World
Exploring Russia’s Support of Africa’s Coupists
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
In this insightful interview, Professor Sergiu Mișcoiu at the Faculty of European Studies, Babes-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca (Romania), where he serves as a Director of the Centre for International Cooperation and as Director of the Centre for African Studies, discusses the political situation in the French-speaking West African countries, the existing multiple challenges and Russia’s diplomacy within the context of current geopolitical changes and the scramble for influence in Africa. Here are the interview excerpts:
To begin with, what are your arguments that Russia supports military coup plotters (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger et cetera) in Africa?
The logic behind backing the coups is quite evident and relates to the strategy of Russia to fight against the West and to (re)entrench itself in Africa. As the former presidents of the three countries have been supported by the United States, the European Union, and above all, France, the only strategic option of a Russian re-emerging empire opposing the West was to back all the anti-Western forces wherever they might act and whoever they would be.
Since the late 2000s, Russia has been increasingly preoccupied with preparing the ground for anti-Western operations. The progressive entrenchment of the Kremlin-guided paramilitary groups (starting with the infamously Groupe Wagner) in the Central African Republic, then in Mali and to a lesser extent in other parts of Central and Western Africa, has only been the visible peak of the iceberg.
More effective were the troll farms populating the sub-continent with pro-Russian influencers and deploying campaigns of disinformation, which targeted especially the French and UN contingents deployed to fight the jihadist groups. These campaigns contributed to turning the public opinions of those states against the West and more importantly against their presidents, who were denounced as being the “Occident’s puppets”.
While the operations of the coups themselves were most probably not directly coordinated by Russia, the attitude of the national military forces and of the mass of demonstrators who backed the coups was shaped by Russia. The fact that the new juntas in power immediately made declarations and gestures (such as state visits) of rapprochement towards Russia testifies once more of a mechanical convergence of interests between the new strongmen in Bamako, Ouagadougou and Niamey, to which Russia has abundantly contributed over the last decade.
As it explicitly shows, Russia is seemingly interested in military governance in Africa. Does that set the precedence for future military takeovers in Africa?
The outcome of the coups in the three Sahel states encouraged Russia to pursue its strategy in other African countries. Nonetheless, the dismantlement of the Wagner Group and the difficult reorganization of its remaining elements made the Kremlin’s task more difficult, as some axes of penetration into the decision-making and military milieus of the African countries have been strongly shaken, although the new high responsible for the operations, Vladimir Alexeyev, makes substantive efforts to regain control over the remaining networks.
Moreover, the amplitude of Dimitri Prigozhin’s finally aborted rebellion against the Kremlin raised some questions in the minds of many African political, business and military supporters of Moscow. Among those questions, the most important is the following: If the Russian regime itself was on the verge of facing a military attack against its capital, how could it guarantee our support in the eventual case we will try to conduct coups similar to those in the Sahel countries? Consequently, the other would-be putschists’ enthusiasm for following the Sahelian coups’ path has naturally diminished.
Do transitions from democratic governance to military governments have any meaning for fighting growing trends of neo-colonialism in Africa?
Neo-colonialism in Africa has been a growing reality since the end of the Cold War and reached a pinnacle by the early 2000s. Then, the combined effects of September 11 and the anti-neocolonial activism of some leaders such as Laurent Gbagbo in the Ivory Coast rebalanced the power relations making the West increasingly dependent on the strategic support of the “friendly” African heads of state.
More salient in the case of the former French colonies, this process could be suggestively described by the transformation of the “Françafrique” into the “Afrique-France”, with Gabon’s historical leader Omar Bongo gaining unprecedented leverage, going so far as he was able to influence the composition of the French governments of those times. But once again, this page was turned with the world economic crisis of 2008-2011 and with the considerable growth of the jihadist attacks, leading to the destabilization of Mali and the risk of generalization over the entire Sahelian region.
The French-led anti-jihadist operations Serval and then Barkhane, deployed in Mali and reshaped later on into an international security task force with a wider focus on the Sahel, have implicitly deprived to some extent the democratically elected presidents of Niger, Burkina and Mali of their autonomy in matters related to national security and political strategy. This was seen by many as the ultimate proof of the return to colonialism. As the results of the fight against Islamist terrorism have been increasingly modest, especially after 2019, the contestation of the Western-backed presidents has become widespread at different levels of society, of the institutions and of the security forces. This explains the popular support for the series of coups perpetrated in the three countries and shows the important potential that anti-neo-colonialism has as a galvanizer of the discontented peoples of Africa.
Despite the above narratives, do you think the 15-member regional economic bloc, must be firm with the ‘Silence-the-Guns’ policy adopted several years ago by the African Union?
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was caught in the trap of its transformation from a quasi-economic organization to a semipolitical one. If by 2010, the policy of sanctions against illegitimate governments and the direct interventions it operated (like the one in The Gambia against the former president Yahya Jammeh, who refused to leave power after losing the elections in 2017) encountered a relative success, the more recent policies proved inefficacious, culminating with the July 2023 postponed and ultimately cancelled intervention against the putsch in Niger. The legitimacy of ECOWAS has been strongly contested by the new military regimes. At the same, the ‘Silence-the-Guns’ AU-inspired policy has proved idealist, especially when it comes to the conflicts in the Sahel that multiplied “under the watch” of the two organizations.
A research report from the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) describes Russia as ‘a virtual investor’ in Africa, most of its limitless pledges and several bilateral agreements largely aimed at luring (woo-ing) African states and leaders to support its ‘special military operation’ in neighbouring Ukraine. What are your expert views and arguments here?
Vladimir Putin has intended to restore the mightiness of the Soviet Union, including its influence over the African continent. But unlike the USSR, Russia didn’t and doesn’t dispose of the financial and logistic resources needed to massively invest in the key sectors. To compensate for its economic debility, the
The Kremlin inaugurates almost insignificant but ostentatious investment projects and at the same aggressively promotes the anti-Western discourse (“Russia helps, the West takes”).
Moreover, it uses the dependence of several African countries on Russian cereals to “adjust” their positions about the illegal Russian war against Ukraine, especially when it comes to votes taken in the UN General Assembly. A strategy of combination between the Russian para-military presence and massive resource grabbing was applied in the Central African Republic (CAR), where President Faustin-Archange Touadéra saved his seat by relying on a Russian praetorian guard, while in exchange he accepted to formally or informally grant extended rights of exploitation of many gem mines to the companies led by Kremlin-friendly oligarchs, who are the new de facto rulers of the respective mining areas and implicitly of some wider regions in the CAR. Seen as a “laboratory” for the further expansion of this toxic model, the CAR is praised by the Russian military-business elites, who suffer because of the international sanctions, as an Eldorado, proving once again the particularly aggressive neocolonial strategy that Moscow is implementing while criticizing the West.
In practical terms and compared to China, do you think Russia has made a visible impact on the economy and infrastructure development in the continent since the collapse of the Soviet era in 1991?
China has disposed of important financial resources and has been at least between the 1990s and the end of the 2010s incomparably less violent than Russia in spreading its influence all over the African continent. Being led by a regime that spoused the “state capitalist” system, China was capable of using most opportunities provided by the intensive globalization process to extend its presence and consolidate its soft economic power. It succeeded in impressing via its investments in the road and railway infrastructures, in ports, in some major public buildings and other sectors. As compared to China, Russia made almost no difference through its modest investments and bet its entire strategy on this mixture of, on one hand, the renewal of the former USSR networks and the reification of the Soviet past, and on the other, the direct intrusion in the domestic conflicts of the most vulnerable African states.
Can we conclude this discussion with the significance of peace, justice and strong state institutions (UN SDG 16), what has been achieved over the past few years, the challenges and the way forward in West Africa?
Unfortunately, SDG 16 is an untouchable horizon for most African states at this stage. The return of the jihadist threat in several regions of the Sahel, Western Sahara, but also Central and Western Africa, with the extension of the operations of various groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda, ISIS or Boko Haram has engendered an important security crisis that crucially affected the stability of the African states.
The series of coup d’états and unconstitutional replacements of the former or acting leaders (in Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad and Niger) was a response to the ineptitude of the democratic institutional settings to guarantee the basic rights of the citizens, starting with the rights to live and security. The new geopolitical thick division caused by the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine contributed to the aggravation of the security context, especially in terms of food and human security, and deprived many African governments of their capacity to negotiate with multiple actors at different levels, as they are now constrained to pick sides and to act accordingly, like during the Cold War era. If the actual trends continue, I am not optimistic at all about the possibility of getting closer to meeting this SDG.
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has announced the retirement of its director of the African department, Abebe Aemro Selassie, on May 1, 2026. Since his appointment in 2016, Abebe Selassie has served in this position for a decade. During his tenure, IMF added a 25th chair to its Executive Board, increasing the voice of sub-Saharan Africa.
As a director for Africa, he has overseen the IMF’s engagement with 45 countries across sub-Saharan Africa. Abebe and his team work closely with the region’s leaders and policymakers to improve economic and development outcomes. This includes oversight of the IMF’s intensified engagement with the region in recent years, including some $60 billion in financial support the institution has provided to countries since 2020. Reports indicated that under his leadership, his department generally reinforces the organization’s role as a trusted partner to many African countries.
Abebe Selassie has worked with both the regional economic blocs and the African Union (AU) as well as individual African states. The key focus has been the strategic articulation of Africa’s development priorities in reshaping economic governance, mobilizing sustainable investments, and addressing systemic financial challenges.
It is important noting that the IMF has funded diverse infrastructure projects that facilitated either export-led growth or import substitution industrialization models of development. Further to that, African states have also made numerous loans and benefited from much-needed debt relief.
Summarizing the IMF’s key focus areas, among others, for Africa: (i) reforming the global financial architecture in an effort to improve the structure, institutions, rules, and processes that govern international finance in order to make the global economy more stable, equitable, and resilient.
Concessional financing to counter rising borrowing costs, with Africa paying up to 5 times more in interest than advanced economies (AfDB, 2023). Fair representation, pushing for IMF quota reforms to reflect Africa’s $3.4 trillion collective GDP—yet the continent holds less than 5% of voting shares in Bretton Woods institutions.
(ii) Unlocking Investments for Jobs and Sustainable Growth. With Africa’s working-age population set to double to 1 billion by 2050, the African states spotlight: The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), projected to boost intra-African trade by 52% and create 30 million jobs by 2035 (World Bank, 2024). Infrastructure partnerships, targeting sectors such as renewable energy, where Africa receives only 2% of global clean energy investments despite its vast solar and wind potential (IEA, 2024).
(iii) Climate Finance and Debt Relief for Resilience: Africa contributes less than 4% of global emissions but bears the brunt of climate shocks, losing 5–15% of GDP per capita to climate-related disasters annually (African Development Bank, 2024). These are strictly in alignment with Agenda 2063’s aspirations for inclusive growth, maximizing multilateral cooperation and enhancing global engagement with the continent.
“I am deeply grateful for Abe’s visionary leadership, dedication to the Fund’s mission, and unwavering commitment to the members in the region,” Ms. Kristalina Georgieva, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). “The legacy he leaves on the Fund’s work in Africa is one of alignment with the aspirations of people, especially the youth, for good governance, strong economies and lasting prosperity. His trusted advice has been invaluable to me personally, and his leadership has strengthened our mission.”
“A national of Ethiopia, Selassie first joined the IMF in 1994. Over his remarkable 32-year career, he held senior positions including Deputy Director in AFR, Mission Chief for Portugal and South Africa, Division Chief of the Regional Studies Division, and Senior Resident Representative in Uganda. Earlier, he contributed to programs in Turkey, Thailand, Romania, and Estonia, and worked on policy, operational review, and economic research.”
Under his ten-year leadership and as director of the African Department (AFR), Abebe Selassie helped to reinforce the Fund’s role as a trusted partner with sub-Saharan African members. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is an international organization that promotes global economic growth and financial stability, encourages international trade, and reduces poverty.
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
Squeezed between import substitution and dependency syndrome, a condition characterized by a set of associated economic symptoms—that is rules and regulations—majority of African countries are shifting from United States and Europe to an incoherent alternative bilateral partnerships with Russia, China and the Global South.
By forging new partnerships, for instance with Russia, these African countries rather create conspicuous economic dependency at the expense of strengthening their own local production, attainable by supporting local farmers under state budget. Import-centric partnership ties and lack of diversification make these African countries committed to import-dependent structures. It invariably compounds domestic production challenges. Needless to say that Africa has huge arable land and human resources to ensure food security.
A classical example that readily comes to mind is Ghana, and other West African countries. With rapidly accelerating economic policy, Ghana’s President John Dramani Mahama ordered the suspension of U.S. chicken and agricultural products, reaffirming swift measures for transforming local agriculture considered as grounds for ensuring sustainable food security and economic growth and, simultaneously, for driving job creation.
President John Dramani Mahama, in early December 2025, while observing Agricultural Day, urged Ghanaians to take up farming, highlighting the guarantee and state support needed for affordable credit and modern tools to boost food security. According to Mahama, Ghana spends $3bn yearly on basic food imports from abroad.
The government decision highlights the importance of leveraging unto local agriculture technology and innovation. Creating opportunities to unlock the full potential of depending on available resources within the new transformative policy strategy which aims at boosting local productivity. President John Dramani Mahama’s special initiatives are the 24-Hour Economy and the Big Push Agenda. One of the pillars focuses on Grow 24 – modernising agriculture.
Despite remarkable commendations for new set of economic recovery, Ghana’s demand for agricultural products is still high, and this time making a smooth shift to Russia whose poultry meat and wheat currently became the main driver of exports to African countries. And Ghana, noticeably, accepts large quantity (tonnes) of poultry from Russia’s Rostov region into the country, according to several media reports. The supplies include grains, but also vegetable oils, meat and dairy products, fish and finished food products have significant potential for Africa.
The Agriculture Ministry’s Agroexport Department acknowledges Russia exports chicken to Ghana, with Ghanaian importers sourcing Russian poultry products, especially frozen cuts, to meet significant local demand that far outstrips domestic production, even after Ghana lifted a temporary 2020 avian flu-related ban on Russian poultry.
Moreover, monitoring and basic research indicated Russian producers are actively increasing poultry exports to various African countries, thus boosting trade, although Ghana still struggles to balance imports with local industry needs.
A few details indicate the following:
Trade Resumed: Ghana has lifted its ban on Russian poultry imports since April 2021, allowing poultry trade to resume. Russian regions have, thus far, consistently exported these poultry meat and products into the country under regulatory but flexible import rules on a negotiated bilateral agreement.
Significant Market: In any case, Ghana is a key African market for Russian poultry, with exports seeing substantial growth in recent years, alongside Angola, Benin, Cote d’Voire, Nigeria and Sierra Leone.
Demand-Driven: Ghana’s large gap between domestic poultry production and national demand necessitates significant imports, creating opportunities for foreign suppliers like Russia.
Major Exporters: Russia poultry companies are focused on increasing generally their African exports, with Ghana being a major destination. The basic question: to remain as import dependency or strive at attaining food sufficiency?
Product Focus: Exports typically include frozen chicken cuts (legs and meat) very vital for supplementing local supply. But as the geopolitical dynamics shift, Ghana and other importing African countries have to review partnerships, particularly with Russia.
Despite the fact that challenges persist, Russia strongly remains as a notable supplier to Ghana, even under the supervision of John Mahama’s administration, dealing as a friendly ally, both have the vision for multipolar trade architecture, ultimately fulfilling a critical role in meeting majority of African countries’ large consumer demand for poultry products, and with Russia’s trade actively expanding and Ghana’s preparedness to spend on such imports from the state budget.
Following two high-profile Russia–Africa summits, cooperation in the area of food security emerged as a key theme. Moscow pledged to boost agricultural exports to the continent—especially grain, poultry, and fertilisers—while African leaders welcomed the prospect of improved food supplies.
Nevertheless, do these African governments think of prioritising agricultural self-sufficiency. At a May 2025 meeting in St. Petersburg, Russia’s Economic Development Minister, Maxim Reshetnikov, underlined the fact that more than 40 Russian companies were keen to export animal products and agricultural goods to the African region.
Russia, eager to expand its economic footprint, sees large-scale agricultural exports as a key revenue generator. Estimates suggest the Russian government could earn over $15 billion annually from these agricultural exports to African continent.
Head of the Agroexport Federal Center, Ilya Ilyushin, speaking at the round table “Russia-Africa: A Strategic Partnership in Agriculture to Ensure Food Security,” which was held as part of the international conference on ensuring the food sovereignty of African countries in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) on Nov. 21, 2025, said: “We see significant potential in expanding supplies of Russian agricultural products to Africa.”
Ilya Ilyushin, however, mentioned that the Agriculture Ministry’s Agroexport Department, and the Union of Grain Exporters and Producers, exported over 32,000 tonnes of wheat and barley to Egypt totaling nearly $8 million during the first half of 2025, Kenya totaling over $119 million.
Interfax media reports referred to African countries whose markets are of interest for Russian producers and exporters. Despite existing difficulties, supplies of livestock products are also growing, this includes poultry meat, Ilyushin said. Exports of agricultural products from Russia to African countries have more than doubled, and third quarter of 2025 reached almost $7 billion.
The key buyers of Russian grain on the continent are Egypt, Algeria, Kenya, Libya, Tunisia, Nigeria, Morocco, South Africa, Tanzania and Sudan, he said. According to him, Russia needs to expand the geography of supplies, increasing exports to other regions of the continent, increase supplies in West Africa to Benin, Cameroon, Ghana, Liberia and the French-speaking Sahelian States.
Nevertheless, Russian exporters have nothing to complain. Africa’s dependency dilemma still persists. Therefore, Russia to continue expanding food exports to Africa explicitly reflects a calculated economic and geopolitical strategy. In the end of the analysis, the debate plays out prominently and the primary message: Africa cannot and must not afford to sacrifice food sovereignty for colourful symbolism and geopolitical solidarity.
With the above analysis, Russian exporters show readiness to explore and shape actionable strategies for harnessing Africa’s consumer market, including that of Ghana, and further to strengthen economic and trade cooperation and support its dynamic vision for sustainable development in the context of multipolar friendship and solidarity.
By Adedapo Adesanya
Guinea’s military leader Mamady Doumbouya will fully transition to its democratic president after he was elected president of the West African nation.
The former special forces commander seized power in 2021, toppling then-President Alpha Conde, who had been in office since 2010.
Mr Doumbouya reportedly won 86.72 per cent of the election held on December 28, an absolute majority that allows him to avoid a runoff. He will hold the forte for the next seven years as law permits.
The Supreme Court has eight days to validate the results in the event of any challenge. However, this may not be so as ousted Conde and Mr Cellou Dalein Diallo, Guinea’s longtime opposition leader, are in exile.
The election saw Doumbouya face off a fragmented opposition of eight challengers.
One of the opposition candidates, Mr Faya Lansana Millimono claimed the election was marred by “systematic fraudulent practices” and that observers were prevented from monitoring the voting and counting processes.
Guinea is the world leader in bauxite and holds a very large gold reserve. The country is preparing to occupy a leading position in iron ore with the launch of the Simandou project in November, expected to become the world’s largest iron mine.
Mr Doumbouya has claimed credit for pushing the project forward and ensuring Guinea benefits from its output. He has also revoked the licence of Emirates Global Aluminium’s subsidiary Guinea Alumina Corporation following a refinery dispute, transferring the unit’s assets to a state-owned firm.
In September, rating agency, Standard & Poor’s (S&P), assigned an inaugural rating of “B+” with a “Stable” outlook to the Republic of Guinea.
This decision reflects the strength of the country’s economic fundamentals, strong growth prospects driven by the integrated mining and infrastructure Simandou project, and the rigor in public financial management.
As a result, Guinea is now above the continental average and makes it the third best-rated economy in West Africa.
According to S&P, between 2026 and 2028, Guinea could experience GDP growth of nearly 10 per cent per year, far exceeding the regional average.
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