World
Britain, Russia Face Rocky Relations as Liz Truss Becomes New Prime Minister
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
The Russian and Western media headlines have glaringly shown the future of Britain-Russia’s bilateral relationship and how that will further work in a multilateral format in the context of the current global changes as Ms Liz Truss becomes Britain’s new Prime Minister.
Of course, this does not need a simplified or detailed explanation, as both have locked horns over many publicly-known issues within the context of geopolitical changes.
Media articles’ headlines, “Kremlin scathing over Truss but Kyiv praises Britain’s new PM” (The Guardian) and, “Russia says relations with Britain could get worse as Truss elected PM” (The Independent) painted gloomy pictures of the future relations between the two countries. And of course, Britain and Russia have been struggling to raise their bilateral relations during these past several years with little success.
Britain’s new Prime Minister Liz Truss is not new to Britain and Russia’s politics and diplomacy, and geopolitical changes. She previously served as the British Foreign Secretary. Now, she has won the race for the leadership of the ruling Conservative Party, as indications from the results of an internal party vote, declared on September 5.
Truss, 47, received the votes of 81,326 rank-and-file Conservatives. Her rival, former Finance Minister Rishi Sunak, 42 got 60,399 votes. As the leader of the ruling party, Truss replaces Boris Johnson as Prime Minister and has to appoint a new cabinet. Truss becomes Britain’s 56th Prime Minister, and formally confirmed as head of Her Majesty’s Government at an audience with Queen Elizabeth II.
Ms Liz Truss’ perspectives on many important issues are completely at variance with the position often taken by the Russian Federation.
In July 2022, Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova criticized her in an official statement for her anti-Russia remarks which are invariably steeped in painful aggression and nationalism, that is, Russophobia. Within the political spectrum, she is considered a threat to the country and its leadership, especially the current “special military operation” in Ukraine.
“She looks like a second-rate politician afflicted by megalomania. And she is doing all of this instead of addressing the issues at home, which are plenty. This collection of empty slogans vocalised by a raging Truss clearly shows that, in fact, she is either unable to spot the serious crisis in the economy and in domestic politics in a country whose government she is striving to lead, or she simply does not know how to overcome it and is trying to distract voters. Clearly, the well-being and living standards of ordinary Brits are not among her priorities,” Zakharova described her in comments posted to the official website on July 14.
While there are thousands of shreds of evidence pointing to the worsening bilateral relations in political, economic and cultural spheres between the two countries, Russia usually slams Britain together with the European Union into the same category. Similar to the previous well-known Cold War, Russia is battling multiple confrontations from the United States and European Union.
Russia, most often, views Britain from its historical perspectives and the colonial past and directly connects with the present time. Russian authorities have convincingly and publicly highlighted the British colonial practices that spanned more than half a century. Perhaps, taking a line from Russia’s MFA sources, Russia views these two geopolitical blocs as “aggressive and warlike nature and obvious narrow-mindedness” and to deepen our understanding of the situation.
As Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov pointed out during the 30th Assembly of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy, “The external circumstances have not changed radically, not becoming more elevated unfortunately with each passing day. The choice we have taken is made easier by the fact that the ‘collective West’ has declared a total hybrid war against us. It is hard to forecast how long this will last. But it is clear that its consequences will be felt by everyone without exception throughout the world.”
Lavrov further explained that this is not only and not so much about Ukraine, having decided the way to global hegemony, which is being used as an instrument to contain the peaceful development of the Russian Federation in the context of their course to perpetuate a unipolar world order, right after the end of the Cold War. Russia’s diplomacy is, on the one hand, to act with great resolve to fend off all adversarial attacks, while, on the other hand, to consistently, calmly and patiently reinforce positions in order to facilitate Russia’s sustained development from within and improve the quality of life for its people.
Britain’s diplomacy has posed problems, in the political, economic and cultural spheres of the Russian Federation. In the cultural sphere, for instance, Russia was forced to close the British Council. Until now, educational and consular services are still not resolved, and many important issues in political and economic bilateral cooperation. At one time, the fatal 2006 poisoning of former Russian security officer Alexander Litvinenko in London. And the next one, London also used the incident in Salisbury linked with the suspected poisoning of former GRU employee Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia as a provocation against Russia.
Britain has joined the United States, Canada, Europe, Australia and many other countries in imposing draconian sanctions on Russia. In addition to that, Britain as a member of the Group of Seven acts in complete coalition with Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the United States on a number of issues against the Russian Federation. The Group of Seven is composed of the seven wealthiest advanced countries.
After the historic fall of the Soviet era, Russia dreamed of raising its status by joining international organizations. Over the past three decades, Russia became a member of many global bodies, participating actively in the United Nations. But with the Group of Eight (G-8), due to sharp differences among members and the last straw relates to its undertaking of “a special military operation” in Ukraine, Russia ultimately withdrew its membership.
David Harding, a British journalist and author, in early September wrote that Russia’s relations with Britain would get worse under new Prime Minister Liz Truss. He referred to issues that include a growing energy price crisis and the war in Ukraine, both of which are affected by Britain’s relations with Russia. The article was based on Kremlin’s warning shots across the new government by claiming that the low level of the current relations between Moscow and London could get even worse than they are now.
“I wouldn’t like to say that things can change for the worse, because it’s hard to imagine anything worse,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said when asked if Moscow expected any shift in relations with Britain. “But unfortunately, this cannot be ruled out, given that the contenders for the post of British prime minister competed with each other in anti-Russian rhetoric, in threats to take further steps against our country, and so on. Therefore, I don’t think that we can hope for anything positive.”
Truss is chiefly known in Russia for a visit she made to Moscow in February when she and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov held a rancorous meeting. Lavrov described their conversation as like a dialogue between deaf and mute people, complaining that facts had ‘bounced off’ her. Russia’s foreign ministry has also openly mocked her over geographical gaffes, including on one occasion when she mixed up the Black and Baltic seas.
Truss openly challenged Lavrov at their meeting over Russia’s troop build-up near Ukraine, saying: “I can’t see any reason for having 100,000 troops stationed on the border, apart from to threaten Ukraine.” Moscow, which had denied invasion plans, sent its troops in two weeks later. Since then, Britain has been one of the most active and vocal supporters of Ukraine in the war, supplying it with weapons and training.
While there have been several congratulatory messages for Liz Truss, none came from Russia’s official domain. Dutch PM Mark Rutte said on Twitter: “The Netherlands has long enjoyed close ties with the UK, and I look forward to working with Ms Truss to strengthen them even further.”
In addition, Austrian media compared her to Margaret Thatcher but one French newspaper, Les Echos, called her an Iron Weathercock, rather than Iron Lady, for constantly changing political position. Further, German chancellor Olaf Scholz also took to social media to proclaim: “The UK and Germany will continue to work closely together – as partners and friends.”
Russian media, however, published many reports about political developments and have speculated about the directions in future relations. Russia’s wide-circulated Izvestia wrote that British Foreign Secretary Liz Truss has become the new prime minister. As a successor and loyal supporter of former leader Boris Johnson, Truss would lead the ruling Conservative Party, at least, till the 2024 parliamentary election. “Notorious for her harsh rhetoric on Russia, Truss used it proactively in her election campaign. And yet foreign policy is secondary for the British, with a solution to the energy crisis and the fight against falling living standards being their top priorities,” wrote the newspaper.
The British PM favours active support for Kiev and believes the goal for London is to have Russia defeated in Ukraine. With that in mind, Truss could be viewed as a direct successor of Boris Johnson’s policies. The outgoing premier, perhaps, was involved in the Ukrainian conflict more than any other Western leader. Boris Johnson visited Kiev, the Ukrainian capital, three times since Russia launched its special military operation, and he was accused of overlooking domestic issues due to his preoccupation with foreign policy.
The key tasks faced by the new prime minister certainly relate to the economy and the well-being of ordinary citizens. “The United Kingdom is faring much worse economically than the other West European countries,” Vasily Yegorov, an expert on British politics and the author of the Westminister channel on Telegram, told Izvestia. According to forecasts, Great Britain could face 18-22% inflation rates. If the government copes with that issue this fall, it would be easier further down the road. Truss should come up with her economic program in the near future.
Britain and Russia established relations several years ago. Even with the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall much of the relationship has been under constant strain. During these past few years, the relationship has been tense due to European Union sanctions against Russia. The British were viewed as a driving force for those sanctions, making the relationship awkward. In conclusion, Britain and Russia will still have rocky relations in the coming years and even more turbulent over many bilateral and global policy issues under Liz Truss, the new Prime Minister of Britain.
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
The Executive President of the Indian Business Alliance (IBA), Sammy Manoj Kotwani, discusses the landmark moment in deepening Russian-Indian collaboration. Kotwani explains the groundbreaking insights into President Vladimir Putin’s working visit to India, the emerging opportunities and pathways for future cooperation, especially for the two-sided economic collaboration. Follow Sammy Manoj Kotwani’s discussions here:
Interpretation of the latest development in Russian-Indian relations
From my viewpoint in Moscow, this visit has effectively opened a new operational chapter in what has always been described as a “Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership.” It did not just reaffirm political goodwill; it translated that goodwill into a structured economic roadmap through Programme 2030, a clear target to take bilateral trade to around USD 100 billion by 2030, and concrete sectoral priorities: energy, nuclear cooperation, critical minerals, manufacturing, connectivity, fertilizers, and labour mobility.
On the ground, the business community reads this summit as a strong signal that India and Russia are doubling down on strategic autonomy in a multipolar world order. Both sides are trying to de-risk their supply chains and payment systems from over-dependence on any single centre of power. This is visible in the focus on national currencies, alternative payment mechanisms, and efforts to stabilise Rupee–Ruble trade, alongside discussions on a Free Trade Agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union and the reinforcement of corridors like the INSTC and the Chennai–Vladivostok route.
In short, my interpretation is that this summit has moved the relationship from “politically excellent but structurally imbalanced” towards a more diversified, long-term economic framework in which companies are expected to co-produce, co-innovate, and invest, not just trade opportunistically.
Significance of the visit for Indian business in Russia and for the Indian Business Alliance (IBA)
For Indian business operating in the Russian Federation, the visit has three immediate effects: confidence, clarity, and continuity. Confidence, because Indian entrepreneurs now see that despite external pressure, New Delhi and Moscow have explicitly committed to deepening economic engagement—especially in energy, fertilizers, defence co-production, nuclear, and critical minerals—rather than quietly scaling it back.
Clarity, because the summit outcomes spell out where the real opportunities lie:
Energy & Petrochemicals: Long-term crude and LNG supply, but also downstream opportunities in refining, petrochemicals, and logistics, where Indian EPC and service companies can participate.
Pharmaceuticals & Medical Devices: Russia’s import substitution drive makes high-quality Indian generics, formulations, and even localized manufacturing extremely relevant.
IT, Digital & AI: There is growing appetite in Russia for Indian IT services, cybersecurity, and digital solutions that are not dependent on Western tech stacks.
Fertilizers, Agro & Food Processing: New joint ventures in fertilizers and agriculture supply chains were explicitly flagged during and around the summit, which is important for both food security and farm incomes.
Continuity, because the Programme 2030 framework and the expected EAEU FTA give businesses a medium-term policy horizon. Tariff reductions, improved market access and predictable regulation are precisely what Indian SMEs and mid-sized companies need to justify long-term investments in Russia.
For the Indian Business Alliance (IBA), this inevitably means more work and more responsibility. We already see increased incoming requests from Indian firms—from large listed companies to first-time exporters—asking very practical questions: Which Russian region should we enter? How do we navigate compliance under the sanctions environment? Which banks are still handling Rupee–Ruble or third-currency settlements? How can we structure joint ventures to align with Russia’s import substitution goals while protecting IP and governance standards?
IBA’s role, therefore, becomes that of economic diplomacy in action: translating high-level summit language into actual B2B meetings, sectoral delegations, regional partnerships, and deal-making platforms such as the India–Russia Business Dialogue in Moscow. This visit will undoubtedly stimulate and intensify IBA’s work as a bridge between the two ecosystems.
India’s current economic presence in the Russian Federation
If we look beyond the headline trade figures, India’s economic presence in Russia today is significant, but not yet commensurate with its potential. Bilateral trade has grown sharply since 2022, largely on the back of discounted Russian oil and coal, making India one of Russia’s top energy customers. However, the structure is still heavily skewed: Russian exports to India dominate, while Indian exports and investments in Russia remain relatively modest and under-diversified.
On the ground in Moscow and across the regions, we see several strong Indian footholds:
Pharmaceuticals: Indian pharma is well-established, respected for its affordability and quality, and poised to deepen localization in line with Russian import substitution policy.
Tea, Coffee, Spices & Food: Traditional segments with deep historical roots, now expanding into ready-to-eat, wellness, and ethnic food categories.
IT & Services: Still under-represented, but with growing interest as Russian entities look for non-Western software, integration, and outsourcing partners.
Diamonds, Textiles, Apparel, and Light Engineering: Present but fragmented, with enormous room to scale, especially if logistics and payment challenges are addressed.
Where India is still behind is on-the-ground investment and manufacturing presence compared to countries like China. Russian policymakers today are clearly favouring investors who help them achieve technological sovereignty and local value addition. For serious Indian companies willing to commit capital, adapt to Russian standards, and accept the complexities of the current environment, this is a period of unusual opportunity. For purely transactional players looking for quick arbitrage, it is becoming progressively harder.
So, I would characterise India’s economic presence as: strategically important, quickly growing in value, but still under-leveraged in terms of depth, diversification, and localization.
Geopolitical pressure from Washington and future predictions
Pressure from Washington—through sanctions, secondary sanctions risk, financial restrictions, and now even tariff measures linked to India’s energy purchases from Russia—is undoubtedly a real and continuing challenge. It affects everything from shipping insurance and dollar transactions to technology transfers and the risk appetite of global banks. In practical terms, it can complicate even a simple India–Russia trade deal if it touches a sanctioned bank, vessel, or technology.
However, my own assessment, based on 35 years of living and working in Russia, is that this pressure will not fundamentally derail India–Russia friendship, but it will reshape how the relationship functions. India’s foreign policy is anchored in strategic autonomy; it seeks strong ties with the United States and Europe, but not at the cost of abandoning a time-tested partner like Russia. Russia, for its part, sees India as a crucial Asian pole in an emerging multipolar world order and as a long-term market, technology partner, and political counterpart in forums like BRICS, SCO, and the G20.
Looking ahead, I see a few clear trends:
Normalization of alternative payment and logistics systems
We will see more institutionalised use of national currencies, alternative messaging systems, regional banks outside the direct sanctions line, and maybe even digital currencies for specific corridors. Rupee–Ruble trade mechanisms that are today seen as “workarounds” will gradually become part of the normal infrastructure of bilateral commerce.
Shift from pure trade to co-production and joint innovation
To reduce vulnerability to sanctions, both sides will push for manufacturing in India and Russia rather than simple exports: defence co-development, localized pharma and medical devices, high-tech and AI collaborations, and joint ventures in critical minerals and clean energy.
Greater role for regions and business associations
Regional governments in Russia (Far East, Arctic regions, industrial hubs) and Indian states will increasingly drive project-level cooperation, supported by platforms like IBA. This “bottom-up” economic diplomacy will make the relationship more resilient than if it relied only on central governments.
Managed balancing by India
India will continue to deepen technology and investment ties with the West while maintaining energy, defence and strategic cooperation with Russia. The challenge will be to manage U.S. and EU expectations without compromising its core national interests. My prediction is that India will stay firm on this course of balanced engagement, even if it means occasional friction with Washington.
In essence, external pressure may complicate the methods of Indo-Russian cooperation, but it is unlikely to overturn the foundations of trust, mutual interest, and long-term complementarity that have been built over decades.
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
After the expiration of bilateral agreement on trade, the US Congress as well as African leaders, highly recognizing its significance, has been pursuing the extension of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). The agreement, which allows duty-free access to American markets for African exporters, expired on September 30, 2025.
The US Congress is advancing a bill to revive and extend AGOA, but South Africa’s continued inclusion remains uncertain. The trade pact still has strong bipartisan support, with the House Ways and Means Committee approving it 37-3. However, US Trade Representative, Jamieson Greer, raised concerns about South Africa, citing tariffs and non-tariff barriers, and said the administration could consider excluding the country.
This threat puts at risk the duty-free access that has significantly benefited South African automotive, agricultural, and wine exports. The debate highlights how trade policy is becoming entangled with broader diplomatic tensions, casting uncertainty over a key pillar of US-Africa economic relations.
Nevertheless, South Africa continues to lobby for inclusion. South Africa trade summary records show that the US goods and services trade with South Africa estimated at $26.2 billion in 2024. The US and South Africa signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) as far back as in 2012.
The duty-free access for nearly 40 African countries has boosted development and fostered more equitable and sustainable growth in Africa. By design AGOA is a useful mechanism for improving accessibility to trade competitiveness, connectivity, and productivity. During these past 25 years, AGOA has been the cornerstone of US economic engagement with the countries of sub-Saharan Africa.
Key features and benefits of AGOA:
It’s worth reiterating here that during these past several years, AGOA has been the cornerstone of US economic engagement with the countries of sub-Saharan Africa. In this case, as AGOA is closely working with the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Secretariat and with the African Union (AU), trade professionals could primarily leverage various economic sectors and unwaveringly act as bridges between the United States and Africa.
* Duty-free Access: AGOA allows eligible products from sub-Saharan African countries to enter the US market without paying tariffs.
* Promotion of Economic Growth: The program encourages economic growth by providing incentives for African countries to open their economies and build free markets.
* Encouraging Economic Reforms: AGOA encourages economic and political reforms in eligible countries, including the rule of law and market-oriented policies.
* Increased Trade and Investment: The program aims to strengthen trade and investment ties between the United States and sub-Saharan Africa.
With the changing times, Africa is also building its muscles towards a new direction since the introduction of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which was officially launched in July 2019.
In practical terms, trading under the AfCFTA commenced in January 2021. And the United States has prioritized the AfCFTA as one mechanism through which to strengthen its long-term relations with the continent. In the context of the crucial geopolitical changes, African leaders, corporate executives, and the entire business community are optimistic over the extension of AGOA, for mutually beneficial trade partnerships with the United States.
Worthy to say that AGOA, to a considerable degree, as a significant trade policy has played a crucial role in promoting economic growth and development in sub-Saharan Africa.
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
Africa stands at the cusp of a transformative digital revolution. With the expansion of mobile connectivity, internet penetration, digital platforms, and financial technology, the continent’s digital economy is poised to become a significant driver of sustainable development, intra-Africa trade, job creation, and economic inclusion.
The African Union’s Agenda 2063, particularly Aspiration 1 (a prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development), highlights the importance of leveraging technology and innovation. The implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) has opened a new chapter in market integration, creating opportunities to unlock the full potential of the digital economy across all sectors.
Despite remarkable progress, challenges persist. These include limited digital infrastructure, disparities in digital literacy, fragmented regulatory frameworks, inadequate access to financing for tech-based enterprises, and gender gaps in digital participation. Moreover, Africa must assert its digital sovereignty, build local data ecosystems, and secure cyber-infrastructure to thrive in a rapidly changing global digital landscape.
Against this backdrop, the 16th African Union Private Sector Forum provides a timely platform to explore and shape actionable strategies for harnessing Africa’s digital economy to accelerate intra-Africa trade and sustainable development.
The 16th High-Level AU Private Sector forum is set to take place in Djibouti, from the 14 to 16 December 2025, under the theme “Harnessing Africa’s Digital Economy and Innovation for Accelerating Intra-Africa Trade and Sustainable Development”
The three-day Forum will feature high-level plenaries, expert panels, breakout sessions, and networking opportunities. Each day will spotlight a core pillar of Africa’s digital transformation journey.
Day 1: Digital Economy and Trade Integration in Africa
Focus: Leveraging digital platforms and technologies to enhance trade integration and competitiveness under AfCFTA.
Day 2: Innovation, Fintech, and the Future of African Economies
Focus: Driving economic inclusion through fintech, innovation ecosystems, and youth entrepreneurship.
Day 3: Building Policy, Regulatory Frameworks, and Partnerships for Digital Growth
Focus: Creating an enabling environment for digital innovation and infrastructure through effective policy, governance, and partnerships.
To foster strategic dialogue and action-oriented collaboration among key stakeholders in Africa’s digital ecosystem, with the goal of leveraging digital economy and innovation to boost intra-Africa trade, accelerate economic transformation, and support inclusive, sustainable development.
* Promote Digital Trade: Identify mechanisms and policy actions to enable seamless cross-border digital commerce and integration under AfCFTA.
* Foster Innovation and Fintech: Advance inclusive fintech ecosystems and support innovation-driven entrepreneurship, especially among youth and women.
* Policy and Regulatory Harmonization: Build consensus on regional and continental digital regulatory frameworks to foster trust, security, and interoperability.
* Encourage Investment and Public-Private Partnerships: Strengthen collaboration between governments, private sector, and development partners to invest in digital infrastructure, R&D, and skills development.
* Advance Digital Inclusion and Sustainability: Ensure that digital transformation contributes to environmental sustainability and the empowerment of marginalized communities.
The AU Private Sector Forum has held several forums, with key recommendations. These recommendations provide valuable insights into the challenges and opportunities facing the African private sector and offer guidance for policymakers on how to support its growth and development.
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