World
Exploring Russia’s Support of Africa’s Coupists
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
In this insightful interview, Professor Sergiu Mișcoiu at the Faculty of European Studies, Babes-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca (Romania), where he serves as a Director of the Centre for International Cooperation and as Director of the Centre for African Studies, discusses the political situation in the French-speaking West African countries, the existing multiple challenges and Russia’s diplomacy within the context of current geopolitical changes and the scramble for influence in Africa. Here are the interview excerpts:
To begin with, what are your arguments that Russia supports military coup plotters (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger et cetera) in Africa?
The logic behind backing the coups is quite evident and relates to the strategy of Russia to fight against the West and to (re)entrench itself in Africa. As the former presidents of the three countries have been supported by the United States, the European Union, and above all, France, the only strategic option of a Russian re-emerging empire opposing the West was to back all the anti-Western forces wherever they might act and whoever they would be.
Since the late 2000s, Russia has been increasingly preoccupied with preparing the ground for anti-Western operations. The progressive entrenchment of the Kremlin-guided paramilitary groups (starting with the infamously Groupe Wagner) in the Central African Republic, then in Mali and to a lesser extent in other parts of Central and Western Africa, has only been the visible peak of the iceberg.
More effective were the troll farms populating the sub-continent with pro-Russian influencers and deploying campaigns of disinformation, which targeted especially the French and UN contingents deployed to fight the jihadist groups. These campaigns contributed to turning the public opinions of those states against the West and more importantly against their presidents, who were denounced as being the “Occident’s puppets”.
While the operations of the coups themselves were most probably not directly coordinated by Russia, the attitude of the national military forces and of the mass of demonstrators who backed the coups was shaped by Russia. The fact that the new juntas in power immediately made declarations and gestures (such as state visits) of rapprochement towards Russia testifies once more of a mechanical convergence of interests between the new strongmen in Bamako, Ouagadougou and Niamey, to which Russia has abundantly contributed over the last decade.
As it explicitly shows, Russia is seemingly interested in military governance in Africa. Does that set the precedence for future military takeovers in Africa?
The outcome of the coups in the three Sahel states encouraged Russia to pursue its strategy in other African countries. Nonetheless, the dismantlement of the Wagner Group and the difficult reorganization of its remaining elements made the Kremlin’s task more difficult, as some axes of penetration into the decision-making and military milieus of the African countries have been strongly shaken, although the new high responsible for the operations, Vladimir Alexeyev, makes substantive efforts to regain control over the remaining networks.
Moreover, the amplitude of Dimitri Prigozhin’s finally aborted rebellion against the Kremlin raised some questions in the minds of many African political, business and military supporters of Moscow. Among those questions, the most important is the following: If the Russian regime itself was on the verge of facing a military attack against its capital, how could it guarantee our support in the eventual case we will try to conduct coups similar to those in the Sahel countries? Consequently, the other would-be putschists’ enthusiasm for following the Sahelian coups’ path has naturally diminished.
Do transitions from democratic governance to military governments have any meaning for fighting growing trends of neo-colonialism in Africa?
Neo-colonialism in Africa has been a growing reality since the end of the Cold War and reached a pinnacle by the early 2000s. Then, the combined effects of September 11 and the anti-neocolonial activism of some leaders such as Laurent Gbagbo in the Ivory Coast rebalanced the power relations making the West increasingly dependent on the strategic support of the “friendly” African heads of state.
More salient in the case of the former French colonies, this process could be suggestively described by the transformation of the “Françafrique” into the “Afrique-France”, with Gabon’s historical leader Omar Bongo gaining unprecedented leverage, going so far as he was able to influence the composition of the French governments of those times. But once again, this page was turned with the world economic crisis of 2008-2011 and with the considerable growth of the jihadist attacks, leading to the destabilization of Mali and the risk of generalization over the entire Sahelian region.
The French-led anti-jihadist operations Serval and then Barkhane, deployed in Mali and reshaped later on into an international security task force with a wider focus on the Sahel, have implicitly deprived to some extent the democratically elected presidents of Niger, Burkina and Mali of their autonomy in matters related to national security and political strategy. This was seen by many as the ultimate proof of the return to colonialism. As the results of the fight against Islamist terrorism have been increasingly modest, especially after 2019, the contestation of the Western-backed presidents has become widespread at different levels of society, of the institutions and of the security forces. This explains the popular support for the series of coups perpetrated in the three countries and shows the important potential that anti-neo-colonialism has as a galvanizer of the discontented peoples of Africa.
Despite the above narratives, do you think the 15-member regional economic bloc, must be firm with the ‘Silence-the-Guns’ policy adopted several years ago by the African Union?
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was caught in the trap of its transformation from a quasi-economic organization to a semipolitical one. If by 2010, the policy of sanctions against illegitimate governments and the direct interventions it operated (like the one in The Gambia against the former president Yahya Jammeh, who refused to leave power after losing the elections in 2017) encountered a relative success, the more recent policies proved inefficacious, culminating with the July 2023 postponed and ultimately cancelled intervention against the putsch in Niger. The legitimacy of ECOWAS has been strongly contested by the new military regimes. At the same, the ‘Silence-the-Guns’ AU-inspired policy has proved idealist, especially when it comes to the conflicts in the Sahel that multiplied “under the watch” of the two organizations.
A research report from the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) describes Russia as ‘a virtual investor’ in Africa, most of its limitless pledges and several bilateral agreements largely aimed at luring (woo-ing) African states and leaders to support its ‘special military operation’ in neighbouring Ukraine. What are your expert views and arguments here?
Vladimir Putin has intended to restore the mightiness of the Soviet Union, including its influence over the African continent. But unlike the USSR, Russia didn’t and doesn’t dispose of the financial and logistic resources needed to massively invest in the key sectors. To compensate for its economic debility, the
The Kremlin inaugurates almost insignificant but ostentatious investment projects and at the same aggressively promotes the anti-Western discourse (“Russia helps, the West takes”).
Moreover, it uses the dependence of several African countries on Russian cereals to “adjust” their positions about the illegal Russian war against Ukraine, especially when it comes to votes taken in the UN General Assembly. A strategy of combination between the Russian para-military presence and massive resource grabbing was applied in the Central African Republic (CAR), where President Faustin-Archange Touadéra saved his seat by relying on a Russian praetorian guard, while in exchange he accepted to formally or informally grant extended rights of exploitation of many gem mines to the companies led by Kremlin-friendly oligarchs, who are the new de facto rulers of the respective mining areas and implicitly of some wider regions in the CAR. Seen as a “laboratory” for the further expansion of this toxic model, the CAR is praised by the Russian military-business elites, who suffer because of the international sanctions, as an Eldorado, proving once again the particularly aggressive neocolonial strategy that Moscow is implementing while criticizing the West.
In practical terms and compared to China, do you think Russia has made a visible impact on the economy and infrastructure development in the continent since the collapse of the Soviet era in 1991?
China has disposed of important financial resources and has been at least between the 1990s and the end of the 2010s incomparably less violent than Russia in spreading its influence all over the African continent. Being led by a regime that spoused the “state capitalist” system, China was capable of using most opportunities provided by the intensive globalization process to extend its presence and consolidate its soft economic power. It succeeded in impressing via its investments in the road and railway infrastructures, in ports, in some major public buildings and other sectors. As compared to China, Russia made almost no difference through its modest investments and bet its entire strategy on this mixture of, on one hand, the renewal of the former USSR networks and the reification of the Soviet past, and on the other, the direct intrusion in the domestic conflicts of the most vulnerable African states.
Can we conclude this discussion with the significance of peace, justice and strong state institutions (UN SDG 16), what has been achieved over the past few years, the challenges and the way forward in West Africa?
Unfortunately, SDG 16 is an untouchable horizon for most African states at this stage. The return of the jihadist threat in several regions of the Sahel, Western Sahara, but also Central and Western Africa, with the extension of the operations of various groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda, ISIS or Boko Haram has engendered an important security crisis that crucially affected the stability of the African states.
The series of coup d’états and unconstitutional replacements of the former or acting leaders (in Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad and Niger) was a response to the ineptitude of the democratic institutional settings to guarantee the basic rights of the citizens, starting with the rights to live and security. The new geopolitical thick division caused by the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine contributed to the aggravation of the security context, especially in terms of food and human security, and deprived many African governments of their capacity to negotiate with multiple actors at different levels, as they are now constrained to pick sides and to act accordingly, like during the Cold War era. If the actual trends continue, I am not optimistic at all about the possibility of getting closer to meeting this SDG.
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
At the plenary session under the theme “Development Through Access to Global Markets” organised during the first International Transport and Logistics Forum held in St. Petersburg, both Russian and African speakers have acknowledged, in their high-quality presentations, the importance of fostering understanding of transport innovations, shifting investment and the possibility of addressing current infrastructure challenges for economic growth.
In promoting comprehensive cooperation in the transport and logistics sphere, Deputy Minister of Transport of the Russian Federation, Dmitry Zverev, stressed that the African continent is one of the fastest-growing regions of the world, demonstrating an average GDP growth rate of 4.5% per year.
According to expert projections, by 2050, Africa’s population will reach 2.5 billion people. To ensure logistical links, it is necessary to build a clear and understandable dialogue with partners, working simultaneously at two levels: at the level of governments, through intergovernmental agreements, and at the level of co-business partnerships. Russian transport corridors guarantee the stability of supplies. Today, there are issues of food security, fertiliser supply and formation of new chains, and other emerging geopolitical challenges facing Africa.
As the guest/main speaker, Zverev explained that Russian companies such as FESCO, RZD, GLONASS and Avtodor are actively involved in this process. This is a unique experience sharing technology and infrastructure solutions in significant volumes. “And frankly, that’s an important image distinction of Russia: we’re not just exporting or selling something – we’re offering technologies and cooperation. Together with technologies, we provide training and prepare national personnel who will work on their transport infrastructure in the future,” asserted Zverev.
Minister of Energy and Infrastructure of the United Arab Emirates, Suhail Mohammed Al Mazrouei, spoke of his country’s decision to invest significant money in the development of its railway infrastructure, with work already underway to connect to Oman by rail and open up new opportunities for freight transportation to Africa and Asia.
“We continue to invest in the development of our country’s logistics network and alternative routes. Russia is an important exporter of raw materials, and development in its regions will contribute to economic growth across the globe. Central Asia is also emerging as a key player, and we are investing in the region’s infrastructure and connecting China to the global economy through Russia and the Middle East,” he said.
Minister Delegate for Maritime Economy of the Ministry of Maritime Economy, Fisheries, and Coastal Protection of the Togolese Republic, Kokou Edem Tengue, spoke of the importance of understanding the African perspective on changing maritime routes as the situation around the Suez Canal and the Strait of Hormuz creates new opportunities for West Africa.
The Port of Lomé, the largest container port in Sub-Saharan Africa, handles approximately 30 million tonnes of goods annually, and its importance for the region is difficult to overstate. “We are actively working with Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger; the Port of Lomé is a key logistics hub for the landlocked nations of the Sahel,” he said. “It should be noted that Africa relies on chemical fertilisers and grain produced in Russia. We believe that the Port of Lomé could be a part of new sea routes between Africa and Russia.”
In his speech, Minister of Transport of the United Republic of Tanzania, Makame Mnyaa Mbarawa, reported on the active modernisation of the Dar es Salaam port. Previously, the depth of the water was 9–12 meters; now it has increased to 12–15 meters. An increase in the number of operators operating in the port is planned. Thanks to these measures, cargo turnover increased significantly, and ship handling times decreased from 10 days to 2–3. This is an important achievement, after all, speed is a key factor for investors.
However, the port cannot function in isolation; it needs modern rail infrastructure. Tanzania’s government is leading the construction of a new railway to Kigoma, and then into Burundi and south, creating a reliable transportation artery. Dar es Salaam will become a gateway to Burundi, Rwanda, Malawi and Zambia, which depend on cargo flow through this port. Therefore, the development of the port and associated railway is of strategic importance in the region.
“In parallel, the modernisation of the TAZARA railway is going on – a historic artery that requires an upgrade. The private sector is actively involved in this work. After revitalisation, this line will become a key link between Dar es Salaam port and Zambia, he stated. The Government of Tanzania will make every effort to implement these projects and will work closely with the private sector. We invite Russian companies – both state and private – to participate in logistics projects and port infrastructure modernisation.”
As far as road safety in Niger is concerned, the country is facing various challenges that require finding ways to improve the situation, according to the Speaker from Niger, Abdurakhaman Amadou. Within the framework of the discussion, he also noted that an important step was to upgrade the car park and road network. As Niger has no access to the sea, the emphasis is on road traffic to ensure the country’s supply.
“We have access to the port of Lome in the Togolese Republic, which remains neutral towards us. However, the Caton port is closed for us, which created serious difficulties as 80% of our exports and imports passed through it. Recently, the situation has started to improve due to the construction of a railway by Nigeria, which will provide us with access to its ports,” Abdurakhaman informed.
In addition, diplomatic relations with Algeria have been restored after a long hiatus, which opens an exit to the Mediterranean. The conference of Islamic states confirmed the intention to build a grand railway linking Dakar and Djibouti across the entire continent from west to east. This railway will partially pass through Niger, which will be an important step in the development of the region’s transportation infrastructure.
President Vladimir Putin, in a message to participants, organisers, and attendees of the International Transport and Logistics Forum, says that Russia is ready to share its experience through joint science and technology programmes and, of course, by training specialists able to ensure the development of transport and logistics in the 21st century, using a new technological foundation. The Transport and Logistics forum was held for the first time on April 1-3 in St. Petersburg, the second-largest city in the Russian Federation.
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
The Arab Republic of Egypt, a country spanning the northeast corner of Africa and the southwest corner of Asia, has a highly strategic location and attracts multifaceted interests of foreign players. For decades, Russia has established diplomatic relations with Egypt and has consistently sustained diverse ties with this country. It is no secret that Russia’s lust for the region is primarily due to the strategic importance of the Mediterranean Sea for investment and economic cooperation with the Maghreb region.
Determined to strengthen, particularly, economic cooperation, Russian President Vladimir Putin has maintained regular contacts with his colleague, President of Egypt, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, mostly discussing both bilateral cooperation and broader regional developments. The current world’s geopolitical development, for instance, the United States-Israeli war on Iran in the Middle East, constitutes one theme both leaders frequently review, attempting to find long-term solutions.
On April 2, Putin met with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Emigration, and Egyptian Expatriates of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Badr Abdelatty, in the Kremlin – the seat of Russia’s presidency. In attendance during the official talks on the Russian side were Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Presidential Aide Yury Ushakov, while Egypt was represented by Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Russian Federation Hamdy Shaaban. Ultimately, there is no need to overstate the importance of this meeting.
Russia’s footprints are expanding in Egypt, highlighting the growing industrial investment and the strengthening of bilateral manufacturing ties by undertaking projects to ensure energy security. At the same time, maintaining regular dialogue remains very important for both leaders.
Putin, speaking with the three-member delegation in the Kremlin, underlined the fact that there are many promising initiatives underway, many of which are already being implemented. He has previously spoken in detail about the construction of a nuclear power plant and the construction of an industrial zone, and over ten major Russian companies have expressed interest in participating in this project.
Nuclear Plants in El-Dabaa, Egypt
The construction of nuclear plants in the city of El-Dabaa, about 320 kilometres northwest of Cairo, the capital of Egypt. It is the first nuclear power plant in Egypt, and will have four VVER-1200 reactors, making Egypt the only country in the region to have a Generation III+ reactor. On November 19, 2015, Egypt and Russia signed an initial agreement, under which Russia agreed to build and finance Egypt’s first nuclear power plant. These are now being carried out, not as a charity project, but with a loan of $28 billion. According to reports, Russia will finance 85% as a state loan of $25 billion, and Egypt will provide the remaining 15% in the form of instalments. The Russian loan has a repayment period of 22 years, with an annual interest rate of 3%.
At the meeting, Putin also raised the construction of an industrial zone in Egypt. There are many appealing and related opportunities in this, regarding having an industrial zone to be located on the banks of the Suez Canal. The industrial zone is also entering a new phase, as Russian auto-manufacturing enterprises are advancing distinctive plans to expand local vehicle production, reinforcing the country’s role as a regional manufacturing hub. The move reflects broader economic linkages between Russia and Africa, particularly in industrial development and supply chain integration.
Conveying Greetings and Reviewing the Middle East Situation
Naturally, the situation in the region remains a shared concern, according to Putin, and further hope that the ongoing conflict will be promptly resolved. “As you know, President Trump also addressed this issue yesterday. Let me reiterate that we are prepared to make every effort to help stabilise the situation and, as they say in such cases, return it to normal,” he stressed during the meeting. In this context, it is particularly important to know Egypt’s assessment as a key country in the Middle East.
Putin reminded the delegation of another Russia-Africa summit, which is planned for October 2026. With high hopes that Egypt will be represented by a strong, high-level delegation. Should the Egyptian President’s schedule allow, he would, of course, ahead of the summit, be very pleased to welcome him to Moscow. Jointly chaired by Vladimir Putin and Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, the first Russia-Africa summit, an important acute phase of the developments with Africa, under the motto of ‘For Peace, Security and Development’, was held for the first time in October 2019, in Sochi, a city located on the Black Sea coast. The idea to hold a Russia-Africa forum was initiated by President Putin at the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) summit in Johannesburg in July 2018.
The head of the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, as traditionally expected, conveyed greetings from President El-Sisi to the Russian president and handed over a written message. President el-Sisi places great value on all aspects of the bilateral cooperation, and is extremely grateful for constructive collaboration on the El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant, which represents a key milestone in the partnership. Despite the challenges, it is evident that the project is moving forward and will be completed by 2028.
In summary, as Egypt and Russia are reliable and time-tested partners, Putin plans to promote strategic projects, particularly in trade, economics, energy, and food security. With over 107 million inhabitants, Egypt is the most populous country in the Arab world, the third-most populous country in Africa, and the 15th-most populous in the world.
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
In an interview, Senator Mushahid Hussain, President of Pakistan-Africa Institute for Development and Research (PAIDR), explicitly offers a few important insights into the US-Israeli war on Iran and its implications for BRICS+ and Africa. Here are the interview excerpts:
What’s your interpretation of the US-Israel war on Iran, in the context of developments in the Middle East region?
The US-Israel illegal and unwarranted war on Iran was spearheaded by [Benjamin] Netanyahu (Prime Minister of Israel) and actively supported by [Donald] Trump (President of USA) as a Joint Operation with three fundamental goals: a) decimate the Islamic Revolutionary Regime; b) reshape the Middle East as part of Zionism’s ‘Greater Israel’ Project; c) preclude any possibility of establishing a Palestinian State with Jerusalem as its capital.
What is your assessment of Iran’s joining BRICS+ in 2025, China’s and Russia’s roles as members of this association, in this US-Israel war with Iran?
China and Russia have played, by and large, a low-key diplomatic role in supporting Iran but without any active political initiatives. BRICS is divided from within, as India is keen to curry favour with the USA and avoids close association with BRICS since the time that Trump attacked BRICS last year. But China & Russia are clear political beneficiaries of the war as American prestige is at an all-time low, having got entangled in an unwinnable war, resulting in weakening of the US ‘sole superpower’ image.
As an Asian expert, how would you characterise Africa’s reactions? And do you think that reactions were objectively authentic, basing perspectives broadly on Arab and Middle East contributions to Africa’s development?
Africa’s reactions to the war are primarily through the prism of the Global South, viewing Iran as resisting American-Israeli hegemonic designs, as, for example, manifested in two examples: South Africa’s rejection of American pressures to wean South Africa away from its support for Iran. Plus, Somalia joined Pakistan and China in supporting the Russian resolution in the UN Security Council seeking an immediate ceasefire and negotiations to halt the War, despite strident Western/US opposition to the Russian resolution.
-
Feature/OPED6 years agoDavos was Different this year
-
Travel/Tourism10 years ago
Lagos Seals Western Lodge Hotel In Ikorodu
-
Showbiz3 years agoEstranged Lover Releases Videos of Empress Njamah Bathing
-
Banking8 years agoSort Codes of GTBank Branches in Nigeria
-
Economy3 years agoSubsidy Removal: CNG at N130 Per Litre Cheaper Than Petrol—IPMAN
-
Banking3 years agoSort Codes of UBA Branches in Nigeria
-
Banking3 years agoFirst Bank Announces Planned Downtime
-
Sports3 years agoHighest Paid Nigerian Footballer – How Much Do Nigerian Footballers Earn