Business Post Contributor
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
In this insightful interview conducted by our media executive Kestér Kenn Klomegâh with Fyodor Lukyanov, Chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Research Director at the Valdai Discussion Club, and Editor-in-Chief of Russia in Global Affairs journal, focused largely on Russia and Africa relations, and a few aspects of the emerging new world order. Lukyanov also discussed, at length, Russia’s engagement with Africa as well as the expectations from Africa. Here are the interview excerpts:
During the late October Valdai gathering, Vladimir Putin’s speech underscored the fact that Russia was looking for its Soviet-era allies and “non-Western friends” to create a new world order. What are the implications, from historical perspectives, relating to Africa?
The role of Africa in international affairs is growing; no one can deny it. Russian credit record in relationship with Africa is not easy – from very tight contacts in the decolonization era and period when African countries were building their statehood through the bumpy road in the 1990s when Russia suffered a huge economic and geopolitical setback and was forced to the emergency survival to the slow, but steady re-establishment of ties in 21st century. It should be noted that the renaissance of Russian interest vis-à-vis Africa started much earlier than Russia – West relations collapsed due to the Ukrainian war. And it was a result of the realization that Africa would be increasingly important in decades to come.
As far as the Russian vision of the world order is concerned, it should be a polycentric and pretty complicated constellation of countries or a group of countries (regional groupings) with a permanently shifting balance and steady work on adjustment of different interests. Not easy, but a vaccine against anybody’s hegemony and an opportunity to be flexible in pursuing own needs. Africa, as a big group of countries with interests which are both intertwined and contradicting can serve both as a model of the future global picture and a strong unit in this world if needed. Notwithstanding all that, Africa has its strengths and weaknesses based on history, but the balance is positive in this new world. Most of the potential success depends on African countries themselves and their ability to build up relations with outside powers on a rational and calculated basis.
The Soviet Union, of course, enormously supported Africa’s liberation struggle to attain political independence in the 60s. African leaders are looking for external players with funds to invest and transform their economy. In practical terms, what could be Russia’s role in fighting what is frequently referred to as “neocolonialism” in Africa?
Unlike former colonial powers and, to some extent, China, it is quite clear that Russia doesn’t envisage an exclusive or an ultimately leading role in Africa. There are no political disadvantages associated with Russian relations with Africa. The practical input could be huge, in case Russia does its homework. Russian resources to invest massively are not comparable with what China or Western states can do. But, Russia has a lot of services which are on the highest international level, while much more cost-effective, and they can be offered to African partners. Russia has, for example, developed one of the best systems of digital state services in the world; Russian tax authorities are better equipped with modern technology than most of the developed countries. Russian experience in the raw material sector is unique, as many technological solutions are independent of other great powers, which is getting more and more important now. As I said, the Russian problem is to complete its homework – to list all we can offer and manage those offers in a transparent way, and understandable for partners. It will be done soon because now it gets very vital for Russian development.
Do you think Russia is much more critical of the United States and European Union’s hegemony in Africa? How can we interpret African elites feeling (after the first 2019 summit) about Russia’s renewed economic interests in Africa?
Russia is much more critical of the US hegemony where ever it exists, Africa is not an exemption. Russian economic and political focus on Africa is obvious, and skills to implement it in a contemporary way acceptable for partners will increase now.
What are your views about Russia’s public outreach diplomacy with Africa? How would you evaluate Russia’s engagement, particularly in sustainable development in Africa?
Russia was not very advanced in its diplomatic outreach to Africa until a certain moment, the situation started to improve in the 2010s, and now we have entered a new stage. Minister Sergey Lavrov’s activity all over the continent is very telling. As for sustainable development, this concept is a product of a particular political period; I would call it advanced liberal globalization. This period is over; we are moving towards something else. Frankly, I don’t believe that Russia will be much interested in current circumstances to be part of international efforts to promote sustainable development as understood by international organizations and bureaucracy. But Russia will certainly be eager to work together with particular countries on particular projects.
Geopolitical confrontation, rivalry and competition in Africa. For now, Russia has too many initiatives and bilateral agreements with African countries. What are your suggestions here for strengthening Russia and African relations, especially in the economic direction?
You are right, optimization is needed. Fewer projects and initiatives, more practical outcomes. That is what I mentioned earlier as a necessity to do homework. Combination of very well-calibrated regional initiatives and bilateral projects where Russia has a clear competitive advantage – be it technology, security or food – should be priorities. And they should be numbered, not endless. Africa is certainly not the main topic for the BRICS agenda; those countries prefer to focus on global issues, where they don’t have any major differences (if any), while the regional level is more controversial. Anyway, there is no intention to build a unified front against US and EU. BRICS is by default not confrontational; there is no goal to counterwork the West, but rather to bypass it.
In Africa, each BRICS member will have its own agenda, and no coordination is expected. But then, Africa is represented in BRICS by South Africa. And I would suggest that it would be a natural task for South Africa to promote the African agenda in this group. Of course, each BRICS state has its own hierarchy of interests, and this is normal. But as BRICS aspires greater international role and Africa is growing in significance as an essential part of the world, I see the field for common interests. As far as a confrontation with the West is concerned, there is no such goal for most BRICS countries indeed. But if we look at international trends and the speed with which the previous international system collapsed and overall competition spreads, I would not be so sure to predict how the international situation and stance of BRICS will evolve in years to come.
