World
Russia’s Promise of Building Nuclear Plants in Africa
By Kester Kenn Klomegah
For more than two decades, Russia has been struggling to help Africa overcome its energy deficit, with little success.
But now, with financial support from the European Union (EU), two international organizations have been chosen as modelling partners for the development of the African Continental Power Systems Master Plan (CMP).
The two organizations will lead the development of an electricity master plan that promotes access to affordable, reliable and sustainable electricity supplies across the continent.
As expected, African stakeholders will play roles in identifying surplus and deficit regions/countries, in terms of electricity generation and demand, as well as the most cost-effective ways of expanding clean electricity generation and transmission infrastructure across Africa.
African energy ministers tasked the African Union Development Agency (AUDA-NEPAD) to lead the development of the master plan. Following a two-year consultation process coordinated by the EU Technical Assistance Facility (TAF) for Sustainable Energy.
Eastern and Southern Africa are vast, geographically diverse regions with rapidly growing populations and rising demands for energy, according to the master plan, there are two regional power pools.
A new study entitled Planning and Prospects for Renewable Power: Eastern and Southern Africa assesses the long-term energy plans for the two regional power pools (known as the Eastern and Southern African Power Pools), and finds the region well-endowed with high quality, cost-effective, but under-utilized wind and solar resources.
In practical terms, Africans are looking for energy alternatives to embark on the next round of industrialization. Russia’s nuclear energy diplomacy in Africa has been at the crossroad over the past two decades since the collapse of Soviet-era.
In order to find long-shelf solutions to chronic power shortages, African leaders and Governments, that have shown interest in adopting Russian nuclear energy, signed necessary legal documents but lacked the needed funds for prompt implementation and final realization.
Russia and Africa’s aspirations in this sphere of nuclear cooperation come with many challenges. In Rwanda and many other African countries, the first question is finance. “Rwanda’s annual budget stands at US$3 billion while the construction of the nuclear power plant would cost not less than US$9 billion which is equivalent to Rwanda’s entire gross domestic product,” David Himbara, Rwandan-Canadian Professor of International Development at Canada’s Centennial College, wrote in an emailed interview.
He said that Rwandan President Paul Kagame always believed that he must validate his supposedly visionary and innovative leadership by pronouncing grand projects that rarely materialized.
Currently, all African countries have a serious energy crisis. Over 620 million in Sub-Saharan Africa out of 1.3 billion people do not have electricity. It is in this context that several African countries are exploring nuclear energy as part of the solution.
There is only one nuclear power plant on the entire African continent, namely, Koeberg nuclear power station in South Africa. Commissioned in 1984, Koeberg provides nearly 2,000 megawatts, which is about 5% of installed electricity generation in South Africa.
According to Himbara, “Of all African countries that have shown interest in nuclear energy, none have so far gone beyond the stage of conducting a preliminary feasibility study, project costing and financing models, except South Africa.”
But, the South Africa US$76 billion deal with the Russians to build a nuclear power plant collapsed along with the Government of Jacob Zuma that negotiated the deal in secrecy, in fact when such corporate projects have to be discussed and approved by the parliament and necessarily have to pass through an international tendering process.
Russia and South Africa concluded an intergovernmental agreement on strategic partnership in the nuclear sphere in 2014. The agreement provided, in particular, for the construction of up to eight NPP power units.
“Nuclear waste will pile up, and where are they going to put it? The Sahara? The US is always trying to force nuclear waste repository on some poor or indigenous community and when that fails, the waste keeps piling up at the reactor sites, creating greater and greater environmental risks,” according to Himbara.
He underscored the fact that “managing nuclear waste and its safety is universally complex and dangerous. The Chernobyl disaster in Ukraine and Fukushima in Japan, remind the world of the human and environmental costs of nuclear power accidents. Millions of people are still suffering from radiation and radiation-related diseases till today.”
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, in an interview with the Hommes d’Afrique magazine in March 2018, described Africa as rich in raw material resources, including those that are required for high technology and for moving to a new technological pattern. Apart from mining, Russia and African countries are cooperating on high technology.
What was more important for Africa’s energy sector when he informed that Rosatom has been considering a number of projects that are of interest to Africans, for instance, the creation of a nuclear research and technology centre in Zambia. Nigeria has a similar project. There are good prospects for cooperation with Ghana, Tanzania and Ethiopia. Talks are still continuing on the construction of nuclear power plants in South Africa.
Shadreck Luwita, Zambian Ambassador to the Russian Federation, informed that the processes of design, feasibility study and approvals regarding the project have been concluded, in the case of Zambia. The site of the project designated and it is envisaged that construction should commence, in earnest, not later than the second half of 2018. That construction remains a monumental dream, though.
In addition, he affirmed that the Russians envisaged technology transfer in the development of this massive project by way of manpower development capacity. For now, there are a few Zambian nationals, who are studying nuclear science in Russia.
The Zambian Government ultimately profitable hopes are that upon commissioning of this project, excess power generated from this plant could be made available for export to neighbouring countries under the Southern African Development Community Power Pool framework arrangement.
Zambians are still worried about Russia’s promise of nuclear plants estimated at US$10 billion. In February 2020, Chairperson of the Federation Council (the Upper House or the Senate), Valentina Matviyenko, headed a Russian delegation on a three-day reciprocal visit aimed at strengthening parliamentary diplomacy with Namibia and Zambia.
While in Zambia meeting with the president and other high-ranking legislators, she expressed regret at the suspension of the construction of a centre for nuclear science and technology due to financial issues. The request submitted to the Russian president needed careful consideration by the relevant ministries and departments. She hoped Russia and Zambia would jointly find options to promote funding to roll out the construction of a centre for nuclear science and technology.
This is not an isolated case. From all indications, Russia wants to turn nuclear energy into a major export industry. It has signed agreements with African countries, many with no nuclear tradition, including Rwanda and Zambia. In addition, Russia is set to build large nuclear plants in Egypt that could serve the Maghreb region.
Interestingly, Egypt’s dreams of building nuclear plants have spanned with the agreement that was signed (as far back in March 2008) during an official visit to the Kremlin by the ousted President Hosni Mubarak, and then again with former Egyptian leader Mohammed Morsi who discussed the same nuclear project with Vladimir Putin in April 2013 in Sochi, southern Russia.
During the dawn of a new era at the Sochi summit, Vladimir Putin and Abdel Fattah Al Sisi signed an agreement to set up four nuclear plants in El Dabaa, on the Mediterranean coast west of the port city of Alexandria, where a research reactor has stood for years.
The deal was signed on the heels of talks held between Putin and Al Sisi, where both expressed high hopes that Russia would help construct the country’s first nuclear facility. Egypt began its nuclear program in 1954 and in 1961, acquired a 2-megawatt research reactor, built by the Soviet Union.
However, plans to expand the site have been decades in the making that Rosatom will provide its fuel, personnel training, and build the necessary infrastructure. The four blocks of the nuclear power plant will cost about US$20 billion. Director Anton Khlopkov and Research Associate Dmitry Konukhov at the Center for Energy and Security Studies, co-authored a report to Valdai Discussion Club, that the success of Egypt’s nuclear project depends on three key factors.
These are the political stability and security situation in Egypt, a viable financing mechanism that reflects the country’s economic situation, and the government’s ability to secure support for the project among the local residents of El Dabaa, the site chosen for Egypt’s first nuclear plant back in the 1980s.
In reality, Ghana has similar never-ending dreams and fairy tales of owning nuclear plants. The agreement was re-signed on June 2, 2015. The Russian reactor, a 1000 MW plant, will cost a minimum of $4.2 billion. The financing scheme has not been finalized by the parliament. And it will take about eight to ten years from site feasibility studies to commissioning of the first unit, according to the Ghana Atomic Energy Commission.
As local media reported, Ghana’s quest to industrialize for economic growth and development has fast-tracked plans to establish nuclear power in the country within the next decade, which means by 2029 and export excess power to other countries in the West African sub-region.
With “One District, One Factory” – Ghana’s industrialization agenda might not be realized under Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo’s administration based on the roadmap of the nuclear power programme to commence construction by 2023 and inject nuclear energy into the grip by 2030.
The African countries’ MoUs and Agreements with Rosatom including South Africa, Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Zambia and the rest are, most probably, stacked. Nearly three decades after the Soviet collapse, not a single plant has been completed in Africa.
Some still advocate for alternative energy supply. Gabby Asare Otchere-Darko, Founder and Executive Director of Danquah Institute, a non-profit organization that promotes policy initiatives and advocates for Africa’s development, wrote in an email that “Africa needs expertise, knowledge transfer and the kind of capital imports that can assist Africa to develop its physical infrastructure, add value to two of its key resources: natural resources and human capital.”
Russia has respectable expertise in one key area for Africa: energy development. “But, has Russia the courage, for instance, to take on the stalled $8-$10 billion Inga 3 hydropower project on the Congo river? This is the kind of development project that can vividly send out a clear signal to African leaders and governments that Russia is, indeed, ready for business,” he said.
The renewable energy potential is enormous in Africa, citing the Grand Inga Dam in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Grand Inga is the world’s largest proposed hydropower scheme. It is a grand vision to develop a continent-wide power system. Grand Inga 3, expected to have an electricity-generating capacity of about 40,000 megawatts – which is nearly twice as much as the 20 largest nuclear power stations.
Ryan Collyer, the Regional Representative of Rosatom for Sub-Saharan Africa, told me in an interview in April 2021, that apart from energy poverty, nuclear can solve other continent problems, from low industrialization to advances in science, healthcare, and agriculture, thus propelling the continent towards the master plan of African Union’s Agenda 2063.
“It envisions Africa’s transformation into the global powerhouse of the future, so we are advocating a diverse energy mix that utilizes all available resources, including renewables and nuclear, to ensure climate resilience and environmental safety, social equity, and supply security,” Collyer said.
Some researchers and experts strongly believe and further estimate that the cost of building nuclear power, especially its associated high risks, does not make any sense when compared to the cost of building renewables or other sources of energy to solve energy shortages in Africa.
According to the company profile, Rosatom offers a complete range of nuclear power products and services from nuclear fuel supply, technical services and modernization to personnel training and establishing nuclear infrastructure. With 70 years of experience, the company is the world leader in high-performance solutions for all kinds of nuclear power plants. Rosatom has built more than 120 research reactors in Russia and abroad.
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
In this interview, Gustavo de Carvalho, Programme Head (Acting): African Governance and Diplomacy, South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), discusses at length aspects of Africa’s developments in the context of shifting geopolitics, its relationships with external countries, and expected roles in the emerging multipolar world. Gustavo de Carvalho further underscores key issues related to transparency in agreements, financing initiatives, and current development priorities that are shaping Africa’s future. Here are the interview excerpts:
Is Africa undergoing the “second political re-awakening” and how would you explain Africans’ perceptions and attitudes toward the emerging multipolar world?
We should be careful not to overstate novelty. African states exercised real agency during the Cold War, too, from Bandung to the Non-Aligned Movement. What has actually shifted is the structure of the international system around the continent. The unipolar moment has faded, the menu of partners has widened, and a generation of policymakers under fifty operates without the inhibitions of either the Cold War or the immediate post-Cold War period. African publics, however, are more pragmatic than multipolar rhetoric assumes. Afrobarometer’s surveys across more than thirty countries consistently show citizens evaluating external partners on tangible outcomes such as infrastructure, jobs and security, rather than on civilisational narratives. China is generally associated with positive economic influence, the United States retains the strongest pull as a development model, and Russia, despite a louder political profile, registers a smaller and more geographically concentrated footprint. Multipolarity is not a destination Africans are arriving at. It is a working environment that creates more options and more risks at once.
Do you think it is appropriate to use the term “neo-colonialism” referring to activities of foreign players in Africa? By the way, who are the neo-colonisers in your view?
The term has analytical value when used carefully, and loses it when deployed selectively against whichever power one wishes to embarrass. Nkrumah’s 1965 formulation was precise: political independence accompanied by continued external control over economic and political life. The honest test is whether contemporary patterns reproduce that asymmetry, irrespective of the capital from which they originate. The structural picture is well documented. Africa still exports primary commodities and imports manufactured goods. Intra-African trade hovers around fifteen per cent of total trade, well below Asian or European levels. African sovereigns pay a measurable risk premium on debt that exceeds what fundamentals alone justify. Applied consistently, the lens directs attention to opaque resource-for-infrastructure contracts, security-for-mineral bargains, debt agreements with confidentiality clauses, and aid architectures that bypass African institutions. That description fits legacy French commercial arrangements in francophone Africa, Chinese mining concessions in the DRC, Russian-linked gold extraction in the Central African Republic and Sudan, Gulf-backed port and farmland deals along the Red Sea, and Western corporate practices that have not always met the standards their governments preach. Naming a single neo-coloniser tells us more about the speaker’s politics than about the structure.
How would you interpret the current engagement of foreign players in Africa? Do you also think there is geopolitical competition and rivalry among them?
Competition is real and intensifying, and the proliferation of Africa-plus-one summits is the clearest indicator. Russia has held two summits, in Sochi in 2019 and St Petersburg in 2023. The EU, Turkey, Japan, India, the United States, South Korea, Saudi Arabia and the UAE all host their own variants. Trade figures give a more honest sense of weight than diplomatic theatre. China-Africa trade reached around 280 billion dollars in 2023, United States-Africa trade sits in the 60 to 70 billion range, and Russia-Africa trade is roughly 24 billion, heavily concentrated in grain, fertiliser and arms. Describing the continent as a chessboard, however, understates how African states themselves are shaping these dynamics, sometimes through skilful diversification and sometimes through security bargains that entail longer-term costs. The Sahel illustrates the latter starkly. Between 2020 and 2023, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger expelled French forces, downgraded their relationships with ECOWAS and the UN stabilisation mission, and welcomed Russian security contractors. ACLED data shows civilian fatalities from political violence rising rather than falling across the same period. Substituting providers without strengthening domestic institutions does not produce sovereignty. It changes the terms of dependence.
Do you think much depends on African leaders and their people (African solutions to African problems) to work toward long-term, sustainable development?
The principle is correct, and it is regularly weaponised in two unhelpful directions. External actors invoke it to justify withdrawing from responsibilities they continue to hold, particularly over financial flows and arms transfers that pass through their own jurisdictions. Some African leaders invoke it to deflect legitimate scrutiny of governance failings, repression or corruption. Genuine African agency requires more than rhetoric. The AU’s operating budget remains modest in absolute terms, and external partners still cover a significant share of programmatic activities, which shapes what gets funded. The African Standby Force, conceived in 2003, remains only partially operational more than two decades on. The African Continental Free Trade Area, in force since 2021, has rolled out more slowly than drafters hoped because the political will to lower national barriers lags the speeches. Long-term development depends on African leaders financing more of their own security and development priorities, on publics holding them accountable, and on a clearer-eyed view of what foreign forces can deliver. Whether the actors are Russian-linked contractors in the Sahel and Central African Republic, Western counter-terrorism deployments, or others, external security providers tend to address symptoms while leaving the political and economic drivers of insecurity intact.
Often described as a continent with huge, untapped natural resources and large human capital (1.5 billion), what then specifically do African leaders expect from Europe, China, Russia and the United States?
Expectations differ across the three relationships, and that differentiation is itself a marker of agency. From China, leaders expect infrastructure financing, sustained commodity demand, and a partnership that does not condition itself on domestic governance reforms. FOCAC commitments have delivered visible results in ports, railways and power generation, though Beijing itself has shifted toward smaller, more selective lending since around 2018. From Russia, expectations are narrower because the economic footprint is. Moscow’s offer is political backing in multilateral forums, arms transfers, grain and fertiliser supply, civilian nuclear cooperation in a handful of cases, and security partnerships, including those involving private military formations. The record of those security arrangements in the Central African Republic, Mali, Sudan and Mozambique deserves a sober assessment on its own terms, because the human and political costs are documented and uneven. From the United States, leaders look for market access through instruments such as AGOA, whose post-2025 future has generated significant uncertainty, alongside private capital, technology partnerships and a posture that treats the continent as more than a counter-terrorism theatre. The priorities across all three relationships are essentially the same: transparency in the terms of agreements, arrangements that preserve future policy space, and partnerships that build domestic productive capacity rather than substitute for it. The continent’s leverage in this multipolar moment is real, but it is not permanent. It will be squandered if used to rotate among external dependencies rather than reduce them.
By Adedapo Adesanya
Africa’s startup ecosystem showed tentative signs of recovery in April 2026, with deal activity picking up after a subdued March, though funding volumes remained weak by recent standards, Business Post gathered from the latest data by Africa: The Big Deal.
In the review month, a total of 32 startups across the continent announced funding rounds of at least $100,000, raising a combined $110 million through a mix of equity, debt and grant deals, excluding exits. The figure represents a notable rebound from the 22 deals recorded in March, suggesting renewed investor engagement after a slow start to the second quarter.
However, the recovery in deal count did not translate into stronger capital inflows. April’s $110 million total marks the lowest monthly funding volume since March 2025, when startups raised $52 million, and falls significantly short of the previous 12-month average of $275 million per month.
The data highlights a growing divergence between investor activity and cheque sizes, with more deals being completed but at smaller ticket values.
The data showed that, despite this, looking at the numbers on a month-to-month basis does not tell the whole story of venture funding cycles as a broader 12-month rolling view presents a more stable picture of Africa’s startup ecosystem.
Based on this, over the 12 months to April 2026 (May 2025–April 2026), startups across the continent raised a total of $3.1 billion, excluding exits – largely in line with the range observed since August 2025. The figure has hovered around $3.1 billion, with only marginal deviations of about $90 million, indicating relative stability despite recent monthly dips.
A closer breakdown shows that equity financing accounted for $1.7 billion of the total, while debt funding contributed $1.4 billion, alongside approximately $30 million in grants. This composition underscores the growing role of debt in sustaining overall funding levels.
The data suggests that while headline monthly figures may point to short-term weakness, the broader funding environment remains resilient, supported in large part by continued activity in debt financing, even as equity investments show signs of moderation.
The report said if April’s total amount was lower than March’s overall, it was higher on equity: $74 million came as equity and $36 million as debt, while March had been overwhelmingly debt-led ($55 million equity, $96 million debt).
In the review month, the deals announced include Egyptian fintech Lucky raising a $23 million Series B, while Gozem ($15.2 million debt) and Victory Farms ($15 milliomn debt) did most of the heavy lifting on the debt side. Ethiopia-based electric mobility start-up Dodai announced $13m ($8m Series A + $5m debt).
April also saw two exits as Nigeria’s Bread Africa was acquired by SMC DAO as consolidation continues in the country’s digital asset sector, and Egypt’s waste recycling start-up Cyclex was acquired by Saudi-Egyptian investment firm Edafa Venture.
Year-to-Date (January to April), startups on the continent have raised a total of $708 million across 124 deals of at least $100,000, excluding exits. The funding mix was almost evenly split, with $364 million in equity (51.4 per cent) and $340 million in debt (48.0 per cent), alongside a small contribution from grants (0.6 per cent). This is an early sign that funding startups is taking a different shape compared to what the ecosystem witnessed in 2025.
For instance, in the first four months of last year, startups raised a higher $813 million across a significantly larger 180 deals. More notably, last year’s funding was heavily skewed toward equity, which accounted for $652 million (80.1 per cent) compared to just $138 million in debt (16.9 per cent).
The year-on-year comparison points to two clear trends: a contraction in deal activity as evidenced by a 31 per cent drop, and a 13 per cent decline in total funding. At the same time, the composition of capital has shifted meaningfully, with debt now playing a much larger role in sustaining funding volumes.
By Adedapo Adesanya
Nigeria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has summoned South Africa’s Acting High Commissioner to complain about xenophobic attacks against its citizens, weeks after a similar complaint was lodged by Ghana.
The ministry called the meeting to convey “profound concern regarding recent events that have the potential to impact the established cordial relations between Nigeria and South Africa,” it said in a statement posted on X on Monday.
It noted that the country is aware of the growing discontent among Nigerians concerning the treatment of their nationals in South Africa, but implored calm while it plans to repatriate those willing to return home voluntarily, amid growing fears that recent attacks on foreigners there could escalate.
Foreign Minister, Mrs Bianca Odumegwu-Ojukwu, said 130 applicants had already registered for the exercise, adding that the number was expected to rise.
She expressed President Bola Tinubu’s concern about the attacks in the southern African nation, and condemned the violence against foreign nationals and demonstrations characterised by “xenophobic rhetoric, hate speeches and incendiary anti-migrant statements”.
“Nigerian lives and businesses in South Africa must not continue to be put at risk, and we remain committed to working to explore with South Africa ways to put an end to this,” she said.
She cited the killing of two Nigerians in separate incidents involving local security personnel, insisting that her government was demanding justice.
She said the Nigerian president’s priority was for the safety of citizens and “consequently, arrangements are currently underway to collate details of Nigerians in South Africa for voluntary repatriation flights for those seeking assistance to return home”.
According to reports, four Ethiopian nationals have also been killed in recent weeks, while there have been attacks on citizens of other African countries.
South African President Cyril Ramaphosa has condemned the attacks but also cautioned foreigners to respect local laws.
He used his Freedom Day address last week – marking the country’s first democratic elections in 1994 – to remind South Africans of the support other African nations had given in the struggle against the racist system of apartheid.
However, anti-immigrant groups in South Africa have accused foreigners of being in the country illegally, taking jobs from locals and having links to crime, especially drug trafficking.
They have also reportedly been stopping people outside hospitals and schools, demanding to see their identity papers.
Last month, Ghana summoned South Africa’s top envoy after a video was widely shared showing a Ghanaian man being challenged to prove he had the correct immigration papers.
Anti-immigrant sentiment rose earlier this year after reports that the head of the Nigerian community in the port city of KuGompo (formerly East London) had been installed in a traditional role often translated as “king”. Some South Africans in the local area saw this as an attempt to grab political power and kicked against it.
South Africa is home to about 2.4 million migrants, just less than 4 per cent of the population, according to official figures. However, many more are thought to be in the country without official authorisation. Most come from neighbouring countries such as Lesotho, Zimbabwe and Mozambique, which have a history of providing migrant labour to their wealthy neighbour.
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