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COMESA Competition Commission Unveils Draft Guidelines

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COMESA Competition Commission

By Lerisha Naidu and Zareenah Rasool

The COMESA Competition Commission published draft guidelines to the COMESA Competition Regulations, 2004 (Regulations) for public comment on October 19, 2021.

The guidelines aim to provide clarity on the commission’s policies and procedures and to foster transparency and certainty in the administration and enforcement of the Regulations.

These draft guidelines are based on international best practices and policy approaches of key regulators, including the European Commission.

They address three fundamental areas of regulatory enforcement – the determination of fines and administrative penalties, settlement procedures and hearing procedures.

The determination of fines and administrative penalties

To ensure proportionality and fairness in imposing sanctions for antitrust violations, the commission has devised a two-step methodology for calculating penalties under the Regulations. The two-step methodology will entail computing a “base amount” and increasing or decreasing it according to aggravating or mitigating considerations, on a case-by-case basis.

Base Amount: The commission will set the base amount for a fine based on the undertaking’s turnover within the common market in the financial year preceding the infringement.

The proposed starting point for determining the base amount for specific infringements is a proportion of the infringing entity’s revenue. By way of example, the base proportion of turnover would be 5% for cartel conduct, 3% for abuse of dominance, and 2% for gun-jumping. To compute the final base amount, the commission will consider the nature, gravity, and duration of the infringement, as well as the number of affected consumers.

Adjustments: The base amount may be adjusted upward based on aggravating factors such as repeat offences, refusal to cooperate and/or being characterized as an “initiator” of the conduct concerned.

Conversely, the base amount may be adjusted downward based on mitigating factors such as full cooperation, efficiency justifications for the conduct, extent of involvement, and even negligence in engaging in the alleged conduct.

Ultimately, the fine imposed shall not be in excess of 10% of the infringing entity’s annual turnover. To establish a sufficiently deterrent effect, the Commission may increase the fine by up to 1% of the total turnover, subject to the 10% cap. Importantly, fines imposed may exceed the infringement‑related gains.

The commission may also levy a “symbolic fine” in specific instances. The draft guidelines do not define a “symbolic fine”, the manner in which it will be computed, or under what circumstances it may be imposed.

It appears that such a fine would not be computed in accordance with the above two-step methodology. This will involve the exercise of the authority’s discretion and may result in a lack of certainty and clarity, for which additional guidance may be necessary.

Settlement procedures

Procuring settlements is crucial to effective antitrust enforcement, and increases procedural efficiency, thus reducing time and financial resources spent on proceedings. To that end, the draft guidelines are intended to provide direction on the Commission’s approach to settlement proceedings in relation to antitrust infringements.

The guidelines state that no admission of infringement or culpability is required for authorisation proceedings under Article 20 of the Regulations (in terms of which the commission may grant authorization to an entity to enter and/or give effect to an agreement if its public benefits outweigh any anticompetitive effects), which is in line with the Regulations. However, certain settlement proceedings require an admission of liability – these settlement proceedings are those relating to Article 19 abuse of dominance, Article 21 determination of anticompetitive conduct on request (by any person who believes that activity by a firm located in a Member State has the effect, or is likely to have the effect, of restricting competition in the Common Market), and Article 22 determination of anticompetitive conduct at the Commission’s own initiative (where the Commission has reason to believe that business conduct by an undertaking restrains competition in the Common Market). Many jurisdictions take a similar approach. The non-imposition of admissions of guilt clauses may go some way towards fostering parties’ willingness to enter into settlement agreements.

The draft guidelines further state that joint representatives must be appointed by the parties when the Commission commences settlement proceedings against two or more parties within a single economic unit. The appointment of joint representatives is simply to ease the settlement discussions.

According to the guidelines, the committee responsible for initial determinations would be vested with the power to confirm or withhold its confirmation of a settlement reached between the Commission and infringing parties. Withholding confirmation would occur in circumstances of “blatant and unfair settlement terms”.

It is unclear whether the committee would have the discretion to either refer the settlement agreement back to the Commission for renegotiation or with proposed changes, or the Committee would have the legal power to make the appropriate changes prior to confirmation of the settlement agreement. Arguably, the former would be a sensible approach to allow the parties to comment on any proposed changes.

Hearing procedures

These rules provide broad guidance on the elements of any hearing, including notice timelines, when hearings may be held, evidence testing, and the conduct of proceedings. The Regulations allow hearings in three situations – during the investigative process, before the publication of notice of compulsory recall of defective goods, and before the Committee for initial determination of cases.

Hearings may also be requested by a party under investigation. A COVID-friendly inclusion into the guidelines states that hearings can be conducted in private or in public, either via video conference, physical attendance, or both.

The rules specify that if the Committee issues a breach order, it may direct parties to discuss a remedy. If the parties cannot agree on a remedy, the Committee would issue an order without further consultation. Parties would still be able to review and/or appeal the order on the merits.

Lastly, the guidelines note that the determination of the Committee for initial determinations would be published in its official publication. However, parties would be allowed to object to such publication based on legitimate business interests.

Interested parties have been invited to submit their comments on these draft guidelines by no later than Friday, November 12, 2021, by emailing the Registrar of the Commission, Meti Demissie Disasa at [email protected] or [email protected].

Lerisha Naidu is a Partner at Sphesihle Nxumalo, Associate, while Zareenah Rasool is a Candidate Attorney, Competition & Antitrust Practice at Baker McKenzie Johannesburg

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Abebe Selassie to Retire as Director of African Department at IMF

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Abebe Aemro Selassie

By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has announced the retirement of its director of the African department, Abebe Aemro Selassie, on May 1, 2026. Since his appointment in 2016, Abebe Selassie has served in this position for a decade. During his tenure, IMF added a 25th chair to its Executive Board, increasing the voice of sub-Saharan Africa.

As a director for Africa, he has overseen the IMF’s engagement with 45 countries across sub-Saharan Africa. Abebe and his team work closely with the region’s leaders and policymakers to improve economic and development outcomes. This includes oversight of the IMF’s intensified engagement with the region in recent years, including some $60 billion in financial support the institution has provided to countries since 2020. Reports indicated that under his leadership, his department generally reinforces the organization’s role as a trusted partner to many African countries.

Abebe Selassie has worked with both the regional economic blocs and the African Union (AU) as well as individual African states. The key focus has been the strategic articulation of Africa’s development priorities in reshaping economic governance, mobilizing sustainable investments, and addressing systemic financial challenges.

It is important noting that the IMF has funded diverse infrastructure projects that facilitated either export-led growth or import substitution industrialization models of development. Further to that, African states have also made numerous loans and benefited from much-needed debt relief.

Summarizing the IMF’s key focus areas, among others, for Africa: (i) reforming the global financial architecture in an effort to improve the structure, institutions, rules, and processes that govern international finance in order to make the global economy more stable, equitable, and resilient.

Concessional financing to counter rising borrowing costs, with Africa paying up to 5 times more in interest than advanced economies (AfDB, 2023). Fair representation, pushing for IMF quota reforms to reflect Africa’s $3.4 trillion collective GDP—yet the continent holds less than 5% of voting shares in Bretton Woods institutions.

(ii) Unlocking Investments for Jobs and Sustainable Growth. With Africa’s working-age population set to double to 1 billion by 2050, the African states spotlight: The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), projected to boost intra-African trade by 52% and create 30 million jobs by 2035 (World Bank, 2024).  Infrastructure partnerships, targeting sectors such as renewable energy, where Africa receives only 2% of global clean energy investments despite its vast solar and wind potential (IEA, 2024).

(iii) Climate Finance and Debt Relief for Resilience: Africa contributes less than 4% of global emissions but bears the brunt of climate shocks, losing 5–15% of GDP per capita to climate-related disasters annually (African Development Bank, 2024). These are strictly in alignment with Agenda 2063’s aspirations for inclusive growth, maximizing multilateral cooperation and enhancing global engagement with the continent.

“I am deeply grateful for Abe’s visionary leadership, dedication to the Fund’s mission, and unwavering commitment to the members in the region,” Ms. Kristalina Georgieva, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). “The legacy he leaves on the Fund’s work in Africa is one of alignment with the aspirations of people, especially the youth, for good governance, strong economies and lasting prosperity. His trusted advice has been invaluable to me personally, and his leadership has strengthened our mission.”

“A national of Ethiopia, Selassie first joined the IMF in 1994. Over his remarkable 32-year career, he held senior positions including Deputy Director in AFR, Mission Chief for Portugal and South Africa, Division Chief of the Regional Studies Division, and Senior Resident Representative in Uganda. Earlier, he contributed to programs in Turkey, Thailand, Romania, and Estonia, and worked on policy, operational review, and economic research.”

Under his ten-year leadership and as director of the African Department (AFR), Abebe Selassie helped to reinforce the Fund’s role as a trusted partner with sub-Saharan African members. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is an international organization that promotes global economic growth and financial stability, encourages international trade, and reduces poverty.

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Africa Squeezed between Import Substitution and Dependency Syndrome

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Dependency Syndrome

By Kestér Kenn  Klomegâh

Squeezed between import substitution and dependency syndrome, a condition characterized by a set of associated economic symptoms—that is rules and regulations—majority of African countries are shifting from United States and Europe to an incoherent alternative bilateral partnerships with Russia, China and the Global South.

By forging new partnerships, for instance with Russia, these African countries rather create conspicuous economic dependency at the expense of strengthening their own local production, attainable by supporting local farmers under state budget. Import-centric partnership ties and lack of diversification make these African countries committed to import-dependent structures. It invariably compounds domestic production challenges. Needless to say that Africa has huge arable land and human resources to ensure food security.

A classical example that readily comes to mind is Ghana, and other West African countries. With rapidly accelerating economic policy, Ghana’s President John Dramani Mahama ordered the suspension of U.S. chicken and agricultural products, reaffirming swift measures for transforming local agriculture considered as grounds for ensuring sustainable food security and economic growth and, simultaneously, for driving job creation.

President John Dramani Mahama, in early December 2025, while observing Agricultural Day, urged Ghanaians to take up farming, highlighting the guarantee and state support needed for affordable credit and modern tools to boost food security. According to Mahama, Ghana spends $3bn yearly on basic food imports from abroad.

The government decision highlights the importance of leveraging unto local agriculture technology and innovation. Creating opportunities to unlock the full potential of depending on available resources within the new transformative policy strategy which aims at boosting local productivity. President John Dramani Mahama’s special initiatives are the 24-Hour Economy and the Big Push Agenda. One of the pillars focuses on Grow 24 – modernising agriculture.

Despite remarkable commendations for new set of economic recovery, Ghana’s demand for agricultural products is still high, and this time making a smooth shift to Russia whose poultry meat and wheat currently became the main driver of exports to African countries. And Ghana, noticeably, accepts large quantity (tonnes) of poultry from Russia’s Rostov region into the country, according to several media reports. The supplies include grains, but also vegetable oils, meat and dairy products, fish and finished food products have significant potential for Africa.

The Agriculture Ministry’s Agroexport Department acknowledges Russia exports chicken to Ghana, with Ghanaian importers sourcing Russian poultry products, especially frozen cuts, to meet significant local demand that far outstrips domestic production, even after Ghana lifted a temporary 2020 avian flu-related ban on Russian poultry.

Moreover, monitoring and basic research indicated Russian producers are actively increasing poultry exports to various African countries, thus boosting trade, although Ghana still struggles to balance imports with local industry needs.

A few details indicate the following:

Trade Resumed: Ghana has lifted its ban on Russian poultry imports since April 2021, allowing poultry trade to resume. Russian regions have, thus far, consistently exported these poultry meat and products into the country under regulatory but flexible import rules on a negotiated bilateral agreement.

Significant Market: In any case, Ghana is a key African market for Russian poultry, with exports seeing substantial growth in recent years, alongside Angola, Benin, Cote d’Voire, Nigeria and Sierra Leone.

Demand-Driven: Ghana’s large gap between domestic poultry production and national demand necessitates significant imports, creating opportunities for foreign suppliers like Russia.

Major Exporters: Russia poultry companies are focused on increasing generally their African exports, with Ghana being a major destination. The basic question: to remain as import dependency or strive at attaining food sufficiency?

Product Focus: Exports typically include frozen chicken cuts (legs and meat) very vital for supplementing local supply. But as the geopolitical dynamics shift, Ghana and other importing African countries have to review partnerships, particularly with Russia.

Despite the fact that challenges persist, Russia strongly remains as a notable supplier to Ghana, even under the supervision of John Mahama’s administration, dealing as a friendly ally, both have the vision for multipolar trade architecture, ultimately fulfilling a critical role in meeting majority of African countries’ large consumer demand for poultry products, and with Russia’s trade actively expanding and Ghana’s preparedness to spend on such imports from the state budget.

Following two high-profile Russia–Africa summits, cooperation in the area of food security emerged as a key theme. Moscow pledged to boost agricultural exports to the continent—especially grain, poultry, and fertilisers—while African leaders welcomed the prospect of improved food supplies.

Nevertheless, do these African governments think of prioritising agricultural self-sufficiency. At a May 2025 meeting in St. Petersburg, Russia’s Economic Development Minister, Maxim Reshetnikov, underlined the fact that more than 40 Russian companies were keen to export animal products and agricultural goods to the African region.

Russia, eager to expand its economic footprint, sees large-scale agricultural exports as a key revenue generator. Estimates suggest the Russian government could earn over $15 billion annually from these agricultural exports to African continent.

Head of the Agroexport Federal Center, Ilya Ilyushin, speaking at the round table “Russia-Africa: A Strategic Partnership in Agriculture to Ensure Food Security,” which was held as part of the international conference on ensuring the food sovereignty of African countries in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) on Nov. 21, 2025, said: “We see significant potential in expanding supplies of Russian agricultural products to Africa.”

Ilya Ilyushin, however, mentioned that the Agriculture Ministry’s Agroexport Department, and the Union of Grain Exporters and Producers, exported over 32,000 tonnes of wheat and barley to Egypt totaling nearly $8 million during the first half of 2025, Kenya totaling over $119 million.

Interfax media reports referred to African countries whose markets are of interest for Russian producers and exporters. Despite existing difficulties, supplies of livestock products are also growing, this includes poultry meat, Ilyushin said. Exports of agricultural products from Russia to African countries have more than doubled, and third quarter of 2025 reached almost $7 billion.

The key buyers of Russian grain on the continent are Egypt, Algeria, Kenya, Libya, Tunisia, Nigeria, Morocco, South Africa, Tanzania and Sudan, he said. According to him, Russia needs to expand the geography of supplies, increasing exports to other regions of the continent, increase supplies in West Africa to Benin, Cameroon, Ghana, Liberia and the French-speaking Sahelian States.

Nevertheless, Russian exporters have nothing to complain. Africa’s dependency dilemma still persists. Therefore, Russia to continue expanding food exports to Africa explicitly reflects a calculated economic and geopolitical strategy. In the end of the analysis, the debate plays out prominently and the primary message: Africa cannot and must not afford to sacrifice food sovereignty for colourful symbolism and geopolitical solidarity.

With the above analysis, Russian exporters show readiness to explore and shape actionable strategies for harnessing Africa’s consumer market, including that of Ghana, and further to strengthen economic and trade cooperation and support its dynamic vision for sustainable development in the context of multipolar friendship and solidarity.

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Coup Leader Mamady Doumbouya Wins Guinea’s 2025 Presidential Election

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Mamady Doumbouya

By Adedapo Adesanya

Guinea’s military leader Mamady Doumbouya will fully transition to its democratic president after he was elected president of the West African nation.

The former special forces commander seized power in 2021, toppling then-President Alpha Conde, who had been in office since 2010.

Mr Doumbouya reportedly won 86.72 per cent of the election held on December 28, an absolute majority that allows him to avoid a runoff. He will hold the forte for the next seven years as law permits.

The Supreme Court has eight days to validate the results in the event of any challenge. However, this may not be so as ousted Conde and Mr Cellou Dalein Diallo, Guinea’s longtime opposition leader, are in exile.

The election saw Doumbouya face off a fragmented opposition of eight challengers.

One of the opposition candidates, Mr Faya Lansana Millimono claimed the election was marred by “systematic fraudulent practices” and that observers were prevented from monitoring the voting and counting processes.

Guinea is the world leader in bauxite and holds a very large gold reserve. The country is preparing to occupy a leading position in iron ore with the launch of the Simandou project in November, expected to become the world’s largest iron mine.

Mr Doumbouya has claimed credit for pushing the project forward and ensuring Guinea benefits from its output. He has also revoked the licence of Emirates Global Aluminium’s subsidiary Guinea Alumina Corporation following a refinery dispute, transferring the unit’s assets to a state-owned firm.

In September, rating agency, Standard & Poor’s (S&P), assigned an inaugural rating of “B+” with a “Stable” outlook to the Republic of Guinea.

This decision reflects the strength of the country’s economic fundamentals, strong growth prospects driven by the integrated mining and infrastructure Simandou project, and the rigor in public financial management.

As a result, Guinea is now above the continental average and makes it the third best-rated economy in West Africa.

According to S&P, between 2026 and 2028, Guinea could experience GDP growth of nearly 10 per cent per year, far exceeding the regional average.

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