Feature/OPED
Johannesburg Summit: A Critical Look at BRICS and Africa
By Professor Maurice Okoli
Undoubtedly the forthcoming 15th BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) summit on August 22 – 24 in Johannesburg, South Africa, opens the door for multiple critical issues mostly relating to the irreversible processes of the emerging new world. While it seriously presents an opportunity to take meticulous stock of its wins and losses, strengths and weaknesses, the summit has the imperative to examine the new paradigms, evaluate innovative directions and assess strategies for moving the organization further in this re-configuration world.
The BRIC concept was created by the Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neill and the “S” was added after South Africa joined the group in 2010. But the first meeting of the group began in St Petersburg in 2005. It was simply referred to as RIC, which stood for Russia, India and China. Then, Brazil and, subsequently, South Africa joined later, which is why it is now popularly called BRICS. As rotating chair, South Africa first held the summit in 2013 in Durban, the second in July 2018 and now the third in August 2023.
Durban hosted African leaders, heads of the G20, representatives of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Caribbean Community. Since then, BRICS Five and African States have greatly strengthened and expanded their cooperation in the economy, politics and the humanitarian sphere. BRICS considers Africa is one of the world’s most rapidly developing regions.
During the summit in South Africa, Russian President Vladimir Putin attended a meeting of BRICS leaders with delegation heads from invited African states and chairs of international associations. Those invited included leaders from Africa, namely Angola, Botswana, Ethiopia, Gabon, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
I would like to remind and further emphasize that BRICS and the African States have similar development goals in many respects. In 2015, the BRICS summit in Russia adopted the large-scale BRICS Strategy for Economic Partnership. In fact, during that gathering, Putin’s position was about involving African partners in the areas identified then: the economy, finance, and food security.
It was also based on the fact that Russia has always given priority to the development of relations with African countries based on long-standing traditions of friendship and mutual assistance. Notwithstanding the long list of pledges at the meeting in July 2018, a considerable part of the Russian initiatives was for localizing industrial businesses in Africa. Russia has consistently advocated for deepening the organization’s interaction with the African continent. It was at that meeting that Putin, for the first, mentioned the idea of holding a Russia-Africa summit with the participation of heads of African States.
Expanding BRICS Membership
With the forthcoming August 2023 summit, heated discussions and debates have been on the organization’s expansion, adoption of alternative currency and various proposals to redesign its architecture with new comprehensive objectives and tasks within the context of the current geopolitical changes. This growing enthusiasm and interest in the BRICS has various underlying motivations, which have to be accommodated within the broader framework. There is a strong common motive for forming an alliance in a multipolar world.
As several media reports show, in my own monitoring and research assessment, a large number of Asian, African and Latin American States are interested in forging a full-fledged structural membership and possible cooperation with the BRICS. More than 20 States have formally applied to join BRICS. The authentic criteria and mechanism for the expansion of the organization is being developed.
South Africa’s term as the rotating Chair of BRICS ends this August, as stipulated by the guidelines and rules, and will pass on the baton to Brazil. This implies that South African President Cyril Ramaphosa has a lot more at hand at this last-minute crucial moment. Tracking the developments of the organization, especially this 2023 presidency of South Africa, there have been so many controversial questions which are still currently receiving enormous attention, including South Africa’s relationship with Russia, BRICS common currency, as well as other global issues.
According to reports, BRICS is steadily or rather rapidly becoming an alternative organization for the Global South against the backdrop of the accusations of the United States and Europe, together with their allies’ political dominance, hegemony and unipolar or unitary approach towards global problems, and especially those adversely affecting the developing or the least developed nations. The emphasis is on geopolitical and development cooperation with non-Western States appears to be sliding, and BRICS is now attracting friends. Those lined-up states are consolidating their growing desire to join BRICS.
Johannesburg summit, therefore, has the primary tasks now, developing along two aspects: by admitting new members and by strengthening cooperation of BRICS with potential new members. The possibility of expanding membership (for purposes of determining the principles, standards, criteria and procedures of this process) in the organization is still under discussion within the BRICS framework.
China and Russia have seemingly been pushing for the expansion of BRICS, soliciting support for the multipolar system of global governance instead of the existing rules-based unipolar directed by the United States. Often explained that a bigger BRICS primarily offers huge opportunities among the group members and for developing countries.
On the other side, BRICS researchers and analysts argue and believe that additional States will not be admitted to BRICS, but each organization’s partner has the chance and will be able to choose a convenient mode of cooperation within the BRICS+ new structure. The argument holds the fact regarding re-titling BRICS. Therefore, it is highly likely to be the case, but this requires a consensus of all the members of BRICS.
More countries have become interested in joining the group: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sudan, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zimbabwe. This growing interest in the BRICS project has various underlying motivations, which have to be accommodated within the broader framework.
In advancing the discussion here, interesting to remind here that during the 14th BRICS summit successfully held in June 2022, President Xi Jinping emphasized at the meeting that BRICS countries gather not in a closed club or an exclusive circle but a big family of mutual support and a partnership for win-win cooperation. At the same summit, BRICS leaders reached an important common understanding about BRICS expansion and expressed support for discussion on the standards and procedures of the expansion.
Africa’s Alliance with BRICS
South Africa, the first African State, joined the group on the initiative of China and Russia. Its membership has reflected and altered the organization’s name, now known as BRICS. It has, since then, played significant roles in hosting summits, influencing the organization’s activities, and creating historical milestones in this 21st-century world. South Africa can warmly be credited, first for its membership presence and second for laying the pathways for strategic expansion plans to include the African States. At least, South Africa has brought a tectonic shift in landscape, a transformative aspect when African States participated in BRICS plus Outreach in July 2018.
Russian President Vladimir Putin attended a meeting of BRICS leaders with delegations from invited African states and chairs of international associations in July 2018. And BRICS documents show the participating leaders of African States as Angola, Botswana, Ethiopia, Gabon, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
In practical terms, BRICS has recognized and welcomed Africans into its fold long ago. “I am grateful to the President of the Republic of South Africa for organizing this representative meeting. In 2013 in Durban, BRICS leaders held a meeting with the heads of African states for the first time. We know that Africa is one of the world’s most rapidly developing regions, so its representation is important for BRICS,” Putin said in his introductory speech. In awakening reality, African States are still seeking greater representation and louder instrumental voices on international platforms, including the Group of Twenty (G20) and the United Nations.
BRICS, together with the majority of the African States, the African Union, and all the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), are getting involved to halt the system of unipolarity. Without a doubt, Africa has a common vision and unflinching interest that BRICS plays an essential role on the global multilateral stage. This Global South political movement consistently presents a fundamental coherent challenge to the West.
Dilma Rousseff at Russia-Africa Summit
At the Russia-Africa summit held late July 2023, during the high-profile line-up of speakers during the plenary session, former President of Brazil from 2011 to 2016 and now the new President of the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB), Dilma Rousseff, reaffirmed BRICS position towards building a more multilateral and multipolar world.
The BRICS New Development Bank, now also includes Egypt, Bangladesh and the UAE, supports the development initiatives of developing nations on all continents just as other regional development banks do. These nations can count on agreements on using national currencies in trade transactions, according to Rousseff, the first female to hold the position.
The New Development Bank was established just eight years ago, in 2014, at the BRICS summit in Fortaleza. This bank is often called the BRICS bank because it was established by the will of the five BRICS members, but it has already outgrown this framework and is not limited to just these members. It works towards ensuring sustainable development and eliminating the threat of poverty and famine and in the spirit of true multilateralism. The bank is working to share experiences and best practices of sustainable development.
Rousseff, however, stressed the fact that in loaning its funds, the bank is not dependent on external factors. The bank provides a platform for the development of the Global South. In this sense, the developing nations of all continents, especially Africa, Latin America and Asia, are its strategic partners.
She believes participants should not be affected by problems that may arise in Western markets, and for this reason, it is developing its own transaction systems. The NDB receives money in different markets and in the currencies of all developing nations, not only in dollars or euros. The NDB has already approved 98 projects in member states, amounting in total to about US$35 billion. It cooperates with the African Export-Import Bank and other banks engaged in economic and social development. It implements infrastructure and logistics projects aimed at improving living standards in the BRICS members.
We perfectly understand that the proposed expansion has admirable and beneficial geopolitical importance. Worth noting here that African States are readjusting their place in the multipolar world, moving to new emerging multinational centres such as BRICS. For many from Africa, it is an opportunity for something much newer within the spectrum of their internal development paradigm. Therefore, it has become increasingly attractive as a new stage for diplomacy and development financing.
In fact, reviewing and analysing the current emerging developments, especially for the Global South, Africans are now describing it as an organization that can challenge the dominant United States and European-led global governance structures. And of course, there are also several arguments that China and India are equally emerging powers. There are visible signs that both consider Africa as their new playground, and will probably compete with each other to ‘impress’ Africa with goodies like aid, soft loans or trade.
The NDB and BRICS Common Currency
Records indicate that BRICS are under-represented in the global financial architecture. Europe and the United States dominate institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Fully aware of this shortfall, BRICS established in 2015 its own National Development Bank. The idea for setting up the bank was first proposed by India at the 4th BRICS summit in 2012 held in Delhi, but was finally created three years later. It is a multilateral development bank established with an initial capital of US$100 billion. According to its stipulated primary functions, NDB has to cooperate with international organizations and other financial entities and provide technical assistance for projects to be supported by the Bank.
With the current global unstable and volatile situation creating skyrocketing uncertainties in global economic recovery, China has unreservedly shown its contribution to strengthening BRICS. Despite its large population of 1.5 billion, which many have considered as an impediment, China pursues admirable collaborative strategic diplomacy with external countries and among the BRICS.
For 16 years since its inception, China has offered the largest financial support for the BRICS National Development Bank and contributed tremendously to other directions, including health, education and economic collaboration among the group. That is one reason why BRICS has gained extensive recognition.
More and more countries are willing and interested to become members of the organization, make joint efforts to overcome difficulties and challenges and realize common development and prosperity. BRICS activities have expanded during the past few years. Now many States participated in the Outreach and BRICS plus segments of the organization. But now, with the emerging new global order, BRICS seeks to expand its membership and consolidate its platform as an instrument for pushing against the existing rules-based order unipolar system.
A careful study and analysis monitored show that BRICS activities have expanded during the past few years. States participated in the Outreach and BRICS plus segments of the organization. There are also a number of African countries, including Algeria, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Senegal and Zimbabwe that have also shown interest. Uruguay is part way through the process of joining, while Argentina, Cuba, Honduras and Saudi Arabia and a number of Asian States have expressed desire. Bangladesh, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt have joined since 2021, bringing its membership to eight. Egypt has already been involved for a fairly long time. Last December 2022, Egypt, the decision on its accession to the New Development Bank was made by BRICS.
According to media reports, Ennahar TV quoted Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune as saying that Algeria has applied to join the BRICS group and submitted a request to become a shareholder member of the BRICS Bank with an amount of US$1.5 billion.
In July, Tebboune visited China and sought to join the BRICS to open new economic opportunities. Algeria is rich in oil and gas resources and seeking to diversify its economy and strengthen its partnership with members such as China. Already China plans to invest US$36 billion in Algeria across sectors including manufacturing, new technology, the knowledge economy, transport and agriculture.
Charles Robertson, Chief Economist at Renaissance Capital, argues that “Russia and others in the BRICS would like to see larger power centres emerge to offer an alternative to that Western dominated construct. That is reasonable enough – providing there are countries with the money to backstop the new institutions, such as China supporting the BRICS bank, and if the countries offer an alternative vision that provides benefits to new members.”
In today’s changing conditions, BRICS has been very concerned about de-dollarization and strongly advocating for its own currency. Thus in the discussion on 26 July 2023 in St. Petersburg, Putin stressed doubtlessly that Rousseff used her rich experience in public work and knowledge in this area to develop the institution. In today’s conditions, this is not easy to do, given what is happening in world finance and the use of the dollar as an instrument of political struggle. But the members of BRICS are not ‘friends’ against someone; they work in each other’s interests. This applies to the financial sector.
“In general, we are good participants in this organization; we fulfil everything on time, all our obligations to it. We know that there is a question about the liquidity of the bank, there are some ideas that come from you, from your staff, and we will support this,” Putin said at the meeting with her. “Relations between BRICS members are developing in national currencies, and settlements are increasing. In this regard, the bank can also play a significant role in the development of joint activities.”
Putin’s Perceptions of BRICS and Africa
In late July 2023, when the second Russia-Africa summit was held, Russian President Vladimir Putin underlined Africa’s new role and remnants of colonialism in the continent. Putin explicitly explained that Africa is turning into “a new centre of power,” and everybody will have to reckon with it. “The era of the hegemony of one or several countries is receding into the past” – “however, not without resistance on the part of those who got used to their own uniqueness and monopoly in global affairs.”
Without missing words, Putin unreservedly shared his objective thoughts, and Africans know these trends across the continent over the years. The situation in many regions of Africa still remains unstable, particularly due to the West’s ‘divide and rule’ policy. This is why Russia, with consistency, favours or advocates for expanding the role of African representation, for instance, in the UN, including the Security Council: “It is high time to remedy historical injustice.”
Taking a clear position on issues that affect the entire continent will be more productive. Moreso, with the process of geopolitics rapidly shifting, African leaders have to assess their external relationships in the context of their national and cultural sovereignty to play a more active role in resolving regional and global challenges.
At this point of the analysis, it is also very necessary to take a glance look at BRICS members’ performance with Africa. Over the last two decades, partnerships with Africa have become central to China’s geostrategic objectives. It has made significant investments to secure favourable media coverage to promote a positive view of China and to counter the influence of the United States.
As a strong member of BRICS, it has used the media to improve African perceptions. India and Brazil are doing something similar but on a comparatively lower scale. Smart African States, in an attempt to reset relations with global powers, are equally capitalizing on these new opportunities to improve aspects of development for the impoverished population. Whatever the case, the potentials exist for African leaders to explore. BRICS in this emerging world has diverse opportunities for industrial, economic, agricultural, commercial and financial development.
Johannesburg as Summit Venue
The 15th summit will also discuss the expansion of the bank, which has admitted the United Arab Emirates, Bangladesh and Egypt as members. Nevertheless, most of NDB related questions are on the agenda during the 15th BRICS summit scheduled for August 22 – 24 at the Sandton Convention Centre in Johannesburg, South Africa.
That BRICS has the potential of becoming a global player is a fact since more intend to join the group, and if we look carefully, each of them has significant assets to contribute: some have huge financial potential, others have huge demographic potential, others have expertise in particular industries. BRICS is simply consolidating its position to control economic development on a global scale and to vehemently oppose Western values and U.S. hegemony.
For China, this summit is a new opportunity to present its current projects, as well as its new initiatives, such as GDI (Global Development Initiative), GSI (Global Security Initiative), GCI (Global Civilisation Initiative). The already ten-year old Belt-and-Road Initiative (BRI) currently covers 147 countries with more than 3,000 projects worth trillions of dollars.
Ahead of the summit, South Africa’s Anil Sooklal said in a lecture at the University of KwaZulu-Natal that so far, representatives from more than 70 nations have been invited to attend, necessary security arrangements have been made, and other pre-visit formalities have been completed. And that Russia’s Vladimir Putin will participate via video (virtual) format. “This will be the largest gathering with foreign nations from the Global South coming together to discuss the current global challenges,” Sooklal said.
South Africa’s Foreign Ministry confirmed that Russia would be represented at this month’s BRICS summit by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov after President Vladimir Putin decided not to attend in person due to a warrant for his arrest issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for alleged war crimes in Ukraine. Kremlin also said an official decision reached “by mutual agreement” allows Putin to skip in-person participation.
South African President Cyril Ramaphosa has repeatedly said that BRICS as a dynamic group would usher in a new global development era that promises a system of more inclusive, sustainable and fair principles. BRICS group, in an expanded form, can support a sustainable and equitable global economic recovery.
Ramaphosa further believes that the BRICS is simply a highly-valuable platform fixed to strengthen ties with partner States in support of economic growth, development process for discussing global economic problems and challenges, and above all, for strengthening the role of developing States in the emerging multipolar world.
Formed officially in 2009-2010, the organization has struggled to have the kind of geopolitical influence that matches its collective economic reach. It also embodies a synergy of cultures and explores a model of genuine multilateral diplomacy. Its structure is formed in compliance with 21st-century realities. Efforts within its framework are based on the principles of equality, mutual respect and justice. BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) collectively represent about 26% of the world’s geographical area and about 42% of the world’s population.
Professor Maurice Okoli is a fellow at the Institute for African Studies and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences. He is also a fellow at the North-Eastern Federal University of Russia. He is an expert at the Roscongress Foundation and the Valdai Discussion Club.
As an academic researcher and economist with a keen interest in current geopolitical changes and the emerging world order, Maurice Okoli frequently contributes articles for publication in reputable media portals on different aspects of the interconnection between developing and developed countries, particularly in Asia, Africa and Europe. With comments and suggestions, he can be reached via email ma***********@***il.com
By Blaise Udunze
Daily, the world watches Nigeria through a familiar lens in what appears to be a gory situation. Especially in cases when the news headlines tell stories of farmer-herder clashes, bandit attacks, kidnappings, villages reduced to ashes or deserted by the dwellers, as thousands of Nigerians have been displaced across states such as Zamfara, Plateau, Benue, Niger, Kaduna and Nasarawa. Subliminally, this is about to become a similarly ugly occurrence in southwestern Nigeria, which is fast becoming obvious if not nipped in the bud quickly.
Recorded data have shown that bandits, Boko Haram, and others killed over 190,000 Nigerians in 17 years and displaced 3.7 million people.
A human rights organisation, the International Society for Civil Liberties and Rule of Law (Intersociety), in its fearful revelation, has said that no fewer than 190,150 Nigerians have been killed by bandits, Boko Haram insurgents, and suspected armed herdsmen between July 2009 and March 19, 2026, as this calls for concern.
The dominant explanations often point to ethnic tensions, religious divisions, climate change, shrinking grazing routes or weak security institutions. No doubt, those factors are certainly part of Nigeria’s complex security crisis. Yet another question deserves serious examination.
What if, in some locations, the violence is also serving another purpose? What if some of the territories experiencing repeated displacement are the same places sitting atop some of Nigeria’s most valuable mineral deposits? More importantly, if such a pattern exists, who benefits when communities disappear?
Of a truth, these questions are uncomfortable, but undeniably they deserve careful investigation rather than dismissal.
For ages, Nigeria has been naturally endowed, and it is estimated to be rich in enormous significant reserves of gold, lithium, uranium, tin, columbite and other strategic minerals increasingly sought after in the global transition to clean energy technologies. As international demand for battery minerals continues to rise, these resources have become far more valuable than they were only a decade ago.
If one overlays publicly available geological information with maps showing persistent violence, some observers argue that striking geographical overlaps appear in several regions. Such overlaps alone cannot establish causation. Correlation is not proof of conspiracy. However, they raise questions worthy of independent scrutiny.
One issue attracting increasing attention and adequately yearns for answer is whether prolonged insecurity may inadvertently or deliberately create conditions that make mineral extraction easier.
Under Nigeria’s Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act 2007, mineral resources belong to the Federal Government, while mining rights are granted through licences and leases. Community engagement and land access are expected to form part of the licensing process, although implementation varies depending on circumstances. This raises an important policy question.
What happens when the communities expected to participate in those processes have already fled because of violence?
Displacement changes the dynamics of land ownership, consent and access. While no evidence automatically proves that attacks are orchestrated to facilitate mining, the sequence of violence followed by renewed commercial activity in some locations deserves closer examination by regulators, lawmakers and investigative journalists.
In conflict studies, researchers have long observed that wars often generate economic winners alongside humanitarian losers. Could elements of Nigeria’s insecurity also be producing economic beneficiaries?
Reports over the years have documented concerns about illegal mining operations across parts of northern Nigeria. Government agencies themselves have repeatedly acknowledged that criminal networks profit from the country’s vast mineral wealth. The unresolved question is whether isolated criminality has, in some instances, evolved into more sophisticated alliances involving political influence, financial interests and international supply chains. If so, the implications extend far beyond Nigeria.
Invariably, it is clearly known that lithium has become one of the world’s most strategic commodities, powering electric vehicle batteries and renewable energy storage systems. Gold has always remained one of the safest global investment assets during periods of uncertainty. Meanwhile, it is well confirmed that the global appetite for these minerals creates enormous financial incentives.
Suppose violent displacement reduces resistance to extraction. Suppose shell companies subsequently acquire mining interests. Suppose minerals then leave Nigeria through legitimate-looking export documentation while their true value remains understated.
These scenarios remain allegations unless supported by verifiable evidence. Yet they outline a framework that investigators may wish to test rather than ignore. Financial crime experts frequently identify trade mis-invoicing as one of the most common methods of illicit financial flows worldwide.
Could Nigeria’s solid minerals sector be vulnerable to similar practices? If valuable lithium ore is deliberately but inaccurately described as lower-value material on export documents, substantial wealth could potentially leave the country without reflecting its true market value. Likewise, if unrefined gold exits through privileged channels with limited scrutiny, questions naturally arise about oversight, transparency and accountability over criminal activities which have continued to stunt and disrupt the country’s socio-economic growth and at the same time cause carnage.
Such possibilities are not accusations against any particular institution or company. Rather, they illustrate why stronger monitoring systems are increasingly essential. Another question concerns logistics.
With the high level of criminal activities, industrial mining requires heavy machinery, diesel supplies, transportation networks and specialised personnel. These are not operations that can remain invisible indefinitely.
If certain territories are genuinely too dangerous for security agencies, how do industrial-scale extraction activities reportedly continue in some remote locations? If they do, who protects those operations? Who authorises their movement? Who verifies what is extracted? Who ensures royalties and export revenues reach public coffers? These are governance questions that demand institutional answers.
Equally important is the international dimension. Minerals extracted in Nigeria ultimately enter global supply chains. Gold may pass through international refining hubs before entering financial markets. Lithium may become part of battery manufacturing destined for electric vehicles, which are being sold across Europe, North America and Asia.
One known fact is that consumers purchasing products containing these minerals rarely know the full story of where they originated.
Increasingly, however, investors and governments are demanding ethical sourcing standards that trace minerals from extraction to final manufacture.
A critical factor that must be taken into cognisance is that if insecurity is creating opportunities for illegal or unethical extraction anywhere in the world, multinational companies have responsibilities alongside national governments, of which the onus falls on the Nigerian government.
Transparency cannot stop at the mine gate. Nor should accountability end at national borders. Another issue requiring attention concerns beneficial ownership.
Across many jurisdictions, shell companies can obscure the identities of individuals ultimately controlling commercial assets. If politically exposed persons or powerful business interests are hidden behind complex corporate structures registered offshore, identifying beneficiaries becomes significantly more difficult. This challenge is hardly unique to Nigeria.
Findings showed that from Latin America to Central Africa and Southeast Asia, resistant corporate networks have frequently complicated efforts to combat corruption and illicit resource extraction. That is precisely why open corporate registries, beneficial ownership databases and transparent mining licence disclosures are becoming global governance priorities. For Nigeria, the stakes could hardly be higher.
The country stands at the centre of the world’s emerging critical minerals economy. The Nigerian government can’t feign ignorance of the fact that, when handled transparently, these resources could finance infrastructure, education, healthcare, and industrial development for generations.
In no way would the government claim not knowing that when handled poorly, they risk becoming another chapter in the well-documented “resource curse,” where extraordinary natural wealth coincides with persistent poverty, insecurity and institutional weakness.
The ultimate challenge, therefore, is not simply about mining. It is about governance. It is about whether public institutions possess both the independence and capacity to ensure that natural resources benefit citizens rather than narrow interests. It is about whether conflict zones receive genuine peacebuilding efforts instead of becoming forgotten frontiers. And it is about whether international markets demand accountability with the same enthusiasm they demand raw materials.
None of these questions should be answered through speculation. They require rigorous investigations, forensic financial analysis, satellite imagery, mining license audits, customs records, beneficial ownership disclosures and courageous journalism.
They require governments willing to open their books. They require international cooperation capable of tracing money across borders. Most importantly, they require asking questions that have too often remained unasked.
Perhaps Nigeria’s security crisis is exactly what it appears to be: a tragic convergence of historical grievances, weak institutions, criminality and environmental pressures. Or perhaps, in some places, another layer of economic incentive deserves closer scrutiny.
Until those questions are thoroughly investigated, one possibility will continue to linger. Maybe the world’s attention has been fixed on the blood spilt above ground, while too little attention has been paid to the extraordinary wealth lying beneath it.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: bl***********@***il.com
Feature/OPED
What Does Nigeria’s $51bn Reserves Milestone Mean if Most New Foreign Money Can Leave Quickly?
Nigeria’s foreign reserves have climbed to about $51 billion, a decade-plus high, according to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). EBC Financial Group (EBC) notes that this reflects stronger investor confidence, but the second half may show whether it holds, as the build rests on three cyclical drivers: oil earnings, short-term foreign money and a narrowing official-to-street naira gap.
Reserves rose from about $32 billion in April 2024, during a dollar shortage, to about $51 billion now, near the CBN’s target. Much came from two cyclical sources, strong oil earnings and money chasing high-yielding naira assets, so EBC expects the pace to slow or reverse. Fitch Ratings, a major international credit rating agency, expects a marginal decline to about $47 billion by the end of 2026, citing higher spending and external pressures.
David Precious, Senior Market Analyst at EBC Financial Group, said, “Nigeria’s reserve build is real but may not be durable yet, because nearly all of the new money is the kind that can leave quickly. Of the $10.37 billion that came in over the first quarter, the overwhelming majority was short-term portfolio funds rather than long-term investment, so a shift in oil prices, global interest rates or confidence in the naira might pull a large part of it straight back out.”
Most New Money Can Still Leave Quickly
The composition of the foreign inflows explains the caution over how long the build can last. The country attracted $10.37 billion in foreign investment in the first quarter of 2026, up 83.83 per cent year-on-year, according to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Of that, $9.86 billion or 95.09 per cent, was portfolio money, largely short-term naira debt such as Treasury bills that investors can sell at the next auction, while foreign direct investment, the long-term kind that builds factories and jobs, was $135.08 million, or 1.30 per cent. Put simply, of each dollar coming in, about 95 cents can leave quickly, and barely one cent stays.
That money supports reserves while it stays. Dollars brought in to buy naira assets add to market supply, letting the CBN hold more reserves and steady the naira. It leaves when conditions change. Nigeria earns most of its export dollars from oil and gas, so lower oil prices mean fewer dollars, and as a member of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), it cannot simply produce more, output capped by quota and reduced by theft and ageing fields. Higher global interest rates draw money toward safer returns abroad, and a weakening naira prompts investors to sell early. When oil fell in 2016 and 2020, foreign investors withdrew and could not convert naira to dollars as supply dried up, leaving the CBN to clear more than $7 billion in trapped obligations into 2024.
The Oil Boost is No Longer Certain
Oil looked like a dependable source of the dollars behind the reserves only months ago. Earlier in 2026, concern over disruption around the Strait of Hormuz lifted crude prices, and stronger receipts flowed in, with crude oil export earnings of $8.11 billion in the first quarter in the CBN’s balance-of-payments data. That support is now easing. The tension has subsided, and Brent traded near $72 on June 29, down about 24 per cent over the month, back to pre-conflict levels. With the price boost gone and output constrained, reserves are more exposed, leaning on non-oil earnings and investor patience rather than oil.
The Naira Still Trades at Two Prices
The naira has traded at two prices, an official rate and a higher parallel-market rate, and closing that gap into one trusted price is what many investors might watch most. Before committing funds, they may want assurance they can convert naira to dollars at a fair rate when they exit, and a wide gap revives the fear of being trapped that lingers from earlier shortages. The gap has narrowed to roughly N20 to N30, with the CBN’s official rate near N1,380 per dollar on June 26 against parallel-market quotes around N1,400. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2026 Article IV review urged Nigeria to depend less on this fast-moving portfolio money and to keep phasing out its multiple exchange-rate practices. The CBN’s Foreign Exchange Manual, in force from 1 June, is intended to make the market clearer, though such rules build confidence only once investors can freely trade dollars at the posted rate.
What could Make the Build Durable
A few signs that may show the build turning durable include a smaller gap between the official and street naira rates, more long-term foreign investment, and steadier oil earnings. A gap that stays small, now roughly N20 to N30, may mean investors trust the official rate and no longer need the street market. A clear rise in foreign direct investment, only $135 million last quarter against $9.86 billion of short-term money, might mean lasting capital is replacing funds that can leave at the next auction. Oil earnings that hold up, rather than sliding from the low $70s, should help keep reserves steady, since oil and gas bring in most of Nigeria’s export dollars.
“Reserves built on money chasing high yields can fall as fast as they rose, as they did after the last two oil shocks, when investors left, and the CBN spent years clearing a foreign-exchange backlog,” Precious added. “What holds through a downturn is slower money, direct investment, steady oil and non-oil export earnings and one credible naira rate, and that is the shift Nigeria has yet to make.”
By Olajumoke Bello
Across Nigeria, small and medium enterprises remain the backbone of economic activity. They drive trade, create jobs, and sustain millions of livelihoods. Yet, despite their importance, many SMEs continue to operate below their full potential due to persistent structural challenges.
Access to finance remains one of the most cited constraints. However, the issue today goes beyond the availability of capital. Many businesses struggle with financial readiness, weak documentation, and limited understanding of what lenders require. This often leads to missed opportunities, even when funding options exist.
At the same time, SMEs face gaps in market access and visibility. Business owners operate in highly localised environments, with limited exposure to broader networks that can unlock partnerships, new markets, and growth opportunities. This isolation can constrain scalability and reduce long-term competitiveness.
Equally important is the capability gap. Many entrepreneurs grow through resilience and experience but lack structured knowledge on critical areas such as financial management, export readiness, and digital adoption. Without this, even well-capitalised businesses can struggle to sustain growth.
These challenges point to a clear need for a more practical and integrated approach to SME support. It is no longer sufficient to offer standalone solutions. SMEs require ecosystems that combine knowledge, access, and direct engagement in ways that reflect how they actually operate.
A key shift is the move from centralised interventions to localised engagement. SMEs are deeply influenced by their immediate environments, whether markets, industrial clusters, or trade corridors. Solutions must therefore be brought closer to where these businesses function, allowing for more relevant support and stronger relationships.
Another important shift is from awareness to action. Business owners do not only need information; they need insights that they can apply immediately. This includes understanding how to structure their finances, how to access trade opportunities, and how to connect with the right partners to scale their operations.
There is also a growing need for continuity. Many SME-focused initiatives deliver strong initial impact but lack follow-through. For support to be effective, it must extend beyond one-off engagements into sustained relationships, with clear pathways for onboarding, advisory, and growth.
For financial institutions, this presents both responsibility and an opportunity. Supporting SMEs now requires moving beyond transactional banking to deeper partnership models. It requires understanding businesses at a granular level and co-creating solutions that evolve with their needs.
At Stanbic IBTC, this perspective continues to shape our approach to SME development. Our focus is on delivering practical support that translates into real business outcomes, helping enterprises grow, compete, and contribute more meaningfully to the economy.
As part of this commitment, we are extending our SME engagement to the regions through the Nigeria Business Summit Regional Tour. The tour will take structured, on-ground activations into key commercial hubs, where SMEs can access funding guidance, trade insights, advisory support, and direct engagement with financial experts.
The regional tour will take place across five strategic locations, bringing these solutions closer to business owners in Aba, Onitsha, Ibadan and Kano.
This approach reflects an important principle. When support moves closer to businesses and when solutions are delivered in ways that are practical and continuous, SMEs are better positioned to grow sustainably. In turn, this strengthens not only individual enterprises but the broader economy.
Olajumoke Bello is the Head of Enterprise Banking at Stanbic IBTC Bank
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