World
Russia and Africa: Who is Courting Whom?
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
The South African Institute of International Affairs has put into circulation its latest policy report on Russia-African relations. In the introductory chapter, Steven Gruzd, Samuel Ramani and Cayley Clifford – have summarized various aspects of the developments between between Russia and Africa over the past few years and finally questioned the impact of Russia’s policy on Africa.
According to Steven Gruzd, Samuel Ramani and Cayley Clifford, this special far-reaching policy report includes academic research from leading Russian, African and international scholars. It addresses the dimensions of Russian power projection in Africa, new frontiers of Russian influence and provides a roadmap towards understanding how Russia is perceived in Africa.
It highlights narratives about anti-colonialism and describes how these sources of solidarity are transmitted by Russian elites to their African public. For seeking long-term influence, Russian elites have oftentimes used elements of anti-colonialism as part of the current policy to control the perceptions of Africans and primarily as new tactics for power projection in Africa.
The reports delved into the historical fact that after the collapse of the Soviet era, already more than three decades, Russia is resurgent in Africa. While Russia has been struggling to make inroads into Africa these years, the only symbolic event was the first Russia-Africa Summit held in Sochi, which fêted heads of state from 43 African countries and showcased Moscow’s great power ambitions.
Moscow has signed bilateral agreements to participate in various economic directions with many African countries. It has also signed military-technical agreements with over 20 African countries and has secured lucrative mining and nuclear energy contracts on the continent. Russia exports more arms to Africa than the United States, France and China combined. It uses private military contractors.
While it has made thousands of promises and signed bilateral agreements, Russia is largely invisible in economic sectors, keeps a remote distance from participating in building critical infrastructures and investing in industrial spheres. Moscow simply builds relations on illusions and lacks the capacity and overwhelming power to realize its policy goals in Africa. During critical times of coronavirus pandemic, Moscow terribly failed to supply 300 million Sputnik V vaccines through the African Union.
Russia’s expanding influence in Africa are compelling, but a closer examination further reveals a murkier picture. Despite Putin’s lofty trade targets, Russia’s trade with Africa stands at just $20 billion, which is lower than that of India or Turkey.
The report authors said that the renewed attention by Russia to Africa presents both risks and opportunities for the continent, especially in this changing geopolitical situation. But the key question arises: Who is courting whom?
The report points to the fact that African countries have engaged with Russia in a ‘business-as-usual fashion’ and have either refrained from condemning Russia’s aggression or from expressing explicit solidarity with Ukraine. Nevertheless, over half of all African states sided with the West in condemning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in UN General Assembly votes in March and October 2022.
Russia’s major breakthroughs on the continent are confined to its support for fragile states, such as Mali, or autocracies, such as Cameroon, as major regional powers are reluctant to convert rhetorical cooperation into multidimensional partnerships.
The authors further wrote that “Russia’s growing assertiveness in Africa is a driver of instability and that its approach to governance encourages pernicious practices, such as kleptocracy and autocracy promotion, and the dearth of scholarship on Moscow’s post-1991 activities in Africa is striking.”
Records further show that Russia indeed kept a low profile for two decades after the Soviet collapse. One particularly problematic assumption is that Russia’s resurgence in Africa is a relatively recent phenomenon, which took hold at the tail end of Putin’s second term from 2004 to 2008 and accelerated after Russia-West relations soured over the 2014 Ukraine crisis and Russia’s annexation of Crimea.
Now Russia’s main tactics to expand its influence, such as debt forgiveness, arms contracts to fragile states and resistance to US unilateralism, come from its transition-era playbook and are not simply throwbacks to its Soviet-era superpower status. These continuities and forces that have shaped them are largely ignored in Western accounts and deserve granular attention.
In addition, Russia has used social media, state media and ‘political technologists’ to create distorted narratives of Russian largesse and to erode public support for Western involvement in Africa. At times, image triumphs over reality, as Russian narratives are more appealing than its actions. It is clear that Moscow’s approach to Africa is customised and is not a mere extrapolation from Putin’s global approach to foreign policy.
Moreover, the limited amplification of African voices causes sub-Saharan Africa to be viewed as a passive pawn of Russian power projection and neglects the perspectives of African civil society and the historical legacies that drive elites to court the Kremlin. Africa’s agency is thus discounted and diminished.
On the other hand, Russian public diplomacy in Africa explores the targeted use of historical ties, existing anti-Western narratives, state-centric approach and educational programmes to enhance Moscow’s ‘soft power’ on the continent.
In Southern Africa, a pattern of ‘differentiated courtship’ emerges clearly. By bridging Southern and Eastern Africa, its tactics include debt-for-development, nuclear energy, military and paramilitary cooperation, disinformation campaigns and election interference and sponsorship of political parties.
Further in the Horn of Africa, Russia’s tactics for influence projections span from participating in anti-piracy missions to vaccine diplomacy.
The war in Ukraine has elevated the level of scrutiny of Russia’s actions both in Europe and elsewhere in the world, including in Africa. Undeniably, Moscow is wooing African elites to serve its interests, African states are trying to play off Moscow, Washington, Brussels and Beijing for maximum advantage. While many complexities and nuances still remain in the entire relationships, it necessary not to over-generalize the unique features in the bilateral ties.
In the context of a multipolar geopolitical order, Russia’s image of cooperation could be seen as highly enticing, but it is also based on illusions. Better still, Russia’s posture is a clash between illusions and reality. “Russia, it appears, is a neo-colonial power dressed in anti-colonial clothes,” says the report.
Simply put, Moscow’s strategic incapability, inconsistency and dominating opaque relations are adversely affecting sustainable developments in Africa. Thus far, Russia looks more like a ‘virtual great power’ than a genuine challenger to European, American and Chinese influence.
The second Russia-Africa Summit – if it indeed goes ahead in July 2023 – will provide an ideal opportunity to reflect on progress since the inaugural gathering in 2019, and attempt to separate bluster from the concrete facts on the ground. But, ‘who is courting whom’ in the current relations between Africa and Russia.
By Adedapo Adesanya
The Pan-African Payments and Settlement System (PAPSS), a pan-African payments infrastructure provider designed to facilitate trade on the continent is piloting an African currency market platform to boost commerce across borders in the region.
According to its chief executive, Mr Mike Ogbalu, the service backed by 15 central banks on the continent, expects to add the platform later this year.
He said this will complement its payments infrastructure that it says is currently integrated with 150 commercial banks.
“The rates will be market driven, and our system is able to do a matching based on the rates offered by the different participants in our ecosystem,” the CEO of PAPSS, told Reuters in an interview from Cairo.
The Africa Currency Marketplace, as the platform will be known, will allow parties to exchange local currencies directly, Mr Ogbalu said.
Africa has faced challenges in its foreign exchange markets with challenges ranging around liquidity.
Already, South Africa and Nigeria dominate geographically and much of the wider trading centre around local and hard currency pairs. Those seeking other African currencies must typically secure Dollars first.
However, the region has also seen some major currency reforms with countries such as Nigeria, Egypt and Ethiopia pushing ahead with efforts to move to more market-based regimes.
There have been frequent case of companies not being able to repatriate their revenue from other countries in the region, whenever violence or economic problems cause Dollar shortages in markets like South Sudan or the Central African Republic.
Mr Ogbalu cited the example of an Ethiopian airline selling Naira-denominated tickets in Nigeria, which could then exchange its naira revenue with a Nigerian company trading in Ethiopia using the Birr.
“Our system will intelligently match them and then party A will get Naira in Nigeria and party B will get birr in Ethiopia. The transaction just completes without any third-party currency being involved at all,” Mr Ogbalu said.
He also noted that companies operating in the region have been forced to take a write down every financial year to account for currency revaluations in markets with volatile currencies.
He added that others have invested in assets like real estate to try to preserve the value of their assets in such markets.
There have been attempts to use cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin to get around that problem but their usage is still low, partly due to lack of legal frameworks to support their use in markets like Kenya.
“Those are some of the things we think that this African currency marketplace will unlock,” he said.
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
On March 6, 2025, the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation hosted the roundtable Information Bridge: Russia – Africa.
The event was organized by the Expert Council on Development and Support of Comprehensive Partnership with African Countries under the Deputy Chairman of the State Duma of the Russian Federation, Alexander M. Babakov, and the Afro-Russian Energy Association.
Representatives from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, leading Russian and African journalists and editors, well-known bloggers, media company officials from both Russia and Africa, information security specialists, and representatives from analytical centers and research organizations participated in the roundtable.
The event was moderated by Nikolai Novichkov, a deputy of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation and Deputy Chairman of the Expert Council. The co-moderator was Yulia Berg, head of the Globus expert club and co-author of the GlobalInsights program on Pan-African television.
Participants of the discussion developed specific proposals and recommendations on using media and the blogosphere to promote Russian-African projects, initiatives, and to expand cooperation between Russia and African countries in the field of media communications.
The event was opened by Alexander Babakov, Deputy Chairman of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation and Chairman of the Expert Council on Development and Support of Comprehensive Partnership with African Countries. He emphasized that the issues in media communication between Russia and Africa cannot be resolved without state participation.
“We will certainly, at least within the framework of the State Duma, look for mechanisms that would primarily prioritize state influence and create conditions under which our state’s information agenda could be implemented. There are many institutes and resources available for this. We need to approach them very carefully and seriously today,” said Babakov.
Maria Zakharova, the official representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, highlighted the existing problems in the media field between Russia and Africa:
“The network of correspondents of Russian and African media has the potential to develop, but it is insufficient. There are no accredited African media in Russia. Interaction with local correspondents exists, but African journalists visit Russia episodically, mainly for major events. Against the backdrop of French and English-speaking media influence and a lack of Russian content, the African audience gets a distorted view of Russia and bilateral cooperation.”
Zakharova also proposed ways to resolve the issues in establishing media relations:
“It is important to continue contacts between Russian and African media. Strengthening cooperation through educational programs, press tours, and major media conferences is essential. Africa’s population is 1.5 billion, half of whom are under 20 years old. This is an age when people want to learn, set goals, and break into the world. Modern technologies create an information environment that cannot be overlooked. We have achievements, but we need more.”
Irina Abramova, Director of the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, made several proposals to develop media relations between Russia and Africa:
“It is crucial for journalists to understand Africa to avoid mistakes. We are ready to give lectures and cooperate to improve literacy in covering African topics. In large countries, media should broadcast not only in capitals but also in provinces, addressing educational issues as 50% of Africa’s population is under 20 years old.”
“Furthermore, it is important to bring African bloggers to show the reality of Russia and unite efforts to expand the themes and understanding of mutual interests. Africa is young, open to new things, and should not be portrayed only as a poor and hungry territory,” concluded Abramova.
Louis Gowend, Chair of the Commission for African Diaspora Relations and Public Relations at the Russia-Africa Club of Lomonosov Moscow State University, expressed the viewpoint that Irina Olegovna Abramova’s idea of creating a unified information space between Russia and Africa should be implemented.
However, to achieve this, as emphasized by Artur Kureev, Editor-in-Chief of “African Initiative,” it is first necessary to unify all resources and media related to Africa to establish a cohesive agenda. Artur Sergeevich added that a comprehensive strategy and understanding are necessary to determine the most effective way to engage with the African audience. It’s also crucial to assist the African infrastructure and develop it on a Russian foundation, including technological projects for internet development.
Kinfu Zenebe, head of African diasporas, stated that collaboration with media should focus on African media representatives in the Russian Federation. He suggested that the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs facilitate accreditation for representatives of African media in the Russian Federation. Through a mechanism, African countries should also be allowed to establish small bureaus in Moscow, which would serve as a strategic step towards strengthening strong diplomatic ties.
Cameroonian journalist and member of the Globus expert club, Clarissa Waidorven, highlighted the role of media in strengthening Russian-African ties, emphasizing that coverage of these relations in the global media landscape requires attention to both traditional and new media.
“Western media actively influence African narratives by enticing local bloggers. Russia should strategically use media platforms to advance its interests, creating a positive image through media diplomacy.”
Svyatoslav Shchegolev, Head of African Content Production at RT, emphasized the broadcasting challenges in delivering the Russian perspective to the audience:
“Today in Africa, they are finding new ways to convey information to viewers, sometimes in spite of Western pressure. There is a great deal of attention and willingness to cooperate directly from African media. In several countries, this includes state television channels.”
Victoria Smorodina, Editor-in-Chief of International Reporters, provided recommendations for France on “surviving” on the African continent:
“France needs to rethink its information warfare strategy in Africa, acknowledging the break from past influence. Instead of opposing pan-African demands, it should support the creation of an independent Africa by developing local media, culture, cinema, and theater.”
According to the Editor-in-Chief, this approach will help counter the influence of Turkey, the USA, and other powers.
“France’s defeat in the information sphere should stimulate the development of a new doctrine that combines cognitive sovereignty defense with offensive tools. Partnerships with private companies, a legal framework, and structures are needed to regulate information operations,” she argued.
Andrey Gromov, Executive Secretary of the Board of the African-Russian Energy Association (AREA), summarized the roundtable by presenting the resolution’s provisions containing specific recommendations on measures to stimulate Russian-African cooperation in the information sphere.
“We know of many business projects that simply fell apart because there wasn’t enough coverage. We didn’t understand from our side the contribution of the Russian Federation,” he stressed. Following the roundtable, recommendations were sent to the Government of the Russian Federation, in particular to develop and implement a comprehensive program to promote a positive image of Russia in African countries and to counteract the spread of disinformation about Russia in African media.
By Adedapo Adesanya
Global food prices rose in February 2025, driven by higher sugar, dairy and vegetable oil price, a report from the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) has revealed.
It was revealed that the FAO Food Price Index (FFPI) averaged 127.1 points in February 2025, up 2.0 points (1.6 per cent) from its revised January level.
While the meat price index remained stable, all other price indices rose, with the most significant increases recorded for sugar, dairy and vegetable oils.
The overall index was 9.7 points (8.2 per cent) higher than its corresponding level one year ago; however, it remained 33.1 points (20.7 per cent) below the peak reached in March 2022.
The FAO Cereal Price Index averaged 112.6 points in February, rising by 0.8 points (0.7 per cent) from January but remaining 1.2 points (1.1 per cent) below its February 2024 level.
Wheat export prices increased month-on-month, driven by tighter domestic supplies in the Russian Federation, which constrained export volumes and shifted demand to other suppliers, adding upward pressure on global prices.
Additional support to the price increases came from concerns over unfavourable crop conditions in parts of Europe, the Russian Federation and the United States of America.
World maize prices continued their upward trend in February, primarily due to tightening seasonal supplies in Brazil, worsening crop conditions in Argentina, and strong export demand for United States’ maize.
Among other coarse grains, world prices of barley and sorghum also increased. By contrast, the FAO All Rice Price Index declined by 6.8 per cent in February, as ample exportable supplies and weak import demand exerted downward pressure on prices.
The FAO Vegetable Oil Price Index averaged 156.0 points in February, up 3.0 points (2.0 per cent) from the previous month and as much as 35.1 points (29.1 per cent) above its level a year earlier. The increase in the index was driven by higher quotations across palm, rapeseed, soy and sunflower oils.
Meanwhile, global soyoil prices increased on firm global demand, particularly from the food sector. In the case of sunflower and rapeseed oils, prices were mainly supported by concerns over likely tightening supplies in the coming months.
The FAO Meat Price Index averaged 118.0 points in February, down marginally by 0.1 points (0.1 per cent) from January but remaining 5.4 points (4.8 per cent) above its level a year ago.
International poultry meat prices declined, driven by abundant global supplies primarily due to high export availabilities from Brazil, despite continuing avian influenza outbreaks in other major producing countries.
Similarly, pig meat prices softened, pressured by lower quotations in the European Union. While prices showed signs of stabilization, they remained below early January levels (before the outbreak of foot and mouth disease) due to a surplus caused by trade restrictions on German pig meat.
By contrast, ovine meat prices rose, underpinned by strong global demand. New Zealand’s export volumes declined due to lower production, but higher slaughter rates in Australia raised supply, limiting the price increases.
Meanwhile, bovine meat quotations strengthened, driven by rising Australian prices amid robust global demand, particularly from the United States of America.
However, the increase was partially offset by lower Brazilian bovine meat prices due to ample cattle supplies.
The FAO Dairy Price Index stood at 148.7 points in February, rising by 5.7 points (4.0 per cent) from January and standing 28.0 points (23.2 per cent) higher than its level a year ago.
The increase was driven by higher prices across all major dairy products. International cheese prices increased for the third consecutive month, rising by 4.7 per cent from January.
The rise was fueled by strong import demand, as recovering production in Europe was offset by seasonal output declines in Oceania. Quotations for whole milk powder also increased, up 4.4 per cent from January, underpinned by robust demand despite stagnating production in Oceania.
International butter prices rebounded, rising by 5.2 points (2.6 per cent) month-to-month, as declining milk output in Oceania, following seasonal patterns, coincided with strong domestic and international demand. Prices of skim milk powder registered a modest 1.8 per cent increase month-to-month, as seasonally higher production in Europe was offset by declining production in Oceania.
The FAO Sugar Price Index averaged 118.5 points in February, up 7.3 points (6.6 per cent) from January after three consecutive monthly declines. However, it remained 22.2 points (15.8 per cent) lower than its level in February of last year.
The increase in world sugar prices was driven by concerns over tighter global supplies in the 2024/25 season. Declining production prospects in India and concerns over the impact of recent dry weather on the upcoming crop in Brazil, which exacerbated the seasonal effect, underpinned the increase in prices.
Additionally, the strengthening of the Brazilian Real against the US Dollar, which tends to affect exports from Brazil, further contributed to the overall increase in global sugar prices.
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