World
BRICS+ Heading Towards Strategic Enlargement and Consolidating Multipolar World
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
The question yet stands: what potential countries with high aspirations are gearing up to join BRICS+, an informal association of developing economies, during the forthcoming summit this October 22-24? In the context of preparations for the BRICS+ summit, a number of significant issues, including the expansion of the association, were reviewed and considered at the sidelines of the 79th session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reiterated “the creation of a category of partner states” for the current association of BRICS+. Lavrov had already indicated the “suspension” of membership into BRICS+ and further emphasized that “the ministers reviewed the efforts to coordinate the modalities of the new category, BRICS partner countries” as far back in June 2024 during the BRICS Foreign Ministers Council in Russia’s Nizhny Novgorod.
In late September in New York, Lavrov told a news conference following his participation in the high-level week of the 79th session of the UN General Assembly that BRICS+ considered further expansion inappropriate for now, the current BRICS member countries now considered it not feasible to admit new members, but countries expressing readiness would only become supporting partners and would maintain permanent contacts. These partner members could use BRICS+ to pursue the common goals of fighting United States dominance and Western hegemony. BRICS is also steadily working towards creating a multipolar world.
“As for the prospects for BRICS expansion, at this stage, all affiliated countries consider it reasonable not to make new decisions for the time being and to adapt the organization, an association of like-minded members. There were five of us, now there are ten. Of course, this requires some kind of habituation and smooth entry of new members into the work in line with the traditions that the quintet has developed over the years,” Lavrov said.
On the other hand, the transition towards a new economic architecture, characterized by de-dollarization and diversification of global financial frameworks, presents immense opportunities and challenges for the Global South. Russia’s engagements with mostly common geopolitical like-minded countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America regions underscore the strategic importance of the future development of BRICS+.
Meanwhile, BRICS+ rising against United States hegemony and dominance, ultimately helps create the situation or conditions for China to emerge as the global economic power. The ultimate result – BRICS+ is rather driving China, with an estimated population of 1.5 billion, to establish a global presence, Russia has been cooperating within the external economic parameters, especially with China and India.
Under Russia’s BRICS presidency which began in January 2024, Ethiopia, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates became the second wave of the newest members to join BRICS. South Africa ascended in 2011 under China’s initiative. In 2015, BRICS established the New Development Bank (NDB), the only financial instrument to compete with other multilateral institutions such as the International Monetary Bank and the World Bank. While these operate worldwide, the NDB has limited scope of operations over the past decade. Nevertheless, NDB has made significant headway, at least, in consolidating its position and has also taken a few steps in raising the possibility of forging sustainable economic cooperation and collaborating on investment partnerships among member states. According to media reports, NDB primarily intended to pursue a flexible financial framework to create a fairer, more equitable system, in contrast to IMF and the World Bank. By advocating for these essential reforms, NDB portrays itself as the main instrument for reshaping the financial landscape for the Global South.
As often emphasized, BRICS+ functions on the basis of consensus. The consensus principle primarily aims at finding agreements that reflect the mutual accord of all participants. BRICS+ is an informal association of emerging economies based on a respectful attitude towards each other and on mutual consideration to promote collaboration based on a balance of interests and strictly adhering to the principle of the sovereign equality of states and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. Moreover, its transforming structure remains an emerging force for a new global architecture.
In these previous years, BRICS+ has been emerging as a key player in this world and has the potential to drive significant economic growth and development but BRICS+ and the Global South collaboration face the challenges of diversity in politics, economy and culture. This is evidently noticeable in the dynamism of tackling complex issues such as economic development, trade, climate change, and global governance. The degree of variations significantly in terms of their level of economic development and political influence could complicate efforts to create a cohesive alliance, according to experts’ interpretations.
Leaders will decide on BRICS membership expansion on the basis of full consultation and consensus. The following countries have either expressed interest in joining BRICS or have already applied for membership:
(i) AFRICA
Algeria: In terms of market size, Algeria has the tenth-largest proven natural gas reserves globally, is the world’s sixth-largest gas exporter, and has the world’s third-largest untapped shale gas resources.
According to reports, Africa States have submitted applications: Angola, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, DR Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Libya, Mali Republic and Niger Republic.
Nigeria: Nigeria’s Foreign Minister Yusuf Tuggar has announced that the country intends to become a member of the BRICS group of nations within the next two years. Nigeria has a GDP of $448 billion, a population of 213 million and a GDP per capita of $2,500. It has the world’s 9th largest gas reserves and significant oil reserves.
Senegal: It is a medium-capacity gold mining and energy player, with reserves in gold, oil, and gas. The energy industry is at a growth stage as reserves have only recently been found. The energy-hungry BRICS nations will be keen to secure their supplies.
Sudan: Sudan’s top five export markets are 100% BRICS – China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, India, and the UAE. Sudan also has regional clout. It is Africa’s third-largest country by area and is a member of the League of Arab States (LAS). Should Sudan join the BRICS it would give the group complete control of the Red Sea supply routes
East Africa: South Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda and Zimbabwe.
(ii) AMERICAS
Bolivia: Asset-rich but relatively poor, Bolivia has the fastest GDP growth rate in Latin America
There are also Chile, Colombia and Costa Rica.
Cuba: Cuba’s sanctions defiance has long made it a favourite of China and Russia when wanting to annoy the United States. It also has significant agreements with China and Russia, is a member of the BRI and has significant Caribbean and LatAm influence.
Ecuador: Ecuador is negotiating Free Trade Agreements with both China and the Eurasian Economic Union. It would make sense to substitute these with a looser BRICS arrangement in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras.
Nicaragua: Nicaragua is a mining player and the leading gold-producing country in Central America. It has a Free Trade Agreement with the ALBA bloc and is an influential player in the Caribbean.
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama and Peru.
Uruguay: Uruguay has joined the BRICS New Development Bank – a sure sign that official BRICS membership is pending.
Venezuela: Another outlier, but its energy reserves and political stance fit well with China and Russia’s needs.
(iii) ASIA
Afghanistan: An outlier, but Afghanistan has significant resources and is a member of the BRI. Diplomatic changes are required, but China, India and Russia are all keen to see redevelopment in the country once political stability can be secured.
Azerbaijan and Bahrain
Bangladesh: Bangladesh is one of the world’s top five fastest-growing economies and is undergoing significant infrastructure and trade development reforms. It shares a 4,100 km border with India.
Indonesia: One of Asia’s leading economies, Indonesia’s potential has again been raised to join BRICS. In July 2023, Jakarta accepted an invitation to participate in the 2023 BRICS summit.
Kazakhstan: Kazakhstan’s economy is highly dependent on oil and related products. In addition to oil, its main export commodities include natural gas, ferrous metals, copper, aluminium, zinc and uranium.
Others include Iraq, Kuwait, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar
Mongolia: Mongolia is both a problem and a solution, while geographically attractive. It requires extensive investment in its energy sector; yet is resource-rich and a transit point between Russia, Kazakhstan and China. It is not a member of any trade bloc, with a looser BRICS arrangement better suited to maintaining its regional impartiality.
Pakistan: Pakistan has filed an application to join the BRICS group of nations in 2024 and is counting on Russia’s assistance during the membership process, the country’s newly appointed Ambassador to Russia Muhammad Khalid Jamali has stated.
Sri Lanka: Sri Lanka isn’t keen on opening up its markets yet has significant economic problems. China is interested in port and Indian Ocean access while Russian tourism investments are increasing. A BRICS agreement would be loose enough to satisfy all concerns, while India will want to keep an eye on it.
Turkiye: Turkiye’s trade figures with the current and most of the upcoming BRICS members show significant growth. Getting access to BRICS NDB funding may also prove attractive for Ankara as talks are expected across a number of issues.
Thailand: Thailand is one of ASEAN’s largest economies, via ASEAN it has additional Free Trade Agreements with Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, China, Hong Kong and India, and agreements with Chile, and Peru. Thailand is also a signatory to the RCEP FTA between ASEAN and Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea.
Uzbekistan: Uzbekistan is one of Central Asia’s fastest-growing economies, yet it is hampered by being double-landlocked. Membership in BRICS would give it market access to China, Europe, and the rest of Asia in a more protected manner.
These have also shown potential interest: Syria, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Vietnam and Yemen.
(iv) EUROPE
Azerbaijan and Belarus: In the former Soviet space, Belarus and Azerbaijan have recently expressed their synonymized interest in leveraging the BRICS platform. Based on the historical fact that Belarus and Russia have already formed a Union State, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko irreversibly promised Belarus’ ascension into BRICS.
“Azerbaijan has filed an official application for joining BRICS,” Azerbaijan’s news agency quoted Foreign Ministry’s spokesman, Aykhan Hajizada. Baku’s intention to jump on the bandwagon of BRICS is reflected in the joint declaration on strategic partnership between Azerbaijan and China, which was signed on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Astana in early July.
That, however, Belarus sees BRICS as a basis for economic development and is ready to join integration processes within the framework of the informal association. “We are interested in getting involved in integration processes in that space. BRICS is another footing to help us maintain balance and economic stability,” BelTA agency quoted Lukashenko as emphatically asserting.
Notably, Azerbaijan and Belarus are former Soviet republics, with common historical backgrounds despite the stark indications of disparity in approach to current politics and economic development, much still remains uniquely common in cultural practice and in society. Undoubtedly, both the older and current generations have a comprehensive understanding of Soviet history and culture. Azerbaijan and Belarus becoming BRICS members will fortify the SCO operations in the region. Therefore, Azerbaijan and Belarus governments and their state institutions such as the cabinet, legislature and judiciary, would endorse aligning to BRICS, and its contribution towards shaping a new post-Soviet space within the framework of an emerging new geopolitical reality.
Meanwhile, as Sergey Lavrov noted “the weight, prestige and role of an individual candidate country and, of course, its position in the international arena” would be taken into account in decision-making on accepting new members to expand, a bit later, BRICS. An updated list of candidate countries for BRICS membership, which was “suspended” for the time being, would still be prepared for consideration at the October summit under Russia’s chairmanship.
Amid the heightening of geopolitical changes, the forthcoming BRICS summit in Kazan on October 22-24 presents an opportunity, most possibly, to determine and review critical pending issues including the association’s structure, and membership. Ensuring qualitative geopolitical influence must be the key priority. The political and economic impact should be paramount instead of anti-western rhetoric and stringent confrontation. As the situation stands, the numerical strength of BRICS is equally important as well as creating the necessary instruments and taking step-by-step comprehensive measures for promoting global peace and future development-oriented aspirations. Despite positive achievements and future expectations, challenges remain. Perhaps, some of the new members with political divergences have already begun to manipulate their national interest and therefore discredit BRICS as demonstrated by Ethiopia and Egypt at the UN General Assembly in New York.
By Aduragbemi Omiyale
Accessing the US Dollar in the East Africa region has now been made easier with the expansion of the stablecoin settlement infrastructure of SCRYPT.
This development enables banks, payment providers and corporate treasury teams to move value into and out of the continent in real time.
Businesses paying international suppliers frequently have to convert local currency into USD before purchasing stablecoins for settlement, incurring FX conversions and spreads before any payment is made.
But SCRYPT is eliminating this intermediate conversion by enabling direct settlement corridors for local African currencies into stablecoins.
This development allows businesses to move from local currency to stablecoin settlement in a single licensed transaction, without first sourcing rationed bank dollars, as stablecoins are increasingly becoming settlement infrastructure rather than an investment product.
The expansion adds settlement support across four African currencies: the Kenyan shilling (KES), Tanzanian shilling (TZS), Rwandan franc (RWF) and Ugandan shilling (UGX). Each corridor is delivered through the same full-stack infrastructure our clients already use for trading, custody and treasury operations.
Speaking on this, the chief executive of SCRYPT, Norman Wooding, said, “Across Africa, stablecoin adoption is driven by economic need, not speculation.
“Businesses here are not chasing yield; they are trying to pay suppliers and manage treasury without losing margin to a banking system that rations dollars. Licensed, fair-rate dollar access is the clearest proof of what this infrastructure is for.”
Also commenting, the Managing Director of Markets & Trading at SCRYPT, Mr Gabriel Titopoulos, said, “Until now, reaching stablecoins from local African currencies meant buying scarce dollars and incurring several layers of conversion costs.
“SCRYPT removes this friction. Firms and payment providers can now settle straight from local currencies through live corridors, with local partners.”
World
African Graduates Association Promoting Multifaceted Initiatives With Russian Educational Institutions
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
In preparations for the third Russia-Africa Summit, scheduled for late October 2026, Dr Francois Ngan, deputy chairman of the Union of Associations of African Graduates of Soviet and Russian Universities, during an official working visit, has held a consultative meeting with Professor Vladimir Filippov, the President of the Russian University of Peoples’ Friendship (RUDN), and former Minister of Higher Education of Russia, Chairman of the National Commission for Accreditation of Higher Education.
RUDN is an educational institution established in 1960, primarily to provide higher education to Third World students. It has now become a popular multidisciplinary spot for many students, especially from developing countries. The university offers various academic programmes and has research infrastructure that comprises laboratories and interdisciplinary centres. The university is named after the former Congolese leader, Patrice Lumumba.
Dr Francois Ngan and Professor Filippov discussed the importance of the Graduates Association as a continental platform dedicated to strengthening unity, cooperation, and promoting shared progress among African graduates who studied in the former Soviet Union and in the Russian Federation. They also reviewed multifaceted initiatives that could bring together alumni associations from across Africa, whose members obtained education and professional training, and cultural experiences in Soviet and Russian institutions of higher learning.
Professor Filippov expressed optimism in addressing emerging challenges as a result of shifting geopolitical changes, emphasised strategic cooperation in the educational sphere with Africa, in general, and with the Republic of Cameroon, in particular, and further about the integration of African students during their studies in the Russian Federation.
The meeting also touched on academic and scientific work, the possibility of rewriting a scientific thesis, and the official organisation of transferring versions translated into six languages for the library of RUDN. Significant questions relating to Russia’s educational opportunities, collaborations and partnerships involving African countries were thoroughly discussed.
The Union of Associations of African Graduates of Soviet and Russian Universities was created under one continental umbrella to promote friendship, for professional networking, to engage in cultural exchange, and with particular emphasis on forging strategic cooperation between Africa and Russia.
World
Russia to Support Industrial Growth, Technological Advancement and Supply Chain Resilience across Africa
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
With the heightening of geopolitical rivalry and competition, a new Russia-Africa working group has emerged as a significant institutional mechanism and plans to focus on facilitating and monitoring strategic investments, industrialisation, and infrastructural development—the Strategic Action Plan 2023-2026—that was outlined during the second Russia-Africa summit, in St.Petersburg, the second largest city in the Russian Federation.
While substantial progress has, largely, lagged on the multidimensional economic front with Africa primarily due to its internal difficulties and the complexity of relations with its former Soviet neighbours, Russian officials believe there still remains huge untapped potential in strengthening bilateral cooperation. As planned, President Vladimir Putin has already signed an executive order that directs Moscow to host the forthcoming third Russia-Africa summit in October 2026.
On June 30, a regular meeting of the Business Council on Africa was held under the chairmanship of the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry. It was dedicated to issues of trade, economic and investment cooperation with Africa. The group discussed the current state and prospects for the implementation of policy initiatives with an emphasis on assisting the countries of the continent, strengthening their economic, energy, technological and food sovereignty, as well as training specialists for Africa.
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has reiterated that Russia-Africa relations primarily depend on an understanding of the importance of collective action based on the principles of equality, mutual respect and resolving common tasks. In the past few years, Russia-Africa cooperation has been noticeably strengthening. “We are deepening political dialogues, developing bilateral contacts with African countries, promoting cordial cooperation between ministries and departments, and expanding humanitarian exchanges. We are also continuing the structural diversification of trade partnerships and economic dimensions.”
“Next on the agenda is the launch of diplomatic missions in The Gambia, Liberia, Togo, and the Union of the Comoros,” Lavrov said at a meeting of the Business Council under the Russian foreign minister. Lavrov noted that Russian embassies began operating in three other African countries in 2025: Niger, Sierra Leone, and South Sudan. A new Department for Partnership with Africa was also established. According to the top diplomat, “expanding Russia’s diplomatic presence on the continent contributes to developing relations.”
There are already 45 Russian embassies operating in Africa. The Russian foreign minister noted that Moscow is quickly rebuilding its presence in African countries, which sharply declined during the collapse of the Soviet Union. “There will be literally four or five countries left where we still need to establish full-fledged embassies, and then, we will have 100 per cent coverage of the entire African continent with our diplomatic presence,” Lavrov emphasised.
After the first summit in October 2019, the Foreign Ministry also created the Secretariat of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum. Its main tasks include controlling the roadmap to Africa’s multidimensional cooperation and guiding potential Russian investors to the continent. This also underscored the priority and post-Soviet solidarity Russia currently attaches to its policy towards Africa, within the growing framework of the emerging new architecture of multipolarity in the Global South.
In an interview in June 2026, the director of the Department of Partnership with Africa at the Foreign Ministry, Tatyana Dovgalenko, shared a few insights in the lead-up to the third summit. Furthermore, Dovgalenko explained that Russia would move away from security to concentrate more on economic issues, especially to team up with African colleagues to streamline mechanisms for implementing projects that will ensure food security and agriculture, and help Africa in installing processing facilities to support its self-sufficiency. She also emphasised energy and vital infrastructures, and the third direction was to simultaneously work more coherently with sub-regional organisations.
Over the past few years, bilateral relations have been increasing. There are positive dynamics in trade turnover, estimated at $30 billion. Steps are being taken to build payment systems, preferably in national currencies, while Russia looks to open four more diplomatic offices, bringing the total to 48 across Africa. Russia is currently training 37,000 African students, but only approximately 1/3 on state scholarships in Russia’s educational institutions. “We are ready to share valuable experiences of building a sovereign development model with African partners to achieve self-reliant economic growth based on their own resources and capabilities. Russia aims at creating processing capabilities and localising production, and provides access to advanced technological solutions,” underlined Dovgalenko in her interview with New Eastern Outlook.
For African countries that have endured difficult decades on the path to political independence, it is now important to take full control over the untapped resources, direct income and revenue toward stimulating the national economic sector, rather than paying for the well-being of the Western “golden billion” during this changing geopolitical era, according to Dovgalenko.
According to reports, the forthcoming Russia-Africa summit will have an economic agenda, including the digital economy, technology, artificial intelligence, healthcare, investment, and settlements in global trade. Of course, the agenda will also cover Africa’s political aspects. But if African friends bring along any specific ideas, Russia will give them serious attention. In addition, with continuity and consistency, pay increased attention to expanding ties with Africa’s regional integration associations.
Going forward, the focus will be on translating strong trade relations into deeper investment partnerships, fostering technology collaboration, strengthening industrial linkages and contributing towards the shared objectives set by the leadership of both African countries and Russia. At the third summit, the above-mentioned specific initiatives will be further designed. In this regard, the key document, the new action plan for the next three-year period (2027-2029), is intended to reflect dynamic realities in the future relations of Russia and Africa
