Feature/OPED
Curbing the Menace of Suicide in Nigeria
By Okechukwu Keshi Ukegbu
Suicide is defined as the act of intentionally causing one’s own death. Studies have traced causes of suicide to mental disorders, including depression, bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, personality disorders, and substance abuse—including alcoholism and the use of benzodiazepine, among others.
Unfortunately, analysts have begun to wonder recently if the evil spirit influencing suicide has finally decided to domicile in Nigeria. No minute passes without the news of suicide or attempted suicide. Every now and then, the stories that adorn the media landscape are “a student of the Lagos State Polytechnic, KingEzekiel Joseph Mayowa, drank sniper because his girlfriend of 9 years left him. Mayowa, who was a part-time student of the Lagos State Polytechnic, Ikorodu Campus, department of hospitality management technology, died after using the now popular sniper, an insecticide, to end his life”. A Nigerian father of two identified as Seun Adedutan has taken his own life. The father of two who was described as a good Christian took two bottles of sniper to end his own life”.
The incidents cited above are tip of the iceberg. The list of suicide cases keep expanding. Nigerians were greeted on the morning of the 6th of April, 2019, with the news of the suicide case of a lecturer at the Department of Mathematics, in the University of Ibadan. It was reported that the deceased ended his life after unfulfilled dreams of completing his PhD programme. The following week on 19th April 2019, a 100-level student of Kogi State University, Ayingba, also died by suicide after she was reportedly jilted by her boyfriend. She was said to have taken Sniper, a pesticide. Efforts to save her life were abortive. Several days later on 29th April, news broke that another undergraduate, a 100-level student of Chemical Engineering at the University of Port Harcourt, Rivers State, ended his life after drinking two bottles of Sniper.
Shortly thereafter, an 18-year-old was found dead in her room in Aluu, one of the host communities of UNIPORT with bottles of insecticide and Sniper by her side. On the 4th May 2019, a 26-year-old hairdresser in Lagos ended her life after her boyfriend of two years ditched her. On May 13th, 2019 another student of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, escaped death by the whiskers as attempts on suicide failed.
Another baffling case of suicide occurred on May 14th, 2019, involving one member of a Pentecostal Church in Lagos, who reportedly got depressed over his accommodation issues before taking his own life. On the 15th May 2019, a 17-year-old in Jos, was reported to have drank Sniper to end his life when he learned that he had failed the 2019 JAMB exam. A day after on May 16th, it was also reported that a third year Physics/Astronomy undergraduate of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, was found dead in an uncompleted building in the educational institution. His lifeless body was found dangling on a rope suspended from a height.
As the list keeps expanding, experts have generated fear that the situation may not abate in the nearest future as there is the likelihood that more Nigerians are likely to succumb to suicide if urgent attention is not taken to address underlying factors that are fuelling the upsurge.
Among all the causes of suicide in Nigeria, depression is fingered as the key. World Health Organization (WHO) statistics showed that depression affected about 7 million people in 2015 (3.9 percent), while in 2016, suicide was the second leading cause of death among people between the ages of 15 and 29.
The same health says that globally, 300 million people – 4.4 percent of the world population – are affected by depression, a leading cause of suicide. The WHO also notes that 5.4 percent of Africans have depression and contributes to 9 percent of global cases of depression. Good Health Weekly findings reveal that people that experience setbacks are more likely be depressed and contemplate suicide than others.
Experts have proffered the following suggestions as measures that can ameliorate the situation: readjusting the traditional family structure, deemphasizing the spirit of make it at all cost; ensuring job security; improving the number of psychiatrists; and passage of Mental Health Bill.
It will be recalled that a similar alarm was raised last year by Dr. Abubakar Bagudu, Consultant Psychiatric with the Abubakar Tafawa Balewa Teaching Hospital (ATBTH), Bauchi. The alarm by Bagaudu said that eight out of every 10 patients brought to the mental clinic of the hospital are youths who abused drugs.
Bagudu further disclosed that drug abuse among young people had left them with depression and high level of suicide.
The consultant’s claim buttressed a recent World Health Organisation( WHO) report that half of all mental health cases started from ages 14.The report added that most cases went undetected.
Bagudu also noted that the ugly trend has compelled the Psychiatric department of the Teaching Hospital to create awareness among post primary school students.
It was also reported that Bauchi was among the states with a high rate of codeine abuse, translating into large turnout of patients with mental problems in the state.
Experts have attributed reasons of drug abuse to such factors as influence of peer group pressure to improve self-esteem, drug availability, accessibility, wrongful prescription and lack of drug education and the list is inexhaustible.
Researches have revealed that most youths who took to drugs was as a result of peer group influence. This is in a bid by our youths to join the league of young men that make things happen within their neighbourhood.
Like it is often postulated that “bad company corrupts good manners,” parents have enormous work in this direction by influencing to a greater extent the companies their wards keep. This approach will go a long way in checking drug addiction among our youths.
Another disheartening factor is the poor manner in which the circulation of drugs is regulated in the country. This trend has facilitated the proliferation of “prescription drugs” in the open market. The trend has degenerated to the level that drugs that require doctor’s prescription before dispensing to be sold in the open market.
In saner climes, certain drugs do not circulate widely except “Over The Counter” drugs. The situation has degenerated to the extent that the circulation and proliferation of drugs such as tramadol has assumed a geometric rate. While the consumption of this substance (tramadol) may have assumed arithmetic progression, its consumption may have assumed a geometric rate. In every street corner now tramadol is sold and consumed without recourse to its consequence.
Tramadol clinically serves as a pain relief but today it is abused and its use has been expanded to other uses such as to enhance productivity for menial labour and sex enhancement. According to experts, an abuse or prolonged use of tramadol exposes the user to psychotic consequences. That is to say that in the nearest future, Dr. Bagudu’s outcry will be a child’s play considering the large number of our youths that will parade our streets insane.
The consequence for prolonged or abuse of tramadol does not begin and end with psychotic effects .Indeed, tramadol abuse is a disaster begging for urgent attention. In few years, an army of youths that are unproductive or less productive will be unleashed on the society.
It is on this strength that public opinion moulders are agitating for the restriction of the insecticide, sniper, out of circulation or on the other hand, raising the price of the product to the high heavens so that it cannot be easily accessed because researches have shown that the insecticide is the major facilitator of suicide.
Drug abuse and economic hardship are Siamese twins that are hardly separated, and if suicide is to be frontally addressed in Nigeria, the issue of ameliorating economic hardship undergone by Nigerians should be sufficiently addressed. It is a common parlance that “a hungry man is an angry man”.
While it is incontrovertible that economic hardship leads to depression and consequently depression, it is enough for us to take our lives because of economic hardship or other related misfortunes. We should bear in mind the advice that “hard times do not last forever but hard men do”.
From the above proposals, it will not be out of place to suggest here that the various agents of socialisation, especially the church and media, the orientation agencies, and the anti- drug agencies have crucial roles to play.
By Blaise Udunze
Daily, the world watches Nigeria through a familiar lens in what appears to be a gory situation. Especially in cases when the news headlines tell stories of farmer-herder clashes, bandit attacks, kidnappings, villages reduced to ashes or deserted by the dwellers, as thousands of Nigerians have been displaced across states such as Zamfara, Plateau, Benue, Niger, Kaduna and Nasarawa. Subliminally, this is about to become a similarly ugly occurrence in southwestern Nigeria, which is fast becoming obvious if not nipped in the bud quickly.
Recorded data have shown that bandits, Boko Haram, and others killed over 190,000 Nigerians in 17 years and displaced 3.7 million people.
A human rights organisation, the International Society for Civil Liberties and Rule of Law (Intersociety), in its fearful revelation, has said that no fewer than 190,150 Nigerians have been killed by bandits, Boko Haram insurgents, and suspected armed herdsmen between July 2009 and March 19, 2026, as this calls for concern.
The dominant explanations often point to ethnic tensions, religious divisions, climate change, shrinking grazing routes or weak security institutions. No doubt, those factors are certainly part of Nigeria’s complex security crisis. Yet another question deserves serious examination.
What if, in some locations, the violence is also serving another purpose? What if some of the territories experiencing repeated displacement are the same places sitting atop some of Nigeria’s most valuable mineral deposits? More importantly, if such a pattern exists, who benefits when communities disappear?
Of a truth, these questions are uncomfortable, but undeniably they deserve careful investigation rather than dismissal.
For ages, Nigeria has been naturally endowed, and it is estimated to be rich in enormous significant reserves of gold, lithium, uranium, tin, columbite and other strategic minerals increasingly sought after in the global transition to clean energy technologies. As international demand for battery minerals continues to rise, these resources have become far more valuable than they were only a decade ago.
If one overlays publicly available geological information with maps showing persistent violence, some observers argue that striking geographical overlaps appear in several regions. Such overlaps alone cannot establish causation. Correlation is not proof of conspiracy. However, they raise questions worthy of independent scrutiny.
One issue attracting increasing attention and adequately yearns for answer is whether prolonged insecurity may inadvertently or deliberately create conditions that make mineral extraction easier.
Under Nigeria’s Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act 2007, mineral resources belong to the Federal Government, while mining rights are granted through licences and leases. Community engagement and land access are expected to form part of the licensing process, although implementation varies depending on circumstances. This raises an important policy question.
What happens when the communities expected to participate in those processes have already fled because of violence?
Displacement changes the dynamics of land ownership, consent and access. While no evidence automatically proves that attacks are orchestrated to facilitate mining, the sequence of violence followed by renewed commercial activity in some locations deserves closer examination by regulators, lawmakers and investigative journalists.
In conflict studies, researchers have long observed that wars often generate economic winners alongside humanitarian losers. Could elements of Nigeria’s insecurity also be producing economic beneficiaries?
Reports over the years have documented concerns about illegal mining operations across parts of northern Nigeria. Government agencies themselves have repeatedly acknowledged that criminal networks profit from the country’s vast mineral wealth. The unresolved question is whether isolated criminality has, in some instances, evolved into more sophisticated alliances involving political influence, financial interests and international supply chains. If so, the implications extend far beyond Nigeria.
Invariably, it is clearly known that lithium has become one of the world’s most strategic commodities, powering electric vehicle batteries and renewable energy storage systems. Gold has always remained one of the safest global investment assets during periods of uncertainty. Meanwhile, it is well confirmed that the global appetite for these minerals creates enormous financial incentives.
Suppose violent displacement reduces resistance to extraction. Suppose shell companies subsequently acquire mining interests. Suppose minerals then leave Nigeria through legitimate-looking export documentation while their true value remains understated.
These scenarios remain allegations unless supported by verifiable evidence. Yet they outline a framework that investigators may wish to test rather than ignore. Financial crime experts frequently identify trade mis-invoicing as one of the most common methods of illicit financial flows worldwide.
Could Nigeria’s solid minerals sector be vulnerable to similar practices? If valuable lithium ore is deliberately but inaccurately described as lower-value material on export documents, substantial wealth could potentially leave the country without reflecting its true market value. Likewise, if unrefined gold exits through privileged channels with limited scrutiny, questions naturally arise about oversight, transparency and accountability over criminal activities which have continued to stunt and disrupt the country’s socio-economic growth and at the same time cause carnage.
Such possibilities are not accusations against any particular institution or company. Rather, they illustrate why stronger monitoring systems are increasingly essential. Another question concerns logistics.
With the high level of criminal activities, industrial mining requires heavy machinery, diesel supplies, transportation networks and specialised personnel. These are not operations that can remain invisible indefinitely.
If certain territories are genuinely too dangerous for security agencies, how do industrial-scale extraction activities reportedly continue in some remote locations? If they do, who protects those operations? Who authorises their movement? Who verifies what is extracted? Who ensures royalties and export revenues reach public coffers? These are governance questions that demand institutional answers.
Equally important is the international dimension. Minerals extracted in Nigeria ultimately enter global supply chains. Gold may pass through international refining hubs before entering financial markets. Lithium may become part of battery manufacturing destined for electric vehicles, which are being sold across Europe, North America and Asia.
One known fact is that consumers purchasing products containing these minerals rarely know the full story of where they originated.
Increasingly, however, investors and governments are demanding ethical sourcing standards that trace minerals from extraction to final manufacture.
A critical factor that must be taken into cognisance is that if insecurity is creating opportunities for illegal or unethical extraction anywhere in the world, multinational companies have responsibilities alongside national governments, of which the onus falls on the Nigerian government.
Transparency cannot stop at the mine gate. Nor should accountability end at national borders. Another issue requiring attention concerns beneficial ownership.
Across many jurisdictions, shell companies can obscure the identities of individuals ultimately controlling commercial assets. If politically exposed persons or powerful business interests are hidden behind complex corporate structures registered offshore, identifying beneficiaries becomes significantly more difficult. This challenge is hardly unique to Nigeria.
Findings showed that from Latin America to Central Africa and Southeast Asia, resistant corporate networks have frequently complicated efforts to combat corruption and illicit resource extraction. That is precisely why open corporate registries, beneficial ownership databases and transparent mining licence disclosures are becoming global governance priorities. For Nigeria, the stakes could hardly be higher.
The country stands at the centre of the world’s emerging critical minerals economy. The Nigerian government can’t feign ignorance of the fact that, when handled transparently, these resources could finance infrastructure, education, healthcare, and industrial development for generations.
In no way would the government claim not knowing that when handled poorly, they risk becoming another chapter in the well-documented “resource curse,” where extraordinary natural wealth coincides with persistent poverty, insecurity and institutional weakness.
The ultimate challenge, therefore, is not simply about mining. It is about governance. It is about whether public institutions possess both the independence and capacity to ensure that natural resources benefit citizens rather than narrow interests. It is about whether conflict zones receive genuine peacebuilding efforts instead of becoming forgotten frontiers. And it is about whether international markets demand accountability with the same enthusiasm they demand raw materials.
None of these questions should be answered through speculation. They require rigorous investigations, forensic financial analysis, satellite imagery, mining license audits, customs records, beneficial ownership disclosures and courageous journalism.
They require governments willing to open their books. They require international cooperation capable of tracing money across borders. Most importantly, they require asking questions that have too often remained unasked.
Perhaps Nigeria’s security crisis is exactly what it appears to be: a tragic convergence of historical grievances, weak institutions, criminality and environmental pressures. Or perhaps, in some places, another layer of economic incentive deserves closer scrutiny.
Until those questions are thoroughly investigated, one possibility will continue to linger. Maybe the world’s attention has been fixed on the blood spilt above ground, while too little attention has been paid to the extraordinary wealth lying beneath it.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: bl***********@***il.com
Feature/OPED
What Does Nigeria’s $51bn Reserves Milestone Mean if Most New Foreign Money Can Leave Quickly?
Nigeria’s foreign reserves have climbed to about $51 billion, a decade-plus high, according to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). EBC Financial Group (EBC) notes that this reflects stronger investor confidence, but the second half may show whether it holds, as the build rests on three cyclical drivers: oil earnings, short-term foreign money and a narrowing official-to-street naira gap.
Reserves rose from about $32 billion in April 2024, during a dollar shortage, to about $51 billion now, near the CBN’s target. Much came from two cyclical sources, strong oil earnings and money chasing high-yielding naira assets, so EBC expects the pace to slow or reverse. Fitch Ratings, a major international credit rating agency, expects a marginal decline to about $47 billion by the end of 2026, citing higher spending and external pressures.
David Precious, Senior Market Analyst at EBC Financial Group, said, “Nigeria’s reserve build is real but may not be durable yet, because nearly all of the new money is the kind that can leave quickly. Of the $10.37 billion that came in over the first quarter, the overwhelming majority was short-term portfolio funds rather than long-term investment, so a shift in oil prices, global interest rates or confidence in the naira might pull a large part of it straight back out.”
Most New Money Can Still Leave Quickly
The composition of the foreign inflows explains the caution over how long the build can last. The country attracted $10.37 billion in foreign investment in the first quarter of 2026, up 83.83 per cent year-on-year, according to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Of that, $9.86 billion or 95.09 per cent, was portfolio money, largely short-term naira debt such as Treasury bills that investors can sell at the next auction, while foreign direct investment, the long-term kind that builds factories and jobs, was $135.08 million, or 1.30 per cent. Put simply, of each dollar coming in, about 95 cents can leave quickly, and barely one cent stays.
That money supports reserves while it stays. Dollars brought in to buy naira assets add to market supply, letting the CBN hold more reserves and steady the naira. It leaves when conditions change. Nigeria earns most of its export dollars from oil and gas, so lower oil prices mean fewer dollars, and as a member of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), it cannot simply produce more, output capped by quota and reduced by theft and ageing fields. Higher global interest rates draw money toward safer returns abroad, and a weakening naira prompts investors to sell early. When oil fell in 2016 and 2020, foreign investors withdrew and could not convert naira to dollars as supply dried up, leaving the CBN to clear more than $7 billion in trapped obligations into 2024.
The Oil Boost is No Longer Certain
Oil looked like a dependable source of the dollars behind the reserves only months ago. Earlier in 2026, concern over disruption around the Strait of Hormuz lifted crude prices, and stronger receipts flowed in, with crude oil export earnings of $8.11 billion in the first quarter in the CBN’s balance-of-payments data. That support is now easing. The tension has subsided, and Brent traded near $72 on June 29, down about 24 per cent over the month, back to pre-conflict levels. With the price boost gone and output constrained, reserves are more exposed, leaning on non-oil earnings and investor patience rather than oil.
The Naira Still Trades at Two Prices
The naira has traded at two prices, an official rate and a higher parallel-market rate, and closing that gap into one trusted price is what many investors might watch most. Before committing funds, they may want assurance they can convert naira to dollars at a fair rate when they exit, and a wide gap revives the fear of being trapped that lingers from earlier shortages. The gap has narrowed to roughly N20 to N30, with the CBN’s official rate near N1,380 per dollar on June 26 against parallel-market quotes around N1,400. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2026 Article IV review urged Nigeria to depend less on this fast-moving portfolio money and to keep phasing out its multiple exchange-rate practices. The CBN’s Foreign Exchange Manual, in force from 1 June, is intended to make the market clearer, though such rules build confidence only once investors can freely trade dollars at the posted rate.
What could Make the Build Durable
A few signs that may show the build turning durable include a smaller gap between the official and street naira rates, more long-term foreign investment, and steadier oil earnings. A gap that stays small, now roughly N20 to N30, may mean investors trust the official rate and no longer need the street market. A clear rise in foreign direct investment, only $135 million last quarter against $9.86 billion of short-term money, might mean lasting capital is replacing funds that can leave at the next auction. Oil earnings that hold up, rather than sliding from the low $70s, should help keep reserves steady, since oil and gas bring in most of Nigeria’s export dollars.
“Reserves built on money chasing high yields can fall as fast as they rose, as they did after the last two oil shocks, when investors left, and the CBN spent years clearing a foreign-exchange backlog,” Precious added. “What holds through a downturn is slower money, direct investment, steady oil and non-oil export earnings and one credible naira rate, and that is the shift Nigeria has yet to make.”
By Olajumoke Bello
Across Nigeria, small and medium enterprises remain the backbone of economic activity. They drive trade, create jobs, and sustain millions of livelihoods. Yet, despite their importance, many SMEs continue to operate below their full potential due to persistent structural challenges.
Access to finance remains one of the most cited constraints. However, the issue today goes beyond the availability of capital. Many businesses struggle with financial readiness, weak documentation, and limited understanding of what lenders require. This often leads to missed opportunities, even when funding options exist.
At the same time, SMEs face gaps in market access and visibility. Business owners operate in highly localised environments, with limited exposure to broader networks that can unlock partnerships, new markets, and growth opportunities. This isolation can constrain scalability and reduce long-term competitiveness.
Equally important is the capability gap. Many entrepreneurs grow through resilience and experience but lack structured knowledge on critical areas such as financial management, export readiness, and digital adoption. Without this, even well-capitalised businesses can struggle to sustain growth.
These challenges point to a clear need for a more practical and integrated approach to SME support. It is no longer sufficient to offer standalone solutions. SMEs require ecosystems that combine knowledge, access, and direct engagement in ways that reflect how they actually operate.
A key shift is the move from centralised interventions to localised engagement. SMEs are deeply influenced by their immediate environments, whether markets, industrial clusters, or trade corridors. Solutions must therefore be brought closer to where these businesses function, allowing for more relevant support and stronger relationships.
Another important shift is from awareness to action. Business owners do not only need information; they need insights that they can apply immediately. This includes understanding how to structure their finances, how to access trade opportunities, and how to connect with the right partners to scale their operations.
There is also a growing need for continuity. Many SME-focused initiatives deliver strong initial impact but lack follow-through. For support to be effective, it must extend beyond one-off engagements into sustained relationships, with clear pathways for onboarding, advisory, and growth.
For financial institutions, this presents both responsibility and an opportunity. Supporting SMEs now requires moving beyond transactional banking to deeper partnership models. It requires understanding businesses at a granular level and co-creating solutions that evolve with their needs.
At Stanbic IBTC, this perspective continues to shape our approach to SME development. Our focus is on delivering practical support that translates into real business outcomes, helping enterprises grow, compete, and contribute more meaningfully to the economy.
As part of this commitment, we are extending our SME engagement to the regions through the Nigeria Business Summit Regional Tour. The tour will take structured, on-ground activations into key commercial hubs, where SMEs can access funding guidance, trade insights, advisory support, and direct engagement with financial experts.
The regional tour will take place across five strategic locations, bringing these solutions closer to business owners in Aba, Onitsha, Ibadan and Kano.
This approach reflects an important principle. When support moves closer to businesses and when solutions are delivered in ways that are practical and continuous, SMEs are better positioned to grow sustainably. In turn, this strengthens not only individual enterprises but the broader economy.
Olajumoke Bello is the Head of Enterprise Banking at Stanbic IBTC Bank
