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Tasks Before the Re-elected APC National Chairman

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apc national chairman Nentawe Yilwatda

By Edwin Uhara

There is no doubt that the national convention of our great party, the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC), has come and gone, with the former Minister of Humanitarian Affairs and Poverty Alleviation, Professor Nentawe Yilwatda, retained as the National Chairman of the party.

I congratulate him and the new members of the National Working Committee (NWC) of the party, even as I encourage them to brace up for the challenging tasks ahead.

However, I must point out that the new NWC members are not going to enjoy any honeymoon because the time frame for the conduct of party primaries is too short, and as a result, the leadership must roll up its sleeves and hit the ground running because there is no time for a walk in the park at the moment.

In this regard, the party must adopt both proactive and reactive strategies in handling the post-primary election crisis, which will most likely erupt.

I’m not a pessimist, but the new party leadership must anticipate a crisis emanating from some states over conflicts of interest and make arrangements on how to strike a balance between the interests of longstanding members and the interests of new members who now enjoy the attention of the party.

This is where the proactive strategy will work perfectly for the overall interest of the party.

The second strategy is that the leadership must embark on genuine reconciliation immediately after the primary elections are over in order to establish a modus vivendi within the party structure across states.

If this second aspect is not properly handled, anything can happen because politicians always go to where their nest would be feathered.

The Presidential Primary would not be an issue because the President would be given the automatic ticket of the party.

Next time, when our party delegates will be coming back to Abuja, it will be to ratify the automatic ticket that would be given to Mr President.

So, at the presidential level, the leadership will have a field day because there would not be much trouble in this regard, but it will most definitely not be like that at the state level.

This is where the challenge lies, and it requires high-level negotiation abilities and conflict resolution skills to overcome it.

Such a challenge did not arise in Anambra, Ondo and other states that recently witnessed gubernatorial primaries because it’s a staggered primary with minimal interest.

This area is one of the most neglected aspects that led to the downfall of the former ruling party — the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) in the 2015 Presidential Election.

A lot of analysts focused on the immediate cause of PDP failure, but refused to look at the remote cause, which I want to highlight in this piece because I was part of the process.

Towards the end of 2014, the PDP conducted the worst party primary, which it carried over to the 2015 general election year.

Initially, the party encouraged interested members to buy the nomination and expression of interest forms at very high prices and promised that it would give every member a level playing ground.

But during the primaries, the party went against its own rules, and the leadership carried on as if nothing had happened.

Because these aggrieved party members commanded huge followership among the electorates, they decided to protest under the auspices of the PDP Aspirants Forum (PAF), of which I was one of its national spokespersons.

PAF wanted to engage the party leadership to amicably find a lasting solution to the crisis, but some hardliners within the party hierarchy, who thought that the election would be business as usual, frustrated every one of our moves until we decided to go public.

Because our members refused to participate in partisan activities, their non-participation started showing bad and dangerous signals for all the candidates, including President Goodluck Jonathan.

First, public opinion began to go against the candidates. Second, the electorates began to pelt the President with pebbles and sachet waters.

Third, blame and counterblame started creeping into the campaign train.

While all these were happening, General Buhari, who was the candidate of the APC, soared high as he became the main beneficiary of the internal party wrangling.

The Presidency and the PDP refused to recognise the political reality in the country and also underestimated their main challenger, General Muhammadu Buhari and his party, without knowing that the APC had covertly engaged the services of AKPD, which was the political consultancy firm owned by David Axelrod, President Obama’s Chief Campaign Strategist for the 2008 and 2012 United States Presidential Elections.

Because Mr Axelrod had the ear of President Obama, he was able to turn the heart of Mr Obama against President Jonathan.

Accordingly, Obama mobilised David Cameron, who was then the UK Prime Minister and other allies to work against Jonathan’s re-election.

When the Presidency saw the danger ahead, they decided to reach out to PAF by sending the Deputy Director-General of the Jonathan/Sambo Presidential Campaign Organisation, Professor Tunde Adeniran and the traditional ruler of Jonathan’s community in Ogbia, King Asara A. Asara, to the group.

Professor Adeniran urged PAF members not to allow what some persons had done to cause them to leave the party or work against it during polls, noting that there were some party members on the campaign train who did not want President Jonathan reelected.

While speaking on behalf of the President, the Traditional Ruler of Akipelai Community in Ogbia Local Government Area of Bayelsa State, Chief Asara A. Asara, appealed to PAF members not to leave the party saying, “President Jonathan was deeply worried over the way and manner the last primaries were conducted, but, because the automatic ticket granted him by the party was yet to be ratified as at the time the various primaries were conducted, he was very helpless in intervening in the matter. He assured them that the President would soon meet with them.

On March 2, 2015, President Jonathan finally invited PAF members to the Presidential Villa, but most of our members refused to attend.

Some members who honoured the invitation observed that everyone was already in panic mode.

This was when the Director -General of the PDP Presidential Campaign Council, Senator Amodu Ali, told us that the battle was not against Buhari but against the American Government.

Trying to justify his claim, Senator Ali said that Mr Obama was angry with President Jonathan because he refused to allow same sex marriage to be made official in Nigeria, but this narrative fell on deaf ears because the PDP had already lost the sympathy of many Nigerians.

For example, instead of running their campaigns on issues, the party decided to focus on Buhari, making him the campaign issue.

So, after the popular Abuja peace accord, President Obama started sending his then Secretary of State, Senator John Kerry, to Nigeria often and often signalling danger over any plot to rig the election.

After much filibustering, PAF dissected everything within the context of truth and observed that even if we decided to support the PDP, public opinion had already gone against the party.

For example, Hon. Ndudi Elumelu, who was one of the governorship aspirants for Delta State, said that elections had not yet been conducted, but some of the beneficiaries of the kangaroo primaries had started carrying themselves as if they had won the election already.

Other members like the Governorship Aspirant for Lagos State, Chief Babatunde Badamasi, Rivers State, Hon. Gabriel Pidomson, Benue State, Mrs Rosaline Ada Chenge, Imo State, late Chief Bethel Amadi, the Senatorial Aspirant for Edo North, Chief Richard Lamai, Adamawa, Mallam Isa Tambaran, Anambra, Barrister Chike Madueke, House of Representatives Aspirants like Hon. Pat Asadu, Lady Irene Ottih, Chief Mrs Olivia Agbajo and over 150 Aspirants for various State House of Assemblies spoke in a similar direction.

It was at this point that Buhari saw the opportunity and sent a high-powered delegation to the PAF members. Though he has been sending Senator Dino Melaye, who was one of his campaign spokespersons to the group.

So, while some defected to APC, including myself to support Buhari, others remained in PDP but to work against it during polls, which in the end, Buhari gave PDP a very hard blow with a crushing defeat.

Ever since then, the PDP has never recovered from the Buhari blow and from the look of things, they will have no option but to adopt our President as their presidential candidate for next year’s election.

So, with the benefits of hindsight, insight and foresight, I write this piece to arrest things before they go out of hand.

Once again, congratulations to our Chairman and members of the National Working Committee of the party.

Comrade Edwin Uhara is a Political Operative, Public Policy Analyst and former Member of the APC Presidential Campaign Council. He can be reached via email: [email protected]

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Moving the Stablecoin Conversation From Hype to Utility in Africa’s Next Payments Evolution

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Rajat Mishra Onafriq

By Rajat Mishra

For much of the past decade, discussions around stablecoins have been dominated by cryptocurrency speculation. Increasingly, however, stablecoins are emerging as practical financial infrastructure for moving money across borders, managing liquidity and improving payment efficiency.

The real opportunity lies not in choosing between traditional finance and digital assets, but in building an integrated financial ecosystem where both work together to improve efficiency, broaden financial access and deepen economic connectivity across the continent.

Despite significant advances in financial inclusion and digital payments, moving money across African borders remains far more difficult than it should be. Businesses continue to face challenges when making cross-border payments. Fragmented payment networks, multiple intermediaries, and lengthy settlement processes increase costs and create operational inefficiencies.

Remittance providers, the specialised financial services that millions rely on to send money home, face many of the same structural challenges. These providers play a critical role across the continent. In fact, 19 of Africa’s 54 countries receive remittance inflows equivalent to at least 4% of their GDP. Yet Africa remains the world’s most expensive region to send money to.

These challenges are not a reflection of remittance providers themselves, but of the fragmented banking and settlement infrastructure underpinning international money movement. Financial institutions must often manage liquidity across multiple disconnected currency markets while relying on complex correspondent banking networks and clearing systems. The result is higher costs, slower settlements, and capital that remains unnecessarily locked up.

One of the most immediate opportunities for stablecoins lies in improving cross-border settlement. Consider a Kenyan business importing goods from South Africa. Under traditional settlement models, payments often pass through multiple correspondent banking relationships, involve several foreign exchange conversions, and can take days before funds reach the intended recipient.

Stablecoin-enabled settlement rails have the potential to reduce much of this friction by enabling value to move more efficiently between financial institutions across markets. The result can be shorter settlement times, greater transparency and improved predictability for businesses operating across borders.

The benefits extend well beyond businesses. For millions of Africans working abroad, remittances remain a financial lifeline, helping families pay school fees, healthcare costs and daily living expenses. Yet sending money home often involves navigating a complex chain of money transfer operators, correspondent banks, and local payout partners, with each additional layer introducing costs and delays.

Stablecoins can help streamline the backend movement of funds between institutional participants, reducing settlement costs and improving efficiency across the value chain.

For end users, the advantage is simplicity. Recipients do not need to interact with, or even understand stablecoins directly. They continue to receive money through familiar, trusted channels, whether a local bank account or mobile money wallet, only faster and at a lower cost.

Beyond payments, stablecoins also address one of the less visible but most significant challenges in cross-border finance: liquidity management. Financial institutions operating across multiple markets must constantly ensure they have sufficient funds in the right currency, in the right jurisdiction and at the right time. Today, this often requires pre-funding accounts across multiple countries, a costly practice that traps large amounts of capital and limits financial flexibility.

Stablecoins introduce a new model for moving value across borders in near real time, enabling institutions to manage liquidity dynamically as demand arises. This can reduce the need for large pre-funded balances, improve treasury efficiency and free up capital that can be deployed more productively. Ultimately, these efficiencies can translate into faster settlements, lower costs, and better services for businesses and consumers alike.

However, the true value of stablecoins will not come from isolated blockchain networks operating independently of existing financial systems. Their long-term impact will depend on how effectively they integrate with banks, mobile money platforms, payment service providers and existing payment infrastructure. Interoperability will be critical to ensuring payment flows move seamlessly between systems, markets and currencies. The goal should be to strengthen and modernise today’s payment ecosystem, not replace it.

From experiment to infrastructure: what global moves are telling us

Some of the clearest signals that stablecoins are moving from experimentation to infrastructure are coming from card networks. Mastercard’s reported agreement to acquire BVNK, valued at up to $1.8 billion, points to a strategic investment in the settlement layer connecting stablecoin rails with traditional banking and reflects growing institutional confidence in stablecoin-enabled cross-border payments.

Visa’s expansion of stablecoin-backed cards through Stripe’s Bridge to more than 100 countries reflects a complementary strategy. Rather than acquiring infrastructure outright, Visa is leveraging its existing global network as the final distribution layer for stablecoin-funded payments.

The inclusion of African markets is particularly significant. It signals growing confidence that stablecoin-backed payment instruments can operate alongside, and in some cases complement, the mobile money ecosystems that already dominate wallet-based payments across much of the continent.

Taken together, these developments point to a broader shift. Card payment networks are moving from observing the stablecoin conversation to investing directly in the infrastructure that underpins it. For Africa, the implication is not that stablecoins will replace existing payment rails, but that success will increasingly belong to institutions capable of orchestrating multiple settlement rails – cards, bank transfers, mobile money and stablecoins- within a unified, interoperable ecosystem. Local market expertise, regulatory relationships and last-mile distribution will remain decisive competitive advantages.

Building for scale through trust and regulation

But despite their potential, stablecoins cannot operate outside the boundaries of regulated financial systems. Their long-term viability across Africa depends on clear regulatory frameworks, robust compliance standards and trusted infrastructure that supports transparency, risk management and consumer protection.

We are already seeing this evolution. In markets such as South Africa, institutions facilitating cross-border settlements must navigate increasingly sophisticated regulatory requirements, including approvals for certain offshore crypto-related activities. Globally, initiatives such as the OECD’s Crypto-Asset Reporting Framework (CARF) and expanded Travel Rule obligations are raising expectations around reporting, tax transparency and compliance.

These developments reinforce a simple reality: stablecoin infrastructure does not reduce compliance obligations. It raises the bar for governance, transparency and institutional risk management. The objective is not to bypass regulation, but to build interoperable payment systems that can innovate confidently within it.

From the edges to the plumbing

The stablecoin conversation is steadily moving beyond speculation and towards practical implementation. What once sat at the edges of the payments debate is becoming part of the plumbing of cross-border finance rather than a parallel system to it.

The question is no longer whether stablecoins have a role to play in payments. The question is where they deliver the greatest value. In Africa, that value is increasingly clear: faster settlement, improved liquidity efficiency and more connected cross-border commerce. The winners will not be those that replace existing financial systems, but those that successfully connect stablecoin rails with the banks, mobile money networks and payment providers that already power the continent’s economy.

For pan-African payment networks such as Onafriq, the priority is ensuring that emerging technologies complement the financial infrastructure businesses and consumers already trust, rather than introducing new layers of complexity.

The opportunity lies in connecting stablecoin settlement with banks, mobile money networks and payment providers, ensuring the benefits of this new infrastructure deliver tangible outcomes for African businesses and consumers.

Rajat Mishra is the CPO for Network Product & Deputy Group CPIO at Onafriq

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The Quiet Strength of Kaduna’s Fiscal Discipline and Public Finance

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Kaduna's Fiscal Discipline

By Sani Abdulrazak, PhD

The irony in governance is that the projects that capture public imagination are often the least difficult to appreciate. A newly commissioned road, a modern school, a renovated hospital or a flyover bridge speaks for itself. Fiscal discipline does not. Yet, behind every lasting development lies an often-overlooked virtue: the prudent management of public resources. Governments are judged ultimately not by the abundance of their income but by the wisdom of their choices in spending that income. Though prosperity is desirable as we all know, we have to admit that stewardship is equally indispensable. When public finance is guided by discipline rather than expediency, governments create not only projects but also the confidence that today’s development will not become tomorrow’s burden.

It is against this backdrop that Kaduna State’s fiscal journey deserves careful reflection.

Governor Uba Sani assumed office in May 2023 at a time when the state, and by extension the country’s economic landscape, was anything but forgiving. The removal of fuel subsidy, exchange-rate volatility, persistent inflation, and rising debt-service obligations placed unprecedented pressure on governments at every level. States were confronted with a difficult reality: revenues were uncertain, the demands of citizens were increasing, and the cost of delivering public services was rising sharply. In such circumstances, leadership is tested less by ambition than by restraint. The challenge is not merely to spend, but to spend wisely.

One of the defining features of Kaduna’s public finance strategy has been its emphasis on fiscal prudence. The evolution of Kaduna’s budgets illustrates this approach. The approved 2023 budget stood at approximately ₦376 billion, with about 64 per cent allocated to capital expenditure. By 2026, the state’s budget had expanded to approximately ₦985.9 billion, with nearly 71 per cent earmarked for capital projects. While a larger budget does not automatically translate into better governance, the increasing share devoted to capital expenditure suggests an intention to invest more heavily in assets capable of generating long-term social and economic value.

It is important to note that Kaduna’s fiscal philosophy appears to rest on the belief that sustainable development cannot be separated from responsible financial management. Whether this approach ultimately delivers all the expected outcomes will be judged by history. But the effort to align expenditure with development priorities represents a significant dimension of governance, one that often receives less public attention than it deserves.

Like most Nigerian states, Kaduna relies on a combination of statutory allocations from the Federation Account and internally generated revenue (IGR).  Available fiscal reports indicate that Kaduna has continued efforts to strengthen its internally generated revenue through reforms in tax administration and improved collection mechanisms. While revenue generation alone is not evidence of economic prosperity, it provides government with greater fiscal flexibility and resilience, particularly during periods of national economic uncertainty. Equally important is the principle that expanding the revenue base should not be confused with imposing heavier burdens on taxpayers. The more sustainable path lies in improving efficiency, reducing leakages, and encouraging economic activity that naturally broadens the tax net.

Another pertinently salient aspect of Kaduna’s fiscal approach that deserves attention is the administration’s stated commitment to avoiding new borrowing while continuing to service inherited debt obligations. In a federation where public borrowing has become a common instrument for financing development, such a position reflects a cautious philosophy of public finance. According to official statements, the government has prioritised meeting existing debt commitments while financing new projects through budgetary allocations, statutory revenues, and other available funding sources rather than contracting fresh loans. The most overlooked measure of fiscal discipline is not the size of a budget or even the amount of revenue collected. It is the willingness of a government to treat public funds as a trust rather than an entitlement. Financial prudence is rarely dramatic, but it is often decisive. It is the quiet habit of making difficult choices today so that tomorrow’s opportunities are not compromised by yesterday’s excesses.

There is, pertinently, external evidence to suggest that Kaduna’s emphasis on fiscal discipline is not merely a government narrative. In the 2025 Transparency and Integrity Index of the Centre for Fiscal Transparency and Public Integrity (CeFTPI), Kaduna ranked first among Nigeria’s 36 states for the second consecutive year, scoring 49.08 per cent and recording the country’s highest score; 80 per cent, in the Control of Corruption variable. The assessment covered fiscal transparency, open procurement, human resources, control of corruption and citizen engagement.  This was not an isolated recognition. In the 2024 edition, Kaduna again ranked first among the states, ahead of Kano and Kogi, while in the 2023 Transparency and Integrity Index it placed second nationally with 59.7 per cent.

More recently, the 2025 Phillips Consulting State Performance Index placed Kaduna third among the 36 states and awarded it an Excellent Four-Star rating, with fiscal management among the areas assessed.  These assessments do not, by themselves, prove that every naira has been optimally spent, nor do they erase the challenges confronting the state. They do, however, provide an important independent corroboration that Kaduna’s efforts in transparency, accountability and public-sector financial management have been noticed beyond the corridors of government. In public finance, therefore, such external assessments are worth considering.

Yet, no appraisal of public finance can be complete without acknowledging its limits. Fiscal discipline, however commendable, is not a panacea for every economic challenge. Kaduna, like every other state in Nigeria, operates within a national macroeconomic environment over which it has limited control. Inflation continues to erode purchasing power, businesses contend with high operating costs, exchange-rate volatility affects production and investment, and many households still struggle with the rising cost of living. These realities remind us that sound state finances cannot, by themselves, insulate citizens from broader economic shocks.

This distinction is important because it separates governance from circumstance. A prudent administration may not be able to determine the value of the naira or the global price of commodities, but it can determine how efficiently public resources are managed, how transparently budgets are implemented, and how wisely limited revenues are allocated. In that sense, fiscal discipline should not be judged by whether every economic hardship disappears, but by whether government responds to those hardships with responsibility and not recklessness.

Kaduna’s experience suggests an appreciation of this responsibility. The emphasis on capital investment, efforts to strengthen internally generated revenue, and the administration’s declared preference for avoiding new borrowing while servicing inherited obligations point to a philosophy that values sustainability over expediency. These choices contribute to a financial culture that seeks to preserve the state’s capacity to invest, grow, and respond to future challenges.

That is not to suggest that the work is complete. Public finance is never a finished project; it is a continuous exercise in adaptation. As Kaduna’s economy evolves, expectations will also rightly rise; citizens will demand greater efficiency in service delivery, stronger budget implementation, improved transparency, broader private-sector participation, and measurable improvements in living standards. Fiscal discipline must therefore remain dynamic, ensuring that every naira spent delivers the greatest possible public value.

Prudent financial management remains the quiet strength of Kaduna’s fiscal discipline and public finance. It is a strength that is rarely seen or acknowledged by the majority; the strength to prioritise sustainability over excess and fiscal adventurism. It is important to note that the loudest achievements may command today’s headlines, but it is often the quiet virtues- prudence, discipline, accountability, and foresight- that shape tomorrow’s verdict. In public finance, as in life, the strongest foundations are rarely the most visible, yet they are almost always the most enduring.

Sani Abdulrazak, PhD, is a writer, researcher and public affairs analyst based in Zaria, Kaduna State.

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On Onaiyekan—When Heaven Becomes Corruption’s Laundromat

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corruption in nigeria

By Prince Charles Dickson Ph.D

Nigeria is perhaps the only country where a politician may steal enough money to build three universities, donate twenty bags of rice to a prayer house, and immediately be introduced as “a great philanthropist and pillar of the faith.” The congregation applauds. The cleric smiles. Cameras flash. Heaven receives a bank alert it never requested.

“Sai Baba! Sai Malami!” the praise singers thunder, while the distinguished guest adjusts his cap, grips his prayer beads and looks humbly into the middle distance. By evening, another politician is occupying the front pew of a cathedral, lifting two hands in worship, although one suspects the third invisible hand is still inside the public treasury.

This is the Nigerian religious-political circus: spectacular costumes, sacred vocabulary, endless pilgrimages and remarkably little evidence of moral transformation.

We must begin with an important correction. It is neither fair nor provable to claim that 99.99 per cent of corrupt politicians are practising Muslims and Christians. What can be said is that Nigeria is overwhelmingly populated by people who identify as Muslim or Christian. Pew Research Centre estimates that Muslims and Christians together constitute virtually the entire population. Consequently, most politicians, honest or dishonest, will publicly identify with one of those religions.

The real scandal, therefore, is not that corrupt politicians belong to religions. It is that corruption appears perfectly comfortable living beside loud professions of faith. It eats breakfast with Christianity, attends afternoon prayers with Islam, and sleeps peacefully beneath framed quotations from scripture.

Nigeria has produced a curious creature: the devout kleptocrat.

He fasts, but the treasury must break the fast. He pays tithe, but not tax. He performs ablution, but refuses institutional cleansing. He kneels before God and places the country beneath his shoe.

He asks forgiveness every week without returning what he took.

He sponsors pilgrimages with money that could have equipped hospitals, then asks the pilgrims to pray for Nigeria’s development. This is like stealing somebody’s generator and requesting prayers for the darkness in his house.

Christianity does not teach this. Islam does not teach it. African traditional morality does not teach it. Even ordinary home training does not teach it.

Both Islam and Christianity treat public trust, justice, compassion, honesty and care for the vulnerable as serious moral obligations. Neither faith provides a theological washing machine into which stolen funds can be inserted and brought out smelling of incense. A pilgrimage is not a corruption amnesty. A church donation is not a plea bargain. Sponsoring religious programmes does not convert public theft into charity.

You cannot steal a community’s borehole and donate bottled water during Ramadan. You cannot divert teachers’ salaries and build a church auditorium. You cannot inflate a road contract, abandon the road, then organise a thanksgiving service after surviving an accident on that same road.

At some point, even hypocrisy deserves professional embarrassment.

The economic context makes the performance more offensive. Claims that “over 79 per cent” of Nigerians are poor depend on the definition and dataset being used, so that figure should not be repeated as a settled fact. However, the verified picture is already grim enough. The World Bank estimated that more than half of Nigerians were living in poverty in 2025, while its Nigeria country assessment says poverty remains widespread and that poorer households may spend up to 70 per cent of their income on food.

Meanwhile, nearly 35 million Nigerians were projected to face acute or severe food insecurity during the 2026 lean season, the highest level recorded for the country in the relevant analysis.

These are not decorative statistics. They represent children arriving at school too hungry to learn, parents dividing one meal into three diplomatic portions, pensioners choosing between medication and food, and graduates discovering that their certificates have become expensive bookmarks.

Against this background, unexplained political wealth is not merely vulgar. It is morally violent.

The statement that any present or former officeholder possessing ₦5 billion must automatically be a thief may satisfy public anger, but law and fairness require greater care. Some politicians had legitimate businesses, inheritances or investments before entering office. Wealth alone is not proof of theft.

However, unexplained wealth is a legitimate basis for scrutiny. Where a public officer’s assets are wildly inconsistent with lawful earnings, the burden of public explanation becomes unavoidable. Nigeria’s Code of Conduct system requires public officers to declare their assets and liabilities, while the Code of Conduct Bureau is responsible for receiving, examining and monitoring those declarations.

The correct democratic question is therefore not simply, “Are you rich?”

It is: What lawful activity produced this wealth, when was it earned, was it properly declared, were taxes paid, and can the explanation survive independent investigation?

A senator cannot tell citizens that wealth is a “mystery of God” when his declared salary is public knowledge. Divine favour is not an accounting category. “Grace” cannot explain twenty-seven properties, twelve companies and a warehouse full of dollars. Even manna came with distribution rules.

The deeper problem is that parts of Nigeria’s religious establishment have become involved in an unhealthy exchange with political power. Politicians provide money, access, vehicles, land and proximity to government. Religious leaders provide legitimacy, titles, photographs, prayers and a moral raincoat.

The politician arrives as “His Excellency, the divinely chosen servant-leader.” Nobody asks how the servant acquired a private jet while the people he serves cannot afford transport. Nobody wants to upset the offering basket. Prophecy suddenly develops selective eyesight.

To be balanced, many Nigerian clerics, Muslim and Christian, speak courageously against corruption, defend vulnerable communities and refuse political capture. Many politicians also practise their faith sincerely and serve without stealing. The disease is not universal.

But the silence of influential religious institutions is often too expensive to ignore.

A cleric who constantly condemns young people for indecent dressing but cannot condemn officials who undress the national treasury has misplaced his moral measuring tape. A preacher who sees spiritual danger in hairstyles but none in budget padding needs more than revelation. An imam who lectures poor traders about honesty while celebrating officials with inexplicable fortunes has reduced religion to ceremonial wallpaper.

Religious leaders must recover the courage to ask unpopular questions. Before accepting a massive donation from a public official, they should ask whether the donor’s known income can reasonably support it. Institutions should publish major political donations and establish ethical rules governing gifts from politically exposed persons. Stolen money does not become holy because it enters a religious account.

The state must also stop outsourcing accountability to divine judgement. Nigerians frequently say, “God will judge them,” which is true within religious belief, but God also gave the country auditors, investigators, courts, journalists, voters and laws. Waiting exclusively for celestial prosecution is institutional laziness wearing a prayer shawl.

Asset declarations should be effectively verified, and greater public access would strengthen accountability. The ICPC has itself previously advocated publication of public servants’ declared assets as an anti-corruption measure.  Investigative institutions must follow money without consulting party membership, regional origin, denomination or prayer vocabulary. A thief speaking in tongues and a thief reciting Arabic remain thieves requiring evidence-based investigation and lawful prosecution.

Citizens also have work to do. We cannot condemn corruption in Abuja while celebrating it when “our son” returns home with unexplained wealth. Communities organise receptions. Traditional titles multiply. Clerics pronounce blessings. Relatives announce that God has finally remembered the family. Nobody asks what job produced the convoy.

Our outrage is often tribal, partisan and denominational. We investigate opponents and interpret allies. When their politician steals, it is corruption. When ours steals, it is strategic empowerment of the constituency.

Nigeria will not defeat corruption until stolen wealth becomes socially shameful rather than socially impressive.

The politician who cannot explain his fortune should not receive a chieftaincy title, front-row seat, honorary doctorate or harvest-launch chairmanship. He should receive questions. Many questions. Questions with documents attached.

Religion must become more than pilgrimage photographs, prayer caps, rosaries, flowing gowns and amplified declarations of righteousness. True faith must disturb injustice. It must make theft uncomfortable, generosity accountable and leadership answerable.

Otherwise, the mosque becomes a photo studio, the church becomes a reputation-repair workshop, and religion becomes perfume sprayed over the odour of public theft.

The final question is not whether Nigerian politicians pray. Many clearly do.

The question is whether their prayers have ever met their consciences. Because a nation cannot shout “Amen” loudly enough to convert corruption into governance. Either way—May Nigeria win.

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