World
BRICS+ Heading Towards Strategic Enlargement and Consolidating Multipolar World
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
The question yet stands: what potential countries with high aspirations are gearing up to join BRICS+, an informal association of developing economies, during the forthcoming summit this October 22-24? In the context of preparations for the BRICS+ summit, a number of significant issues, including the expansion of the association, were reviewed and considered at the sidelines of the 79th session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reiterated “the creation of a category of partner states” for the current association of BRICS+. Lavrov had already indicated the “suspension” of membership into BRICS+ and further emphasized that “the ministers reviewed the efforts to coordinate the modalities of the new category, BRICS partner countries” as far back in June 2024 during the BRICS Foreign Ministers Council in Russia’s Nizhny Novgorod.
In late September in New York, Lavrov told a news conference following his participation in the high-level week of the 79th session of the UN General Assembly that BRICS+ considered further expansion inappropriate for now, the current BRICS member countries now considered it not feasible to admit new members, but countries expressing readiness would only become supporting partners and would maintain permanent contacts. These partner members could use BRICS+ to pursue the common goals of fighting United States dominance and Western hegemony. BRICS is also steadily working towards creating a multipolar world.
“As for the prospects for BRICS expansion, at this stage, all affiliated countries consider it reasonable not to make new decisions for the time being and to adapt the organization, an association of like-minded members. There were five of us, now there are ten. Of course, this requires some kind of habituation and smooth entry of new members into the work in line with the traditions that the quintet has developed over the years,” Lavrov said.
On the other hand, the transition towards a new economic architecture, characterized by de-dollarization and diversification of global financial frameworks, presents immense opportunities and challenges for the Global South. Russia’s engagements with mostly common geopolitical like-minded countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America regions underscore the strategic importance of the future development of BRICS+.
Meanwhile, BRICS+ rising against United States hegemony and dominance, ultimately helps create the situation or conditions for China to emerge as the global economic power. The ultimate result – BRICS+ is rather driving China, with an estimated population of 1.5 billion, to establish a global presence, Russia has been cooperating within the external economic parameters, especially with China and India.
Under Russia’s BRICS presidency which began in January 2024, Ethiopia, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates became the second wave of the newest members to join BRICS. South Africa ascended in 2011 under China’s initiative. In 2015, BRICS established the New Development Bank (NDB), the only financial instrument to compete with other multilateral institutions such as the International Monetary Bank and the World Bank. While these operate worldwide, the NDB has limited scope of operations over the past decade. Nevertheless, NDB has made significant headway, at least, in consolidating its position and has also taken a few steps in raising the possibility of forging sustainable economic cooperation and collaborating on investment partnerships among member states. According to media reports, NDB primarily intended to pursue a flexible financial framework to create a fairer, more equitable system, in contrast to IMF and the World Bank. By advocating for these essential reforms, NDB portrays itself as the main instrument for reshaping the financial landscape for the Global South.
As often emphasized, BRICS+ functions on the basis of consensus. The consensus principle primarily aims at finding agreements that reflect the mutual accord of all participants. BRICS+ is an informal association of emerging economies based on a respectful attitude towards each other and on mutual consideration to promote collaboration based on a balance of interests and strictly adhering to the principle of the sovereign equality of states and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. Moreover, its transforming structure remains an emerging force for a new global architecture.
In these previous years, BRICS+ has been emerging as a key player in this world and has the potential to drive significant economic growth and development but BRICS+ and the Global South collaboration face the challenges of diversity in politics, economy and culture. This is evidently noticeable in the dynamism of tackling complex issues such as economic development, trade, climate change, and global governance. The degree of variations significantly in terms of their level of economic development and political influence could complicate efforts to create a cohesive alliance, according to experts’ interpretations.
Leaders will decide on BRICS membership expansion on the basis of full consultation and consensus. The following countries have either expressed interest in joining BRICS or have already applied for membership:
(i) AFRICA
Algeria: In terms of market size, Algeria has the tenth-largest proven natural gas reserves globally, is the world’s sixth-largest gas exporter, and has the world’s third-largest untapped shale gas resources.
According to reports, Africa States have submitted applications: Angola, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, DR Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Libya, Mali Republic and Niger Republic.
Nigeria: Nigeria’s Foreign Minister Yusuf Tuggar has announced that the country intends to become a member of the BRICS group of nations within the next two years. Nigeria has a GDP of $448 billion, a population of 213 million and a GDP per capita of $2,500. It has the world’s 9th largest gas reserves and significant oil reserves.
Senegal: It is a medium-capacity gold mining and energy player, with reserves in gold, oil, and gas. The energy industry is at a growth stage as reserves have only recently been found. The energy-hungry BRICS nations will be keen to secure their supplies.
Sudan: Sudan’s top five export markets are 100% BRICS – China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, India, and the UAE. Sudan also has regional clout. It is Africa’s third-largest country by area and is a member of the League of Arab States (LAS). Should Sudan join the BRICS it would give the group complete control of the Red Sea supply routes
East Africa: South Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda and Zimbabwe.
(ii) AMERICAS
Bolivia: Asset-rich but relatively poor, Bolivia has the fastest GDP growth rate in Latin America
There are also Chile, Colombia and Costa Rica.
Cuba: Cuba’s sanctions defiance has long made it a favourite of China and Russia when wanting to annoy the United States. It also has significant agreements with China and Russia, is a member of the BRI and has significant Caribbean and LatAm influence.
Ecuador: Ecuador is negotiating Free Trade Agreements with both China and the Eurasian Economic Union. It would make sense to substitute these with a looser BRICS arrangement in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras.
Nicaragua: Nicaragua is a mining player and the leading gold-producing country in Central America. It has a Free Trade Agreement with the ALBA bloc and is an influential player in the Caribbean.
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama and Peru.
Uruguay: Uruguay has joined the BRICS New Development Bank – a sure sign that official BRICS membership is pending.
Venezuela: Another outlier, but its energy reserves and political stance fit well with China and Russia’s needs.
(iii) ASIA
Afghanistan: An outlier, but Afghanistan has significant resources and is a member of the BRI. Diplomatic changes are required, but China, India and Russia are all keen to see redevelopment in the country once political stability can be secured.
Azerbaijan and Bahrain
Bangladesh: Bangladesh is one of the world’s top five fastest-growing economies and is undergoing significant infrastructure and trade development reforms. It shares a 4,100 km border with India.
Indonesia: One of Asia’s leading economies, Indonesia’s potential has again been raised to join BRICS. In July 2023, Jakarta accepted an invitation to participate in the 2023 BRICS summit.
Kazakhstan: Kazakhstan’s economy is highly dependent on oil and related products. In addition to oil, its main export commodities include natural gas, ferrous metals, copper, aluminium, zinc and uranium.
Others include Iraq, Kuwait, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar
Mongolia: Mongolia is both a problem and a solution, while geographically attractive. It requires extensive investment in its energy sector; yet is resource-rich and a transit point between Russia, Kazakhstan and China. It is not a member of any trade bloc, with a looser BRICS arrangement better suited to maintaining its regional impartiality.
Pakistan: Pakistan has filed an application to join the BRICS group of nations in 2024 and is counting on Russia’s assistance during the membership process, the country’s newly appointed Ambassador to Russia Muhammad Khalid Jamali has stated.
Sri Lanka: Sri Lanka isn’t keen on opening up its markets yet has significant economic problems. China is interested in port and Indian Ocean access while Russian tourism investments are increasing. A BRICS agreement would be loose enough to satisfy all concerns, while India will want to keep an eye on it.
Turkiye: Turkiye’s trade figures with the current and most of the upcoming BRICS members show significant growth. Getting access to BRICS NDB funding may also prove attractive for Ankara as talks are expected across a number of issues.
Thailand: Thailand is one of ASEAN’s largest economies, via ASEAN it has additional Free Trade Agreements with Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, China, Hong Kong and India, and agreements with Chile, and Peru. Thailand is also a signatory to the RCEP FTA between ASEAN and Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea.
Uzbekistan: Uzbekistan is one of Central Asia’s fastest-growing economies, yet it is hampered by being double-landlocked. Membership in BRICS would give it market access to China, Europe, and the rest of Asia in a more protected manner.
These have also shown potential interest: Syria, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Vietnam and Yemen.
(iv) EUROPE
Azerbaijan and Belarus: In the former Soviet space, Belarus and Azerbaijan have recently expressed their synonymized interest in leveraging the BRICS platform. Based on the historical fact that Belarus and Russia have already formed a Union State, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko irreversibly promised Belarus’ ascension into BRICS.
“Azerbaijan has filed an official application for joining BRICS,” Azerbaijan’s news agency quoted Foreign Ministry’s spokesman, Aykhan Hajizada. Baku’s intention to jump on the bandwagon of BRICS is reflected in the joint declaration on strategic partnership between Azerbaijan and China, which was signed on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Astana in early July.
That, however, Belarus sees BRICS as a basis for economic development and is ready to join integration processes within the framework of the informal association. “We are interested in getting involved in integration processes in that space. BRICS is another footing to help us maintain balance and economic stability,” BelTA agency quoted Lukashenko as emphatically asserting.
Notably, Azerbaijan and Belarus are former Soviet republics, with common historical backgrounds despite the stark indications of disparity in approach to current politics and economic development, much still remains uniquely common in cultural practice and in society. Undoubtedly, both the older and current generations have a comprehensive understanding of Soviet history and culture. Azerbaijan and Belarus becoming BRICS members will fortify the SCO operations in the region. Therefore, Azerbaijan and Belarus governments and their state institutions such as the cabinet, legislature and judiciary, would endorse aligning to BRICS, and its contribution towards shaping a new post-Soviet space within the framework of an emerging new geopolitical reality.
Meanwhile, as Sergey Lavrov noted “the weight, prestige and role of an individual candidate country and, of course, its position in the international arena” would be taken into account in decision-making on accepting new members to expand, a bit later, BRICS. An updated list of candidate countries for BRICS membership, which was “suspended” for the time being, would still be prepared for consideration at the October summit under Russia’s chairmanship.
Amid the heightening of geopolitical changes, the forthcoming BRICS summit in Kazan on October 22-24 presents an opportunity, most possibly, to determine and review critical pending issues including the association’s structure, and membership. Ensuring qualitative geopolitical influence must be the key priority. The political and economic impact should be paramount instead of anti-western rhetoric and stringent confrontation. As the situation stands, the numerical strength of BRICS is equally important as well as creating the necessary instruments and taking step-by-step comprehensive measures for promoting global peace and future development-oriented aspirations. Despite positive achievements and future expectations, challenges remain. Perhaps, some of the new members with political divergences have already begun to manipulate their national interest and therefore discredit BRICS as demonstrated by Ethiopia and Egypt at the UN General Assembly in New York.
World
United States Congress Pursuing AGOA Extension
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
After the expiration of bilateral agreement on trade, the US Congress as well as African leaders, highly recognizing its significance, has been pursuing the extension of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). The agreement, which allows duty-free access to American markets for African exporters, expired on September 30, 2025.
The US Congress is advancing a bill to revive and extend AGOA, but South Africa’s continued inclusion remains uncertain. The trade pact still has strong bipartisan support, with the House Ways and Means Committee approving it 37-3. However, US Trade Representative, Jamieson Greer, raised concerns about South Africa, citing tariffs and non-tariff barriers, and said the administration could consider excluding the country.
This threat puts at risk the duty-free access that has significantly benefited South African automotive, agricultural, and wine exports. The debate highlights how trade policy is becoming entangled with broader diplomatic tensions, casting uncertainty over a key pillar of US-Africa economic relations.
Nevertheless, South Africa continues to lobby for inclusion. South Africa trade summary records show that the US goods and services trade with South Africa estimated at $26.2 billion in 2024. The US and South Africa signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) as far back as in 2012.
The duty-free access for nearly 40 African countries has boosted development and fostered more equitable and sustainable growth in Africa. By design AGOA is a useful mechanism for improving accessibility to trade competitiveness, connectivity, and productivity. During these past 25 years, AGOA has been the cornerstone of US economic engagement with the countries of sub-Saharan Africa.
Key features and benefits of AGOA:
It’s worth reiterating here that during these past several years, AGOA has been the cornerstone of US economic engagement with the countries of sub-Saharan Africa. In this case, as AGOA is closely working with the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Secretariat and with the African Union (AU), trade professionals could primarily leverage various economic sectors and unwaveringly act as bridges between the United States and Africa.
* Duty-free Access: AGOA allows eligible products from sub-Saharan African countries to enter the US market without paying tariffs.
* Promotion of Economic Growth: The program encourages economic growth by providing incentives for African countries to open their economies and build free markets.
* Encouraging Economic Reforms: AGOA encourages economic and political reforms in eligible countries, including the rule of law and market-oriented policies.
* Increased Trade and Investment: The program aims to strengthen trade and investment ties between the United States and sub-Saharan Africa.
With the changing times, Africa is also building its muscles towards a new direction since the introduction of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which was officially launched in July 2019.
In practical terms, trading under the AfCFTA commenced in January 2021. And the United States has prioritized the AfCFTA as one mechanism through which to strengthen its long-term relations with the continent. In the context of the crucial geopolitical changes, African leaders, corporate executives, and the entire business community are optimistic over the extension of AGOA, for mutually beneficial trade partnerships with the United States.
Worthy to say that AGOA, to a considerable degree, as a significant trade policy has played a crucial role in promoting economic growth and development in sub-Saharan Africa.
World
Accelerating Intra-Africa Trade and Sustainable Development
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
Africa stands at the cusp of a transformative digital revolution. With the expansion of mobile connectivity, internet penetration, digital platforms, and financial technology, the continent’s digital economy is poised to become a significant driver of sustainable development, intra-Africa trade, job creation, and economic inclusion.
The African Union’s Agenda 2063, particularly Aspiration 1 (a prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development), highlights the importance of leveraging technology and innovation. The implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) has opened a new chapter in market integration, creating opportunities to unlock the full potential of the digital economy across all sectors.
Despite remarkable progress, challenges persist. These include limited digital infrastructure, disparities in digital literacy, fragmented regulatory frameworks, inadequate access to financing for tech-based enterprises, and gender gaps in digital participation. Moreover, Africa must assert its digital sovereignty, build local data ecosystems, and secure cyber-infrastructure to thrive in a rapidly changing global digital landscape.
Against this backdrop, the 16th African Union Private Sector Forum provides a timely platform to explore and shape actionable strategies for harnessing Africa’s digital economy to accelerate intra-Africa trade and sustainable development.
The 16th High-Level AU Private Sector forum is set to take place in Djibouti, from the 14 to 16 December 2025, under the theme “Harnessing Africa’s Digital Economy and Innovation for Accelerating Intra-Africa Trade and Sustainable Development”
The three-day Forum will feature high-level plenaries, expert panels, breakout sessions, and networking opportunities. Each day will spotlight a core pillar of Africa’s digital transformation journey.
Day 1: Digital Economy and Trade Integration in Africa
Focus: Leveraging digital platforms and technologies to enhance trade integration and competitiveness under AfCFTA.
Day 2: Innovation, Fintech, and the Future of African Economies
Focus: Driving economic inclusion through fintech, innovation ecosystems, and youth entrepreneurship.
Day 3: Building Policy, Regulatory Frameworks, and Partnerships for Digital Growth
Focus: Creating an enabling environment for digital innovation and infrastructure through effective policy, governance, and partnerships.
To foster strategic dialogue and action-oriented collaboration among key stakeholders in Africa’s digital ecosystem, with the goal of leveraging digital economy and innovation to boost intra-Africa trade, accelerate economic transformation, and support inclusive, sustainable development.
* Promote Digital Trade: Identify mechanisms and policy actions to enable seamless cross-border digital commerce and integration under AfCFTA.
* Foster Innovation and Fintech: Advance inclusive fintech ecosystems and support innovation-driven entrepreneurship, especially among youth and women.
* Policy and Regulatory Harmonization: Build consensus on regional and continental digital regulatory frameworks to foster trust, security, and interoperability.
* Encourage Investment and Public-Private Partnerships: Strengthen collaboration between governments, private sector, and development partners to invest in digital infrastructure, R&D, and skills development.
* Advance Digital Inclusion and Sustainability: Ensure that digital transformation contributes to environmental sustainability and the empowerment of marginalized communities.
The AU Private Sector Forum has held several forums, with key recommendations. These recommendations provide valuable insights into the challenges and opportunities facing the African private sector and offer guidance for policymakers on how to support its growth and development.
World
Russia’s Lukoil Losses Strategic Influence Across Africa
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
Lukoil, Russia’s energy giant, has seriously lost its grounds across Africa, due to United States sanctions. Sanctions have complicated the company’s potential continuity in operating its largest oil field projects, grappling its investment particularly in Republic of Ghana, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Federal Republic of Nigeria.
Reports indicated the sanctions are further dismantling most of Lukoil’s operations, causing significant staff layoffs in its offices worldwide. For instance, Lukoil’s significant upstream operations in the Middle East include a 75% stake in Iraq’s West Qurna 2 oilfield and a 60% stake in Iraq’s Block 10 development. In Egypt, the company holds stakes in various oilfields alongside local partners.
Lukoil has until December 13, 2025, to negotiate the sale of most of its international assets, including those in Asia, Africa and Latin America. It has already terminated several important agreements that were signed with international partners due to difficulties in circumventing the sanctions.
Reports said calculated efforts to diversify exploration business relations is turning extremely complex, and current at the cross-roads, Lukoil will have to ultimately give up existing contracts and agreements it had signed with external countries.
Lukoil’s website reports also pointed to reasons for abandoning oil and gas exploration and drilling project that it began in Sierra Leone. According to those reports, Lukoil could withdraw from almost all of the projects in West Africa.
In addition to geopolitical sanctions, technical and geographical hitches, Lukoil noted on its website, an additional obstacles that “the African leadership and government policies always pose serious problems to operations in the region.” Similarly, the Kremlin-controlled Rosneft abandoned its interest in the southern Africa oil pipeline construction, negatively impacted on Angola, Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe.
United States sanctions has hit Lukoil, one of the Russia’s biggest oil companies, like many other Russian companies, that has had a long history shuttling forth and back with declaration of business intentions or mere interests in tapping into oil and gas resources in Africa.
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