World
How is Russia Straddling to Make Economic Impact in Africa
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
While Russia’s interest in sub-Saharan Africa is nothing new, Russian authorities have realized that it’s time to move back primarily to reclaim its economic footprints and to find old Soviet-era allies, but that step comes with new challenges, especially from other foreign players and the changing internal political and economic conditions in Africa.
Long before it held its first symbolic summit in October 2019, many experts indicated in several policy reports that “Russia has often failed to capitalize on the historical connection between Moscow and those African elites who had been educated in the Soviet Union and Russia.”
For the past few years, Russian authorities are only demonstrating steady and strategic steps at the possibility of pushing huge investments in lucrative sectors, often rattling in hyperbolic statements on ways to strengthen bilateral relations and expand economic cooperation in a number of African countries.
That theatrical show of corporate investment and business interests has been sealed into various agreements, resulting from high-powered state delegations who frequently visited both regions. Records concretely indicated that 92 bilateral agreements were signed during the first summit; little has been achieved, and yet Russians are looking forward to new agreements in the forthcoming July gathering in St. Petersburg.
Keir Giles, an associate fellow of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) in London, explained to me in an email interview, precisely in April 2015, that “Russia’s approach to Africa is all about making up for a lost time. The Soviet Union’s intense involvement in African nations came to an abrupt halt in the early 1990s, and for a long time, Moscow simply didn’t have the diplomatic and economic resources to pay attention to Africa while Russia was consumed with internal problems.”
According to Giles, “that changed in the last decade, thanks to two things: the arrival of President Vladimir Putin with a new foreign policy focus, and the massive influx of cash on the back of increased oil prices, which transformed Russian state finances. Russia is interested both in economic opportunities and in rebuilding political relationships that had in some ways been on hold for over a decade.”
In order to raise Russia’s economic influence and profile in Africa, the Coordinating Committee on Economic Cooperation with Sub-Saharan Africa, popularly referred to as AfroCom, was created in June 2009 on the initiative of the Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry and Vnesheconombank to help promote and facilitate Russian business in Africa. Since its creation, it has had full-fledged support from the Russian Government, the Federation Council and State Duma, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the African diplomatic community.
At the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation, Georgi Petrov, noted at AfroCom’s annual executive meeting held in April 2015 that “in view of the current geopolitical situation in the world and the economic situation in Russia, Russian businesses have to look for new markets. In this regard, of particular interest is the African continent, which today is one of the fastest-growing regions in the world with annual GDP growth of 5%. In addition, opportunities for projects in Africa are opened with the accession of South Africa to the BRICS bloc.” Petrov was referring to Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa as members of BRICS.
Reports also showed that Russia has started strengthening its economic cooperation by opening trade missions with the responsibility of providing sustainable business services and plans to facilitate import-export trade in a number of African countries. A simple calculation shows that already been more than a decade since the establishment of the Coordinating Committee on Economic Cooperation with Sub-Saharan Africa. There are also several Joint Commissions on Trade and Economic Cooperation, and of course, there are Trade and Economic councillors at nearly all of Russia’s diplomatic missions in Africa.
But these Russian trade centres must necessarily embark on a “Doing Business in Africa” campaign to encourage Russian businesses to take advantage of growing trade and investment opportunities to promote trade fairs and business-to-business matchmaking in key spheres in Africa.
Maxim Matusevich, an associate professor and director of the Russian and East European Studies Program at Seton Hall University, told me in an interview that “in the past decades, there was some revival of economic ties between Africa and Russia – mostly limited to the arms trade and oil/gas exploration and extraction. Russia’s presence in Africa and within African markets continues to be marginal, and I think that Russia has often failed to capitalize on the historical connection between Moscow and those African elites who had been educated in the Soviet Union.”
“It is possible that the ongoing crisis in the relations between Russia and the West will stimulate Russia’s leadership to look for new markets for new sources of agricultural produce. Many African nations possess abundant natural resources and have little interest in Russia’s gas and oil. As it was during the Soviet times, Russia could only offer a few manufactured goods that would successfully compete with Western-made products. African nations will probably continue to acquire Russian-made arms, but otherwise, I see only a few prospects for diversification of cooperation in the near future,” added Maxim Matusevich.
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and the Special Presidential Representative for the Middle East and Africa, Mikhail Bogdanov, have several times paid working visits to Africa. On the other side, they have held several meetings these several years, with several high delegations from Africa. The parties have, these several years, discussed bilateral and regional issues and the improvement of diverse cooperation between Russia and Africa, including cooperation with sub-regional organizations of the continent, according to the several transcripts posted to the official website of the Foreign Ministry.
Without a doubt, Russia’s strategic return to Africa has sparked academic discussions at various levels where academic researchers openly admitted that political consultations are on track, arms export has significantly increased, but other export products are extremely low. In addition, Russia’s involvement in infrastructure development and industry has been invisible for the past decades on the continent.
In another interview, Themba Mhlongo, Head of Programmes at the Southern Africa Trust, thinks that Africa should not expect higher trade flows with Russia simply because Africa has not engaged Russia.
Mhlongo told me that “Russia has not been as aggressive as China in pursuing opportunities in Africa because Russia has natural resources and markets in Eastern Europe, South West Asia. Russian exports to Africa might be dominated by machinery and military equipment which serves their interest well.”
Notwithstanding the above weaknesses, he suggested that Africa must engage all BRICS members equally, including Brazil and Russia, in order to build alliances and open trade opportunities, including finance and investment opportunities. Also, African countries must not seem to show preferences in their foreign policy in favour of Western Europe if they want to benefit from trade relations with Russia. They must learn to be neutral; neutrality is a pragmatic strategy!
Mhlongo suspects that Africa still holds an old view about Russia being a communist state and less technologically developed or unsophisticated than Western Europe. But Russia never colonized Africa, so there are no colonial ties between the two – Africa and Russia.
“If you look at African trade flows to Europe, they reflect colonial ties most of the time. However, modern Russia is now an important emerging market country and a member of BRICS. But Russian society is closed, and its orientation is towards Western Europe, particularly the United States (probably due to the period of bipolar global power system that existed before). Russia exports to Africa but rarely sets up businesses. The language (or culture in general) could be one of the barriers to developing trade relations with Russia,” he underlined in his discussion.
He proposed that both Africa and Russia could initiate a dialogue to explore economic opportunities between them. However, there are other avenues to engage each other through the BRICS bloc or through bilateral diplomatic channels. Russia has embassies in Africa, and African countries have diplomatic representations in Russia. Africa may have to pay special attention to cultural issues, try to understand Russia in this ever-changing environment and find an entry point to engage Russia.
On her part, Alexandra Arkhangelskaya, a senior researcher at the Institute of African Studies under the Russian Academy of Sciences and a staff lecturer at the Moscow High School of Economics, told me in an interview that Russia and Africa needed each other – “Russia is a vast market not only for African minerals but for various other goods and products produced by African countries.”
The signs for Russian-African relations are impressive – declarations of intentions have been made, important bilateral agreements signed – now it remains to be seen how these intentions and agreements will be implemented in practice, she pointed out in her discussions.
The revival of Russia-Africa relations should be enhanced in all fields: political, economic, trade, scientific, technological, and cultural. Obstacles to the broadening of Russian-Africa relations should be addressed. These include, in particular, the lack of knowledge in Russia about the situation in Africa and vice versa, suggested Arkhangelskaya.
“As we witness rapid deterioration of relations between Russia and the West unfold, Russia’s decision to ban the import of some agricultural products from countries that have imposed sanctions against Moscow offers great opportunities for the expansion of trade of such products from Africa,” the professor observed in her discussion.
Experts who have researched Russia’s foreign policy in Africa at the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute for African Studies have reiterated that Russia’s exports to Africa can be possible only after the country’s industrial-based experiences a more qualitative change and introduces tariff preferences for trade with African partners. As a reputable institute during the Soviet era, it has played a considerable part in developing African studies in the Russian Federation.
“The situation in Russian-African foreign trade will change for the better if Russian industry undergoes technological modernization, the state provides Russian businessmen systematic and meaningful support, and small and medium businesses receive wider access to foreign economic cooperation with Africa,” according to Professor Aleksei Vasiliev, of the RAS Institute for African Studies and a full member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and Evgeny Korendyasov, an expert at the RAS Institute for African Studies.
In one of his speeches posted to the official website, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov noted frankly in remarks: “it is evident that the significant potential of our economic cooperation is far from being exhausted, and much remains to be done so that Russian and African partners know more about each other’s capacities and needs. Creating a mechanism for providing public support to business interaction between Russian companies and the African continent is still on the agenda.”
World
Russia Expands Military-Technical Cooperation With African Partners
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
Despite geopolitical complexities, tensions and pressure, Russia’s military arms and weaponry sales earned approximately $15 billion at the closure of 2025, according to Kremlin report. At the regular session, chaired by Russian President Vladimir Putin on Jan. 30, the Commission on Military and Technical Cooperation with Foreign Countries analyzed the results of its work for 2025, and defined plans for the future.
It was noted that the system of military-technical cooperation continued to operate in difficult conditions, and with increased pressure from the Western countries to block business relations with Russia. The meeting, however, admitted that export contracts have generally performed sustainably. Russian military products were exported to more than 30 countries last year, and the amount of foreign exchange exceeded $15 billion.
Such results provide an additional opportunity to direct funds to the modernization of OPC enterprises, to the expansion of their production capacities, and to advanced research. It is also important that at these enterprises a significant volume of products is civilian products.
The Russian system of military-technical cooperation has not only demonstrated effectiveness and high resilience, but has created fundamental structures, which allow to significantly expand the “geography” of supplies of products of military purpose and, thus strengthen the position of Russia’s leader and employer advanced weapons systems – proven, tested in real combat conditions.
Thanks to the employees of the Federal Service for Military Technical Cooperation and Rosoboronexport, the staff of OPC enterprises for their good faith. Within the framework of the new federal project “Development of military-technical cooperation of Russia with foreign countries” for the period 2026-2028, additional measures of support are introduced. Further effective use of existing financial and other support mechanisms and instruments is extremely important because the volumes of military exports in accordance with the 2026 plan.
Special attention would be paid to the expansion of military-technological cooperation and partnerships, with 14 states already implementing or in development more than 340 such projects.
Future plans will allow to improve the characteristics of existing weapons and equipment and to develop new promising models, including those in demand on global markets, among other issues – the development of strategic areas of military-technical cooperation, and above all, with partners on the CIS and the CSTO. This is one of the priority tasks to strengthen both bilateral and multilateral relations, ensuring stability and security in Eurasia.
From January 2026, Russia chairs the CSTO, and this requires working systematically with partners, including comprehensive approaches to expanding military-technical relations. New prospects open up for deepening military-technical cooperation and with countries in other regions, including with states on the African continent. Russia has been historically strong and trusting relationships with African countries. In different years even the USSR, and then Russia supplied African countries with a significant amount of weapons and military equipment, trained specialists on their production, operation, repair, as well as military personnel.
Today, despite pressure from the West, African partners express readiness to expand relations with Russia in the military and military-technical fields. It is not only about increasing supplies of Russian military exports, but also about the purchase of other weapons, other materials and products. Russia has undertaken comprehensive maintenance of previously delivered equipment, organization of licensed production of Russian military products and some other important issues. In general, African countries are sufficient for consideration today.
World
Trump Picks Kevin Warsh to Succeed Jerome Powell as Federal Reserve Chair
By Adedapo Adesanya
President Donald Trump has named Mr Kevin Warsh as the successor to Mr Jerome Powell as the Federal Reserve chair, ending a prolonged odyssey that has seen unprecedented turmoil around the central bank.
The decision culminates a process that officially began last summer but started much earlier than that, with President Trump launching a criticism against the Powell-led US central bank almost since he took the job in 2018.
“I have known Kevin for a long period of time, and have no doubt that he will go down as one of the GREAT Fed Chairmen, maybe the best,” Mr Trump said in a Truth Social post announcing the selection.
US analysts noted that the 55-year old appear not to ripple market because of his previous experience at the apex bank as Governor, with others saying he wouldn’t always do the bidding of the American president.
If approved by the US Senate, Mr Warsh will take over the position in May, when Mr Powell’s term expires.
Despite having argued for reductions recently, “Warsh has a long hawkish history that markets have not forgotten,” one analyst told Bloomberg.
President Trump has castigated Mr Powell for not lowering interest rates more quickly. His administration also launched a criminal investigation of Powell and the Federal Reserve earlier this month, which led Mr Powell to issue an extraordinary rebuke of President Trump’s efforts to politicize the independent central bank.
World
BRICS Agenda, United States Global Dominance and Africa’s Development Priorities
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
Donald Trump has been leading the United States as its president since January 2025. Washington’s priority is to Make America Great Again (MAGA). Trump’s tariffs have rippled many economies from Latin America through Asian region to the continent of Africa. Trump’s Davos speech has explicitly revealed building a ‘new world order’ based on dominance rather than trust. He has also initiated whirlwind steps to annex Greenland, while further created the Board of Peace, aimed at helping end the two-year war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza and to oversee reconstruction. Trump is handling the three-year old Russia-Ukraine crisis, and other deep-seated religious and ethnic conflicts in Africa.
These emerging trends, at least in a considerable short term, are influencing BRICS which has increased its geopolitical importance, and focusing on uniting the countries in the Global East and Global South. From historical records, BRICS, described as non-western organization, and is loosing its coherence primarily due to differences in geopolitical interests and multinational alignments, and of course, a number of members face threats from the United States while there are variations of approach to the emerging worldwide perceptions.
In this conversation, deputy director of the Center for African Studies at Moscow’s National Research University High School of Economics (HSE), Vsevolod Sviridov, expresses his opinions focusing on BRICS agenda under India’s presidency, South Africa’s G20 chairmanship in 2024, and genegrally putting Africa’s development priorities within the context of emerging trends. Here are the interview excerpts:
What is the likely impact of Washington’s geopolitics and its foreign policy on BRICS?
From my perspective, the current Venezuela-U.S. confrontation, especially Washington’s tightened leverage over Venezuelan oil revenue flows and the knock-on effects for Chinese interests, will be read inside BRICS as a reminder that sovereign resources can still be constrained by financial chokepoints and sanctions politics. This does not automatically translate into BRICS taking Venezuela’s side, but it does strengthen the bloc’s long-running argument for more resilient South-South trade settlement, diversified energy chains, and financing instruments that reduce exposure to coercive measures, because many African and other developing economies face similar vulnerabilities around commodities, shipping, insurance, and correspondent banking. At the same time, BRICS’ expansion makes consensus harder: several members maintain significant ties with the U.S., so the most likely impact is a technocratic push rather than a loud political campaign.
And highlighting, specifically, the position of BRICS members (South Africa, Ethiopia and Egypt, as well as its partnering African States (Nigeria and Uganda)?
Venezuela crisis urges African members to demand that BRICS deliver usable financial and trade tools. For South Africa, Ethiopia, and Egypt, the Venezuela case is more about the precedent: how quickly external pressure can reshape a country’s fiscal room, debt dynamics, and even investor perceptions when energy revenues and sanctions compliance collide. South Africa will likely argue that BRICS should prioritize investment, industrialization, and trade facilitation. Ethiopia and Egypt, both debt-sensitive and searching for FDI, will be especially attentive to anything that helps de-risk financing, while avoiding steps that could trigger secondary-sanctions anxieties or scare off diversified investors.
Would the latest geopolitical developments ultimately shape the agenda for BRICS 2026 under India’s presidency?
India’s 2026 chairmanship is already framed around “Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability,” and Venezuela’s shock (paired with broader sanction/market-volatility lessons) will likely sharpen the resilience part. From an African perspective, that is an opportunity: South Africa, Ethiopia, and Egypt can press India to translate the theme into deliverables that matter on the ground: food and fertilizer stability, affordable energy access, infrastructure funding. India, in turn, has incentives to keep BRICS focused on economic problem-solving rather than becoming hostage to any single flashpoint. So the Venezuela episode may function as a cautionary case study that accelerates practical cooperation where African members have the most to gain. And I would add: the BRICS agenda will become increasingly Africa-centered simply because Africa’s weight globally is rising, and recent summit discussions have repeatedly highlighted African participation as a core Global South vector. South Africa’s G20 chairmanship last year explicitly framed around putting Africa’s development priorities high on the agenda, further proves this point.
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