,” Precious added. “What holds through a downturn is slower money, direct investment, steady oil and non-oil export earnings and one credible naira rate, and that is the shift Nigeria has yet to make.”
By Olajumoke Bello
Across Nigeria, small and medium enterprises remain the backbone of economic activity. They drive trade, create jobs, and sustain millions of livelihoods. Yet, despite their importance, many SMEs continue to operate below their full potential due to persistent structural challenges.
Access to finance remains one of the most cited constraints. However, the issue today goes beyond the availability of capital. Many businesses struggle with financial readiness, weak documentation, and limited understanding of what lenders require. This often leads to missed opportunities, even when funding options exist.
At the same time, SMEs face gaps in market access and visibility. Business owners operate in highly localised environments, with limited exposure to broader networks that can unlock partnerships, new markets, and growth opportunities. This isolation can constrain scalability and reduce long-term competitiveness.
Equally important is the capability gap. Many entrepreneurs grow through resilience and experience but lack structured knowledge on critical areas such as financial management, export readiness, and digital adoption. Without this, even well-capitalised businesses can struggle to sustain growth.
These challenges point to a clear need for a more practical and integrated approach to SME support. It is no longer sufficient to offer standalone solutions. SMEs require ecosystems that combine knowledge, access, and direct engagement in ways that reflect how they actually operate.
A key shift is the move from centralised interventions to localised engagement. SMEs are deeply influenced by their immediate environments, whether markets, industrial clusters, or trade corridors. Solutions must therefore be brought closer to where these businesses function, allowing for more relevant support and stronger relationships.
Another important shift is from awareness to action. Business owners do not only need information; they need insights that they can apply immediately. This includes understanding how to structure their finances, how to access trade opportunities, and how to connect with the right partners to scale their operations.
There is also a growing need for continuity. Many SME-focused initiatives deliver strong initial impact but lack follow-through. For support to be effective, it must extend beyond one-off engagements into sustained relationships, with clear pathways for onboarding, advisory, and growth.
For financial institutions, this presents both responsibility and an opportunity. Supporting SMEs now requires moving beyond transactional banking to deeper partnership models. It requires understanding businesses at a granular level and co-creating solutions that evolve with their needs.
At Stanbic IBTC, this perspective continues to shape our approach to SME development. Our focus is on delivering practical support that translates into real business outcomes, helping enterprises grow, compete, and contribute more meaningfully to the economy.
As part of this commitment, we are extending our SME engagement to the regions through the Nigeria Business Summit Regional Tour. The tour will take structured, on-ground activations into key commercial hubs, where SMEs can access funding guidance, trade insights, advisory support, and direct engagement with financial experts.
The regional tour will take place across five strategic locations, bringing these solutions closer to business owners in Aba, Onitsha, Ibadan and Kano.
This approach reflects an important principle. When support moves closer to businesses and when solutions are delivered in ways that are practical and continuous, SMEs are better positioned to grow sustainably. In turn, this strengthens not only individual enterprises but the broader economy.
Olajumoke Bello is the Head of Enterprise Banking at Stanbic IBTC Bank
