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China-India Conflict a Potential Threat to BRICS Association

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BRICS leaders

By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh

The tension between China and India threatens to paralyse BRICS – the association of five major emerging national economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. While struggling to expand and influence on the global stage, China and India have locked horns over issues in their bilateral relations, ranging from border security to trade conflicts and information war.

The latest strains began in early May and culminated in hand-to-hand fighting in the Galwan Valley, a remote stretch of the 3,380-kilometre (2,100-mile) Line of Actual Control – the border established following a war between India and China in 1962 that resulted in an uneasy truce.

Punsara Amarasinghe, a former research fellow at the Faculty of Law, Higher School of Economics in Moscow, and now a PhD candidate in international law at the Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies in Pisa, Italy, argues that this tension is rather ironic given that in the past the two countries shared many civilisational values and both were victims of Western colonialism.

When India gained independence in 1947 from the British, its first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru built a rapport with Communist China by accepting the government of Mao Zedong with great anticipation that both China and India would become the stalwarts in the global campaign against Western imperialism. For example, it was Nehru’s idea that China should be granted a place in the non-aligned movement despite some of opposition from some members at the famous Bandung Conference in 1955.

However, the comity between the two nations was short-lived as China claimed the territory near Arunachal Pradesh whereas India adhered to the line of control known as the McMahon Line established by the British under the 1914 Simla Convention with the consent of Tibet. From the 1950s onwards, China showed its interest in the Aksai Chin area albeit its cordial relations with Nehru’s India. This long dispute finally ended in military escalation in 1962 and became known as the Sino-Indian War.

While acknowledging that some other issues have marred their relationship apart from the current border conflict, Amarasinghe told this article author that “both China and India have longed for global governance as emerging powers, and particularly, the influence expanded by China in South Asia has rapidly increased India’s doubt on China’s presence. Secondly, China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative project has encircled India geopolitically, creating a plethora of doubts about India’s state apparatus.”

He added that the notion of nuclear weapon strategies and India’s affinity with the USA are the biggest dilemmas that China has persistently had in dealing with India. Moreover, India has been the sanctuary for Tibetan refugees, including the Dalai Lama.

As to the fundamental question of whether all these issues put together could reappear in future, Amarasinghe emphasized: “Having looked at the trajectories of the history of Indo-China conflict, one can ascertain that the India-China issue has always been imbued with a question of power. Both states are yearning for global governance. Yet India is ahead of the curve as the world’s largest democracy and a state with one of the strongest soft powers, making the Indian narrative stronger, whereas Beijing is known for its autocracy.”

On the other hand, he reminded, “We should not forget that the pact signed between China and India in 1996 clearly says that two states cannot use firearms in a border dispute escalation. However, there have been several events that have shown the acts of aggression in the Indo-China border conflict. The Chinese efforts to build a road in the Doklam area near the border created a tense situation in 2017. Three years after that event, the conflict erupted again.”

China’s Foreign Ministry stipulated measures that would be implemented to normalise the situation and prevent future armed conflicts. “The sides welcomed the developments of relations between defence agencies and the external affairs ministries, agreed to support such consultations in the future and implement agreements that were reached by the two sides during the talks between the border troops commanders, as well complete as soon as possible the process of frontline troop withdrawal,” read a ministry statement.

The Foreign Ministry noted that the sides also reached an agreement to implement measures to “prevent the reoccurrence of incidents which may influence the situation and peace in the border region.”

“The relationship of China and India underwent various trials and their progress towards modern development was not always swift. As had been recently demonstrated correctly, and at the same time incorrectly, by the recent incident in the western sector of the China-India border in the Galwan River valley, China will continue to assert its territorial sovereignty as well as peace and tranquillity in the border region,” according to the statement.

The sides expressed readiness to respect the agreements achieved previously by the heads of state, pay specific attention to the issue of state borders and prevent “disagreements from becoming conflicts.” The sides also confirmed their adherence to the earlier agreements on the state border and expressed readiness to implement measures to normalise the situation in the border region.

Sino-Indian geopolitical rivalry is certainly not new, but today it has multifaceted implications for developments in the South Asian region and most possibly for BRICS. For example, in email discussions, Dr. Zhu Ming of the Institute for Global Governance Studies at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS), noted that while there have been several disagreements between China and India, some have been resolved within the framework of international law but others have remained without comprehensive solutions.

Within the context of geopolitical alliances and emerging challenges, Tahama Asadis, a graduate of Strategic Studies from the National Defence University in Islamabad, noted the changing alliances and power equilibrium among the United States, China, India and Pakistan that bear key implications for inter-state rivalry and the consequent crisis dynamics in South Asia.

China has so far been successful in influencing South Asia because of many factors. One of the major reasons is that China has managed to project itself as a neighbour that would not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, least of all, in the internal affairs of its friends and partners. In the light of its ‘Good Neighbour Policy’, China’s increased diplomatic and economic engagements in South Asia are aimed at enhancing its strategic influence in the region.

Professor Ian Taylor at the University of St Andrews in the United Kingdom explained that he did not see any long-term future for the BRICS as a coherent grouping on the world stage. According to Taylor, the China-India rivalry (as exemplified by border clashes) shows how shallow the alliance is. Furthermore, Brasilia has its own “Brazilian Trump” who sees alliance with the West as the way forward, not with other “developing countries”.

Originally, BRIC was a four-member alliance until South Africa officially became a member in December 2010, after formally being invited by China to join and subsequently being accepted by the founding BRIC countries. The group was renamed BRICS – with the “S” standing for South Africa – to reflect the group’s expanded membership. South Africa is a staunch member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

“South Africa is in terminal decline and was only admitted to the BRICS for politically expedient-politically correct reasons. Its membership damaged the group’s credibility. And of course, China will resist to the very end the notion that India be admitted to the UN Security Council as a Permanent Member,” Taylor explained, adding that so much for the vaunted “South-South solidarity” that the BRICS was supposed to represent and what all the noise was about when it was launched.

Zhu Ming holds conservative not so negative views on the future of BRICS amid India-China conflicts, giving two reasons. The first and most important is that Beijing is still keeping a low profile on this conflict. For instance, Chinese local media coverage of this conflict is still quite low, and Beijing has not revealed losses on the Chinese side in order not to form the impression of too huge a gap in losses between the two sides as to humiliate the Indian side. “Just imagine, if two people were fighting, the situation would be extremely hard to turn back to normal very soon. But if one side could keep relatively calm, the situation would be more optimistic.”

Secondly, the disputed land is not worthy of a war between the two countries. “However, the rising nationalist mood of India is a bit troublesome. BRICS is not nothing to New Delhi, it will not be a good option for India to quit BRICS. Since BRICS was formed jointly by five powers, China does not own BRICS,” he told this article author, adding, “It is a bit early to judge the prospects of BRICS. It is quite possible that the global and BRICS health governance system could be another rising cooperation field within the BRICS group after the forthcoming BRICS summit.”

“While there are no official claims from the Kremlin that Putin was brokering any negotiation between the two to reconcile the border dispute if Russia can make a good move in meddling with the Indo-China border conflict, I assume it will work to a greater extent. Given the history of Russia’s dominant role in South Asia since its Soviet past, Moscow has a greater capacity to play the role of mediator. Besides that, BRICS is a platform for emerging powers and its capacity cannot be discarded as a regional political talk shop. Thus, I believe BRICS would create some steps for a more amicable solution,” Amarasinghe concluded on an optimistic note.

Alicia Garcia-Herrero is Senior Research Fellow at the Brussels-based think tank Bruegel and Adjunct Professor at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, noted in her article headlined “China Continues To Dominate An Expanded BRICS” published by the East Asia Forum that China has been the leading proponent of expanding BRICS to BRICS+. The main reason for the expansion was to make BRICS more representative of the developing world and give it a stronger voice on the global stage.

But the six countries invited to join — which has become five after Argentina’s withdrawal — are quite heterogeneous. Some are net creditors (such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates), while others are net debtors and in a very weak financial position. Half of them are large exporters of fossil fuels (Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Iran). Ethiopia and Egypt stand out as members from Africa, a continent that has become increasingly important for China’s and India’s foreign policy, according to Garcia-Herrero.

The BRICS countries are considered the foremost geopolitical rival to the G7 bloc of leading advanced economies, implementing competing initiatives such as the New Development Bank, the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement, the BRICS pay, the BRICS Joint Statistical Publication and the BRICS basket reserve currency. But in practical reality, China has large control and uses the platform to widen its economic influence. Most of the trade growth has been China-centric, with contributions from the rest of BRICS remaining quite flat until recently. Russia, with its limited economic impact, only remains an excellent public relations organizer for BRICS.

The BRICS members are known for their significant influence on regional affairs, and all are members of the G20. Since its establishment in 2009, the BRICS nations have met annually at several summits, with South Africa having hosted the most recent 15th BRICS Summit in August 2023. Currently, Russia is heading the rotating in 2024 and plans to push forward significant issues, particularly the association’s expansion and transforming it into an anti-Western coalition. Reports indicate about 40 countries, the majority in Africa and Asia have expressed readiness to join BRICS from the Global South. The association has three areas of strategic partnership: policy and security, economy and finance, and cultural and educational cooperation.

Between now and until October when Kazan will host the 16th summit, Moscow has scheduled various activities including the BRICS Games, BRICS Foreign Ministers, BRICS Academic and BRICS Parliamentary meetings, these aim at showcasing BRICS geopolitical influence and increasing coalition for building a fairer, better and multipolar world. It also operates based on non-interference and equality with the hope of ensuring members get mutual economic benefits in the world. BRICS has received both praise and criticism from academics, researchers, politicians geopolitical analysts and writers around the world.

The origins of BRICS — a bloc comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa and, as of 2024, new members Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates — can be traced back to a 2001 publication by Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neill titled ‘Building Better Global Economic BRICs’. O’Neill argued that Brazil, Russia, India and China were poised to play an increasingly significant role in the global economy. BRIC was officially launched in 2009 and was renamed BRICS in 2010 when South Africa joined, and Russia will make history by admitting the largest ever in 2024.

The founding countries of Brazil, Russia, India, and China held the first summit in Yekaterinburg in 2009, with South Africa joining the association a year later. Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates joined on 1 January 2024 The five BRICS countries together represent over 3.1 billion people, or about 41 percent of the world population. The five nations had a combined nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 18.6 trillion dollars and an estimated 4.46 trillion dollars in combined foreign reserves.

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Abebe Selassie to Retire as Director of African Department at IMF

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Abebe Aemro Selassie

By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has announced the retirement of its director of the African department, Abebe Aemro Selassie, on May 1, 2026. Since his appointment in 2016, Abebe Selassie has served in this position for a decade. During his tenure, IMF added a 25th chair to its Executive Board, increasing the voice of sub-Saharan Africa.

As a director for Africa, he has overseen the IMF’s engagement with 45 countries across sub-Saharan Africa. Abebe and his team work closely with the region’s leaders and policymakers to improve economic and development outcomes. This includes oversight of the IMF’s intensified engagement with the region in recent years, including some $60 billion in financial support the institution has provided to countries since 2020. Reports indicated that under his leadership, his department generally reinforces the organization’s role as a trusted partner to many African countries.

Abebe Selassie has worked with both the regional economic blocs and the African Union (AU) as well as individual African states. The key focus has been the strategic articulation of Africa’s development priorities in reshaping economic governance, mobilizing sustainable investments, and addressing systemic financial challenges.

It is important noting that the IMF has funded diverse infrastructure projects that facilitated either export-led growth or import substitution industrialization models of development. Further to that, African states have also made numerous loans and benefited from much-needed debt relief.

Summarizing the IMF’s key focus areas, among others, for Africa: (i) reforming the global financial architecture in an effort to improve the structure, institutions, rules, and processes that govern international finance in order to make the global economy more stable, equitable, and resilient.

Concessional financing to counter rising borrowing costs, with Africa paying up to 5 times more in interest than advanced economies (AfDB, 2023). Fair representation, pushing for IMF quota reforms to reflect Africa’s $3.4 trillion collective GDP—yet the continent holds less than 5% of voting shares in Bretton Woods institutions.

(ii) Unlocking Investments for Jobs and Sustainable Growth. With Africa’s working-age population set to double to 1 billion by 2050, the African states spotlight: The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), projected to boost intra-African trade by 52% and create 30 million jobs by 2035 (World Bank, 2024).  Infrastructure partnerships, targeting sectors such as renewable energy, where Africa receives only 2% of global clean energy investments despite its vast solar and wind potential (IEA, 2024).

(iii) Climate Finance and Debt Relief for Resilience: Africa contributes less than 4% of global emissions but bears the brunt of climate shocks, losing 5–15% of GDP per capita to climate-related disasters annually (African Development Bank, 2024). These are strictly in alignment with Agenda 2063’s aspirations for inclusive growth, maximizing multilateral cooperation and enhancing global engagement with the continent.

“I am deeply grateful for Abe’s visionary leadership, dedication to the Fund’s mission, and unwavering commitment to the members in the region,” Ms. Kristalina Georgieva, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). “The legacy he leaves on the Fund’s work in Africa is one of alignment with the aspirations of people, especially the youth, for good governance, strong economies and lasting prosperity. His trusted advice has been invaluable to me personally, and his leadership has strengthened our mission.”

“A national of Ethiopia, Selassie first joined the IMF in 1994. Over his remarkable 32-year career, he held senior positions including Deputy Director in AFR, Mission Chief for Portugal and South Africa, Division Chief of the Regional Studies Division, and Senior Resident Representative in Uganda. Earlier, he contributed to programs in Turkey, Thailand, Romania, and Estonia, and worked on policy, operational review, and economic research.”

Under his ten-year leadership and as director of the African Department (AFR), Abebe Selassie helped to reinforce the Fund’s role as a trusted partner with sub-Saharan African members. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is an international organization that promotes global economic growth and financial stability, encourages international trade, and reduces poverty.

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Africa Squeezed between Import Substitution and Dependency Syndrome

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Dependency Syndrome

By Kestér Kenn  Klomegâh

Squeezed between import substitution and dependency syndrome, a condition characterized by a set of associated economic symptoms—that is rules and regulations—majority of African countries are shifting from United States and Europe to an incoherent alternative bilateral partnerships with Russia, China and the Global South.

By forging new partnerships, for instance with Russia, these African countries rather create conspicuous economic dependency at the expense of strengthening their own local production, attainable by supporting local farmers under state budget. Import-centric partnership ties and lack of diversification make these African countries committed to import-dependent structures. It invariably compounds domestic production challenges. Needless to say that Africa has huge arable land and human resources to ensure food security.

A classical example that readily comes to mind is Ghana, and other West African countries. With rapidly accelerating economic policy, Ghana’s President John Dramani Mahama ordered the suspension of U.S. chicken and agricultural products, reaffirming swift measures for transforming local agriculture considered as grounds for ensuring sustainable food security and economic growth and, simultaneously, for driving job creation.

President John Dramani Mahama, in early December 2025, while observing Agricultural Day, urged Ghanaians to take up farming, highlighting the guarantee and state support needed for affordable credit and modern tools to boost food security. According to Mahama, Ghana spends $3bn yearly on basic food imports from abroad.

The government decision highlights the importance of leveraging unto local agriculture technology and innovation. Creating opportunities to unlock the full potential of depending on available resources within the new transformative policy strategy which aims at boosting local productivity. President John Dramani Mahama’s special initiatives are the 24-Hour Economy and the Big Push Agenda. One of the pillars focuses on Grow 24 – modernising agriculture.

Despite remarkable commendations for new set of economic recovery, Ghana’s demand for agricultural products is still high, and this time making a smooth shift to Russia whose poultry meat and wheat currently became the main driver of exports to African countries. And Ghana, noticeably, accepts large quantity (tonnes) of poultry from Russia’s Rostov region into the country, according to several media reports. The supplies include grains, but also vegetable oils, meat and dairy products, fish and finished food products have significant potential for Africa.

The Agriculture Ministry’s Agroexport Department acknowledges Russia exports chicken to Ghana, with Ghanaian importers sourcing Russian poultry products, especially frozen cuts, to meet significant local demand that far outstrips domestic production, even after Ghana lifted a temporary 2020 avian flu-related ban on Russian poultry.

Moreover, monitoring and basic research indicated Russian producers are actively increasing poultry exports to various African countries, thus boosting trade, although Ghana still struggles to balance imports with local industry needs.

A few details indicate the following:

Trade Resumed: Ghana has lifted its ban on Russian poultry imports since April 2021, allowing poultry trade to resume. Russian regions have, thus far, consistently exported these poultry meat and products into the country under regulatory but flexible import rules on a negotiated bilateral agreement.

Significant Market: In any case, Ghana is a key African market for Russian poultry, with exports seeing substantial growth in recent years, alongside Angola, Benin, Cote d’Voire, Nigeria and Sierra Leone.

Demand-Driven: Ghana’s large gap between domestic poultry production and national demand necessitates significant imports, creating opportunities for foreign suppliers like Russia.

Major Exporters: Russia poultry companies are focused on increasing generally their African exports, with Ghana being a major destination. The basic question: to remain as import dependency or strive at attaining food sufficiency?

Product Focus: Exports typically include frozen chicken cuts (legs and meat) very vital for supplementing local supply. But as the geopolitical dynamics shift, Ghana and other importing African countries have to review partnerships, particularly with Russia.

Despite the fact that challenges persist, Russia strongly remains as a notable supplier to Ghana, even under the supervision of John Mahama’s administration, dealing as a friendly ally, both have the vision for multipolar trade architecture, ultimately fulfilling a critical role in meeting majority of African countries’ large consumer demand for poultry products, and with Russia’s trade actively expanding and Ghana’s preparedness to spend on such imports from the state budget.

Following two high-profile Russia–Africa summits, cooperation in the area of food security emerged as a key theme. Moscow pledged to boost agricultural exports to the continent—especially grain, poultry, and fertilisers—while African leaders welcomed the prospect of improved food supplies.

Nevertheless, do these African governments think of prioritising agricultural self-sufficiency. At a May 2025 meeting in St. Petersburg, Russia’s Economic Development Minister, Maxim Reshetnikov, underlined the fact that more than 40 Russian companies were keen to export animal products and agricultural goods to the African region.

Russia, eager to expand its economic footprint, sees large-scale agricultural exports as a key revenue generator. Estimates suggest the Russian government could earn over $15 billion annually from these agricultural exports to African continent.

Head of the Agroexport Federal Center, Ilya Ilyushin, speaking at the round table “Russia-Africa: A Strategic Partnership in Agriculture to Ensure Food Security,” which was held as part of the international conference on ensuring the food sovereignty of African countries in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) on Nov. 21, 2025, said: “We see significant potential in expanding supplies of Russian agricultural products to Africa.”

Ilya Ilyushin, however, mentioned that the Agriculture Ministry’s Agroexport Department, and the Union of Grain Exporters and Producers, exported over 32,000 tonnes of wheat and barley to Egypt totaling nearly $8 million during the first half of 2025, Kenya totaling over $119 million.

Interfax media reports referred to African countries whose markets are of interest for Russian producers and exporters. Despite existing difficulties, supplies of livestock products are also growing, this includes poultry meat, Ilyushin said. Exports of agricultural products from Russia to African countries have more than doubled, and third quarter of 2025 reached almost $7 billion.

The key buyers of Russian grain on the continent are Egypt, Algeria, Kenya, Libya, Tunisia, Nigeria, Morocco, South Africa, Tanzania and Sudan, he said. According to him, Russia needs to expand the geography of supplies, increasing exports to other regions of the continent, increase supplies in West Africa to Benin, Cameroon, Ghana, Liberia and the French-speaking Sahelian States.

Nevertheless, Russian exporters have nothing to complain. Africa’s dependency dilemma still persists. Therefore, Russia to continue expanding food exports to Africa explicitly reflects a calculated economic and geopolitical strategy. In the end of the analysis, the debate plays out prominently and the primary message: Africa cannot and must not afford to sacrifice food sovereignty for colourful symbolism and geopolitical solidarity.

With the above analysis, Russian exporters show readiness to explore and shape actionable strategies for harnessing Africa’s consumer market, including that of Ghana, and further to strengthen economic and trade cooperation and support its dynamic vision for sustainable development in the context of multipolar friendship and solidarity.

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Coup Leader Mamady Doumbouya Wins Guinea’s 2025 Presidential Election

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Mamady Doumbouya

By Adedapo Adesanya

Guinea’s military leader Mamady Doumbouya will fully transition to its democratic president after he was elected president of the West African nation.

The former special forces commander seized power in 2021, toppling then-President Alpha Conde, who had been in office since 2010.

Mr Doumbouya reportedly won 86.72 per cent of the election held on December 28, an absolute majority that allows him to avoid a runoff. He will hold the forte for the next seven years as law permits.

The Supreme Court has eight days to validate the results in the event of any challenge. However, this may not be so as ousted Conde and Mr Cellou Dalein Diallo, Guinea’s longtime opposition leader, are in exile.

The election saw Doumbouya face off a fragmented opposition of eight challengers.

One of the opposition candidates, Mr Faya Lansana Millimono claimed the election was marred by “systematic fraudulent practices” and that observers were prevented from monitoring the voting and counting processes.

Guinea is the world leader in bauxite and holds a very large gold reserve. The country is preparing to occupy a leading position in iron ore with the launch of the Simandou project in November, expected to become the world’s largest iron mine.

Mr Doumbouya has claimed credit for pushing the project forward and ensuring Guinea benefits from its output. He has also revoked the licence of Emirates Global Aluminium’s subsidiary Guinea Alumina Corporation following a refinery dispute, transferring the unit’s assets to a state-owned firm.

In September, rating agency, Standard & Poor’s (S&P), assigned an inaugural rating of “B+” with a “Stable” outlook to the Republic of Guinea.

This decision reflects the strength of the country’s economic fundamentals, strong growth prospects driven by the integrated mining and infrastructure Simandou project, and the rigor in public financial management.

As a result, Guinea is now above the continental average and makes it the third best-rated economy in West Africa.

According to S&P, between 2026 and 2028, Guinea could experience GDP growth of nearly 10 per cent per year, far exceeding the regional average.

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