World
COMESA Competition Commission Unveils Draft Guidelines
By Lerisha Naidu and Zareenah Rasool
The COMESA Competition Commission published draft guidelines to the COMESA Competition Regulations, 2004 (Regulations) for public comment on October 19, 2021.
The guidelines aim to provide clarity on the commission’s policies and procedures and to foster transparency and certainty in the administration and enforcement of the Regulations.
These draft guidelines are based on international best practices and policy approaches of key regulators, including the European Commission.
They address three fundamental areas of regulatory enforcement – the determination of fines and administrative penalties, settlement procedures and hearing procedures.
The determination of fines and administrative penalties
To ensure proportionality and fairness in imposing sanctions for antitrust violations, the commission has devised a two-step methodology for calculating penalties under the Regulations. The two-step methodology will entail computing a “base amount” and increasing or decreasing it according to aggravating or mitigating considerations, on a case-by-case basis.
Base Amount: The commission will set the base amount for a fine based on the undertaking’s turnover within the common market in the financial year preceding the infringement.
The proposed starting point for determining the base amount for specific infringements is a proportion of the infringing entity’s revenue. By way of example, the base proportion of turnover would be 5% for cartel conduct, 3% for abuse of dominance, and 2% for gun-jumping. To compute the final base amount, the commission will consider the nature, gravity, and duration of the infringement, as well as the number of affected consumers.
Adjustments: The base amount may be adjusted upward based on aggravating factors such as repeat offences, refusal to cooperate and/or being characterized as an “initiator” of the conduct concerned.
Conversely, the base amount may be adjusted downward based on mitigating factors such as full cooperation, efficiency justifications for the conduct, extent of involvement, and even negligence in engaging in the alleged conduct.
Ultimately, the fine imposed shall not be in excess of 10% of the infringing entity’s annual turnover. To establish a sufficiently deterrent effect, the Commission may increase the fine by up to 1% of the total turnover, subject to the 10% cap. Importantly, fines imposed may exceed the infringement‑related gains.
The commission may also levy a “symbolic fine” in specific instances. The draft guidelines do not define a “symbolic fine”, the manner in which it will be computed, or under what circumstances it may be imposed.
It appears that such a fine would not be computed in accordance with the above two-step methodology. This will involve the exercise of the authority’s discretion and may result in a lack of certainty and clarity, for which additional guidance may be necessary.
Settlement procedures
Procuring settlements is crucial to effective antitrust enforcement, and increases procedural efficiency, thus reducing time and financial resources spent on proceedings. To that end, the draft guidelines are intended to provide direction on the Commission’s approach to settlement proceedings in relation to antitrust infringements.
The guidelines state that no admission of infringement or culpability is required for authorisation proceedings under Article 20 of the Regulations (in terms of which the commission may grant authorization to an entity to enter and/or give effect to an agreement if its public benefits outweigh any anticompetitive effects), which is in line with the Regulations. However, certain settlement proceedings require an admission of liability – these settlement proceedings are those relating to Article 19 abuse of dominance, Article 21 determination of anticompetitive conduct on request (by any person who believes that activity by a firm located in a Member State has the effect, or is likely to have the effect, of restricting competition in the Common Market), and Article 22 determination of anticompetitive conduct at the Commission’s own initiative (where the Commission has reason to believe that business conduct by an undertaking restrains competition in the Common Market). Many jurisdictions take a similar approach. The non-imposition of admissions of guilt clauses may go some way towards fostering parties’ willingness to enter into settlement agreements.
The draft guidelines further state that joint representatives must be appointed by the parties when the Commission commences settlement proceedings against two or more parties within a single economic unit. The appointment of joint representatives is simply to ease the settlement discussions.
According to the guidelines, the committee responsible for initial determinations would be vested with the power to confirm or withhold its confirmation of a settlement reached between the Commission and infringing parties. Withholding confirmation would occur in circumstances of “blatant and unfair settlement terms”.
It is unclear whether the committee would have the discretion to either refer the settlement agreement back to the Commission for renegotiation or with proposed changes, or the Committee would have the legal power to make the appropriate changes prior to confirmation of the settlement agreement. Arguably, the former would be a sensible approach to allow the parties to comment on any proposed changes.
Hearing procedures
These rules provide broad guidance on the elements of any hearing, including notice timelines, when hearings may be held, evidence testing, and the conduct of proceedings. The Regulations allow hearings in three situations – during the investigative process, before the publication of notice of compulsory recall of defective goods, and before the Committee for initial determination of cases.
Hearings may also be requested by a party under investigation. A COVID-friendly inclusion into the guidelines states that hearings can be conducted in private or in public, either via video conference, physical attendance, or both.
The rules specify that if the Committee issues a breach order, it may direct parties to discuss a remedy. If the parties cannot agree on a remedy, the Committee would issue an order without further consultation. Parties would still be able to review and/or appeal the order on the merits.
Lastly, the guidelines note that the determination of the Committee for initial determinations would be published in its official publication. However, parties would be allowed to object to such publication based on legitimate business interests.
Interested parties have been invited to submit their comments on these draft guidelines by no later than Friday, November 12, 2021, by emailing the Registrar of the Commission, Meti Demissie Disasa at [email protected] or [email protected].
Lerisha Naidu is a Partner at Sphesihle Nxumalo, Associate, while Zareenah Rasool is a Candidate Attorney, Competition & Antitrust Practice at Baker McKenzie Johannesburg
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
Despite geopolitical complexities, tensions and pressure, Russia’s military arms and weaponry sales earned approximately $15 billion at the closure of 2025, according to Kremlin report. At the regular session, chaired by Russian President Vladimir Putin on Jan. 30, the Commission on Military and Technical Cooperation with Foreign Countries analyzed the results of its work for 2025, and defined plans for the future.
It was noted that the system of military-technical cooperation continued to operate in difficult conditions, and with increased pressure from the Western countries to block business relations with Russia. The meeting, however, admitted that export contracts have generally performed sustainably. Russian military products were exported to more than 30 countries last year, and the amount of foreign exchange exceeded $15 billion.
Such results provide an additional opportunity to direct funds to the modernization of OPC enterprises, to the expansion of their production capacities, and to advanced research. It is also important that at these enterprises a significant volume of products is civilian products.
The Russian system of military-technical cooperation has not only demonstrated effectiveness and high resilience, but has created fundamental structures, which allow to significantly expand the “geography” of supplies of products of military purpose and, thus strengthen the position of Russia’s leader and employer advanced weapons systems – proven, tested in real combat conditions.
Thanks to the employees of the Federal Service for Military Technical Cooperation and Rosoboronexport, the staff of OPC enterprises for their good faith. Within the framework of the new federal project “Development of military-technical cooperation of Russia with foreign countries” for the period 2026-2028, additional measures of support are introduced. Further effective use of existing financial and other support mechanisms and instruments is extremely important because the volumes of military exports in accordance with the 2026 plan.
Special attention would be paid to the expansion of military-technological cooperation and partnerships, with 14 states already implementing or in development more than 340 such projects.
Future plans will allow to improve the characteristics of existing weapons and equipment and to develop new promising models, including those in demand on global markets, among other issues – the development of strategic areas of military-technical cooperation, and above all, with partners on the CIS and the CSTO. This is one of the priority tasks to strengthen both bilateral and multilateral relations, ensuring stability and security in Eurasia.
From January 2026, Russia chairs the CSTO, and this requires working systematically with partners, including comprehensive approaches to expanding military-technical relations. New prospects open up for deepening military-technical cooperation and with countries in other regions, including with states on the African continent. Russia has been historically strong and trusting relationships with African countries. In different years even the USSR, and then Russia supplied African countries with a significant amount of weapons and military equipment, trained specialists on their production, operation, repair, as well as military personnel.
Today, despite pressure from the West, African partners express readiness to expand relations with Russia in the military and military-technical fields. It is not only about increasing supplies of Russian military exports, but also about the purchase of other weapons, other materials and products. Russia has undertaken comprehensive maintenance of previously delivered equipment, organization of licensed production of Russian military products and some other important issues. In general, African countries are sufficient for consideration today.
By Adedapo Adesanya
President Donald Trump has named Mr Kevin Warsh as the successor to Mr Jerome Powell as the Federal Reserve chair, ending a prolonged odyssey that has seen unprecedented turmoil around the central bank.
The decision culminates a process that officially began last summer but started much earlier than that, with President Trump launching a criticism against the Powell-led US central bank almost since he took the job in 2018.
“I have known Kevin for a long period of time, and have no doubt that he will go down as one of the GREAT Fed Chairmen, maybe the best,” Mr Trump said in a Truth Social post announcing the selection.
US analysts noted that the 55-year old appear not to ripple market because of his previous experience at the apex bank as Governor, with others saying he wouldn’t always do the bidding of the American president.
If approved by the US Senate, Mr Warsh will take over the position in May, when Mr Powell’s term expires.
Despite having argued for reductions recently, “Warsh has a long hawkish history that markets have not forgotten,” one analyst told Bloomberg.
President Trump has castigated Mr Powell for not lowering interest rates more quickly. His administration also launched a criminal investigation of Powell and the Federal Reserve earlier this month, which led Mr Powell to issue an extraordinary rebuke of President Trump’s efforts to politicize the independent central bank.
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
Donald Trump has been leading the United States as its president since January 2025. Washington’s priority is to Make America Great Again (MAGA). Trump’s tariffs have rippled many economies from Latin America through Asian region to the continent of Africa. Trump’s Davos speech has explicitly revealed building a ‘new world order’ based on dominance rather than trust. He has also initiated whirlwind steps to annex Greenland, while further created the Board of Peace, aimed at helping end the two-year war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza and to oversee reconstruction. Trump is handling the three-year old Russia-Ukraine crisis, and other deep-seated religious and ethnic conflicts in Africa.
These emerging trends, at least in a considerable short term, are influencing BRICS which has increased its geopolitical importance, and focusing on uniting the countries in the Global East and Global South. From historical records, BRICS, described as non-western organization, and is loosing its coherence primarily due to differences in geopolitical interests and multinational alignments, and of course, a number of members face threats from the United States while there are variations of approach to the emerging worldwide perceptions.
In this conversation, deputy director of the Center for African Studies at Moscow’s National Research University High School of Economics (HSE), Vsevolod Sviridov, expresses his opinions focusing on BRICS agenda under India’s presidency, South Africa’s G20 chairmanship in 2024, and genegrally putting Africa’s development priorities within the context of emerging trends. Here are the interview excerpts:
What is the likely impact of Washington’s geopolitics and its foreign policy on BRICS?
From my perspective, the current Venezuela-U.S. confrontation, especially Washington’s tightened leverage over Venezuelan oil revenue flows and the knock-on effects for Chinese interests, will be read inside BRICS as a reminder that sovereign resources can still be constrained by financial chokepoints and sanctions politics. This does not automatically translate into BRICS taking Venezuela’s side, but it does strengthen the bloc’s long-running argument for more resilient South-South trade settlement, diversified energy chains, and financing instruments that reduce exposure to coercive measures, because many African and other developing economies face similar vulnerabilities around commodities, shipping, insurance, and correspondent banking. At the same time, BRICS’ expansion makes consensus harder: several members maintain significant ties with the U.S., so the most likely impact is a technocratic push rather than a loud political campaign.
And highlighting, specifically, the position of BRICS members (South Africa, Ethiopia and Egypt, as well as its partnering African States (Nigeria and Uganda)?
Venezuela crisis urges African members to demand that BRICS deliver usable financial and trade tools. For South Africa, Ethiopia, and Egypt, the Venezuela case is more about the precedent: how quickly external pressure can reshape a country’s fiscal room, debt dynamics, and even investor perceptions when energy revenues and sanctions compliance collide. South Africa will likely argue that BRICS should prioritize investment, industrialization, and trade facilitation. Ethiopia and Egypt, both debt-sensitive and searching for FDI, will be especially attentive to anything that helps de-risk financing, while avoiding steps that could trigger secondary-sanctions anxieties or scare off diversified investors.
Would the latest geopolitical developments ultimately shape the agenda for BRICS 2026 under India’s presidency?
India’s 2026 chairmanship is already framed around “Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability,” and Venezuela’s shock (paired with broader sanction/market-volatility lessons) will likely sharpen the resilience part. From an African perspective, that is an opportunity: South Africa, Ethiopia, and Egypt can press India to translate the theme into deliverables that matter on the ground: food and fertilizer stability, affordable energy access, infrastructure funding. India, in turn, has incentives to keep BRICS focused on economic problem-solving rather than becoming hostage to any single flashpoint. So the Venezuela episode may function as a cautionary case study that accelerates practical cooperation where African members have the most to gain. And I would add: the BRICS agenda will become increasingly Africa-centered simply because Africa’s weight globally is rising, and recent summit discussions have repeatedly highlighted African participation as a core Global South vector. South Africa’s G20 chairmanship last year explicitly framed around putting Africa’s development priorities high on the agenda, further proves this point.
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