By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh

South Africa, for the first time, heads the G20, a multilateral organization, and it is taking pecuniary measures to balance the heightening complexities around the world. With President Donald Trump in the helm of power in the United States, the most different pragmatic approach in being adopted towards a number of issues ranging from politics through the global economy to social and humanitarian parameters. Geographical regions, including Africa, are also affected to a distinctive extent.

Below is an insightful interview conducted by Kestér Kenn Klomegâh with Mr Tariq Khan, a Senior Research Associate at the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD) associated with the University of South Africa. Tariq focuses on economic, security and diplomatic issues in areas such as Pakistan-Africa Relations, Africn Relations, and Major Powers’ relations with Africa, Asia-Africa Relations and South-South Cooperation, Maritime Affairs. In this interview, Tariq Khan discussed Global Powers, G20 and Africa relations in the emerging new world. Here are the significant excerpts.

What are the practical implications of the United States, a major contributor among G20 members, skipping South Africa’s February summit?

The absence of the United States at the South Africa G20 summit poses diplomatic and strategic connotations of some importance. As a key global economic player, the U.S. influences major policy decisions within the G20, and its non-attendance could signal a de-prioritization of Africa within its foreign policy agenda.

First, it seems that there is no real commitment to the critical issues which the African continent is facing including debt relief, fair trade and development funding. South Africa, as the only African G20 member, has been a strong advocate for the continent’s economic priorities. If the Washington give unimportance or sideline this engagement, it risks reinforcing the perception that Washington is more focused on geopolitical tensions in Europe and Asia while offering only rhetorical support to Africa.

In adding up, such a move will give BRICS a boost, of which South Africa is a component and plays a prominent role. With BRICS growing and positioning itself as an alternative to Western-led institutions, the U.S. absence might encourage African nations to deepen their economic and political cooperation within BRICS which will lead to reduce reliance on Western-dominated frameworks.

Finally, absence of US could deteriorate or weaken the trustworthiness or credibility of the G20 as an inclusive global forum. South Africa has effectively championed the inclusion of the African Union (AU) as a permanent G20 member. If the U.S. disengages from the summit, it could slow momentum for integrating African priorities into global decision-making, reinforcing existing frustrations about Western dominance in multilateral institutions.

Can South Africa’s presidency change perceptions of the G20’s role in global politics and its contributions to Africa’s development?

South Africa’s G20 presidency presents a significant opportunity to reshape Africa’s role in global governance. Traditionally, the G20 has been dominated by the economic priorities of Western and Asian powers, often sidelining the challenges of the Global South. As the only African G20 member, South Africa can drive a more inclusive agenda through three key areas:

1. Reinforcing Africa’s Economic Potential: South Africa can emphasize Africa’s role as a strategic investment destination rather than just an aid recipient, advocating for reforms in global financial institutions to support Africa’s economic growth.
2. Advocating for Structural Reform: Building on its success in securing AU membership in the G20, South Africa can push for concrete actions such as debt restructuring, fair trade terms, and increased voting rights for Africa in institutions like the IMF and World Bank.
3. Shaping Global South Solidarity: By aligning G20 priorities with those of BRICS and the broader Global South, South Africa can challenge the perception that the G20 merely upholds Western economic dominance and instead position it as a balanced institution where emerging economies wield real influence. On the other hand, South Africa must navigate its complex diplomatic positioning. At the same time as maintaining strong Western ties, its BRICS membership and increasing alignment with China and Russia could generate tensions. Achievement will depend on its capability to bridge these divides and promote an Africa-first agenda.

In the context of a rapidly changing global landscape, do we see G20 competing or collaborating with BRICS?

The relationship between G20 and BRICS is distinguished and characterized by both competition and selective collaboration. BRICS as an organization has turned out to be more and more self-confident to challenge Western domination in global governance, mainly following its expansion to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Iran, and Ethiopia and other states.

This reflects a broader shift toward a multipolar world where such organizations similar to the G20 face substitute governance frameworks. Though, collaboration between G20 and BRICS remains indispensable. Several BRICS members such as South Africa, China, India, and Brazil are also in the G20 which means they have an interest in shaping both platforms rather than abandoning one for the other.

Cooperation on issues such as debt relief, climate change and development financing is promising, but ideological and strategic differences may persist. If the G20 remains inflexible in its Western-centric approach, then BRICS could become a direct competitor, attracting more nations disappointed with Western-led economic policies.

The challenge of South Africa is to balance its engagement with both which ensures that interests of Africa are advanced across multiple platforms and could not be compromised its broader economic and diplomatic objectives.

What is the future of the G20, particularly in relation to Africa, given BRICS’ growing influence?

The G20’s significance to Africa will depend on whether it can transition from symbolic commitments to tangible actions. Traditionally, African engagement with the G20 has been marked by unfulfilled promises. To remain a meaningful partner for Africa, the G20 must focus on:

1. Debt Relief and Fair Financing: Many African nations struggle with unsustainable debt burdens. The G20 must push for genuine restructuring mechanisms rather than perpetuating cycles of dependency.
2. Infrastructure Investment: Africa’s development hinges on infrastructure, yet financing remains a challenge. The G20 should support merged financing models that combine public and private investment in sustainable projects.
3. Technology and Industrialization Support: Africa’s long-term prosperity depends on industrialization and technological advancement. The G20 must facilitate technology transfer and capacity-building initiatives that give power to African economies. If the G20 fails to deliver meaningful reforms, African nations may increasingly turn to BRICS, which is enthusiastically positioning itself as a more responsive and approachable alternative.

Should African leaders first reform the African Union (AU) and regional blocs like ECOWAS before expecting changes in global institutions?

Of course yes, African leaders must first strengthen internal institutions before expecting global institutions to treat the continent as a unified force. Weak regional organizations undermine Africa’s bargaining power in global negotiations.

Key areas for reform include:

1. Financial Independence: Reducing reliance on external donors would allow the AU and regional blocs to act with greater autonomy in decision-making.
2. Stronger Enforcement Mechanisms: Regional organizations need better mechanisms to uphold democratic norms and economic agreements to prevent instability from weakening Africa’s global influence.
3. Policy Coordination: A fragmented Africa cannot effectively engage with global institutions. Greater intra-African coordination is needed to present a unified front in international forums. If Africa wants to negotiate from a position of strength, its institutions must be stable, credible, and self-sufficient. Strengthening the AU and regional organizations will enhance Africa’s ability to engage effectively with both G20 and BRICS.

Final Thoughts: The Vision of ‘Africa We Want’

The realization of the “Africa We Want,” as outlined in the AU’s Agenda 2063, requires strategic engagement with external partners. However, Africa must ensure that these partnerships are mutually beneficial rather than reinforcing external dependencies. South Africa’s role is fundamental in this vision. As a bridge between the West, BRICS, and the African continent, it must advocate and promote policies that advance Africa’s long-term interests and objectives. Africa’s engagement with the G20, BRICS, and other international platforms must be strategic to ensure that these institutions contribute to Africa’s broader development agenda rather than perpetuating historical imbalances. In the end, Africa’s success in the global arena will depend on its ability to take advantage from both external partnerships and internal reforms.

By Adedapo Adesanya

The Pan-African Payments and Settlement System (PAPSS), a pan-African payments infrastructure provider designed to facilitate trade on the continent is piloting an African currency market platform to boost commerce across borders in the region.

According to its chief executive, Mr Mike Ogbalu, the service backed by 15 central banks on the continent, expects to add the platform later this year.

He said this will complement its payments infrastructure that it says is currently integrated with 150 commercial banks.

“The rates will be market driven, and our system is able to do a matching based on the rates offered by the different participants in our ecosystem,” the CEO of PAPSS, told Reuters in an interview from Cairo.

The Africa Currency Marketplace, as the platform will be known, will allow parties to exchange local currencies directly, Mr Ogbalu said.

Africa has faced challenges in its foreign exchange markets with challenges ranging around liquidity.

Already, South Africa and Nigeria dominate geographically and much of the wider trading centre around local and hard currency pairs. Those seeking other African currencies must typically secure Dollars first.

However, the region has also seen some major currency reforms with countries such as Nigeria, Egypt and Ethiopia pushing ahead with efforts to move to more market-based regimes.

There have been frequent case of companies not being able to repatriate their revenue from other countries in the region, whenever violence or economic problems cause Dollar shortages in markets like South Sudan or the Central African Republic.

Mr Ogbalu cited the example of an Ethiopian airline selling Naira-denominated tickets in Nigeria, which could then exchange its naira revenue with a Nigerian company trading in Ethiopia using the Birr.

“Our system will intelligently match them and then party A will get Naira in Nigeria and party B will get birr in Ethiopia. The transaction just completes without any third-party currency being involved at all,” Mr Ogbalu said.

He also noted that companies operating in the region have been forced to take a write down every financial year to account for currency revaluations in markets with volatile currencies.

He added that others have invested in assets like real estate to try to preserve the value of their assets in such markets.

There have been attempts to use cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin to get around that problem but their usage is still low, partly due to lack of legal frameworks to support their use in markets like Kenya.

“Those are some of the things we think that this African currency marketplace will unlock,” he said.

By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh 

On March 6, 2025, the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation hosted the roundtable Information Bridge: Russia – Africa.

The event was organized by the Expert Council on Development and Support of Comprehensive Partnership with African Countries under the Deputy Chairman of the State Duma of the Russian Federation, Alexander M. Babakov, and the Afro-Russian Energy Association.

Representatives from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, leading Russian and African journalists and editors, well-known bloggers, media company officials from both Russia and Africa, information security specialists, and representatives from analytical centers and research organizations participated in the roundtable.

The event was moderated by Nikolai Novichkov, a deputy of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation and Deputy Chairman of the Expert Council. The co-moderator was Yulia Berg, head of the Globus expert club and co-author of the GlobalInsights program on Pan-African television.

Participants of the discussion developed specific proposals and recommendations on using media and the blogosphere to promote Russian-African projects, initiatives, and to expand cooperation between Russia and African countries in the field of media communications.

The event was opened by Alexander Babakov, Deputy Chairman of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation and Chairman of the Expert Council on Development and Support of Comprehensive Partnership with African Countries. He emphasized that the issues in media communication between Russia and Africa cannot be resolved without state participation.

“We will certainly, at least within the framework of the State Duma, look for mechanisms that would primarily prioritize state influence and create conditions under which our state’s information agenda could be implemented. There are many institutes and resources available for this. We need to approach them very carefully and seriously today,” said Babakov.

Maria Zakharova, the official representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, highlighted the existing problems in the media field between Russia and Africa:

“The network of correspondents of Russian and African media has the potential to develop, but it is insufficient. There are no accredited African media in Russia. Interaction with local correspondents exists, but African journalists visit Russia episodically, mainly for major events. Against the backdrop of French and English-speaking media influence and a lack of Russian content, the African audience gets a distorted view of Russia and bilateral cooperation.”

Zakharova also proposed ways to resolve the issues in establishing media relations:

“It is important to continue contacts between Russian and African media. Strengthening cooperation through educational programs, press tours, and major media conferences is essential. Africa’s population is 1.5 billion, half of whom are under 20 years old. This is an age when people want to learn, set goals, and break into the world. Modern technologies create an information environment that cannot be overlooked. We have achievements, but we need more.”

Irina Abramova, Director of the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, made several proposals to develop media relations between Russia and Africa:

“It is crucial for journalists to understand Africa to avoid mistakes. We are ready to give lectures and cooperate to improve literacy in covering African topics. In large countries, media should broadcast not only in capitals but also in provinces, addressing educational issues as 50% of Africa’s population is under 20 years old.”

“Furthermore, it is important to bring African bloggers to show the reality of Russia and unite efforts to expand the themes and understanding of mutual interests. Africa is young, open to new things, and should not be portrayed only as a poor and hungry territory,” concluded Abramova.

Louis Gowend, Chair of the Commission for African Diaspora Relations and Public Relations at the Russia-Africa Club of Lomonosov Moscow State University, expressed the viewpoint that Irina Olegovna Abramova’s idea of creating a unified information space between Russia and Africa should be implemented.

However, to achieve this, as emphasized by Artur Kureev, Editor-in-Chief of “African Initiative,” it is first necessary to unify all resources and media related to Africa to establish a cohesive agenda. Artur Sergeevich added that a comprehensive strategy and understanding are necessary to determine the most effective way to engage with the African audience. It’s also crucial to assist the African infrastructure and develop it on a Russian foundation, including technological projects for internet development.

Kinfu Zenebe, head of African diasporas, stated that collaboration with media should focus on African media representatives in the Russian Federation. He suggested that the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs facilitate accreditation for representatives of African media in the Russian Federation. Through a mechanism, African countries should also be allowed to establish small bureaus in Moscow, which would serve as a strategic step towards strengthening strong diplomatic ties.

Cameroonian journalist and member of the Globus expert club, Clarissa Waidorven, highlighted the role of media in strengthening Russian-African ties, emphasizing that coverage of these relations in the global media landscape requires attention to both traditional and new media.

“Western media actively influence African narratives by enticing local bloggers. Russia should strategically use media platforms to advance its interests, creating a positive image through media diplomacy.”

Svyatoslav Shchegolev, Head of African Content Production at RT, emphasized the broadcasting challenges in delivering the Russian perspective to the audience:

“Today in Africa, they are finding new ways to convey information to viewers, sometimes in spite of Western pressure. There is a great deal of attention and willingness to cooperate directly from African media. In several countries, this includes state television channels.”

Victoria Smorodina, Editor-in-Chief of International Reporters, provided recommendations for France on “surviving” on the African continent:

“France needs to rethink its information warfare strategy in Africa, acknowledging the break from past influence. Instead of opposing pan-African demands, it should support the creation of an independent Africa by developing local media, culture, cinema, and theater.”

According to the Editor-in-Chief, this approach will help counter the influence of Turkey, the USA, and other powers.

“France’s defeat in the information sphere should stimulate the development of a new doctrine that combines cognitive sovereignty defense with offensive tools. Partnerships with private companies, a legal framework, and structures are needed to regulate information operations,” she argued.

Andrey Gromov, Executive Secretary of the Board of the African-Russian Energy Association (AREA), summarized the roundtable by presenting the resolution’s provisions containing specific recommendations on measures to stimulate Russian-African cooperation in the information sphere.

“We know of many business projects that simply fell apart because there wasn’t enough coverage. We didn’t understand from our side the contribution of the Russian Federation,” he stressed. Following the roundtable, recommendations were sent to the Government of the Russian Federation, in particular to develop and implement a comprehensive program to promote a positive image of Russia in African countries and to counteract the spread of disinformation about Russia in African media.