Feature/OPED
Alliance of Sahel States: Beginner’s Guide
By Professor Maurice Okoli
Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, the three Francophone West African countries under military government, have established an Alliance of Sahel States (AES, or Alliance des Etats du Sahel in French), which is a confederation formed between the above-mentioned three countries.
It originated as a mutual defence pact and was created by the three countries on September 16, 2023. The confederation was officially established on July 6, 2024. The AES is anti-French and anti-ECOWAS in outlook. All three member states of the AES have had their pro-Western governments overthrown by their militaries, and each is currently ruled by a military junta as part of the coup belt.
In 2002, Mali withdrew from the internationally backed G5 Sahel alliance, and Niger and Burkina Faso followed suit in 2023. This led to the dissolution of the G5 framework by its last two members, Chad and Mauritania. The AES has finally exited the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
In addition to their enthusiasm to ensure long-term political power, the three have generally joined a growing list of African countries that are turning their economies into better environments for their millions of impoverished citizens.
Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, in early July 2024, finally withdrew from the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and have further taken the next collective step to create their own sub-regional bloc referred to as the Alliance of Sahel States (AES).
The treaty underscores a “step towards greater integration” between the signatory countries. The pact is open to new members in the event that the candidate accepts all provisions and the ‘trio’ unanimously agrees on the decision.
In practical terms, the trio has repeatedly explained the primary reasons for the joint action as follows: (i) the AU and the ECOWAS’s significant failure to provide adequate support against fighting the jihadists; (ii) the imposition of ‘illegal sanctions’ that are harming the people; and (iii) that the bloc has fallen under the influence of and indiscriminately manipulated by foreign governments, particularly France. (iv) ECOWAS threatens to intervene to restore civilian rule in Niger.
The Alliance further seeks new members whose political philosophy aligns with the current development challenges. The new confederation’s document outlines various directions on its agenda, including establishing a regional bank and stabilisation fund. It has also issued an executive order to facilitate foreign investment in their territorial space.
The document clip circulated widely on social media, racking up thousands of views and introducing fresh debate around the fact that the former political system was stacked with bureaucracy and conservative policy.
A curious look inside the creation of the Alliance of Sahel States has been making resonating waves. The architects of this alliance, both online and offline, have accordingly been pushing the agenda. The Blueprint Document is open to the public and foreign organisations, the regional bloc ECOWAS, and the continental organisation AU.
Reports have indicated that the inaugural meeting was held on July 6 in Niamey, the capital of Niger, and was attended by President of Burkina Faso Ibrahim Traoré, Transitional President of the Republic of Mali Assimi Goita, and President of Niger’s National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland, Abdourahamane Tchiani.
The Niamey Declaration, in which the ‘trio’ formally announced the establishment of the new confederation,’s primary multifaceted goals include consolidating joint efforts to ensure security and address the socioeconomic problems of the participating states. The alliance will also pursue and undertake joint development projects as well as address questions relating to trade, industry, and agriculture. The document holds the promise to facilitate the free movement of people, goods, and services.
The Alliance of Sahel States is resonating across the sub-region, across Africa, and beyond. Critics have labelled it a real ‘threat to democracy’ and a step to assert ‘an authoritarian’ takeover of political power and administration, while supporters call it a strategic plan to establish power as one ‘of the people, by the people, and for the people, and probably the irreversible beginning of an end of epoch, 500 years of colonialism.
The Alliance of Sahel States came under the spotlight after their July declaration. As expected in the context of the geopolitical situation and analysing the background of the complexities of the evolving political situation, especially in West Africa, it is very noticeable that the United States, Europe, and a few other external powers have stood on the opposite side.
On the other side, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in its weekly media briefing that while consistently advocating for ‘African solutions to African problems’, the initiative by the leaders of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger fully meets the interests of the people of those countries. “We are confident that the Alliance of Sahel States will facilitate the formation of a new regional security architecture. Russia reaffirms its intention to continue to provide the necessary support to the countries of the Alliance of Sahel States,” the report said.
In another related development, Mali’s military leader, Assimi Goita, had spoken by phone with Russian President Vladimir Putin about political developments and his approach to settling the crisis in the region as a whole. Putin stressed “the importance of a peaceful resolution of the situation for a more stable Sahel,” according to the transcript posted to the Kremlin’s website.
Most probably, ECOWAS is now crumbling due to institutional weaknesses combined with being manipulated by external forces. There has been rising anti-western sentiment in the former French colonies. It is also due to the long-standing discontent with and the inability to support effectively in the fight against growing insecurity in the region. Reports say ECOWAS has been working to set up a standing regional force of between 1,500 and 5,000 soldiers, which reports estimate would cost about $2.6bn (£2bn) annually.
But for political observers, their split from ECOWAS comes with many potential ramifications, ranging from economics to security. Buchanan Ismael, a politics professor at the University of Rwanda, believes it “may increase the risk of insecurity” in an already volatile region infested with militant groups.
Hassan Isilow, a political analyst, says in his report that Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger have cemented their split from ECOWAS and formed their own Alliance of Sahel States.
The West Africa region could be headed for ‘foreign-imposed instability,’ warns the University of South Africa’s Ahmed Jazbhay.
More countries could’separate themselves from ECOWAS, if not through coups, then with anti-Western populists,’ says Rwanda-based analyst Buchanan Ismael.
The fact is that the common theme in their statements was greater integration between their countries—the majority of African states that have slowly but surely been drifting away from traditional regional and Western allies.
Research reports published by The Conversation, Agence France Press, British Broadcasting, and many other reputable media indicated that the unilateral withdrawal of three West African countries would be hit by trade regulations and restrictions, thus impacting the population and the economy.
The three are landlocked and among the poorest in the world; this already illustrates their major disadvantage and limited position. Several narratives further pointed to the fundamental fact that the crisis has the potential to escalate into either a conflict across West Africa or the final disintegration of ECOWAS.
In July 2024, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger signed a confederation security pact and formalised their final exit from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the regional bloc that imposed sanctions on them after the coups in Mali in 2020, Burkina Faso in 2022, and Niger in 2023.
“This summit marks a decisive step for the future of our common space. Together, we will consolidate the foundations of our true independence, a guarantee of true peace and sustainable development, through the creation of the ‘Alliance of the Sahel States’ Confederation,” Traore said in a statement posted on X.
By creating their own Alliance of Sahel States, it exposes the regional bloc ECOWAS and the continental organisation AU’s powerlessness, multitude of weaknesses, and long-term inability and incompetency to deal with regional problems through mediation.
In the ECOWAS guidelines, Article 91 of the bloc’s treaty stipulates that member countries remain bound by their obligations for a period of one year after notification of their withdrawal. For better or for worse, these interim military governments have adopted a hardline stance, consistently delaying fixing concrete dates to hold democratic elections.
The AU Commission chief, Moussa Faki Mahamat, repainted the ‘bleak picture’ with a ‘litany of difficulties’ confronting many African countries during the 37th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union (AU) summit held, from February 14 to February 15, at the AU Headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. AUC chief Moussa Faki Mahamat assertively spoke of ‘worrying trends’ in North Africa, the Horn of Africa, and also in West Africa.
Moussa Faki Mahamat blasted the failure to counter multiple “unconstitutional changes of government” following a string of coups in West Africa and warned the scourge of “terrorism” was diverting money away from vital social needs to military spending. In practical reality, the summit was now concerned about looking inward, closely protecting their sovereign prerogatives rather than investing in collective security, somehow to fund most of its budget rather than foreign donors. Gabon and Niger were absent from the summit following their suspension over coups last year, joining Mali, Guinea, Sudan, and Burkina Faso, which are also barred for similar reasons.
As an expert in geopolitics and regional economic integration, it is important to take a close look at the possible obvious implications. Despite taking this innovative step, there are still obstacles and explicit challenges in the areas of coordination and cooperation. For instance, the fact that the three are geographically landlocked stipulates the questions of access to the coastline, logistics, and delivery of goods through seaports.
The next question that cannot be overemphasised is whether Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are members of the West African Economic and Monetary Union, which uses the CFA franc as its common currency. The trio has to create their own currency if they are expelled from the West African Economic and Monetary Union.
Usually referred to as the West African Sahel, it is the vast semi-arid region where Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and other countries are located. This West African Sahel region has been plagued by security challenges, including terrorism and organised crime. Terrorist organisations such as Boko Haram, the Islamic State, and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have operated in the Sahel, exacerbating violence, extremism, and instability in the region.
According to the latest issue of the Global Terrorism Index, there is a strong link between organised crime and terrorism in this region. Terrorism is on the rise, and the Sahel accounts for almost half of all deaths from terrorism globally.
This is further exacerbated by the cross-border operations of armed groups and rising violent extremism. That, combined with widespread and growing desertification, contributes additional strain to the region’s development. Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger have a combined population of approximately 80 million people and some of the fastest population growth rates in the world. But development has been assessed as poor, far below what is needed to guarantee a normal living standard.
In addition to insecurity and instability, these countries are engulfed in various socio-economic problems combined with traditional cultural practices that have lessened development. The system of governance and poor policies largely hinder sustainable development.
In light of the above, ECOWAS will have to adapt its strategy to this new geopolitical reality. The AES could seek to establish or strengthen its partnerships with other international actors, such as Russia or China, of the multipolar BRICS Alliance, which have shown growing interest in Africa.
Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger together comprise some 72 million people, almost a fifth of the regional bloc’s population. It remains one of the least developed countries in the world, with a GDP of $16.23 billion in 2022. Geography and the environment contribute to Burkina Faso’s food insecurity.
Mali’s key industry is agriculture. Cotton is the country’s largest crop export and is exported west throughout Senegal and Ivory Coast. Gold is mined in the southern region, and Mali has the third-highest gold production in Africa (after South Africa and Ghana).
Niger is the second-largest landlocked nation in Africa, behind Chad. Over 80% of its land area lies in the Sahara. In 2021, Niger was the main supplier of uranium to the EU, followed by Kazakhstan and Russia. Despite its large deposit of uranium, Niger has a multidimensional underdevelopment, and 80% of its citizens consistently live in abject poverty.
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) continues to look for appropriate mechanisms to resolve the ongoing crisis. The regional bloc has come under persistent criticism; it has slackened on its primary responsibilities, while some have called for drastic reforms and personnel changes (overhauling or restructuring), attributing to the complete inefficiency of the organisation.
Consisting of 15 member states, ECOWAS facilitates peacekeeping through systematic collaboration with civil society, cooperation with development policies, and other activities to meet sub-regional security challenges. Established on May 28, 1975, the bloc’s reputation has been at stake and most probably needs new dynamic faces at the Secretariat in Abuja, Nigeria.
Professor Maurice Okoli is a fellow at the Institute for African Studies and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences. He is also a fellow at the North-Eastern Federal University of Russia. He is an expert at the Roscongress Foundation and the Valdai Discussion Club.
As an academic researcher and economist with a keen interest in current geopolitical changes and the emerging world order, Maurice Okoli frequently contributes articles for publication in reputable media portals on different aspects of the interconnection between developing and developed countries, particularly in Asia, Africa, and Europe. With comments and suggestions, he can be reached via email: markolconsult (at) gmail (dot) com.
By Blaise Udunze
Daily, the world watches Nigeria through a familiar lens in what appears to be a gory situation. Especially in cases when the news headlines tell stories of farmer-herder clashes, bandit attacks, kidnappings, villages reduced to ashes or deserted by the dwellers, as thousands of Nigerians have been displaced across states such as Zamfara, Plateau, Benue, Niger, Kaduna and Nasarawa. Subliminally, this is about to become a similarly ugly occurrence in southwestern Nigeria, which is fast becoming obvious if not nipped in the bud quickly.
Recorded data have shown that bandits, Boko Haram, and others killed over 190,000 Nigerians in 17 years and displaced 3.7 million people.
A human rights organisation, the International Society for Civil Liberties and Rule of Law (Intersociety), in its fearful revelation, has said that no fewer than 190,150 Nigerians have been killed by bandits, Boko Haram insurgents, and suspected armed herdsmen between July 2009 and March 19, 2026, as this calls for concern.
The dominant explanations often point to ethnic tensions, religious divisions, climate change, shrinking grazing routes or weak security institutions. No doubt, those factors are certainly part of Nigeria’s complex security crisis. Yet another question deserves serious examination.
What if, in some locations, the violence is also serving another purpose? What if some of the territories experiencing repeated displacement are the same places sitting atop some of Nigeria’s most valuable mineral deposits? More importantly, if such a pattern exists, who benefits when communities disappear?
Of a truth, these questions are uncomfortable, but undeniably they deserve careful investigation rather than dismissal.
For ages, Nigeria has been naturally endowed, and it is estimated to be rich in enormous significant reserves of gold, lithium, uranium, tin, columbite and other strategic minerals increasingly sought after in the global transition to clean energy technologies. As international demand for battery minerals continues to rise, these resources have become far more valuable than they were only a decade ago.
If one overlays publicly available geological information with maps showing persistent violence, some observers argue that striking geographical overlaps appear in several regions. Such overlaps alone cannot establish causation. Correlation is not proof of conspiracy. However, they raise questions worthy of independent scrutiny.
One issue attracting increasing attention and adequately yearns for answer is whether prolonged insecurity may inadvertently or deliberately create conditions that make mineral extraction easier.
Under Nigeria’s Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act 2007, mineral resources belong to the Federal Government, while mining rights are granted through licences and leases. Community engagement and land access are expected to form part of the licensing process, although implementation varies depending on circumstances. This raises an important policy question.
What happens when the communities expected to participate in those processes have already fled because of violence?
Displacement changes the dynamics of land ownership, consent and access. While no evidence automatically proves that attacks are orchestrated to facilitate mining, the sequence of violence followed by renewed commercial activity in some locations deserves closer examination by regulators, lawmakers and investigative journalists.
In conflict studies, researchers have long observed that wars often generate economic winners alongside humanitarian losers. Could elements of Nigeria’s insecurity also be producing economic beneficiaries?
Reports over the years have documented concerns about illegal mining operations across parts of northern Nigeria. Government agencies themselves have repeatedly acknowledged that criminal networks profit from the country’s vast mineral wealth. The unresolved question is whether isolated criminality has, in some instances, evolved into more sophisticated alliances involving political influence, financial interests and international supply chains. If so, the implications extend far beyond Nigeria.
Invariably, it is clearly known that lithium has become one of the world’s most strategic commodities, powering electric vehicle batteries and renewable energy storage systems. Gold has always remained one of the safest global investment assets during periods of uncertainty. Meanwhile, it is well confirmed that the global appetite for these minerals creates enormous financial incentives.
Suppose violent displacement reduces resistance to extraction. Suppose shell companies subsequently acquire mining interests. Suppose minerals then leave Nigeria through legitimate-looking export documentation while their true value remains understated.
These scenarios remain allegations unless supported by verifiable evidence. Yet they outline a framework that investigators may wish to test rather than ignore. Financial crime experts frequently identify trade mis-invoicing as one of the most common methods of illicit financial flows worldwide.
Could Nigeria’s solid minerals sector be vulnerable to similar practices? If valuable lithium ore is deliberately but inaccurately described as lower-value material on export documents, substantial wealth could potentially leave the country without reflecting its true market value. Likewise, if unrefined gold exits through privileged channels with limited scrutiny, questions naturally arise about oversight, transparency and accountability over criminal activities which have continued to stunt and disrupt the country’s socio-economic growth and at the same time cause carnage.
Such possibilities are not accusations against any particular institution or company. Rather, they illustrate why stronger monitoring systems are increasingly essential. Another question concerns logistics.
With the high level of criminal activities, industrial mining requires heavy machinery, diesel supplies, transportation networks and specialised personnel. These are not operations that can remain invisible indefinitely.
If certain territories are genuinely too dangerous for security agencies, how do industrial-scale extraction activities reportedly continue in some remote locations? If they do, who protects those operations? Who authorises their movement? Who verifies what is extracted? Who ensures royalties and export revenues reach public coffers? These are governance questions that demand institutional answers.
Equally important is the international dimension. Minerals extracted in Nigeria ultimately enter global supply chains. Gold may pass through international refining hubs before entering financial markets. Lithium may become part of battery manufacturing destined for electric vehicles, which are being sold across Europe, North America and Asia.
One known fact is that consumers purchasing products containing these minerals rarely know the full story of where they originated.
Increasingly, however, investors and governments are demanding ethical sourcing standards that trace minerals from extraction to final manufacture.
A critical factor that must be taken into cognisance is that if insecurity is creating opportunities for illegal or unethical extraction anywhere in the world, multinational companies have responsibilities alongside national governments, of which the onus falls on the Nigerian government.
Transparency cannot stop at the mine gate. Nor should accountability end at national borders. Another issue requiring attention concerns beneficial ownership.
Across many jurisdictions, shell companies can obscure the identities of individuals ultimately controlling commercial assets. If politically exposed persons or powerful business interests are hidden behind complex corporate structures registered offshore, identifying beneficiaries becomes significantly more difficult. This challenge is hardly unique to Nigeria.
Findings showed that from Latin America to Central Africa and Southeast Asia, resistant corporate networks have frequently complicated efforts to combat corruption and illicit resource extraction. That is precisely why open corporate registries, beneficial ownership databases and transparent mining licence disclosures are becoming global governance priorities. For Nigeria, the stakes could hardly be higher.
The country stands at the centre of the world’s emerging critical minerals economy. The Nigerian government can’t feign ignorance of the fact that, when handled transparently, these resources could finance infrastructure, education, healthcare, and industrial development for generations.
In no way would the government claim not knowing that when handled poorly, they risk becoming another chapter in the well-documented “resource curse,” where extraordinary natural wealth coincides with persistent poverty, insecurity and institutional weakness.
The ultimate challenge, therefore, is not simply about mining. It is about governance. It is about whether public institutions possess both the independence and capacity to ensure that natural resources benefit citizens rather than narrow interests. It is about whether conflict zones receive genuine peacebuilding efforts instead of becoming forgotten frontiers. And it is about whether international markets demand accountability with the same enthusiasm they demand raw materials.
None of these questions should be answered through speculation. They require rigorous investigations, forensic financial analysis, satellite imagery, mining license audits, customs records, beneficial ownership disclosures and courageous journalism.
They require governments willing to open their books. They require international cooperation capable of tracing money across borders. Most importantly, they require asking questions that have too often remained unasked.
Perhaps Nigeria’s security crisis is exactly what it appears to be: a tragic convergence of historical grievances, weak institutions, criminality and environmental pressures. Or perhaps, in some places, another layer of economic incentive deserves closer scrutiny.
Until those questions are thoroughly investigated, one possibility will continue to linger. Maybe the world’s attention has been fixed on the blood spilt above ground, while too little attention has been paid to the extraordinary wealth lying beneath it.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: bl***********@***il.com
Feature/OPED
What Does Nigeria’s $51bn Reserves Milestone Mean if Most New Foreign Money Can Leave Quickly?
Nigeria’s foreign reserves have climbed to about $51 billion, a decade-plus high, according to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). EBC Financial Group (EBC) notes that this reflects stronger investor confidence, but the second half may show whether it holds, as the build rests on three cyclical drivers: oil earnings, short-term foreign money and a narrowing official-to-street naira gap.
Reserves rose from about $32 billion in April 2024, during a dollar shortage, to about $51 billion now, near the CBN’s target. Much came from two cyclical sources, strong oil earnings and money chasing high-yielding naira assets, so EBC expects the pace to slow or reverse. Fitch Ratings, a major international credit rating agency, expects a marginal decline to about $47 billion by the end of 2026, citing higher spending and external pressures.
David Precious, Senior Market Analyst at EBC Financial Group, said, “Nigeria’s reserve build is real but may not be durable yet, because nearly all of the new money is the kind that can leave quickly. Of the $10.37 billion that came in over the first quarter, the overwhelming majority was short-term portfolio funds rather than long-term investment, so a shift in oil prices, global interest rates or confidence in the naira might pull a large part of it straight back out.”
Most New Money Can Still Leave Quickly
The composition of the foreign inflows explains the caution over how long the build can last. The country attracted $10.37 billion in foreign investment in the first quarter of 2026, up 83.83 per cent year-on-year, according to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Of that, $9.86 billion or 95.09 per cent, was portfolio money, largely short-term naira debt such as Treasury bills that investors can sell at the next auction, while foreign direct investment, the long-term kind that builds factories and jobs, was $135.08 million, or 1.30 per cent. Put simply, of each dollar coming in, about 95 cents can leave quickly, and barely one cent stays.
That money supports reserves while it stays. Dollars brought in to buy naira assets add to market supply, letting the CBN hold more reserves and steady the naira. It leaves when conditions change. Nigeria earns most of its export dollars from oil and gas, so lower oil prices mean fewer dollars, and as a member of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), it cannot simply produce more, output capped by quota and reduced by theft and ageing fields. Higher global interest rates draw money toward safer returns abroad, and a weakening naira prompts investors to sell early. When oil fell in 2016 and 2020, foreign investors withdrew and could not convert naira to dollars as supply dried up, leaving the CBN to clear more than $7 billion in trapped obligations into 2024.
The Oil Boost is No Longer Certain
Oil looked like a dependable source of the dollars behind the reserves only months ago. Earlier in 2026, concern over disruption around the Strait of Hormuz lifted crude prices, and stronger receipts flowed in, with crude oil export earnings of $8.11 billion in the first quarter in the CBN’s balance-of-payments data. That support is now easing. The tension has subsided, and Brent traded near $72 on June 29, down about 24 per cent over the month, back to pre-conflict levels. With the price boost gone and output constrained, reserves are more exposed, leaning on non-oil earnings and investor patience rather than oil.
The Naira Still Trades at Two Prices
The naira has traded at two prices, an official rate and a higher parallel-market rate, and closing that gap into one trusted price is what many investors might watch most. Before committing funds, they may want assurance they can convert naira to dollars at a fair rate when they exit, and a wide gap revives the fear of being trapped that lingers from earlier shortages. The gap has narrowed to roughly N20 to N30, with the CBN’s official rate near N1,380 per dollar on June 26 against parallel-market quotes around N1,400. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2026 Article IV review urged Nigeria to depend less on this fast-moving portfolio money and to keep phasing out its multiple exchange-rate practices. The CBN’s Foreign Exchange Manual, in force from 1 June, is intended to make the market clearer, though such rules build confidence only once investors can freely trade dollars at the posted rate.
What could Make the Build Durable
A few signs that may show the build turning durable include a smaller gap between the official and street naira rates, more long-term foreign investment, and steadier oil earnings. A gap that stays small, now roughly N20 to N30, may mean investors trust the official rate and no longer need the street market. A clear rise in foreign direct investment, only $135 million last quarter against $9.86 billion of short-term money, might mean lasting capital is replacing funds that can leave at the next auction. Oil earnings that hold up, rather than sliding from the low $70s, should help keep reserves steady, since oil and gas bring in most of Nigeria’s export dollars.
“Reserves built on money chasing high yields can fall as fast as they rose, as they did after the last two oil shocks, when investors left, and the CBN spent years clearing a foreign-exchange backlog,” Precious added. “What holds through a downturn is slower money, direct investment, steady oil and non-oil export earnings and one credible naira rate, and that is the shift Nigeria has yet to make.”
By Olajumoke Bello
Across Nigeria, small and medium enterprises remain the backbone of economic activity. They drive trade, create jobs, and sustain millions of livelihoods. Yet, despite their importance, many SMEs continue to operate below their full potential due to persistent structural challenges.
Access to finance remains one of the most cited constraints. However, the issue today goes beyond the availability of capital. Many businesses struggle with financial readiness, weak documentation, and limited understanding of what lenders require. This often leads to missed opportunities, even when funding options exist.
At the same time, SMEs face gaps in market access and visibility. Business owners operate in highly localised environments, with limited exposure to broader networks that can unlock partnerships, new markets, and growth opportunities. This isolation can constrain scalability and reduce long-term competitiveness.
Equally important is the capability gap. Many entrepreneurs grow through resilience and experience but lack structured knowledge on critical areas such as financial management, export readiness, and digital adoption. Without this, even well-capitalised businesses can struggle to sustain growth.
These challenges point to a clear need for a more practical and integrated approach to SME support. It is no longer sufficient to offer standalone solutions. SMEs require ecosystems that combine knowledge, access, and direct engagement in ways that reflect how they actually operate.
A key shift is the move from centralised interventions to localised engagement. SMEs are deeply influenced by their immediate environments, whether markets, industrial clusters, or trade corridors. Solutions must therefore be brought closer to where these businesses function, allowing for more relevant support and stronger relationships.
Another important shift is from awareness to action. Business owners do not only need information; they need insights that they can apply immediately. This includes understanding how to structure their finances, how to access trade opportunities, and how to connect with the right partners to scale their operations.
There is also a growing need for continuity. Many SME-focused initiatives deliver strong initial impact but lack follow-through. For support to be effective, it must extend beyond one-off engagements into sustained relationships, with clear pathways for onboarding, advisory, and growth.
For financial institutions, this presents both responsibility and an opportunity. Supporting SMEs now requires moving beyond transactional banking to deeper partnership models. It requires understanding businesses at a granular level and co-creating solutions that evolve with their needs.
At Stanbic IBTC, this perspective continues to shape our approach to SME development. Our focus is on delivering practical support that translates into real business outcomes, helping enterprises grow, compete, and contribute more meaningfully to the economy.
As part of this commitment, we are extending our SME engagement to the regions through the Nigeria Business Summit Regional Tour. The tour will take structured, on-ground activations into key commercial hubs, where SMEs can access funding guidance, trade insights, advisory support, and direct engagement with financial experts.
The regional tour will take place across five strategic locations, bringing these solutions closer to business owners in Aba, Onitsha, Ibadan and Kano.
This approach reflects an important principle. When support moves closer to businesses and when solutions are delivered in ways that are practical and continuous, SMEs are better positioned to grow sustainably. In turn, this strengthens not only individual enterprises but the broader economy.
Olajumoke Bello is the Head of Enterprise Banking at Stanbic IBTC Bank
