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Russia’s Engagement in Africa Requires In-depth Study

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Samir Bhattacharya Russia's Engagement in Africa

Kestér Kenn Klomegâh

Within the current geopolitical changes, Africa is experiencing sharp disintegration characterized by differences in political systems, economic structures and cultural norms in member countries. Unfortunately, military takeovers have become a distinctive feature (or accepted form) of regime change, particularly in West Africa. For instance, the Africa Governance Report 2023 focuses on unconstitutional changes of government in Africa.

The 35th Ordinary Session of African Leaders Summit, held in February 2022, urged leaders to deploy concerted efforts in promoting democracy and good governance, including upholding term limits, as per their respective constitutions. The Accra Forum II also underscored the commitment to facilitate the consolidation of constitutionalism in Africa through stakeholder engagement.

The Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, summit declaration (April 2022) further urges the African Union (AU) Member States, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU and the Regional Economic Communities especially ECOWAS, to strictly adhere to what was referred to as the Lomé Declaration and the Johannesburg Declaration on ‘Silencing the Guns’ in Africa, adopted at the 14th Extraordinary Session on 6 December 2020.

The declaration warned external partners collaborating and supporting military governments to hold onto political power. Given the case of and with particular reference to Russia, it condemned external interference in peace and security matters in Africa. In addition, African leaders have expressed grave concern over the resurgence of military takeovers and further urged the adoption of serious measures to intensify efforts at addressing the root causes of coup d’etats.

In this interview, Samir Bhattacharya, an Associate Fellow at Observer Research Foundation (ORF), where he works on geopolitics with particular reference to Africa in the changing global order, says Africa has witnessed six military takeovers since 2022, with several abortive coups, sanctions on the military juntas have been lifted but generally the French-speaking West African countries continue to face multiple democratic challenges with a wider negative impact across the region. Here are the interview excerpts:

To begin with, what are your arguments that Russia supports military coup makers (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger et cetera) in Africa?

It is true that the Russian Private Military Company (PMC) Wagner Group provided political advice to many African leaders throughout the continent, particularly in Sudan, and had offered military support to weak authoritarian governments in nations like Mali and Libya, primarily to combat extremist organizations and insurgencies. The Western experts also emphasized how Russia frequently portrays Africa as a victim of neocolonialism and how it often supports or forms partnerships with autocrats who usually advance anti-Western regimes.

For instance, the Niger coup occurred precisely during the time Russian President Vladimir Putin was in Saint Petersburg receiving the Heads of State and ministries from Africa. There are no coincidences in politics. The president of Ukraine’s advisor, Mykhailo Podolyak, was prompted by this to openly accuse Russia of masterminding the coup. Suspicion was aroused by the coup’s timing as well as the Russian flags being flown in the streets in the days that followed.

The narrative that depicts Russia as a proactive coup advocate is compelling and seems to hold water. Nevertheless, it is based on unsubstantiated hypotheses and ignores what Russia has done to help the junta leaders in the nations where it has started to contribute. Naturally, there are claims of human rights violations followed by denials. Nobody has, however, attempted to investigate if the Wagner group attempted to impose a Russian model of governance on these junta officials.

Wagner most likely wants to promote an African style of governance by demonstrating that it is not interfering in any way beyond its duty as a security provider. My point here is that we need to study Wagner in more detail before parroting what some Western media people are repeating.

Russia is seemingly interested in military governance in Africa. Does that set the precedence for future military takeovers in Africa?

Indeed, Western observers continue to be upset by Moscow’s relative popularity in coup-hit Africa. Most African scholars from North America or Europe indeed seem emphatic that not only does Russia support military coup makers, but a greater Russian engagement would also lead to more coups across the continent. Regretfully, there is hardly any empirical evidence to support these general statements. Therefore, it’s crucial to pay attention to what is happening on the ground rather than succumbing to their narratives and attempting to formulate morally sound responses in support of these arguments.

Do transitions from democratic governance to military governments have meaning for fighting growing trends of neo-colonialism in Africa?

Coups can spread quickly. Many observers warned about Burkina Faso when Mali collapsed, and many predicted that Niger would follow when Burkina fell.

Frustration over the government’s inability to put an end to terrorism and other instability in the Sahel region is the driving force behind all of these coups. Russia seems to appeal to a lot of African sentiment when it attempts to position itself as an anti-colonial power.

However, it would be overly generalizing to attribute the coup to neo-colonialism alone. With eight coups in three years, the Sahel region in West Africa is most affected by coups. However, a close examination reveals that the Sahel Region has endured violent extremism, civil unrest, and poor governance for a very long period. It unmistakably shows how France and other Western powers are losing ground in this region. Frustration with France and other foreign powers increased fairly naturally as their military intervention failed to stem the Islamist insurgency that was spreading throughout the region.

Therefore, the West cannot address the issue merely by blaming Russia. And Russia cannot blame only neocolonialism. I am afraid as many African nations continue to be beset by widespread complaints of poor governance, nepotism, and distress, many more within the region and beyond may eventually see military takeovers of a similar nature.

Despite the above narratives, do you think ECOWAS, the 15-member regional economic bloc, must be firm with the ‘Silence-the-Guns’ policy adopted several years ago by the African Union?

The African Union has presented its flagship project, “Silence the Guns by 2030,” which is also an essential component of “Africa’s Vision 2063,” to establish an Africa free of conflicts. However, following the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, African leaders decided to concentrate more on other concerns, like the security of food and energy. As a consequence, the 2020 deadline for “Silencing the Guns” has finally been moved to 2030.

And ECOWAS, one of the earliest regional organizations, must take the initiative and maintain its resolve. But it must demonstrate that it is capable of acting. Its image has been tarnished during the recent coup in Niger when the ECOWAS threatened the Junta government with military action in favour of a return to the democratic government before reversing course. Furthermore, claims have been made that France controls ECOWAS. In light of the circumstances, ECOWAS needs to take action in the interest of the continent and restore its reputation as a powerful regional organization.

A research report from the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) describes Russia as ‘a virtual investor’ in Africa, most of its pledges largely aimed at luring (woo-ing) African states and leaders to support its ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine. What are your expert arguments here?

I have not read the report. However, the “African agency” is the most prominent victim in the narrative outlined above. It presents Russia as an all-powerful force that supports the overthrow of elected governments, many of which have the backing of the West and seeks to woo or persuade its allies into following its lead or “corrupting” them in the process.

Russia has not been in Africa for nearly thirty years, ever since the fall of the Soviet Union. When Russia hosted the first Russia-Africa Summit in 2019, many people believed it would only add to the already many Africa+1 conferences without offering anything new. However, the pace at which Russia is gaining ground in Africa has startled Western academics. Russia has been more politically and economically involved in Africa in recent years. But in this particular case, one private military group—the Wagner Group, as we all know it—has spearheaded the most successful kind of engagement on behalf of Russia, as opposed to a government-to-government or business-to-business model.

Since late 2017, Wagner’s military presence in Africa has increased significantly. Troops have been stationed in Sudan, Libya, Mali, Mozambique, Burkina Faso, and Mali, and the company is actively seeking to expand into several more states. Nevertheless, it still cannot compete with China, the US, or the EU in terms of physical infrastructure.

In practical terms and compared to China, do you think Russia has made a visible impact on infrastructure development in the continent since the collapse of the Soviet era in 1991?

Africa currently has a $12 billion trade deficit with Russia because it imports five times as much as it exports. President Putin vowed to boost Russia’s trade with Africa from approximately $16.8 billion to $40 billion yearly in five years following the 2019 Russia-Africa Summit.

Currently, it remains stagnant at roughly $18 billion each year, representing 2% of the total trade on the continent. Furthermore, two-thirds of Russia’s overall trade with Africa is confined to merely four countries. They are Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and South Africa.

On the other hand, China is Africa’s largest trading partner for 15 consecutive years. South Africa is China’s largest trading partner among all African economies, accounting for 19.9 per cent of total trade with the continent, followed by Nigeria and Angola. China’s total trade with Africa grew by 1.5 per cent in 2023 from 2022 to $282.1 billion. Chinese exports to Africa reached $173 billion, an increase of 7.5 per cent over 2022, while its imports from the continent dropped by 6.7 per cent to $109 billion. While the $100 million year-on-year increase made 2023 bilateral trade a record, Africa’s trade deficit with China continued to expand, from $46.9 billion in 2022 to $64 billion in 2023. Comparing Russia with China would not be logical.

Can we conclude this discussion with the significance of peace, justice and strong state institutions (UN SDG 16), what has been achieved over the past few years, the challenges and the way forward in West Africa?

Recently, a very significant event took place in West Africa. Three junta-led governments—Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger—decided to leave ECOWAS and establish the “Alliance of Sahel States,” a mini-lateral regional organization, in response to the organization’s threat of military action. It’s being referred to as the “Brexit of Africa” by many, and it might have disastrous repercussions in the neighbouring countries. In response, ECOWAS chose to lift these nations’ economic sanctions. However, maybe it is too little, too late. The United Nations will have a tough time in its quest for SDG-16 in the Sahel.

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Pope Francis Dies at 88 After Protracted Illness

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pope francis

By Adedapo Adesanya

Pope Francis has died at the age of 88 after battling illness in the last couple of months.

The Vatican announced his demise on Monday morning, a day after Easter.

The pontiff, who was Bishop of Rome and head of the Catholic Church, became pope in 2013 after his predecessor, Benedict XVI resigned.

His death was announced by Cardinal Kevin Farrell in a statement released by the Vatican.

He said: “Dearest brothers and sisters, with deep sorrow I must announce the death of our Holy Father Francis.

“At 7.35am this morning, the Bishop of Rome, Francis, returned to the house of the Father. His entire life was dedicated to the service of the Lord and His Church.

“He taught us to live the values of the Gospel with fidelity, courage and universal love, especially in favour of the poorest and most marginalised.

“With immense gratitude for his example as a true disciple of the Lord Jesus, we commend the soul of Pope Francis to the infinite merciful love of the One and Triune God.”

The process for choosing a new pope – conclave – generally takes place between 15 and 20 days after the death of a pontiff.

Cardinals from around the world will gather in the Vatican and choose the new leader of the Catholic church.

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Russia’s Business Integration and Geopolitics of Multipolar World

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St. Petersburg International Economic Forum 2025.

By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh

Popularly referred to as Roscongress Foundation, St. Petersburg International Forum (SPIEF) has been its main cornerstone. The SPIEF has, all these years, focused on charting dignified internal economic integration utilizing available resources, both natural and human capital and combined with financial capability, and the possibility of increasing exportable goods to make a better world.

Since its establishment by a decree of Russian President Vladimir Putin, it has marked chronological achievements in boosting and strengthening corporate investor networking and entrepreneurship. It has also taken several key initiatives to foster potential entrepreneurship, leveraging the vast opportunities and supporting the growth of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in the Russian Federation.

According to reports, designing business brands, expand their objective reach to internal Russia’s landscape, and developing markets in neighboring Soviet republics and farther down in Africa, Asia, Europe, United States and Latin America. Ultimately, the SPIEF is unreservedly committed to providing the necessary support to enable both the state-to-state and the private sector to thrive. Building on the previous unerasable achievements, SPIEF’s mid-June 2025 edition will continue to serve as a solid platform, particularly for corporate networking, brainstorming and collaborating on strategies for potential business developments and their subsequent growth.

The architecture of the entire business programme on 18–21 June, has been fixed, and the theme designed as “Shared Values: The Foundation of Growth in a Multipolar World”, reflecting major shifts in international cooperation and the role of universal values in enabling sustainable economic development.

During the discussions, SPIEF participants will assess and review the effectiveness of measures taken, in the past years, to achieve Russia’s economic stability and progress, and concretely to determine further economic development trajectories in the Russian Federation and its footprints in different regions in the world amidst the current geopolitical challenges.

“We are witnessing tectonic shifts in the world. Not only is the economic map changing, but so too, in some sense, are the systems of economic activity and social relations in a number of countries and even intergovernmental blocs. The St. Petersburg International Economic Forum is becoming more than just a space for dialogue and the generation of ideas and solutions. It is turning into a platform where new meanings and even new practices emerge that can shape the contours of the future.

“It’s important not only to observe these changes, but to drive them and set their direction. And all of this must happen through a format of meaningful, trust-based and collaborative dialogue,” said Anton Kobyakov, Adviser to the President of the Russian Federation and Executive Secretary of the SPIEF Organizing Committee.

The business programme has been structured around four key thematic pillars, each revealing a different dimension of global and national transformation. The central pillar, “Development Economics: Ensuring Growth”, reflects the logic of new economic thinking. It covers two major areas. “The Global Economy: A New Platform for Global Growth” focuses on the resilience of macroeconomic models, investment strategies, the expansion of logistics routes, and the development of new markets.

Discussions will address the future of international trade and supply chain transformation, the role of small and medium-sized businesses, and the regional and sector-specific dimensions of economic policy. Another major area is “The Russian Economy: A New Level of Growth”, which explores the opportunities and challenges facing the Russian economy amid global shifts.

Topics will include building an effective new-cycle economic model, strengthening the resilience of domestic industries, and developing priority sectors such as manufacturing, agriculture, and high technology. This track will also cover Russia’s innovation potential, its integration into global economic processes, investment attraction strategies, and the strengthening of the domestic market.

These themes are directly linked to technological sovereignty and innovation. The “Technology: Pursuing Leadership” pillar will focus on key directions in technological development from AI and automation to independence in microelectronics, new materials, energy, and cybersecurity. At the core is the formation of a sustainable and competitive technological base capable of ensuring the long-term development of the economy and society.

Technological advancement is impossible without a stable value system and strong cultural identity. That’s why the third pillar, “The Living Environment”, will address information sovereignty, cultural identity, social cohesion, and international humanitarian cooperation. Participants will explore how meaning is shaped and communicated in the media landscape, the mechanisms of trust in the digital age, and the role of tradition and historical memory.

This naturally leads into the fourth pillar, “The Individual in a New World”, which will focus on quality of life, health, education, family well-being, urban development, and personal fulfilment. Special attention will be paid to youth and women’s participation in the economy, new employment formats, and managing human capital as a key resource for the future.

The programme will also include sector-specific and international events that have already proven to be essential gathering points for the professional community. Among them are the SCO and BRICS Business Forums, the B20 Forum, the SME Forum, the Creative Industries Forum, and the ‘Ensuring Drug Security’ Russian Pharmaceutical Forum.

The traditional format of business dialogues with representatives from China, India, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, ASEAN, the CIS, and the EAEU will support the expansion of bilateral and multilateral ties, showcase investment projects, and explore industrial and scientific cooperation opportunities. Additional events will include business breakfasts with leaders of major companies, project presentations, public interviews, agreement signings, and an exhibition programme.

This year’s SPIEF will also host the General Assembly of the Organization of Asia-Pacific News Agencies (OANA), as well as the Day of the Future International Youth Economic Forum. The latter is supported by Friends for Leadership, an organization accredited by the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), which brings together young leaders, entrepreneurs and experts from over 100 countries. It was created by the Roscongress Foundation following the 19th World Festival of Youth and Students in 2017.

From the above discussion, reiterating that the theme, “Shared Values: The Foundation of Growth in a Multipolar World”, reflects profound shifts in the framework of international cooperation. Rapidly evolving economic and political processes are transforming the global landscape. The current changes demand broad expert discussion, and SPIEF, as one of the largest business forums, provides a platform for an open dialogue. In addition, it aims to become a space where new ideas are born, shaped into strategy, and transformed into real-world processes that can help shape the future.

The Roscongress Foundation was established in 2007 with the aim of facilitating the development of Russia’s economic potential, promoting its national interests, and strengthening the country’s image. One of the roles of the Foundation is to comprehensively evaluate, analyse, and cover issues on the Russian and global economic agendas. It also offers administrative services, provides promotional support for business projects and attracting investment, helps foster social entrepreneurship and charitable initiatives. The Roscongress Foundation was established in pursuance of a decision by the President of the Russian Federation.

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Trump’s Tariffs, Russia and Africa Trade Cooperation in Emerging Multipolar World

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Trump's Tariffs

By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh

With geopolitical situation heightening, trade wars are also becoming increasingly prominent. The 47th United States President Donald Trump has introduced trade tariffs, splashed it over the world. China, an Asian trade giant and an emerging economic superpower, has its highest shared.

South Africa, struggling with its fragile foreign alliances, is seriously navigating the new United States economic policy and trade measures, at least to maintain its membership in the African Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA) which is going to expire in September 2025.

It is a well-known fact that AGOA waived duties on most commodities from Africa in order to boost trade in American market. The AGOA also offers many African countries trade preferences in the American market, earning huge revenues for their budgets. Financial remittances back to Africa also play mighty roles across the continent from the United States.

That however, the shifting geopolitical situation combined with Trump’s new trade policies and Russia’s rising interest in Africa, the overarching message for African leaders and business corporate executives is to review the level of degree how to appreciably approach and strengthen trade partnership between Africa and Russia.

The notion of a new global order and frequently phrased multipolar world, indicating the construction of a fairer architecture of interaction, in practical terms, has become like a relic and just as a monumental pillar. Even as we watch the full-blown recalibration of power, the geopolitical reshuffling undoubtedly creates the conditions for new forms of cooperation.

In this current era of contradictions and complexities we are witnessing today, we must rather reshape and redefine rules and regulations to facilitate bilateral and multilateral relations between African countries and Russia, if really Russia seeks to forge post-Soviet strategic economic cooperation with Africa.

In fact, post-Soviet in the sense that trade is not concentrate on state-to-state but also private – including, at least, medium scale businesses. The new policy dealing with realities of the geopolitical world, distinctively different from Soviet-era slogans and rhetorics of ‘international friendship and solidarity’ of those days.

Bridging Africa and Russia, at least in the literal sense of the word, necessitates partial departure from theoretical approach to implementing several bilateral and multilateral decisions, better still agreements reached at previous summits and conferences during the past decade.

Understandably Africa has a stage, Russia termed ‘the struggle against neo-colonial tendencies’ and mounting the metal walls against the ‘scrambling of resources’ across Africa. Some experts argued that Africa, at the current stage, has to develop its regions, modernize most the post-independence-era industries to produce exportable goods, not only for domestic consumption. Now the emphasis is on pushing for prospects of a single continental market, the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA).

This initiative, however, must be strategically and well-coordinated well, and here I suggest integration and cooperation starting at country-wide basis to regional level before it broadly goes to the entire continent, consisting 54 independent states.

These are coordinated together as African Union (AU), which in January 2021 initiated the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA). With this trading goals in mind, Africa as a continent has to integrate, promote trade and economic cooperation, engage in investment and development. In that direction, genuine foreign partners are indiscriminately required, foreign investment capital in essential for collaboration as well as their entrepreneurial skills and technical expertise.

For instance, developing relations with Asian giants such China and India, the European Union and the United States. A number of African countries are shifting to the BRICS orbit, in search for feasible alternative opportunities, for the theatrical trade drama. In the Eurasian region and the former Soviet space, Kazakhstan and Russia stand out, as potential partners, for Africa.

Foreign Affairs Minister Sergey Lavrov has said, at the podium before the staff and students at Moscow State Institute of International Affairs in September, that trade between Russia and Africa would grow further as more and more African partners continued to show interest in having Russians in the economic sectors in Africa. This provides greater competition between the companies from Western countries, China, and Russia. With competition for developing mineral resources in Africa, it is easier and cheaper for African colleagues to choose partners.

As far back in October 2010, Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry posted an official report on its website that traditional products from least developed countries (including Africa) would be exempted from import tariffs. The legislation stipulated that the traditional goods are eligible for preferential customs and tariffs treatment.

Thereafter, Minister Sergey Lavrov has reiterated, in speeches, trade preferences for African exporters, but terribly failed to honour these thunderous promises. Notwithstanding the above granting trade preferences, there prevailing multitude of questions relating to the pathways of improving trade transactions, and removing obstacles including those Soviet-era rules and regulations.

Logistics is another torny hurdle. Further to this, Russian financial institutions can offer credit support that will allow to localize Russian production in Africa’s industrial zones, especially southern and eastern African regions that show some stability and have good investment and business incentives.

In order to operate more effectively, Russians have to risk by investing, recognize the importance of cooperation on key investment issues and to work closely on the challenges and opportunities on the continent. On one hand, analyzing the present landscape of Africa, Russia can export its technology and compete on equal terms with China, India and other prominent players. On the other hand, Russia lacks the competitive advantage in terms of finished industrial (manufactured) products that African consumers obtain from Asian countries such as China, India, Japan and South Korea.

Compared to the United States and Europe, Russia did very little after the Cold War and it is doing little even today in Africa. On 27th–28th July 2023, St Petersburg hosted the second Russia-Africa summit. At the plenary session, President Vladimir Putin underscored the fact that there was, prior to the collapse of the Soviet, there were over 330 large infrastructure and industrial facilities in Africa, but most were lost. Regarding trade, Putin, regrettably, noted Russia’s trade turnover with the African countries increased in 2022 and reached almost US$18 billion, (of course, that was 2022).

Arguably, Russia’s economic presence is invisible across Africa. It currently has insignificant trade statistics. Until the end of the first quarter of 2025, Russia still has a little over $20 billion trade volume with Africa. Statistics on Africa’s trade with foreign countries vary largely.

For example, the total United States two-way trade in Africa has actually fallen off in recent years, to about $60 billion, far eclipsed by the European Union with over $240 billion, and China more than $280 billion, according to a website post by the Brookings Institution.

According to the African Development Bank, Africa’s economy is growing faster than those of any other regions. Nearly half of Africa is now classified as middle income countries, the numbers of Africans living below the poverty line fell to 39 percent as compared to 51 percent in 2023, and around 380 million of Africa’s 1.4 billion people are now earning good incomes – rising consumerism – that makes trade profitable.

Nevertheless, there is great potential, as African leaders and entrepreneurial community are turing to Russia for multifaceted cooperation due to the imperialist approach of the United States and its hegemonic stand triggered over the years, and now with Trump new trade tariffs and Washington’s entire African policy.

China has done its part, Russia has to change and adopt new rules and regulations, pragmatic approach devoid of mere frequent rhetorics. It is important discussing these points, and to shamelessly repeat that both Russia and Africa have to make consistent efforts to look for new ways, practical efforts at removing existing obstacles that have impeded trade over the years.

Sprawling from the Baltic Sea to the Pacific Ocean, Russia is a major great power and has the potential to become a superpower. Russia can regain part of its Soviet-era economic power and political influence in present-day Africa.

Certainly, the expected superpower status has to be attained by practical multifaceted sustainable development and by maintaining an appreciably positive relations with Africa. We have come a long way, especially after the resonating first summit (2019 and high-praised second summit (2023), several bilateral agreements are yet to be implemented. The forthcoming Russia – Africa Partnership summit is slated for 2026, inside Africa and preferably in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Kestér Kenn Klomegâh is a frequent and passionate contributor. During his professional career as a researcher specialising in Russia-Africa policy, which spans nearly two decades, he has been detained and questioned several times by Russian federal security services for reporting facts. Most of his well-resourced articles are reprinted in a number of reputable foreign media.

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