Feature/OPED
African Leaders Must Prioritise Climate Risks—Verkooijen
By Kester Kenn Klomegah
In this insightful and wide-ranging interview, Professor Patrick Verkooijen, Chief Executive Officer of Global Center on Adaptation discusses the organization’s establishment, its main objectives, challenges and plans for the future.
The Global Center on Adaptation in Africa (GCA Africa), based at the African Development Bank (AfDB), has launched the Africa Adaptation Acceleration Program to mobilize $25 billion to scale up transformative actions on climate adaptation. It hopes to mobilize funds and bridge the financing gap for climate adaptation across Africa. Here are the interview excerpts:
What does the setting up of the Global Center on Adaptation mean for Africa?
Africa is on the frontline of our climate emergency. Five out of the 10 world’s most climate-vulnerable countries are in Africa. Contributing a meagre 5 per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions, Africa is more victim than a contributor to climate change, with the bulk of its emissions deriving from deforestation and poor land-use practices. Climate change is already negatively affecting the continent’s progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals.
Its impacts are showing up in extreme weather events such as floods, droughts and heatwaves affecting most of the continent with severe economic consequences. Hurricanes Idai and Kenneth in 2018 that hit Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Malawi affected over 3 million people, led to the death of over a thousand people and damaged infrastructure worth about $2 billion.
Compounding the already enormous climate challenges, COVID-19 has ushered in an era of multiple, intersecting systemic shocks, and one of its casualties has been our capacity to adapt and respond to escalating climate risks.
Investment in climate adaptation fell in 2020, even as more than 50 million people were affected. There is no doubt the adaptation challenge for Africa is extraordinary. For us, although the adaptation challenge is a global agenda, our priority is Africa.
We must make up for lost ground and lost time by accelerating action on climate adaption and resilience. Climate change did not stop because of COVID-19, and neither should the urgent task of preparing humanity to live with the multiple effects of a warming planet. If the virus is a shared global challenge so too should be the need to build resilience against future shocks.
In September last year, in the midst of the pandemic, we virtually launched our Africa office hosted by the African Development Bank in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire. Many African Heads of State and Government participated – they understand how vital accelerated adaptation action is because they are living with the impacts of climate change every day. Our rationale is that it doesn’t make sense to have an Africa office in isolation. We also have offices in Beijing and Dhaka because we think solutions that work well in South Asia, for example, could potentially also be translated to Africa and vice versa.
Do you target regions and different segments of the population in Africa? How do you determine and direct the activities of the GCA-Africa?
If we fail to include fairness and equity in how we adapt to a warming planet, we risk pushing millions of more people into poverty. We know how that story ends – with more conflict, migration and instability. With that in mind, we work closely with our partners including the African Adaptation Initiative and the African Development Bank to ensure our activities are directed towards where the need is greatest. Partnering with existing networks, platforms and organizations ensure that we don’t duplicate existing resources but can play a role in effectively filling the gaps that exist.
Right now, global, regional, national, subnational and local entities are working simultaneously, and in parallel to support adaptation actions and many important initiatives exist. However, the speed and scale of adaptation action is grossly insufficient to meet the demand and many stakeholders are not connected to the resources, knowledge, expertise or support others can offer them.
GCA is key to bridging this gap while ensuring at the same time that best practices can be replicated and scaled up in order to catalyse progress towards resilience in the most effective and efficient way.
Africa’s development – be it in infrastructure, agricultural production, urban development, and youth empowerment – can have a different path from other regions. Africa can have a development that is based on a deep understanding of climate risks for planning, resilient approaches with nature and people at the centre, and continuous innovations in technology, financing, and governance for a climate-smart-adapted future.
What are the long-term priority objectives here? But in the short-term, what projects would you tackle in Africa?
The short-term objective, in terms of the programs, is to make sure that when COVID-19 support packages are developed — and they are being developed in real-time by the IMF [International Monetary Fund] and other partners — they have resilience or adaptation action embedded in them.
Current estimates of the cost of climate change to Africa are between $7 – $15 billion per year. African countries are projected to experience clear detrimental macroeconomic consequences from climate change over the coming decades. The IMF estimates that this cost could rise to $50 billion by 2040, about 3% of the continent’s GDP. It is estimated that climate change could result in lower GDP per capita growth ranging, on average, from 10 to 13 per cent, with the poorest countries in Africa displaying the highest adaptation deficit. So, it’s important we act, and we act now.
Let me give an example. As part of the recovery package in Africa and other continents, there is a lot of investment in infrastructure. We want to make sure that these investments have climate risk embedded in their design and hence in their implementation and maintenance. We don’t want to build infrastructure anymore which will be destroyed when the next floods come.
For us, there is a very simple business case, over and above a moral argument, that investing in adaptation is good economics. We think that it is absolutely vital that, in the development of these new infrastructure projects or agriculture projects, that the climate lens is being applied consistently, and that is what we are planning to do in Africa long-term.
We are developing tools, guidelines, methodologies, and innovation programs for governments and development partners to do precisely that. You cannot develop properly without taking climate into consideration. There is this integrated approach that is not always applied, not only in Africa but also across the globe. That is what we are working on.
Since the start of this initiative, what would you consider as your main achievements on the continent? How did you overcome the initial challenges in order to get these positive results?
The urgency of the compounded COVID-19 and climate crises is compelling a new and expanded effort to accelerate momentum on Africa’s adaptation efforts.
At the GCA, we are joining forces with the African Development Bank to use their complementary expertise, resources and networks to develop and implement a new bold Africa Adaptation Acceleration Program (AAAP) to galvanize climate-resilient actions through a triple win approach to address COVID-19, climate change, and the economy.
The AAAP will contribute to closing Africa’s adaptation gap, support African countries to make a transformational shift in their development pathways by putting climate adaptation and resilience at the centre of their critical growth-oriented and inclusive policies, programs, and institutions.
As part of this program, just a couple of weeks ago, at the inaugural Climate Adaptation Summit, hosted by the Netherlands, we announced a new program to deploy billions of dollars to help young people in Africa build a new digitally-driven model of agriculture that can feed the continent’s people and boost prosperity even as the planet heats up.
The African Development Bank has already committed to putting half its climate finance towards the initiative – $12.5 billion between now and 2025.
The challenge now is to raise an equal amount from donor governments, the private sector and international climate funds. In the COVID-context this is challenging – our latest report “State and Trends in Adaptation” showed that investment in climate adaptation fell in 2020 even as more than 50 million people were affected by a record number of floods, droughts, wildfires and storms.
The pandemic is eroding recent progress in building climate resilience, leaving countries and communities more vulnerable to future shocks. I think awareness is really starting to increase that we can either delay climate action and pay for that choice or plan now and prosper. The returns in investing in building climate adaptation and resilience are much greater than the investment – investing $1.8 trillion globally in the next decade could generate $7.1 trillion in total net benefits.
We are also working to strengthen ecosystems that support youth-led climate adaptation entrepreneurship, and youth participation in adaptation policies; scale up climate adaptation innovations by strengthening business development services to 10,000 youth-owned enterprises and 10,000 youth with business ideas on jobs and adaptation; develop tailored skills and provide starting tool packs for one million youth to prepare them for climate-resilient jobs and entrepreneurial opportunities in adaptation and unlock $3 billion in credit for adaptation action by innovative youth-owned enterprises through innovative financial instruments.
With all these on the agenda, what role do African leaders have to play in terms of the global adaptation agenda?
With climate-related disasters expected to slow GDP per capita growth, African Governments are likely to experience increasing pressure on budgets and fiscal balances. Climate extremes are already leading to increased government expenditure, a reduction in the volume of collected taxes, ultimately resulting in an increase in government debt and impairment of investments. Adaptation and investment in climate resilience remain high development and investment priorities for Africa if the continent is to attain the SDGs.
In their Nationally Determined Contributions, African countries have already identified key areas where investments in adaptation and resilience building could yield high dividends. These include agriculture and forestry, water resources, disaster risk reduction, biodiversity and ecosystems, and human settlement. Many African countries are also in the process of preparing and finalizing their National Adaptation Plans.
Having said that, climate change is an all of social problem, no one can solve it alone. The role of African leaders is crucial to mobilise governments to boost climate action on both mitigation and adaptation. They need to improve their ability to incorporate climate risks into planning and financing major infrastructure, agriculture and other resilience-related investments.
With the youngest population in the world, Africa needs to find ways to unlock the power of its youth for adaptation – something we are very focused on at the GCA. Having said all of that, there are already a lot of good adaptation initiatives happening on the continent and many other countries in different regions are going to be able to learn from what Africa is doing.
Besides this, what specifically are the expectations from the leaders, looking at the fact that policies and approaches are different in African countries?
Earlier this year, we published a GCA policy brief, with the African Adaptation Initiative which recommended focusing stimulus investment in Africa on resilient infrastructure and food security to overcome the COVID-climate crisis. This was endorsed by 54 Heads of State and Government on the continent so when it comes to the need to accelerate adaptation action, it’s clear African countries are very much aligned. We are working hard on the ground to facilitate knowledge management and capacity building both within countries and between countries as well as promoting partnerships and co-operation at sub-regional and regional levels for increased synergy and scale. This cannot happen without the support of African leaders.
For example in Ghana, we are working to develop its first national-level assessment of the resilience of its infrastructure systems to climate change. By exploring and showcasing the potential co-benefits of nature-based solutions as part of a country-level package of investment in grey and green infrastructure, Ghana will function as a demonstration country of how to reduce costs and enhance ecosystems and we plan to roll out the initiative to other countries across the continent.
What platforms are there for discussing the GCA initiatives and programs for the African elite and the public? Do foreign organizations offer any support for these?
In January 2021, we hosted our first annual Ministerial Dialogue with over 50 ministers and leaders from international organizations including the newly appointed climate envoy John Kerry and Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Kristalina Georgieva. The aim of this event is to help scale-up global leadership cooperation to accelerate climate adaptation.
Going forward, it will also serve as an annual high-level forum on climate change adaptation, acting as a lever for global leadership to drive a decade of transformation for a climate-resilient world by 2030. African leaders were very active in the dialogue and we look forward to hearing from them in our future sessions.
There are also other partnerships such as the Climate Commissions of the African Union and the African Climate Policy Center. The African Risk Capacity, a specialized agency of the African Union is making important progress enabling countries to manage climate risks and access rapid financing to respond to climate disasters. The African Union is leading the pan-African Great Green Wall initiative which involves many international organizations and foreign governments.
But climate adaptation will not be successful if it just comes from the top-down. The design of adaptation actions must include and be led by local communities who are best placed to understand needs. Solutions need to be context relevant and accompanied by soft support designed to enhance uptakes such as formal education initiatives, agricultural extension or behavioural change campaigns.
Do you suggest governments have to act now to accelerate issues that you have on the agenda for the next few years? What kind of support do you envisage from African governments?
Over half of Africa’s total population experiences food insecurity. The growing number of extreme climate events, from droughts and new crop diseases to floods and unpredictable growing seasons, continue to threaten Africa’s ability to feed itself.
There are increasing rainfall and malaria risks in East Africa, increasing water stress and decreasing agricultural growing periods North Africa, severe flood risks in coastal settlements in West Africa and increased food insecurity, malaria risks and water stress in Southern Africa. The effect of aggregated climate impacts could decrease the continent’s GDP by 30 per cent by 2050.
Suffice to say Africa really doesn’t a moment to lose and we need to accelerate climate adaptation now. In looking towards recovery from the pandemic, we have a unique opportunity to ensure that we all build forward better. It is our responsibility to ensure that the opportunity isn’t wasted and countries around the world must support Africa in this.
Feature/OPED
Avoiding the Coming Deaths in 2027 Elections
By Michael Owhoko, PhD
Inevitable deaths are in the offing in 2027. Those familiar with Nigeria’s electoral mythology, history and patterns know that the 2027 general elections will be a harbinger of death, powered by electoral violence. It will take a miracle to escape what will play out. People will die. Nigerians will perish. Hospitals will be overwhelmed. Nigerians must therefore brace up for the coming calamity, as the intensity and scale will make it a memorable year of regrettable carnage. All six geopolitical areas of the country will be affected.
The event will further rub off on the country’s troubling global perception, and worsen its negative profile as the 5th most violent country in the world, and 4th in the Global Terrorism Index 2026, ranking as the 6th deadliest and 7th most dangerous country for civilians in the world. Besides, the elections will threaten democratic norms, political stability, and erode faith in public institutions due to brazen manipulation of the electoral process.
The coming calamity will largely be fueled by electoral insecurity engendered by the desperation of political parties to outwit one another, particularly the ruling party, the All Progressives Congress (APC) and the main opposition parties, including the African Democratic Congress (ADC) and the Nigeria Democratic Congress (NDC). While the APC will go all out and spare nothing to retain the incumbent government of President Bola Ahmed Tinubu for a second term in office, the ADC and the NDC will deploy every resource at their disposal to dislodge and replace the current APC Government, causing public uproar.
Though other political parties will also show strength and slug it out, the election will be fiercely contested by the APC, NDC and ADC. The stakes are high, and driven by illogical greed and lust for power to control political authority and economic resources, even though the resources are poorly appropriated, and most times, thoughtlessly deployed to protect pride, fund vanity, and maintain empires, as against judicious application for improved living conditions for citizens.
The political parties are likely to deploy political thugs masked as party officials to the field to reinforce their internal strategic plans to achieve programmed goals. By their planned political conduct and indifference, the political parties will, unwittingly, diminish the value of human lives during the general elections. This is the picture of what the country will experience in next year’s general elections.
Before you ask me for proof, go and verify the antecedents of political parties and how their leaders ignited the political atmosphere to set the tone for violence and rigging through their utterances and body language, influenced by irrational desires to achieve electoral victory at all costs. Except for former President Goodluck Jonathan, all presidential candidates since 1999 to date are guilty of stoking the polity through their predilection and declarations.
For example, prelude to the April 2007 Presidential election, the then President Olusegun Obasanjo had alluded that the election would be a “do-or-die affair”. As simple as the statement was, it encouraged supporters of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP) to go the extra mile to push for victory at all costs without thought of probable consequences. Evidently, this resulted in violence and fatalities across the country.
Also, during the 2011 elections, when former and late President Muhammadu Buhari, then candidate of Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), lost to Goodluck Jonathan, his demeanour and post-election utterances, undeniably, provoked and encouraged election violence in parts of the country, particularly in the north-west.
According to Human Rights Watch, over 800 people were killed, and more than 65,000 persons were displaced in the 2011 general elections following widespread protests and riots by Buhari’s supporters in the northern states. The killings, which were worsened by sectarian colouration, occurred in Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Niger, Sokoto, Yobe, and Zamfara.
Without showing empathy for the high number of Nigerians killed, including innocent National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) members, Buhari further threatened that if the next elections scheduled for 2015 were rigged like the 2011 elections, “the dog and the baboon would all be soaked in blood”, implying that violence and death would be inevitable in the 2015 elections. Clearly, Buhari’s comment was an indication of political desperation, intended to use the threat of force and violence to effect the outcome of the political contest, as against allowing the impartial verdict of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC).
Luckily for Nigeria, former President Jonathan conceded defeat, preventing Buhari’s threat from coming to pass in 2015. Jonathan’s action not only doused tension, but it also averted widespread killings and bloodshed that would have accompanied the announcement of the result in his favour, particularly in the northern part of the country. Jonathan’s position was obviously dictated by his philosophy that his ambition and that of anybody was not worth the blood of any Nigerian, which he held as an article of faith throughout the period of the 2015 general elections, preferring a credible and peaceful election.
Also, the incumbent President, Bola Ahmed Tinubu, is not immune from utterances that have encouraged violence. While addressing party members in London in 2023, Tinubu said political power was not served a la carte, but must be secured through intense efforts by “fighting for it, grabbing it, snatching it and running with it”. Whatever that means, this remark was not only unhelpful, it encouraged rigging and violence, as well as opened a new vista of political desperation and redefinition of new premises for an unhealthy autochthonous political process.
A parallel can be drawn between Tinubu’s statement and an incident that occurred at a polling unit in the Lekki axis of Lagos during the 2023 general elections. After queuing for hours in the sun to cast votes, just when ballot papers were to be counted at the end of voting, some thugs emerged from nowhere, scared away voters, seized the ballot box and left with it, perhaps, to thumbprint fresh ballot papers. Surely, there is a correlation between their actions and the political philosophy of “fighting for it, grab it, snatch it and run with it”.
In a similar vein, the Secretary of the Board of Trustees of the New Nigeria People’s Party (NNPP), Alhaji Buba Galadima, recently advised Nigerians to defend their votes in the coming 2027 elections with “bottles and jerry cans of kerosene”. This is an obvious reference to violence and an invitation to anarchy. Indeed, it is a precursor, as a worst-case scenario marked by an unhealthy electoral struggle will be thrown up in the 2027 general elections, where the value of human lives will be degraded.
The culture of killings in every election circle in Nigeria has become legendary. Among all African countries, and indeed, the world over where elections are conducted, Nigeria is reputed for election manipulation and violence, attracting undue global spotlight. As elections draw closer, skepticism, uncertainty, fear, and apprehension permeate the atmosphere due to expected violence.
Though it is the responsibility of the government to protect and guarantee the safety of lives during elections, past assurances by the government to protect the lives of citizens did not translate to safety. When a few successes are discounted, you find that security agencies have proved to be incapable of handling high-level violence, like what happened in the 2011 elections, where over 800 people lost their lives.
From antecedents, politicians are careless about deaths and can sacrifice the blood of innocent Nigerians on the altar of electoral victory. Their interests and activities are driven more by the value of votes, as evident during post-election litigations where they seek legal redress for electoral malpractice rather than justice for the dead.
Sadly, the coming deaths will dwarf all previous politically related killings in the country, necessitating the need to prioritise personal safety. It is imperative to identify and avoid electoral black spots that are notorious for violence. Political thugs are likely to trigger violence by creating an atmosphere of fear and intimidation at polling units aimed at electoral manipulations.
Citizens are therefore advised to devise safety nets that will shield and guarantee personal safety in the event of an obvious threat to life, even if it means avoiding polling booths. Recalled that Nigerians who died during previous election cycles had since been forgotten, and the country moved on without them. Therefore, citizens need to protect themselves to avoid being counted among the dead in the pending catastrophe in 2027.
Dr Mike Owhoko, Lagos-based public policy analyst, author, and journalist, can be reached at www.mikeowhoko.com and followed on X (formerly Twitter) @michaelowhoko.
Feature/OPED
Trapped Between Nigeria’s Failure and South Africa’s Xenophobic Violence
By Blaise Udunze
When the word “xenophobic” is talked about, most affected African countries tend to focus on the pains being experienced by their citizens in South Africa. For a moment, it calls for Nigeria and the rest of the African continent to pause and ask, how did we get here?
The recent happenings across the streets of Johannesburg, Pretoria, and Durban, a painful pattern continues to unfold with frightening and fearful regularity, as Nigerian-owned businesses are looted, migrants hunted, families displaced, and African nationals reduced to targets of rage. If asked, the majority would chorus that the recurring images of xenophobic violence in South Africa are disturbing enough, and no doubt, yes, but the deeper tragedy is beyond the flames and bloodshed. It lies in the silent failures back home that forced many Nigerians into vulnerable exile in the first place.
The reality, as a matter of fact, is that to understand the suffering of Nigerians in South Africa, one must first confront the uncomfortable truth that xenophobia is not merely a South African problem. It is also a Nigerian governance problem exported abroad.
Nigeria, often celebrated as the “Giant of Africa,” has now become the “Mama Africa” who has failed to nurture her many children, with the fact that behind every Nigerian fleeing hardship for survival, known as the “japa” syndrome, in another African country is a story shaped by economic frustration, failed institutions, poor leadership, unemployment, and a financial system disconnected from the realities of ordinary citizens.
One apt way to confirm these inimical factors, the South African president, Cyril Ramaphosa, recently acknowledged this uncomfortable reality when he urged African leaders to address the domestic failures driving mass migration across the continent. Speaking amid renewed anti-foreigner tensions, Ramaphosa identified “misgovernance” as one of the factors forcing Africans to seek refuge in countries like South Africa. Of a truth, his comments may have generated debate, and some “patriotic Nigerians” may also want to prove him wrong, but they reflected a painful reality many African governments would rather avoid.
Nigeria, despite its vast human and natural resources, has increasingly become a country where millions no longer see a future at home. This is a critical irony and the height of it all because a nation blessed with oil wealth and entrepreneurial energy and one of the youngest populations in the world is yet burdened by systemic corruption, policy inconsistency, infrastructural collapse, and a leadership class that has often prioritised politics over productivity, especially with the imminence of an election.
It is so detestable and at the same time fearful that the result is a generation of young Nigerians trapped between hopelessness and migration.
One regrettable experience that has continued to haunt the country for decades is that successive governments have squandered opportunities that could have transformed Nigeria into an industrial and economic powerhouse. Public resources that should have been invested in power, roads, healthcare, manufacturing, education and enterprise development have either disappeared into private pockets or become trapped in wasteful bureaucratic structures.
Reports indicating that over $214 billion in public funds may have been lost, diverted, or trapped in opaque fiscal systems over the last decade capture the scale of Nigeria’s accountability crisis. Whether exact or conservative, such figures reveal a country losing resources or funds rapidly from severe bleeding that could have changed millions of lives.
Looking intently at these developments, one would know that the tragedy is not merely corruption itself but the opportunities corruption destroyed.
Come to think of this fact that with proper governance and strategic economic planning, Nigeria could have developed a thriving SME ecosystem capable of employing millions of citizens. Instead, unemployment and underemployment have become defining realities of national life. The World Economic Forum recently identified unemployment and lack of economic opportunity as Nigeria’s greatest economic threat, yet the country continues to struggle with coherent employment data and long-term economic direction.
This economic suffocation explains why migration has become less of a choice and more of a survival strategy for many Nigerians.
At the centre of this crisis is another troubling contradiction, which is that Nigeria’s banking sector appears increasingly profitable while the real economy continues to deteriorate.
Ordinarily, banks in developing economies are expected to function as engines of growth by financing productive sectors, supporting innovation, and empowering small businesses. Across the world, SMEs are recognised as the backbone of grassroots economic development, and the tangible result is that they create jobs, stimulate local production, and expand economic participation.
In Nigeria, SMEs account for over 70 per cent of registered businesses, contribute nearly half of the country’s GDP and generate between 84 and 90 per cent of employment. Yet, despite their enormous economic importance, SMEs receive barely between 0.5 per cent and one per cent of total commercial bank lending.
This is not just a policy failure; it is an economic tragedy. Rather than financing entrepreneurs and productive enterprises, Nigerian banks have increasingly found comfort in investing heavily in government treasury securities. In 2025 alone, major Nigerian banks reportedly generated N6.68 trillion from total investment securities and treasury bills, benefiting from high-yield government debt instruments instead of supporting businesses capable of creating jobs.
The banking sector’s recapitalisation exercise, which successfully raised N4.56 trillion, was celebrated as a regulatory achievement. But the critical question remains. The recapitalisation is for what purpose?
If stronger banks continue to avoid the productive economy while SMEs remain starved of affordable credit, recapitalisation merely strengthens financial institutions without strengthening national development.
Today, private sector credit in Nigeria remains significantly low compared to many African economies. High interest rates, excessive collateral demands, weak credit infrastructure and risk-averse banking practices have created an environment where small businesses struggle to survive, and these implications are devastating.
Every denied SME loan is a denied employment opportunity. Every failed business is another frustrated entrepreneur. Every frustrated entrepreneur is another Nigerian considering migration.
This is how economic dysfunction transforms into human displacement. In a situation like this, it is noteworthy to state that South Africa naturally becomes an attractive destination because of its relatively advanced infrastructure and larger economy. Today, this has informed Nigerians and other African countries alike to migrate there, not because they hate their country but because they are searching for dignity through work and enterprise.
Yet, in a cruel twist, many become targets of xenophobic violence. Foreign nationals are accused of “taking jobs,” dominating businesses, and contributing to crime. Shops are attacked. Businesses are burned. Lives are lost.
It is not a surprise anymore that the disturbing rhetoric surrounding xenophobia has become increasingly normalised and perceived as fighting against saboteurs. Another major concern is that social media posts celebrating violence against Nigerians reveal a frightening and fearful dehumanisation of fellow Africans. This has continued to be heralded unaddressed, as some extremist anti-migrant groups now openly mobilise hostility against foreign nationals under the guise of economic nationalism.
Yet, as opposition leader Julius Malema rightly asked during one of the recent xenophobic debates. “After attacking foreigners and shutting down their businesses, how many jobs have actually been created?” If you are smart enough to know, it is glaring that this is a question that cuts through the emotional manipulation surrounding xenophobia, which also reflects the fact that destroying a Nigerian-owned shop does not solve unemployment, nor does killing migrants create prosperity. Violence against fellow Africans does not fix structural inequality.
Malema’s argument was blunt but accurate in revealing that xenophobia is not an economic strategy. It must be perceived with the right perspective as the symptom of deeper failures, poverty, inequality, weak governance, and political frustration.
Historically, just like other colonised African countries, South Africa itself carries deep old wounds. The legacy of apartheid left enduring economic inequalities, spatial segregation, unemployment, and psychological scars, but this should not continue to shape social tensions today. What is of concern is that the same people, like other African countries, experienced, were expected to remain forward-looking and forge ahead rather than dwell in the past.
It is even more pathetic that decades after the fall of apartheid, millions of Black South Africans remain trapped in poverty and exclusion; perhaps they are not to be blamed for their failures as they claimed, but the foreigners who didn’t stop them from exerting their skills become the scapegoats.
That frustration often seeks an outlet, and immigrants become easy scapegoats. This, however, does not excuse the brutality.
The stories emerging from xenophobic attacks are horrifying and very dastardly and humiliating, as African migrants have reportedly been beaten, burned alive, stoned, and hunted in communities where they once sought refuge, as two Nigerian citizens were said to have been beaten and burnt to death. To say the least, the pain becomes even more ironic when viewed against history.
Because Nigeria played a major role in supporting South Africa’s anti-apartheid struggle, ranging from financial assistance to diplomatic pressure, scholarships, activism, and cultural solidarity, Nigerians stood firmly with Black South Africans during some of apartheid’s darkest years, which was enough to prevent such ugly events. Nigeria did so much to the point that Nigerian students contributed financially to anti-apartheid campaigns. Nigerian musicians used music to mobilise continental resistance. Successive governments invested enormous diplomatic and material resources into the liberation struggle.
The children and grandchildren of those who made such sacrifices are now among those facing hostility in South Africa today.
History makes the tragedy even heavier. Yet, Nigeria must also confront its own failures honestly. The truth is, if Nigeria had invested half the energy it spent supporting external liberation struggles into building a functional domestic economy, perhaps millions of Nigerians would not be fleeing abroad in search of economic survival today.
The painful reality is that many Nigerians abroad are not economic adventurers; they are economic exiles.
The ugliest side of it all is that they are exiled by unemployment, exiled by corruption, and exiled by policy failures. Again, they are exiled by a system that has repeatedly failed to convert national wealth into shared prosperity but into embezzlement that still finds its resting place in a foreign account.
This is why solving xenophobia requires more than diplomatic protests or emotional outrage, as exuded in the National Assembly by some members like Adams Oshiomhole and others. This calls for the political actors and those in the financial space to fix the conditions that force Nigerians into vulnerable migration in the first place.
One undeniable fact is that, as a country, Nigeria must fundamentally rethink governance and economic management as it takes into consideration the following solutions.
First, public accountability must become non-negotiable and should not be compromised anywhere. Corruption and resource mismanagement are critical and have robbed generations of opportunities, and these are the major traits fueling the exile. Infrastructure, industrial development, education, and healthcare must become genuine priorities rather than campaign slogans, as all these must become a reality, not a feeble promise.
Second, the banking sector must reconnect with the real economy. Financial institutions cannot continue generating enormous profits from government securities while productive sectors collapse. The government should hold a roundtable discussion with banks, which must be incentivised and, where necessary, compelled to increase lending to SMEs and productive industries capable of generating employment.
Third, there must be deliberate and conscious investment in skills, innovation, and entrepreneurship. Young Nigerians should not have to leave their homeland merely to survive because it is an aberration for a country that is enormously rich but still has some of its best hands eloping from the country.
Finally, African governments must reject the politics of division and scapegoating. This contradiction is at its height because Africa cannot claim to pursue continental unity while Africans are hunted in other African countries.
In all of the deliberation, the truth remains the same, in the sense that the story of Nigerians suffering xenophobic violence in South Africa is ultimately a story about failed systems on both sides, one on the side of economic failures pushing migrants out and the social failures turning migrants into enemies.
Until these structural realities are confronted with honesty and urgency, the cycle will continue. More young Nigerians will leave. More migrants will become vulnerable. More African societies will turn inward against each other.
But this trajectory is not irreversible. One gift that can’t be taken away from Nigerians is that Nigeria still possesses the talent, entrepreneurial energy, and human capital necessary to build a prosperous economy that gives its citizens reasons to stay rather than flee. The truth is that what has been lacking is not potential but responsible leadership and economic vision.
The true solution to xenophobia may therefore begin far away from the streets of Johannesburg or Durban. It may begin in Abuja, with governance that works, institutions that serve, banks that invest in people, and leadership that finally understands that national dignity is measured not by speeches but by whether citizens can build meaningful lives at home.
Until then, the “japa” flag will keep flying, as many Nigerians will remain exiled, not merely by borders, but by the failures of the country they still desperately want to believe in.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: [email protected]
Feature/OPED
Why East Africa is Emerging as Africa’s Trade Growth Engine
By Elvis Ndunguru
East Africa, led by Kenya, is emerging as a powerful trade hub driven by infrastructure investment, regional integration and expanding intra-African trade. As a gateway for natural resources, it boasts rare earths, gold, nickel, cobalt, graphite, and other commodities the world needs.
Trade finance is the key to unlocking cross-border flows, supporting SMEs and enabling regional value chains, opening up economic benefits for the region.
As East African trade accelerates, better Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) policies have a stronger bearing on the Tanzanian mainland and Zanzibar, attracting capital movement. As stronger regional demand reshapes trade patterns, increased urbanisation and population growth are driving intra-African trade in fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG), construction materials, and processed goods. Improving macro-stability boosts investability as better fiscal and monetary management emerge.
But global flows demand dependence on solid infrastructure. As corridor-led infrastructure unlocks trade flows, investments in establishing ports, rail, and roads enable trade in new ways. For example, the Port of Mombasa and the Standard Gauge Railway are reducing transit times and connecting important inland markets like Uganda and Rwanda. Regional integration is being driven particularly under the East African Community (EAC) and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), resulting in lowered tariff and non-tariff barriers.
Between South Tanzania and North Kenya, strategically placed ports improve both inter- and intra-continental trade flow. To bolster regional connectivity, Tanzania will spend 12 trillion shillings (TZS) on port expansions. Meanwhile, the $1.4 billion Tazara (Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority) Railway rehabilitation is underway. Kenya is investing in rail, and a new fuel pipeline is being established from Uganda to Tanzania. The Tanzania Standard Gauge Railway is indeed positioned to complement and strategically link with the Lobito Corridor, even though they originate in different parts of the continent. The strategic connection lies in creating a transcontinental logistics network for DRC: goods (especially critical minerals like copper and cobalt) can move more efficiently across Africa, either east to Indian Ocean markets or west to Atlantic routes. This reduces reliance on single export routes, improves resilience, and enhances intra-African trade under frameworks like the African Continental Free Trade Area.
These developments give life to new trade flows, like transporting fuel from Uganda to the Middle East, or moving copper from Congo to China.
In the SADC and EAC regions, comprising over half a billion people, the demand for goods and services, including fuel, is significant. Regional agreements must be fostered to harmonise customs, tariffs, regulations, and the movement of goods, people and services. Frameworks like the EAC Customs Union and AfCFTA have reduced tariffs, but the system is often plagued by border delays and inconsistent enforcement, which dilute the impact of trade.
If banks with trade finance capabilities, including institutions like Absa with a growing pan-African footprint, support infrastructure development, this will boost connectivity, lower transport costs, and improve trade opportunities. Currently, it’s cheaper to move goods from China to Dar es Salaam than to transport them from Dar es Salaam to Mwanza, a region within Tanzania.
Trade finance is most impactful in sectors with predictable cross-border demand, such as agriculture, energy, and FMCG. Structured trade finance and supply chain finance help large corporates extend terms to suppliers, indirectly supporting SME participation.
The East African economy is largely driven by SMEs. In Tanzania, 96% of our economy depends on SMEs, but they lack funding to support themselves. The majority are trade-based, with imports from the Middle East, China, India, and others, and exports like minerals or agri-commodities to other parts of the world. While banks can help support SMEs, the locals must also support them to benefit the local market.
Besides raising capital, risk perception and informality are constraints to their success. Better credit data with digital identities and scalable guarantee schemes backed by Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) helps to mitigate risk. While simplified, digital trade finance products are now available, these are still limited. Anchor-led eco-systems with stronger linkage to large corporates are manifesting in the mining, FMCG, manufacturing and agricultural sectors.
DFIs, as key stakeholders, can work alongside financial institutions to help enhance trade routes. While it might be difficult for them to be on the ground, they can collaborate with the banks in certain markets within the continent to extend their reach.
To help with digitisation, we must empower fintechs to enable much stronger platforms. In Tanzania, SME customers work together to collaborate on small platforms to submit bulk orders to China. There’s strength in numbers.
Banks have the capabilities to support trade flows and payments via digitisation in areas like Ethiopia and the DRC. While some markets like DRC are high-risk, our competitors are growing there. Last year, a regional bank made 30% of its profit in Congo, for example. We can find safe ways to play in those markets, selecting the sectors in which we can perform.
Banks with a Pan-African presence, such as Absa, which operates across key trade corridors, must bring a true corridor strategy to build sector-specific solutions like agri-value chains across multiple countries; use digital platforms to serve mid-market clients, not just large corporates; partner with DFIs to expand risk appetite in frontier markets; and position themselves as a trade enabler, not just financiers, by integrating advisory, foreign exchange, and working capital solutions.
The real differentiator will be the ability to intermediate not just capital, but meaningful connectivity, helping to link clients across markets, currencies, and the supply chain.
Elvis Ndunguru is the Managing Executive for Absa Corporate and Investment Banking, NBC, Tanzania
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