World
Russia’s Engagement in Africa Requires In-depth Study
Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
Within the current geopolitical changes, Africa is experiencing sharp disintegration characterized by differences in political systems, economic structures and cultural norms in member countries. Unfortunately, military takeovers have become a distinctive feature (or accepted form) of regime change, particularly in West Africa. For instance, the Africa Governance Report 2023 focuses on unconstitutional changes of government in Africa.
The 35th Ordinary Session of African Leaders Summit, held in February 2022, urged leaders to deploy concerted efforts in promoting democracy and good governance, including upholding term limits, as per their respective constitutions. The Accra Forum II also underscored the commitment to facilitate the consolidation of constitutionalism in Africa through stakeholder engagement.
The Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, summit declaration (April 2022) further urges the African Union (AU) Member States, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU and the Regional Economic Communities especially ECOWAS, to strictly adhere to what was referred to as the Lomé Declaration and the Johannesburg Declaration on ‘Silencing the Guns’ in Africa, adopted at the 14th Extraordinary Session on 6 December 2020.
The declaration warned external partners collaborating and supporting military governments to hold onto political power. Given the case of and with particular reference to Russia, it condemned external interference in peace and security matters in Africa. In addition, African leaders have expressed grave concern over the resurgence of military takeovers and further urged the adoption of serious measures to intensify efforts at addressing the root causes of coup d’etats.
In this interview, Samir Bhattacharya, an Associate Fellow at Observer Research Foundation (ORF), where he works on geopolitics with particular reference to Africa in the changing global order, says Africa has witnessed six military takeovers since 2022, with several abortive coups, sanctions on the military juntas have been lifted but generally the French-speaking West African countries continue to face multiple democratic challenges with a wider negative impact across the region. Here are the interview excerpts:
To begin with, what are your arguments that Russia supports military coup makers (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger et cetera) in Africa?
It is true that the Russian Private Military Company (PMC) Wagner Group provided political advice to many African leaders throughout the continent, particularly in Sudan, and had offered military support to weak authoritarian governments in nations like Mali and Libya, primarily to combat extremist organizations and insurgencies. The Western experts also emphasized how Russia frequently portrays Africa as a victim of neocolonialism and how it often supports or forms partnerships with autocrats who usually advance anti-Western regimes.
For instance, the Niger coup occurred precisely during the time Russian President Vladimir Putin was in Saint Petersburg receiving the Heads of State and ministries from Africa. There are no coincidences in politics. The president of Ukraine’s advisor, Mykhailo Podolyak, was prompted by this to openly accuse Russia of masterminding the coup. Suspicion was aroused by the coup’s timing as well as the Russian flags being flown in the streets in the days that followed.
The narrative that depicts Russia as a proactive coup advocate is compelling and seems to hold water. Nevertheless, it is based on unsubstantiated hypotheses and ignores what Russia has done to help the junta leaders in the nations where it has started to contribute. Naturally, there are claims of human rights violations followed by denials. Nobody has, however, attempted to investigate if the Wagner group attempted to impose a Russian model of governance on these junta officials.
Wagner most likely wants to promote an African style of governance by demonstrating that it is not interfering in any way beyond its duty as a security provider. My point here is that we need to study Wagner in more detail before parroting what some Western media people are repeating.
Russia is seemingly interested in military governance in Africa. Does that set the precedence for future military takeovers in Africa?
Indeed, Western observers continue to be upset by Moscow’s relative popularity in coup-hit Africa. Most African scholars from North America or Europe indeed seem emphatic that not only does Russia support military coup makers, but a greater Russian engagement would also lead to more coups across the continent. Regretfully, there is hardly any empirical evidence to support these general statements. Therefore, it’s crucial to pay attention to what is happening on the ground rather than succumbing to their narratives and attempting to formulate morally sound responses in support of these arguments.
Do transitions from democratic governance to military governments have meaning for fighting growing trends of neo-colonialism in Africa?
Coups can spread quickly. Many observers warned about Burkina Faso when Mali collapsed, and many predicted that Niger would follow when Burkina fell.
Frustration over the government’s inability to put an end to terrorism and other instability in the Sahel region is the driving force behind all of these coups. Russia seems to appeal to a lot of African sentiment when it attempts to position itself as an anti-colonial power.
However, it would be overly generalizing to attribute the coup to neo-colonialism alone. With eight coups in three years, the Sahel region in West Africa is most affected by coups. However, a close examination reveals that the Sahel Region has endured violent extremism, civil unrest, and poor governance for a very long period. It unmistakably shows how France and other Western powers are losing ground in this region. Frustration with France and other foreign powers increased fairly naturally as their military intervention failed to stem the Islamist insurgency that was spreading throughout the region.
Therefore, the West cannot address the issue merely by blaming Russia. And Russia cannot blame only neocolonialism. I am afraid as many African nations continue to be beset by widespread complaints of poor governance, nepotism, and distress, many more within the region and beyond may eventually see military takeovers of a similar nature.
Despite the above narratives, do you think ECOWAS, the 15-member regional economic bloc, must be firm with the ‘Silence-the-Guns’ policy adopted several years ago by the African Union?
The African Union has presented its flagship project, “Silence the Guns by 2030,” which is also an essential component of “Africa’s Vision 2063,” to establish an Africa free of conflicts. However, following the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, African leaders decided to concentrate more on other concerns, like the security of food and energy. As a consequence, the 2020 deadline for “Silencing the Guns” has finally been moved to 2030.
And ECOWAS, one of the earliest regional organizations, must take the initiative and maintain its resolve. But it must demonstrate that it is capable of acting. Its image has been tarnished during the recent coup in Niger when the ECOWAS threatened the Junta government with military action in favour of a return to the democratic government before reversing course. Furthermore, claims have been made that France controls ECOWAS. In light of the circumstances, ECOWAS needs to take action in the interest of the continent and restore its reputation as a powerful regional organization.
A research report from the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) describes Russia as ‘a virtual investor’ in Africa, most of its pledges largely aimed at luring (woo-ing) African states and leaders to support its ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine. What are your expert arguments here?
I have not read the report. However, the “African agency” is the most prominent victim in the narrative outlined above. It presents Russia as an all-powerful force that supports the overthrow of elected governments, many of which have the backing of the West and seeks to woo or persuade its allies into following its lead or “corrupting” them in the process.
Russia has not been in Africa for nearly thirty years, ever since the fall of the Soviet Union. When Russia hosted the first Russia-Africa Summit in 2019, many people believed it would only add to the already many Africa+1 conferences without offering anything new. However, the pace at which Russia is gaining ground in Africa has startled Western academics. Russia has been more politically and economically involved in Africa in recent years. But in this particular case, one private military group—the Wagner Group, as we all know it—has spearheaded the most successful kind of engagement on behalf of Russia, as opposed to a government-to-government or business-to-business model.
Since late 2017, Wagner’s military presence in Africa has increased significantly. Troops have been stationed in Sudan, Libya, Mali, Mozambique, Burkina Faso, and Mali, and the company is actively seeking to expand into several more states. Nevertheless, it still cannot compete with China, the US, or the EU in terms of physical infrastructure.
In practical terms and compared to China, do you think Russia has made a visible impact on infrastructure development in the continent since the collapse of the Soviet era in 1991?
Africa currently has a $12 billion trade deficit with Russia because it imports five times as much as it exports. President Putin vowed to boost Russia’s trade with Africa from approximately $16.8 billion to $40 billion yearly in five years following the 2019 Russia-Africa Summit.
Currently, it remains stagnant at roughly $18 billion each year, representing 2% of the total trade on the continent. Furthermore, two-thirds of Russia’s overall trade with Africa is confined to merely four countries. They are Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and South Africa.
On the other hand, China is Africa’s largest trading partner for 15 consecutive years. South Africa is China’s largest trading partner among all African economies, accounting for 19.9 per cent of total trade with the continent, followed by Nigeria and Angola. China’s total trade with Africa grew by 1.5 per cent in 2023 from 2022 to $282.1 billion. Chinese exports to Africa reached $173 billion, an increase of 7.5 per cent over 2022, while its imports from the continent dropped by 6.7 per cent to $109 billion. While the $100 million year-on-year increase made 2023 bilateral trade a record, Africa’s trade deficit with China continued to expand, from $46.9 billion in 2022 to $64 billion in 2023. Comparing Russia with China would not be logical.
Can we conclude this discussion with the significance of peace, justice and strong state institutions (UN SDG 16), what has been achieved over the past few years, the challenges and the way forward in West Africa?
Recently, a very significant event took place in West Africa. Three junta-led governments—Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger—decided to leave ECOWAS and establish the “Alliance of Sahel States,” a mini-lateral regional organization, in response to the organization’s threat of military action. It’s being referred to as the “Brexit of Africa” by many, and it might have disastrous repercussions in the neighbouring countries. In response, ECOWAS chose to lift these nations’ economic sanctions. However, maybe it is too little, too late. The United Nations will have a tough time in its quest for SDG-16 in the Sahel.
By Adedapo Adesanya
Social media platform, TikTok’s Chinese owner ByteDance has signed binding agreements with United States and global investors to operate its business in America.
Half of the joint venture will be owned by a group of investors, including Oracle, Silver Lake and the Emirati investment firm MGX, according to a memo sent by chief executive, Mr Shou Zi Chew.
The deal, which is set to close on January 22, 2026 would end years of efforts by the US government to force ByteDance to sell its US operations over national security concerns.
It is in line with a deal unveiled in September, when US President Donald Trump delayed the enforcement of a law that would ban the app unless it was sold.
In the memo, TikTok said the deal will enable “over 170 million Americans to continue discovering a world of endless possibilities as part of a vital global community”.
Under the agreement, ByteDance will retain 19.9 per cent of the business, while Oracle, Silver Lake and Abu Dhabi-based MGX will hold 15 per cent each.
Another 30.1 per cent will be held by affiliates of existing ByteDance investors, according to the memo.
The White House previously said that Oracle, which was co-founded by President Trump’s supporter Larry Ellison, will license TikTok’s recommendation algorithm as part of the deal.
The deal comes after a series of delays.
Business Post reported in April 2024 that the administration of President Joe Biden passed a law to ban the app over national security concerns, unless it was sold.
The law was set to go into effect on January 20, 2025 but was pushed back multiple times by President Trump, while his administration worked out a deal to transfer ownership.
President Trump said in September that he had spoken on the phone to China’s President Xi Jinping, who he said had given the deal the go ahead.
The platform’s future remained unclear after the leaders met face to face in October.
The app’s fate was clouded by ongoing tensions between the two nations on trade and other matters.
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
Despite the complexities posed by Russia-Ukraine crisis, United States has been taking conscious steps to improve commercial relations with Russia. Unsurprisingly, Russia, on the other hand, is also moving to restore and normalise its diplomacy, negotiating for direct connections of air-routes and passionate permission to return its diplomats back to Washington and New York.
In the latest developments, Kirill Dmitriev, Chief Executive Officer of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), has been appointed as Russian President’s Special Envoy to United States. This marked an important milestone towards raising bilateral investment and economic cooperation. Russian President Vladimir Putin tasked him to exclusively promote business dialogue between the two countries, and further to negotiate for the return of U.S. business enterprises. According to authentic reports, United States businesses lost $300+ bn during this Russia-Ukraine crisis, while Russia’s estimated 1,500 diplomats were asked to return to Moscow.
Strategically in late November 2025, the American Chamber of Commerce in Russia (AmCham) has awarded Kirill Dmitriev, praised him for calculated efforts in promoting positive dialogue between the United States and Russia within the framework decreed by President Vladimir Putin. Chief Executive Officer of Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev is the Special Representative of the Russian President for Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries. Since his appointment, his primary focus has been on United States.
“Received an American Chamber of Commerce award ‘For leadership in fostering the US-Russia dialogue,’” Dmitriev wrote on his X page, in late November, 2025. According to Dmitriev, more than 150 US companies are currently operating in Russia, with more than 70% of them being present on the Russian market for over 25 years.
In addition, Chamber President Sergey Katyrin and American Chamber of Commerce in Russia (AmCham) President Robert Agee have also been discussing alternatives pathways to raise bilateral business cooperation. Both have held series of meetings throughout this year, indicating the the importance of sustaining relations as previously. Expectedly, the Roscongress Foundation has been offered its platforms during St. Petersburg International Economic (SPIEF) for the American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham).
On December 9, Sergey Katyrin and Robert Agee noted that, despite existing problems and non-economic obstacles, the business communities of Russia and the United States proceed from the necessity of maintaining professional dialogue. Despite the worsening geopolitical conditions, Sergey Katyrin and Robert Agee noted the importance of preserving stable channels of trade and pragmatic prospects for economic cooperation. These will further serve as a stabilizing factor and an instrument for building mutual trust at the level of business circles, industry associations, and the expert community.
The American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) will be working in the system of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCI) in the Russian Federation, which currently comprises 57,000 legal entities, 130 regional chambers and a combined network of representative offices covering more than 350 points of presence.
According to reports obtained by this article author from the AmCham, promising sectors for Russian-American economic cooperation include healthcare and the medical industry, civil aviation, communications/telecom, natural resource extraction, and energy/energy equipment. The United States and Russia have, more or less, agreed to continue coordinating their work to facilitate the formation of a more favorable environment for Russian and American businesses, reduce risks, and strengthen business ties. Following the American-Russian Dialogue, a joint statement and working documents were adopted.
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
The Executive President of the Indian Business Alliance (IBA), Sammy Manoj Kotwani, discusses the landmark moment in deepening Russian-Indian collaboration. Kotwani explains the groundbreaking insights into President Vladimir Putin’s working visit to India, the emerging opportunities and pathways for future cooperation, especially for the two-sided economic collaboration. Follow Sammy Manoj Kotwani’s discussions here:
Interpretation of the latest development in Russian-Indian relations
From my viewpoint in Moscow, this visit has effectively opened a new operational chapter in what has always been described as a “Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership.” It did not just reaffirm political goodwill; it translated that goodwill into a structured economic roadmap through Programme 2030, a clear target to take bilateral trade to around USD 100 billion by 2030, and concrete sectoral priorities: energy, nuclear cooperation, critical minerals, manufacturing, connectivity, fertilizers, and labour mobility.
On the ground, the business community reads this summit as a strong signal that India and Russia are doubling down on strategic autonomy in a multipolar world order. Both sides are trying to de-risk their supply chains and payment systems from over-dependence on any single centre of power. This is visible in the focus on national currencies, alternative payment mechanisms, and efforts to stabilise Rupee–Ruble trade, alongside discussions on a Free Trade Agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union and the reinforcement of corridors like the INSTC and the Chennai–Vladivostok route.
In short, my interpretation is that this summit has moved the relationship from “politically excellent but structurally imbalanced” towards a more diversified, long-term economic framework in which companies are expected to co-produce, co-innovate, and invest, not just trade opportunistically.
Significance of the visit for Indian business in Russia and for the Indian Business Alliance (IBA)
For Indian business operating in the Russian Federation, the visit has three immediate effects: confidence, clarity, and continuity. Confidence, because Indian entrepreneurs now see that despite external pressure, New Delhi and Moscow have explicitly committed to deepening economic engagement—especially in energy, fertilizers, defence co-production, nuclear, and critical minerals—rather than quietly scaling it back.
Clarity, because the summit outcomes spell out where the real opportunities lie:
Energy & Petrochemicals: Long-term crude and LNG supply, but also downstream opportunities in refining, petrochemicals, and logistics, where Indian EPC and service companies can participate.
Pharmaceuticals & Medical Devices: Russia’s import substitution drive makes high-quality Indian generics, formulations, and even localized manufacturing extremely relevant.
IT, Digital & AI: There is growing appetite in Russia for Indian IT services, cybersecurity, and digital solutions that are not dependent on Western tech stacks.
Fertilizers, Agro & Food Processing: New joint ventures in fertilizers and agriculture supply chains were explicitly flagged during and around the summit, which is important for both food security and farm incomes.
Continuity, because the Programme 2030 framework and the expected EAEU FTA give businesses a medium-term policy horizon. Tariff reductions, improved market access and predictable regulation are precisely what Indian SMEs and mid-sized companies need to justify long-term investments in Russia.
For the Indian Business Alliance (IBA), this inevitably means more work and more responsibility. We already see increased incoming requests from Indian firms—from large listed companies to first-time exporters—asking very practical questions: Which Russian region should we enter? How do we navigate compliance under the sanctions environment? Which banks are still handling Rupee–Ruble or third-currency settlements? How can we structure joint ventures to align with Russia’s import substitution goals while protecting IP and governance standards?
IBA’s role, therefore, becomes that of economic diplomacy in action: translating high-level summit language into actual B2B meetings, sectoral delegations, regional partnerships, and deal-making platforms such as the India–Russia Business Dialogue in Moscow. This visit will undoubtedly stimulate and intensify IBA’s work as a bridge between the two ecosystems.
India’s current economic presence in the Russian Federation
If we look beyond the headline trade figures, India’s economic presence in Russia today is significant, but not yet commensurate with its potential. Bilateral trade has grown sharply since 2022, largely on the back of discounted Russian oil and coal, making India one of Russia’s top energy customers. However, the structure is still heavily skewed: Russian exports to India dominate, while Indian exports and investments in Russia remain relatively modest and under-diversified.
On the ground in Moscow and across the regions, we see several strong Indian footholds:
Pharmaceuticals: Indian pharma is well-established, respected for its affordability and quality, and poised to deepen localization in line with Russian import substitution policy.
Tea, Coffee, Spices & Food: Traditional segments with deep historical roots, now expanding into ready-to-eat, wellness, and ethnic food categories.
IT & Services: Still under-represented, but with growing interest as Russian entities look for non-Western software, integration, and outsourcing partners.
Diamonds, Textiles, Apparel, and Light Engineering: Present but fragmented, with enormous room to scale, especially if logistics and payment challenges are addressed.
Where India is still behind is on-the-ground investment and manufacturing presence compared to countries like China. Russian policymakers today are clearly favouring investors who help them achieve technological sovereignty and local value addition. For serious Indian companies willing to commit capital, adapt to Russian standards, and accept the complexities of the current environment, this is a period of unusual opportunity. For purely transactional players looking for quick arbitrage, it is becoming progressively harder.
So, I would characterise India’s economic presence as: strategically important, quickly growing in value, but still under-leveraged in terms of depth, diversification, and localization.
Geopolitical pressure from Washington and future predictions
Pressure from Washington—through sanctions, secondary sanctions risk, financial restrictions, and now even tariff measures linked to India’s energy purchases from Russia—is undoubtedly a real and continuing challenge. It affects everything from shipping insurance and dollar transactions to technology transfers and the risk appetite of global banks. In practical terms, it can complicate even a simple India–Russia trade deal if it touches a sanctioned bank, vessel, or technology.
However, my own assessment, based on 35 years of living and working in Russia, is that this pressure will not fundamentally derail India–Russia friendship, but it will reshape how the relationship functions. India’s foreign policy is anchored in strategic autonomy; it seeks strong ties with the United States and Europe, but not at the cost of abandoning a time-tested partner like Russia. Russia, for its part, sees India as a crucial Asian pole in an emerging multipolar world order and as a long-term market, technology partner, and political counterpart in forums like BRICS, SCO, and the G20.
Looking ahead, I see a few clear trends:
Normalization of alternative payment and logistics systems
We will see more institutionalised use of national currencies, alternative messaging systems, regional banks outside the direct sanctions line, and maybe even digital currencies for specific corridors. Rupee–Ruble trade mechanisms that are today seen as “workarounds” will gradually become part of the normal infrastructure of bilateral commerce.
Shift from pure trade to co-production and joint innovation
To reduce vulnerability to sanctions, both sides will push for manufacturing in India and Russia rather than simple exports: defence co-development, localized pharma and medical devices, high-tech and AI collaborations, and joint ventures in critical minerals and clean energy.
Greater role for regions and business associations
Regional governments in Russia (Far East, Arctic regions, industrial hubs) and Indian states will increasingly drive project-level cooperation, supported by platforms like IBA. This “bottom-up” economic diplomacy will make the relationship more resilient than if it relied only on central governments.
Managed balancing by India
India will continue to deepen technology and investment ties with the West while maintaining energy, defence and strategic cooperation with Russia. The challenge will be to manage U.S. and EU expectations without compromising its core national interests. My prediction is that India will stay firm on this course of balanced engagement, even if it means occasional friction with Washington.
In essence, external pressure may complicate the methods of Indo-Russian cooperation, but it is unlikely to overturn the foundations of trust, mutual interest, and long-term complementarity that have been built over decades.
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