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Multilateral Collaboration Still Crucial For Tackling Africa’s Conflicts

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Professor Maurice Okoli

By Professor Maurice Okoli

Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have adopted an incredible approach towards tackling chronic conflicts and related security threats from various extremist groups like Boko Haram, al-Qaida, and Islamic State-affiliated groups by creating a formidable military alliance in the semi-arid Sahel region in West Africa.

As these West African States are entangled in fierce ethnic-Islamic conflicts that have adversely impacted their sustainable development and economic progress, the trio-military force reflects more proactive and dynamic coordination in resolving their security hurdles. It would also enhance practical possibilities of combating terrorism and extremism in the interests of strengthening peace and security in the Sahel-Sahara region and other parts of West Africa.

Historically the three were closely under French political control and have extended economic and security ties since colonial times. This geographically landlocked Burkina Faso has had several military coup d’états, the latest took place in Jan. 2022. Mali (May 24, 2021) and Niger (July 26, 2023) witnessed similar political trends, and both are now under military administration and share startling critical accusations of corruption and malfunctioning of state governance against previous governments. But the finger-end points to France for gross under-development and large-scale exploitation.

These former French colonies have, for the past years, suffered from growing political deficiencies and frequent Islamic attacks. But the key reason, the underlying cause, those tribes are rebelling is due to deep-seated abject poverty across the region. Staging military takeovers was the trio’s dynamic struggle to wage a collective war against their governments and France’s influence and hegemony. For instance, France, the United States and other European nations have poured hundreds of millions of dollars into shoring up Niger’s army and the coup has been seen as a major setback. Overall security environment poses uncertain challenges and devises strategies to tackle these emerging threats in the region.

Existing Sanctions

Since last year, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have been under regional and continental sanctions. The 15-member West African regional bloc has imposed stringent sanctions, finding a peaceful solution to the deepening crisis, but yielded little tangible results with no clarity on the next steps.

The African Union (AU), the continental organization which primarily coordinates the political and economic as well as the socio-cultural activities, observes the new trends as military rule spreads or re-appears in the West African region. That however, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat, strongly condemned such actions and further moved to impose its sanctions as well on the military-ridden states. Their AU memberships, since then, have accordingly been suspended too.

Quite recently, on 28 November 2023, the United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres and the African Union Commission Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat convened their seventh African Union-United Nations Annual Conference in New York. In a joint communiqué issued at the end of the meeting, both reviewed progress in the implementation of the UN-AU Joint Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security and the AU-UN Framework for the Implementation of Agenda 2063.

In particular, António Guterres and  Moussa Mahamat again condemned the resurgence of unconstitutional changes of government in Africa and stressed the need for a timely and peaceful return to constitutional order in Burkina Faso, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Sudan which are undergoing complex political transitions to sustain peace, development and human rights in the long term. There must be extensive political awareness among the people in the Sahel region to focus on democracy, development, security and stability. It also called for the release of President Bazoum and other arrested government officials.

Nevertheless, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) were tasked to enhance their joint efforts to promote inclusive political transitions in those countries in support of the efforts of the respective transitional authorities and regional bodies. The meeting called for continued efforts towards the timely completion of all ongoing political transitions through peaceful, inclusive, transparent and credible elections.

Against this backdrop, they expressed concern over the challenges African countries continue to face towards the achievement of the AU Agenda 2063. Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali and Niger, nevertheless have displayed defiance to the sanctions and, crafting a number of approaches and making their efforts toward addressing security and development-oriented issues combined with some kind of good governance.

Revisiting the Past

Within the context of the changing political situation, Russia is rapidly penetrating the Sahel. Moreover, to Russia’s expectations, these Sahelian States have in place provisional governments, which include civil society representatives. “We believe that a military approach to settling the crisis in Niger risks leading to a protracted standoff in the African country and a sharp destabilization of the situation in the Sahara-Sahelian region as a whole,” according to the statement posted to the Foreign Affairs Ministry’s website.

South African Institute of International Affairs reports established the fact that Russia seeks to build on Soviet-era ties, steadily widening its influence, and noticeably deploy the rhetoric of anti-colonialism in Africa. Russia is engaged in an asymmetric influence campaign in Africa. Borrowing from its Syria playbook, Moscow has followed a pattern of parachuting to prop up politically isolated leaders facing crises, often with abundant natural resources. Russia is fighting neo-colonialism from the West, especially in relations with the former colonies. According to the report, Russia sees France as a threat to its interests in Francophone West Africa, the Maghreb and the Sahel. The SAIIA is South Africa’s premier non-government research institute on international issues. (SAIIA, Nov. 2021 Report).

“Sanctions have already been announced against Niger, and its membership in the organization is likely to be suspended. Thus, a belt of states in political isolation and bordering on each other is forming in the Sahara-Sahelian region: Guinea – Mali – Burkina Faso – Niger. Russia is interested in expanding relations with Niger, as well as with all other African States, and thus could help to normalize the situation there,” Vsevolod Sviridov, Expert at the HSE University Center for African Studies, told Russia’s Financial Izvestia.

Russia’s Economic Interest

In pursuit of development, the five Sahel states need peace. An analysis of geopolitical factors underscores glaring facts that Russia is getting stronger with its military influence on a bilateral basis, bartering equipment in exchange for access to natural resources. Mali has an agreement with Russia to build a gold refinery while Burkina Faso also wanted energy power. A four-year memorandum guarantees the West African country’s largest gold refinery. Russia’s state nuclear energy company Rosatom signed a deal with Mali in October 2023 to explore minerals and produce nuclear energy. It unreservedly offered a high-level promise to build a 200- to 300-megawatt solar power plant by mid-2025.

Economic Performance

International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank research reports show that Sahelian states’ economy may face relative stagnation due to unstable conditions including persistent protests in the region. Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali and Niger have been severely affected by the rise in militancy, affecting overall economic performance. Agriculture represents 32% of its gross domestic product and occupies 80% of the working population in Burkina Faso. A large part of the economic activity of the country is funded by international aid, despite having gold ores in abundance. Burkina Faso is the fourth-largest gold producer in Africa, after South Africa, Mali and Ghana.

The December 2023 report by the World Bank, for example, indicated that the poverty rate across the Sahelian region is still deepening due to poor management and governance. The economic and social development could, to some extent, be sustained based on ensuring political stability in the subregion, supporting and intensifying local production, its openness to international trade and export diversification.

According to the UN’s Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) report of 2023, Niger is one of the poorest countries in the world. It faces challenges to development due to its landlocked position, even though it possesses some natural resources including uranium ore. Government finance is derived from revenue exports (mining, oil and agricultural exports) as well as various forms of taxes collected by the government. Reports, however, estimated improvement in its revenues after the exit of France. Niger was the main supplier of uranium to the EU, followed by Kazakhstan and Russia.

Across the Sahel, the estimated aggregate population of 120 million is predominantly young, with 49.2% generally under 25 years old. The conflicts have only deepened poverty and food insecurity, and the challenges increasingly gaining ground in those countries. Future growth may be sustained by the exploitation of various untapped resources. Uranium prices have recovered somewhat over the last few years. But much also depends largely on state control, and good governance, by prioritizing economic sectors in the region.

Latest Developments

Niger has scrapped two key security agreements with the European Union that were intended to help fight violence in the Sahel region. It completely withdrew from EU Military Partnership Mission that was launched in February in Niger. It has also revoked approval for the EU Civilian Capacity-Building Mission, which was established in 2012 to help the country’s security forces fight militants and other threats. Most of Niger’s foreign economic and security allies have sanctioned the country, including France, which had 1,500 troops operating in Niger. All of them have been asked to leave.

In June 2022, Mali also abruptly withdrew from the G5-Sahel group and its Joint Force. The Joint Force was created in 2017 by the “G5” Heads of State—Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger—to counter-terrorism in the region. Reports pointed to the anti-French sentiments and under-equipped local armies to quickly step up their game against Islamist rebels in the volatile Sahelian region. By the end of 2022, France reduced and moved its troops. That ended the so-called “Operation Barkhane” which was a military mission marked by a tactic of permanent occupation of the Sahel countries by French troops. The French government, however, apparently would try to reorganize its strategy in Africa. From some indications, it appears the focus of action turns to the Gulf of Guinea.

At the AU Extraordinary Summit from May 25 to 28, 2022, held in Equatorial Guinea, Moussa Faki Mahamat, Chairperson of the African Union Commission, highlighted the factors contributing to the lack of development including good governance, the growing tendency of usurping power by the military and the significance of forging collective solidarity as a basis for resolving continental and regional problems. Both Senegalese president Macky Sall (then the AU Chairperson) and Moussa Mahamat, issued statements urging the interim military governments to return to constitutional regimes as early as possible, reassuring that the solutions to continental problems and overcoming the existing challenges depend on strong mobilization of African leaders and the effective coordination provided by the African Union. Regrettably, all these have not yet become a thing of the past.

United Nation’s Approach

The United Nations (UN) Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, Jean-Pierre Lacroix, has argued that the peacekeeping and terrorism fight faces greater challenges than ever and that it requires multinational mechanisms and approaches. It also requires member-states to adopt a collective capacity to support political and peace processes. Conflict is more complex and multi-layered.

According to Jean-Pierre Lacroix, peacekeepers are facing terrorists, criminals, armed groups and their allies, who have access to powerful modern weapons and a vested interest in perpetuating the chaos in which they thrive.  Further complicating this situation is the fact that most peacekeeping operations – particularly our large, so-called multidimensional missions in Africa – have long been affected by a discrepancy between their capacities and what is demanded of them by the Security Council and host countries. Financial resources are often inadequate for their mandated tasks.

What’s at Stake

Niger and Burkina Faso exited the anti-Islamist force this early December 2023, withdrawing from an international force known as the G5 that was set up to fight Islamists in the Sahel region. Now Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger – run by military rulers following coups who have formed their mutual defence pact. Their so-called Alliance of Sahel States (AES) was signed back in September. United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres has often spoken against such inter-state collaboration.

But Chad and Mauritania are still part of the G5 force which is meant to be made up of about 5,000 soldiers. A statement from the military-led governments of Burkina Faso and Niger was critical of the G5 force for failing to make the Sahel region safer. It also suggested the anti-jihadist force undermined the two African nations’ desire for greater “independence and dignity” – and was serving foreign interests instead. They almost certainly meant France, whose power has dramatically deteriorated.

Usually referred to as the G5 Sahel, these countries – Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger – are engulfed with various socio-economic problems primarily due to the system of governance and poor policies toward sustainable development. In addition, rights abuse and cultural practices to a considerable extent affect the current state of development.

The big question is what impact this would have on the Islamist militant groups that have been growing in numerical strength, scope of operations and degree of force across the Sahel region. Russia is back in prominence on the world stage. As it flexes its muscles and tentacles to gain influence, the stature of the EU/US continues seemingly fading away. And former French colonies are simply turning to Russia for military support, bartering their natural resources for further much-anticipated collaborative partnerships. Russia has already agreed to develop nuclear power plants in Mali, while in Burkina Faso, it plans to construct an oil refinery.

For fear and concerns about the new rise of all kinds of terrorism and frequent attacks, the Sahel-5 are all turning to Russia for military assistance to fight growing terrorism, and efforts to strengthen political dialogue and promote some kind of partnerships relating to trade and the economy in the region. At the same time, with renewed and full-fledged interest to uproot French domination, Russia has ultimately begun making inroads into the entire Sahel region, an elongated landlocked territory located between North Africa (Maghreb) and West Africa, that stretches from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea.

Unique Lessons from Southern Africa

At least the majority of African leaders have to consider a complete overhaul of their security system across Africa. The Security Committees of the African Union and that of the Economic Community of West African States have to learn a few lessons and methodological approaches in dealing with indiscriminate threats of terrorism, militant groups, Islamic State-linked insurgencies and other related issues in Mozambique.

The worsening security situation at that time was a major setback for Mozambique but has been controlled by the involvement of regional troops from Rwanda and the Southern African Development Community Military Mission (SAMIM). Rwanda offered 1,000 in July 2021. South Africa has the largest contingent of approximately 1,500 troops. External countries are enormously helping to stabilize the situation in Mozambique. Its former colonizers Portugal and the United States both sent special forces to train local troops. Mozambique’s approach towards fighting growing threats of terrorism and conflict resolution offers explicit valuable lessons for the G5 Sahel which are Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger.

At the panel discussions during the mid-December U.S.-Africa Summit in Washington, Mozambican President Filipe Nyusi was very outspoken and shared valuable experiences with the audience about the use of well-constituted regional military force for enforcing peace and security in Mozambique. He told the panellists that there has been “remarkable progress” as businesses have restarted and displaced people began returning to Cabo Delgado, northern Mozambique. His argument simply was on the necessity of adopting ‘African solutions to African problems’ on peace and security issues across Africa, and this should be seriously considered as the most suitable, comprehensive approach under the current emerging geopolitical situation.

Joint regional forces within the context of multilateralism still have, to a large degree, significance in tackling conflicts in Africa. The Joint Forces of the Southern African Development Community are keeping peace in northern Mozambique. The rules, standards and policies, provision of assistance as well as the legal instruments and practices are based on the protocols of building and security stipulated by the African Union. It falls within the framework of peace and security requirements of the African Union. And has an appreciable commendation from the United Nations Security Council.

“We welcome collective action from SADC in committing to bringing sustainable peace to the region. We urge our leaders to consider the lessons learnt from other similar conflicts in Africa. In the Sahel, Somalia, and the Niger Delta offer stark contemporary reminders that a purely militaristic solution (devoid of measures to address the causes of the insurgency) increases the likelihood of its intractability. It is also unlikely to pave the way towards achieving sustainable peace,” the official statement from SADC.

The complexity and challenges in navigating this regional security partnership could be diverse, it depends also on political culture and mechanism of pragmatic approach. There have been various assessments and interpretations, but the security initiative to create the joint southern force underscores the multiplex dynamics to better play at home-grown solutions. The SADC initiative portrays a distinctive blueprint for purely African-headed peacekeeping success stories in the region, precisely for Mozambique and this could be replicated in West Africa.

With the changes sweeping across the world, it is glaringly well-known that a number of external countries are using Africa to achieve geopolitical goals, sowing seeds of confrontation which threaten African unity. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE), during the 36th Ordinary Session of the African Union (AU) held in Addis Ababa, interestingly used the phrase – “African solutions to African problems” – seven times in his speech delivered on February 2023. He strongly suggested that for the existing conflicts and disputes on the continent, it is necessary to mobilize collective efforts to resolve them and “must be confined to this continent and quarantined from the contamination of non-African interference.”

Final Security Breathe

As the security situation stands, the best option is to consider new approaches, taking into cognizance local factors, to regulate tensions and to prioritize development and economic sovereignty in the Sahel. And of course, many experts have suggested that addressing the Sahel crisis requires collective efforts and cooperation from all parties involved that can bring positive change in the region. Ultimately, it must be through tailored collective efforts and, most importantly, within the African context taking local conditions into account. As shown by Mozambique, carefully evaluating the tangible advantages combined with results, underscores the degree of consideration given to foreign involvement in conflicts without bartering natural resources. Sometimes the geopolitical factors are intertwined, though. In any case, to separate facts from fiction, Mozambique’s exemplary case is undoubtedly marked by significant successes.

In the context of – “African solutions to African problems” –  the SADC’s regional force was earlier constituted in April 2021, agreed to deploy a regional force (3,000 troops) in Cabo Delgado, located in northern Mozambique and to fight threats of terrorism in neighbouring Southern African countries. What is referred to as Islamic attacks and insurgency caused havoc and devastation in Cabo Delgado province of Mozambique. The insurgency began in 2017 and left an unimaginable negative effect on settlements of the civilian population, and business and industry operations. The situation now is under control and seen as a distinctive example for the rest of Africa. With relative regional peace, Southern Africa looks now toward the direction of attaining its economic sovereignty. Besides that, SADC counted on funding from the United States and European Union (EU) and the United Nations.

Professor Maurice Okoli is a fellow at the Institute for African Studies and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences. He is also a fellow at the North-Eastern Federal University of Russia. He is an expert at the Roscongress Foundation and the Valdai Discussion Club. As an academic researcher and economist with a keen interest in current geopolitical changes and the emerging world order, Maurice Okoli frequently contributes articles for publication in reputable media portals on different aspects of the interconnection between developing and developed countries, particularly in Asia, Africa and Europe. With comments and suggestions, he can be reached via email: [email protected].

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What Tech Leaders Should Know About IP Contract Strength

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software escrow services

Technology leaders operate at the intersection of innovation, risk, and long-term strategy. As organisations rely more heavily on proprietary platforms, custom software, and licensed technologies, intellectual property contracts become critical business instruments rather than routine legal documents. The strength of these contracts often determines how well a company can protect its innovations, maintain leverage in vendor relationships, and respond to unexpected disruptions.

Strong IP contracts do more than define ownership. They shape accountability, continuity, and trust between parties. For executives and decision makers, understanding what makes an IP agreement resilient is essential to safeguarding both current operations and future growth. Without careful attention, even advanced technology investments can become sources of vulnerability rather than competitive advantage.

Understanding the Role of Intellectual Property in Technology Strategy

Intellectual property sits at the core of most modern technology initiatives. Whether software is developed in-house, licensed from a third party, or built collaboratively, the associated IP defines who controls usage, modification, and distribution. Contracts must clearly reflect how this property aligns with broader business objectives rather than treating IP as a secondary concern.

Tech leaders should evaluate how critical a given technology is to daily operations and customer delivery. The more central the system, the stronger and more precise the IP protections must be. Ambiguous ownership language or overly restrictive licensing terms can limit scalability and innovation. When contracts mirror strategic priorities, they support flexibility rather than constrain it.

Clarity in Ownership and Licensing Provisions

One of the most common weaknesses in IP contracts is unclear ownership language. Agreements should explicitly define which party owns the underlying code, derivative works, and future enhancements. This clarity becomes especially important in custom development arrangements where responsibilities and contributions may overlap.

Licensing provisions must also specify scope, duration, and permitted use. Vague language around usage rights can lead to disputes or unexpected limitations as a business grows or enters new markets. Strong contracts anticipate change and outline how rights evolve alongside business expansion. This level of detail helps prevent costly renegotiations later.

Protecting Access and Continuity Rights

Beyond ownership, access to technology assets is a major concern for leadership teams. If a vendor relationship ends abruptly or a provider becomes unable to perform, access restrictions can disrupt operations. IP contracts should address these risks through well-defined continuity provisions.

In some cases, software escrow services are incorporated to support access to essential materials under specific conditions. While not required in every agreement, mechanisms like this reflect a broader principle of resilience. Tech leaders should ensure that contracts account for worst-case scenarios without undermining productive partnerships. Protection and collaboration are not mutually exclusive when agreements are thoughtfully structured.

Aligning IP Protections with Compliance and Governance

Regulatory compliance and internal governance standards increasingly influence how IP contracts are drafted and enforced. Industries subject to strict data, security, or operational requirements cannot rely on generic contract templates. IP provisions must align with regulatory obligations and internal risk management frameworks.

Leadership teams should collaborate with legal, compliance, and security stakeholders to ensure contracts reflect current standards. This includes addressing data handling, audit rights, and reporting obligations tied to intellectual property usage. When IP contracts support governance objectives, they reduce exposure and demonstrate due diligence to regulators and investors alike.

Managing Disputes and Enforcement Effectively

Even the strongest contracts cannot eliminate the possibility of disagreement. What distinguishes effective IP agreements is how disputes are managed when they arise. Clear dispute resolution clauses provide predictable processes that minimise disruption and preserve working relationships when possible.

Contracts should outline jurisdiction, governing law, and escalation procedures in plain language. Overly complex enforcement mechanisms can delay resolution and increase costs. For tech leaders, the goal is not to prepare for conflict but to ensure that disagreements do not derail core business functions. Well-designed enforcement terms contribute to operational stability.

Planning for Evolution and Innovation

Technology rarely remains static, and IP contracts must evolve accordingly. Agreements should address how updates, integrations, and new use cases are handled over time. Without these provisions, innovation may be slowed by uncertainty or restrictive terms.

Forward-looking contracts recognise that today’s solution may serve tomorrow’s expanded role. By defining how enhancements are owned, licensed, and shared, organisations encourage innovation while preserving control. Tech leaders who prioritise adaptability in IP agreements position their companies to respond confidently to change.

Conclusion

IP contract strength is a strategic concern that extends far beyond legal formalities. For technology leaders, these agreements influence resilience, innovation, and long-term value creation. By focusing on clarity, continuity, compliance, and adaptability, organisations can transform IP contracts into tools that support growth rather than obstacles that limit it. Strong agreements reflect thoughtful leadership and a clear vision for how technology powers the business forward.

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REVEALED: How Nigeria’s Energy Crisis is Driven by Debt and Global Forces

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Nigeria’s Energy Crisis

By Blaise Udunze

For months, Nigerians have argued in circles. Aliko Dangote has been blamed by default. They have accused his refinery of monopoly power, of greed, of manipulation. They have pointed out the rising price of petrol and demanded a villain.

When examined closely, the truth is uncomfortable, layered, and deeply geopolitical because the real story is not at the fuel pump, and this is what Nigerians have been missing unknowingly. The truth is that the real story is happening behind closed doors, across continents, inside financial systems most citizens never see, and the actors will prefer that the people are kept in the dark. And once you see it, the outrage shifts. The questions deepen. The implications expand far beyond Nigeria.

In October 2024, it was obvious that the world would have noticed that Nigeria made a move that should have dominated global headlines, but didn’t. Clearly, this was when the government of President Bola Tinubu introduced a quiet but radical policy, which is the Naira-for-Crude. The idea was simple and revolutionary. Nigeria, Africa’s largest oil producer, would allow domestic refineries to purchase crude oil in naira instead of U.S. dollars. On the surface, it looked like economic reform. In reality, it was something far more consequential. It was a challenge to the global financial order.

For decades, oil has been traded almost exclusively in dollars, reinforcing the dominance of the United States in global finance. By attempting to refine its own oil using its own currency, Nigeria was not just making a policy adjustment. It was testing the boundaries of economic sovereignty. And in today’s world, sovereignty, especially when it touches money, debt, and energy, comes with consequences.

What followed was not loud. There were no emergency broadcasts or dramatic policy reversals. Instead, the response was quiet, bureaucratic, and devastatingly effective just to undermine the processes. Nigeria produces over 1.5 million barrels of crude oil per day, though pushing for 3 million by 20230, yet when the Dangote Refinery requested 15 cargoes of crude for September 2024, what it received was only six from the Nigerian National Petroleum Company Ltd (NNPC), which means its yield for a refinery with such capacity will be low if nothing is done. Come to think of it, between January and August 2025, Nigerian refineries collectively requested 123 million barrels of domestic crude but received just 67 million, which by all indications showed a huge gap. It is a contradiction and at the same time, laughable that an oil-producing nation could not supply its own refinery with its own oil.

So, where was the crude going? The answer exposes a deeper, more uncomfortable truth about Nigeria’s economic reality. The crude was being sold on the international market for dollars. Those dollars were then used, almost immediately, to service Nigeria’s growing mountain of external debt. Loans owed to the same institutions, like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, had to be paid, which are the same institutions applauding this government. Nigeria was not prioritising domestic industrialisation; it was prioritising debt repayment.

And the scale of that debt is no longer abstract. Nigeria’s total debt stock is now projected to rise from N155.1 trillion to N200 trillion, following an additional $6 billion loan request by President Tinubu, hurriedly approved by the Senate. At an exchange rate of N1,400 to the dollar, that single loan adds N8.4 trillion to a debt stock that already stood at N146.69 trillion at the end of 2025. This is not just a fiscal statistic. It is the central pressure shaping every major economic decision in the country.

On paper, the government can point to rising revenue, improving foreign exchange inflows, and stronger fiscal discipline as witnessed when the governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, Olayemi Cardoso, always touted the foreign reserves growth. But a closer review of those numbers reveals a harsher reality. Nigeria is exporting its most valuable resource, converting it into dollars, and sending those dollars straight back out to creditors. The crude leaves. The dollars come in. The dollars leave again. And the cycle repeats.

This is not growth. This is a treadmill powered by debt. Let us not forget that in the middle of that treadmill sits a $20 billion refinery, built to solve Nigeria’s energy dependence, now trapped within the very system it was meant to escape.

By 2025, the contradiction had become impossible to ignore, which is a fact. This is because how can this be explained that the Dangote Refinery, designed to reduce reliance on imports, was increasingly dependent on them. The narrative is that in 2024, Nigeria imported 15 million barrels of crude from America, which is disheartening to mention the least. More troubling is that by 2025, that number surged to 41 million barrels, a 161 per cent increase. By mid-2025, approximately 60 per cent of the refinery’s feedstock was coming from American crude. As of early 2026, Nigerian crude accounted for only about 30 to 35 per cent, which was actually confirmed by Aliko Dangote.

The visible contradiction in this situation is that the refinery built to free Nigeria from dollar dependence was running largely on dollar-denominated imports. Not because the oil did not exist locally, but because the system, shaped by debt obligations and global financial structures, made it more practical to export crude for dollars than to refine it domestically, which leads us to several other covert concerns.

Faced with this troubling reality, there is one major issue that still needs to be answered. This is why Dangote pushed back by filing a N100 billion lawsuit against the NNPC and major oil marketers. He further accused the parties involved of failing to prioritise domestic refining. For a brief moment, one will think that the confrontation, as it appeared, was underway is one that could redefine the balance between state control and private industrial ambition, but these expectations never saw the light of day.

Yes, it never saw the light of day because on July 28, 2025, the lawsuit was quietly withdrawn. No press conferences. No public explanation. No confirmed settlement. Just silence.

There are only a few plausible or credible explanations. As a practice and well-known in the country, institutional pressure may have made continued confrontation untenable. A strategic compromise may have been reached behind closed doors. Or the realities of the system itself may have made victory impossible, regardless of the merits of the case. None of these scenarios suggests a system operating with full autonomy or aligned national interest. All of them point to constraints, political, economic, or structural, that extend far beyond a single company.

Then came the shock that changed everything.

On February 28, 2026, Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz, disrupting a channel through which roughly 20 per cent of the world’s oil supply flows. Prices surged past $100 per barrel. Global markets entered crisis mode. Supply chains are fractured. Countries dependent on Middle Eastern fuel suddenly had nowhere to turn.

And they turned to Nigeria. Nations like South Africa, Ghana, and Kenya began seeking fuel supplies from the Dangote Refinery. The same refinery that had been starved of crude, forced into dollar-denominated imports, and entangled in domestic disputes suddenly became the most strategically important energy asset on the African continent.

Nigeria did not plan for this. It did not negotiate for this. With this development, the world had no choice but to simply run out of options, and Lagos became the fallback.

And then, almost immediately, attention shifted. This swiftly prompted, in early 2026, a United States congressional report to recommend applying pressure on Nigeria’s trade relationships within Africa. Shortly after, on March 16, 2026, the United States launched a Section 301 trade investigation into multiple economies, including Nigeria. This is not a sanction, but it is the legal foundation for one. At the same time, the African Growth and Opportunity Act, which had provided duty-free access to U.S. markets for decades, was allowed to expire in 2025 without renewal.

The sequence is difficult to ignore. As Nigeria’s strategic importance rose, so did external scrutiny. As its potential for regional energy leadership increased, so did the instruments of economic pressure.

To understand why, you must look at the system itself. The global economy runs on the U.S. dollar, which the Iranian government tried to scuttle by implementing a policy that requires oil cargo tankers being transported via the Strait of Hormuz to be paid in Yuan. Most countries need dollars to trade, to import essential goods, and to access global markets. The infrastructure that enforces this is the SWIFT financial network, which connects banks across the world. Control over this system confers enormous power. Countries that step too far outside it risk exclusion, and exclusion, in modern terms, means economic paralysis.

Nigeria’s attempt to trade crude in naira was not just a policy experiment. It was a subtle deviation from a system that rewards compliance and punishes independence. The response was not military. It did not need to be. It was structural. Limit domestic supply. Reinforce dollar dependence. Ensure that even attempts at independence remain tethered to the existing order.

And all the while, the debt clock continues to tick. N155.1 trillion.

That number is not just a fiscal burden. It is leverage. It shapes policy. It influences decisions, and it also determines priorities, which tells you that when a nation is deeply indebted, its room to manoeuvre shrinks. In all of this, one thing that must be understood is that choices that might favour long-term sovereignty are often sacrificed for short-term stability. Debt does not just demand repayment. It demands alignment.

Back home, Nigerians remain focused on the most visible symptom, which is fuel prices. Unbeknownst to most Nigerians, they argue, protest, and assign blame while the forces shaping those prices include global currency systems, sovereign debt obligations, trade pressures, and geopolitical realignments. The price at the pump is not the cause. It is the consequence.

Nigeria now stands at an intersection defined not by scarcity, but by contradiction. What is more alarming is that it produces vast amounts of crude oil, yet struggles to supply its own refinery. It earns more in dollar terms, yet its citizens feel poorer. It builds infrastructure meant to ensure independence, yet operates within constraints that reinforce dependence. This is not a failure of resources, and this is because there is a conflict or tension between what Nigeria wants, which reflects its ambition and structure, and between sovereignty and obligation.

And so the questions remain, growing louder with each passing month and might force Nigerians, when pushed to the wall, to begin demanding answers. If Nigeria has the oil, why is it importing crude? Further to this dismay, more questions arise, such as, why is the refinery paying in dollars if Naira-for-crude exists? One will also be forced to ask if the lawsuit had merit, why was it withdrawn without explanation? If revenues are rising, why is hardship deepening? And if Nigeria is merely a developing economy with limited influence, why is it attracting this level of global attention?

These are not abstract questions. They are the pressure points of a system that extends far beyond Nigeria’s borders.

Because this story is no longer just about one country. The reality is that, perhaps unbeknownst to many, it is about the future of African economic independence. It is about the structure of global energy markets, the dominance of the dollar and the role of debt in shaping national destiny. Honestly, the question that comes to bear is that if Nigeria, with all its resources and scale, cannot fully align its production with its domestic needs, what does that imply for the rest of the continent?

The next time the conversation turns to petrol prices, something must shift. Because the number on the pump is not where this battle is being fought. It is being fought in allocation decisions, in debt negotiations, in regulatory frameworks, in international financial systems, and in quiet policy moves that rarely make headlines.

The Dangote Refinery is not just an industrial project. It is a test case. A test of whether a nation can truly control its own resources in a world where power is rarely exercised loudly, but always effectively. And right now, that test is still unfolding.

Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: [email protected]

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2027: The Unabating Insecurity and the US Directive to Embassy, is History About to Repeat Itself?

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Christie Obiaruko Ndukwe

By Obiaruko Christie Ndukwe

‎We can’t be acting like nothing is happening. The US orders its Embassy Staff and family in the US to leave Nigeria immediately based on security concerns.

‎Same yesterday, President Donald J. Trump posted on his Truth Social that Nigeria was behind the fake news on his comments on Iran.

‎Some people believe it was the same way the Obama Government came against President Goodluck Jonathan before he lost out in the election that removed him from Aso Rock. They say it’s about the same thing for President Asiwaju Bola Ahmed Tinubu.

‎But I wonder if the real voting is done by external forces or the Nigerian electorate. Or could it be that the external influence swings the voting pattern?

‎In the middle of escalating security issues, the opposition is gaining more prominence in the media, occasioned by the ‘controversial’ action of the INEC Chairman in delisting the names of the leaders of ADC, the new ‘organised’ opposition party.

‎But the Federal Government seems undeterred by the flurry of crises, viewing it as an era that will soon fizzle out. Those on the side of the Tinubu Government believe that the President is smarter than Jonathan and would navigate the crisis as well as Trump’s perceived opposition.

‎Recall that in the heat of the CPC designation and the allegations of a Christian Genocide by the POTUS, the FG was able to send a delegation led by the NSA, Mallam Nuhu Ribadu, to interface with the US Government and some level of calm was restored.

‎With the renewed call by the US Government for its people to leave Nigeria, with 23 states classified as “dangerous”, where does this place the government?

‎Can Tinubu manoeuvre what many say is history about to repeat itself, especially with the renewed call for Jonathan to throw his hat into the ring?

‎Let’s wait and see how it goes.

Chief Christie Obiaruko Ndukwe is a Public Affairs Analyst, Investigative Journalist and the National President of Citizens Quest for Truth Initiative

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