World
China-India Conflict a Potential Threat to BRICS Association
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
The tension between China and India threatens to paralyse BRICS – the association of five major emerging national economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. While struggling to expand and influence on the global stage, China and India have locked horns over issues in their bilateral relations, ranging from border security to trade conflicts and information war.
The latest strains began in early May and culminated in hand-to-hand fighting in the Galwan Valley, a remote stretch of the 3,380-kilometre (2,100-mile) Line of Actual Control – the border established following a war between India and China in 1962 that resulted in an uneasy truce.
Punsara Amarasinghe, a former research fellow at the Faculty of Law, Higher School of Economics in Moscow, and now a PhD candidate in international law at the Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies in Pisa, Italy, argues that this tension is rather ironic given that in the past the two countries shared many civilisational values and both were victims of Western colonialism.
When India gained independence in 1947 from the British, its first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru built a rapport with Communist China by accepting the government of Mao Zedong with great anticipation that both China and India would become the stalwarts in the global campaign against Western imperialism. For example, it was Nehru’s idea that China should be granted a place in the non-aligned movement despite some of opposition from some members at the famous Bandung Conference in 1955.
However, the comity between the two nations was short-lived as China claimed the territory near Arunachal Pradesh whereas India adhered to the line of control known as the McMahon Line established by the British under the 1914 Simla Convention with the consent of Tibet. From the 1950s onwards, China showed its interest in the Aksai Chin area albeit its cordial relations with Nehru’s India. This long dispute finally ended in military escalation in 1962 and became known as the Sino-Indian War.
While acknowledging that some other issues have marred their relationship apart from the current border conflict, Amarasinghe told this article author that “both China and India have longed for global governance as emerging powers, and particularly, the influence expanded by China in South Asia has rapidly increased India’s doubt on China’s presence. Secondly, China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative project has encircled India geopolitically, creating a plethora of doubts about India’s state apparatus.”
He added that the notion of nuclear weapon strategies and India’s affinity with the USA are the biggest dilemmas that China has persistently had in dealing with India. Moreover, India has been the sanctuary for Tibetan refugees, including the Dalai Lama.
As to the fundamental question of whether all these issues put together could reappear in future, Amarasinghe emphasized: “Having looked at the trajectories of the history of Indo-China conflict, one can ascertain that the India-China issue has always been imbued with a question of power. Both states are yearning for global governance. Yet India is ahead of the curve as the world’s largest democracy and a state with one of the strongest soft powers, making the Indian narrative stronger, whereas Beijing is known for its autocracy.”
On the other hand, he reminded, “We should not forget that the pact signed between China and India in 1996 clearly says that two states cannot use firearms in a border dispute escalation. However, there have been several events that have shown the acts of aggression in the Indo-China border conflict. The Chinese efforts to build a road in the Doklam area near the border created a tense situation in 2017. Three years after that event, the conflict erupted again.”
China’s Foreign Ministry stipulated measures that would be implemented to normalise the situation and prevent future armed conflicts. “The sides welcomed the developments of relations between defence agencies and the external affairs ministries, agreed to support such consultations in the future and implement agreements that were reached by the two sides during the talks between the border troops commanders, as well complete as soon as possible the process of frontline troop withdrawal,” read a ministry statement.
The Foreign Ministry noted that the sides also reached an agreement to implement measures to “prevent the reoccurrence of incidents which may influence the situation and peace in the border region.”
“The relationship of China and India underwent various trials and their progress towards modern development was not always swift. As had been recently demonstrated correctly, and at the same time incorrectly, by the recent incident in the western sector of the China-India border in the Galwan River valley, China will continue to assert its territorial sovereignty as well as peace and tranquillity in the border region,” according to the statement.
The sides expressed readiness to respect the agreements achieved previously by the heads of state, pay specific attention to the issue of state borders and prevent “disagreements from becoming conflicts.” The sides also confirmed their adherence to the earlier agreements on the state border and expressed readiness to implement measures to normalise the situation in the border region.
Sino-Indian geopolitical rivalry is certainly not new, but today it has multifaceted implications for developments in the South Asian region and most possibly for BRICS. For example, in email discussions, Dr. Zhu Ming of the Institute for Global Governance Studies at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS), noted that while there have been several disagreements between China and India, some have been resolved within the framework of international law but others have remained without comprehensive solutions.
Within the context of geopolitical alliances and emerging challenges, Tahama Asadis, a graduate of Strategic Studies from the National Defence University in Islamabad, noted the changing alliances and power equilibrium among the United States, China, India and Pakistan that bear key implications for inter-state rivalry and the consequent crisis dynamics in South Asia.
China has so far been successful in influencing South Asia because of many factors. One of the major reasons is that China has managed to project itself as a neighbour that would not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, least of all, in the internal affairs of its friends and partners. In the light of its ‘Good Neighbour Policy’, China’s increased diplomatic and economic engagements in South Asia are aimed at enhancing its strategic influence in the region.
Professor Ian Taylor at the University of St Andrews in the United Kingdom explained that he did not see any long-term future for the BRICS as a coherent grouping on the world stage. According to Taylor, the China-India rivalry (as exemplified by border clashes) shows how shallow the alliance is. Furthermore, Brasilia has its own “Brazilian Trump” who sees alliance with the West as the way forward, not with other “developing countries”.
Originally, BRIC was a four-member alliance until South Africa officially became a member in December 2010, after formally being invited by China to join and subsequently being accepted by the founding BRIC countries. The group was renamed BRICS – with the “S” standing for South Africa – to reflect the group’s expanded membership. South Africa is a staunch member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
“South Africa is in terminal decline and was only admitted to the BRICS for politically expedient-politically correct reasons. Its membership damaged the group’s credibility. And of course, China will resist to the very end the notion that India be admitted to the UN Security Council as a Permanent Member,” Taylor explained, adding that so much for the vaunted “South-South solidarity” that the BRICS was supposed to represent and what all the noise was about when it was launched.
Zhu Ming holds conservative not so negative views on the future of BRICS amid India-China conflicts, giving two reasons. The first and most important is that Beijing is still keeping a low profile on this conflict. For instance, Chinese local media coverage of this conflict is still quite low, and Beijing has not revealed losses on the Chinese side in order not to form the impression of too huge a gap in losses between the two sides as to humiliate the Indian side. “Just imagine, if two people were fighting, the situation would be extremely hard to turn back to normal very soon. But if one side could keep relatively calm, the situation would be more optimistic.”
Secondly, the disputed land is not worthy of a war between the two countries. “However, the rising nationalist mood of India is a bit troublesome. BRICS is not nothing to New Delhi, it will not be a good option for India to quit BRICS. Since BRICS was formed jointly by five powers, China does not own BRICS,” he told this article author, adding, “It is a bit early to judge the prospects of BRICS. It is quite possible that the global and BRICS health governance system could be another rising cooperation field within the BRICS group after the forthcoming BRICS summit.”
“While there are no official claims from the Kremlin that Putin was brokering any negotiation between the two to reconcile the border dispute if Russia can make a good move in meddling with the Indo-China border conflict, I assume it will work to a greater extent. Given the history of Russia’s dominant role in South Asia since its Soviet past, Moscow has a greater capacity to play the role of mediator. Besides that, BRICS is a platform for emerging powers and its capacity cannot be discarded as a regional political talk shop. Thus, I believe BRICS would create some steps for a more amicable solution,” Amarasinghe concluded on an optimistic note.
Alicia Garcia-Herrero is Senior Research Fellow at the Brussels-based think tank Bruegel and Adjunct Professor at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, noted in her article headlined “China Continues To Dominate An Expanded BRICS” published by the East Asia Forum that China has been the leading proponent of expanding BRICS to BRICS+. The main reason for the expansion was to make BRICS more representative of the developing world and give it a stronger voice on the global stage.
But the six countries invited to join — which has become five after Argentina’s withdrawal — are quite heterogeneous. Some are net creditors (such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates), while others are net debtors and in a very weak financial position. Half of them are large exporters of fossil fuels (Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Iran). Ethiopia and Egypt stand out as members from Africa, a continent that has become increasingly important for China’s and India’s foreign policy, according to Garcia-Herrero.
The BRICS countries are considered the foremost geopolitical rival to the G7 bloc of leading advanced economies, implementing competing initiatives such as the New Development Bank, the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement, the BRICS pay, the BRICS Joint Statistical Publication and the BRICS basket reserve currency. But in practical reality, China has large control and uses the platform to widen its economic influence. Most of the trade growth has been China-centric, with contributions from the rest of BRICS remaining quite flat until recently. Russia, with its limited economic impact, only remains an excellent public relations organizer for BRICS.
The BRICS members are known for their significant influence on regional affairs, and all are members of the G20. Since its establishment in 2009, the BRICS nations have met annually at several summits, with South Africa having hosted the most recent 15th BRICS Summit in August 2023. Currently, Russia is heading the rotating in 2024 and plans to push forward significant issues, particularly the association’s expansion and transforming it into an anti-Western coalition. Reports indicate about 40 countries, the majority in Africa and Asia have expressed readiness to join BRICS from the Global South. The association has three areas of strategic partnership: policy and security, economy and finance, and cultural and educational cooperation.
Between now and until October when Kazan will host the 16th summit, Moscow has scheduled various activities including the BRICS Games, BRICS Foreign Ministers, BRICS Academic and BRICS Parliamentary meetings, these aim at showcasing BRICS geopolitical influence and increasing coalition for building a fairer, better and multipolar world. It also operates based on non-interference and equality with the hope of ensuring members get mutual economic benefits in the world. BRICS has received both praise and criticism from academics, researchers, politicians geopolitical analysts and writers around the world.
The origins of BRICS — a bloc comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa and, as of 2024, new members Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates — can be traced back to a 2001 publication by Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neill titled ‘Building Better Global Economic BRICs’. O’Neill argued that Brazil, Russia, India and China were poised to play an increasingly significant role in the global economy. BRIC was officially launched in 2009 and was renamed BRICS in 2010 when South Africa joined, and Russia will make history by admitting the largest ever in 2024.
The founding countries of Brazil, Russia, India, and China held the first summit in Yekaterinburg in 2009, with South Africa joining the association a year later. Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates joined on 1 January 2024 The five BRICS countries together represent over 3.1 billion people, or about 41 percent of the world population. The five nations had a combined nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 18.6 trillion dollars and an estimated 4.46 trillion dollars in combined foreign reserves.
World
Russia-Africa Dialogue: Untapped Prospects for Economic Cooperation
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
At the St Petersburg International Economic Forum 2026, the traditional “Russia-Africa Business Dialogue”, which was initiated in 2016, will deliberate aspects of forging economic cooperation between Russia and African countries. For a decade since its creation, this platform has practically discussed most pertinent roadblocks, highlighted the economic sectors, and outlined the prospects. The significant issues have also been treated at the first and second Russia-Africa summits.
As Moscow prepares to hold the next Russia-Africa summit in October, it is quite clear that Russia has still not worked out financial mechanisms to support its investments across Africa. Generally, the federal strategy for this area has been mapped out, Russian investors understand where to invest in Africa, but lacks extremely the financial motivation and approach to integrate young people into the business environment. Other constraining factors include a lack of financial support instruments the suitable environment for experience sharing and collaboration. At the same time, there are reports that point to a broad range of factors that hinder the development of youth entrepreneurship.
Historically, Russia–Africa relations have evolved through distinct phases after phases. The latest phase began from the first Russia-Africa summit through the second, and is currently moving to the third summit in October. As part of the strategic preparations, Tanzanian President Samia Suluhu Hassan was the guest of Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin. Russia and Tanzania have had good relations, but it has been more than a century since the last state visit of a Tanzanian leader to Russia. From the historical records, Mwalimu Nyerere visited in 1969. As a result, Samia Hassan’s official working visit had a special historic significance for the bilateral relations. “We see this as a very positive sign,” noted Putin. Further to that, Samia Hassan was decorated with an honorary doctorate degree (Doctor Honoris Causa) at the Russian Peoples Friendship University, expressed gratitude for the political solidarity, and underlined Russia for the great contribution which it provided during the African political liberation in the 60s.
Tanzania’s Distinctive Profile
Sergei Kiriyenko, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration who oversees the department, visited Tanzania after the November 2025 elections. In addition, Putin’s aide Yuri Ushakov called Tanzania “one of the key partners on the African continent,” recalling that it is home to approximately 70 million people. Samia’s visit to Russia is a victory for Russian diplomacy in Africa, as Tanzania is one of those allies that strengthen Moscow, says Andrey Maslov, Director of the HSE Centre for African Studies. According to the expert, cooperation is based on mutual benefit, and Tanzania does not require assistance. The country is among the continent’s economic leaders, distinguished by high growth rates, a stable political system, and a friendly attitude towards Russia. Russia’s interest in Tanzania is largely due to its geographic location and access to the Indian Ocean. The port of Dar es Salaam is considered a key transport hub in East Africa, serving transit routes to the East African Community (EAC) countries, along with the Kenyan port of Mombasa. Given Tanzania’s population, the EAC’s combined market represents over 300 million people, and the potential for expanding trade lies primarily in agricultural products, fertilisers, and basic industrial goods.
Africa’s participation at the St Petersburg 29th forum is very unique, with the majority from East and Southern Africa. The Director General of the Tanzania Investment and Special Economic Zones Authority (TISEZA), Gilead J. Teri, noted that the Tanzanian delegation has a unique opportunity to advance its agenda and strengthen bilateral relations. The forum gave a powerful boost to trade and economic cooperation. Tanzania presented its investment potential to the Russian business community. Therefore, it could be said that bilateral relations between Russia and Tanzania are flourishing and developing dynamically today.
Eastern and Southern Africa’s Dimensions
While it envisages strengthening ties in a broad range of fields, targeting the Eastern and Southern regions by utilising Tanzania as the gateway, Russia shows that the key partners in that part of Africa. Russia’s attributes for raising investment relations are clear: stability, untapped resources and human capital.
Putin’s meeting with Tanzania’s Samia Hassan, aiming at lifting up bilateral cooperation, which symbolises a new qualitative stage or a new chapter in the relations between Russia, Tanzania and the entire SADC. “Africa is an important partner for Russia, a participant in the emerging and sustainable polycentric architecture of the world order. Our relations with the states of that continent are valuable in their own right and should not be subject to the fluctuations on the international arena,” Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov also said long time ago at the Russia-Africa civil/public gathering held in 2018, in attendance was Stergomena Lawrence Tax, who headed the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
“We are aware that our African friends hold the same views. Relying on the accumulated experience of productive cooperation, Russian diplomats seek to pursue a consistent policy for deepening the range of Russia-Africa relations,” he added. Lavrov said it is necessary to maximise the potential of public, cultural and business diplomacy in the interests of strengthening and expanding the mutually beneficial ties between Russia and African states while invariably adhering to the principle of African solutions to African problems, formulated by the Africans themselves.
Stergomena Lawrence, however, observed that Russia has not been that visible in the region as compared to China, India or Brazil. But it is encouraging that Russia has made the decision to reposition itself as a major partner with Southern Africa. She expressed gratitude that Russia has launched a plan aimed at improving direct trade with the continent/region beyond the traditional sectors like mining, seeking to invest in areas like agriculture, industrial production, high technology and transport.
The Russian Federation’s priorities are also in line with SADC priorities, as evidenced by the priorities of the Foreign Economic Strategy in the region, as indicated below:
Prospecting, mining, oil, construction and mining, purchasing gas, oil, uranium, and bauxite assets (Angola, Namibia and South Africa);
Construction of power facilities—hydroelectric power plants on the River Congo (Angola, Namibia and Zambia) and nuclear power plants (South Africa);
Creating a floating nuclear power plant, and South African participation in the international project to build a nuclear enrichment centre in Russia;
Railway Construction (Angola);
Creation of Russian trade houses for the promotion and maintenance of Russian engineering products (South Africa).
Participation of Russian companies in the privatisation of industrial assets, including those created with technical assistance from the former Soviet Union (Angola).
In the Russian Federation, 10 SADC member countries have their diplomatic offices, namely: Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
Final Words of Wisdom
In pursuit of following Putin’s policy to strengthen ties with the Global South, including Africa, Russia has to re-strategise and take up the existing critical challenges. Despite a noticeable increase in activity, Russia’s strategy on the continent faces several persistent structural limitations that require thoughtful responses. As geopolitical changes heat up, Russia has to understand the necessity to move ahead, back away from tectonic rhetoric and symbolism of diplomacy. By 2025–2026, the African continent had firmly established itself as a key area of global competition and, simultaneously, one of the most important reserves of economic growth. For Russia, this is important to change the very logic of its African ties. It is logical to walk the talk. In other words, Russia’s relations with African countries have to shift from historical rhetoric to a more practical architecture of interests.
On December 19–20, 2025, the second ministerial conference of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum was held in Cairo, with the Roscongress Foundation acting as the operator on the Russian side. The conference was attended by the heads of the African foreign ministries and the leaders of the continent’s integration associations. That conference has been defined as a key stage in the preparations for the third Russia-Africa summit, scheduled for October 2026. As noted by Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova, the meeting is intended to “give additional impetus to the development of the Russian-African partnership and the strengthening of its truly strategic nature.”
For Moscow, institutionalising the format is crucial given the overall transformation of global politics. And ultimately, Africa is becoming a space where external players’ ability to not only declare respect for sovereignty but also propose practical mechanisms for cooperation is being tested. Russia’s strategy is built on combining political rhetoric about multipolarity with concrete areas of cooperation—from trade to energy, and food security to personnel training and military-technical cooperation. Economic spheres and building infrastructures are important for Africa, which is ready for foreign investors with adequate funds and not just geopolitical rhetoric. It has to be noted that Africa is a space of competition between external players.
The continent is an arena of intense competition, with China, the European Union, the United States, Turkey, India, and the Gulf states all operating simultaneously, each offering its models of interaction: from large-scale infrastructure financing to military cooperation and religious and cultural influence. African states are becoming increasingly pragmatic and multi-vector—they are consistently expanding their foreign policy space, weighing the conditions, benefits, and political costs.
In such an environment, the sustainability of Russia’s presence is determined by its ability to offer a concrete and replicable set of advantages. Anti-colonial rhetoric and appeals to historical legacy remain important, but they no longer provide a long-term advantage on their own. Each competitive proposition must be backed by institutional support.
At the St. Petersburg forum, there was a genuine international community of like-minded partners practically united by a common goal: networking and developing business cooperation. “The continued participation confirms the demand for building relationships of business trust and confidence with foreign partners from different regions, including the United States, Europe, the Middle East, Latin America, Asia and Africa,” said Alexander Stuglev, Chairman of the Board and CEO of the Roscongress Foundation. The Roscongress Foundation held the 29th St Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) from 3 to 6 June 2026.
World
CANAL+ Eyes MultiChoice Turnaround as Stocks Debut on JSE
By Adedapo Adesanya
CANAL+ has expressed confidence in its ability to turn around the fortunes of struggling broadcaster MultiChoice as it marks a milestone by becoming the first French company listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE).
The secondary listing of CANAL+ signals strong international confidence in South Africa’s capital markets and reinforces the JSE’s role as a conduit between global capital and African growth opportunities, it said in a statement.
CANAL+ enhances the JSE’s sectoral diversity and provides local investors with direct, rand-denominated exposure to a globally diversified media and entertainment business with a significant African footprint. CANAL+ listed on the London Stock Exchange in December 2024.
The group’s listing on the JSE aligns with its long-term strategy to expand its presence in high-growth markets, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, where rising connectivity, a young and growing population (expected to increase by 800 million by 2050), strong GDP growth (4.5 per cent growth expected between 2026 and 2030) and accelerating demand for content and connectivity continue to drive sector growth.
The JSE listing will increase CANAL+ liquidity and enable African investors to benefit from CANAL+ growth.
According to Mr Maxime Saada, CEO of CANAL+ said, “Joining the Johannesburg Stock Exchange is a statement of our ambition and illustrates our belief in Africa’s future and its creative industry.
“We are proud to become the first French company ever to list in Johannesburg and the only global media and entertainment company listed on the exchange.
“Following our listing on the London Stock Exchange 18 months ago, this dual listing reinforces our ambition to be a bridge between Europe and Africa and anchors our dual-continental approach, consolidating our unique position in the global media and entertainment industry,” he said.
He noted that CANAL+ serves more than 40 million subscribers and generates €9bn in annual revenue.
“Africa will be our growth engine for years to come, and we are dedicated to creating value on the continent and sharing it with our African partners, investors and the creative community. By welcoming African investors, we deepen our roots, diversify our investor base and lay the foundation for the next phase of our growth.”
Commenting on the listing, Ms Valdene Reddy, Group CEO of the JSE, said, “We are proud to welcome CANAL+ to the JSE and to mark the first listing of a French company on our exchange.
World
AfDB President Sees More African Nations Regaining Investment-Grade Ratings
By Adedapo Adesanya
The President of the African Development Bank (AfDB), Mr Sidi Ould Tah, says more African countries are likely to regain or achieve investment-grade credit ratings by next year as reforms begin to deliver results and economic growth accelerates.
Several African sovereigns have already been upgraded in recent months, including Nigeria. However, Nigeria is not yet near investment-grade status.
In May, S&P Global Ratings upgraded Nigeria’s sovereign credit ratings to ‘B’ with a stable outlook, citing structural reforms under President Bola Tinubu and key drivers like higher oil production and improved fiscal revenue.
The country is still five notches from investment-grade. Under S&P’s rating scale, the progression follows— B → B+ → BB- → BB → BB+ → BBB- (investment grade).
S&P raised Morocco to investment grade last year and increased South Africa by one level to BB in November. Ghana, Zambia, the Ivory Coast and Kenya have also benefited from positive rating action linked to fiscal, debt and economic reforms.
“We’re quite confident that the continent will continue to grow very strongly and that African countries will be better rated in the coming years,” Mr Ould Tah said in an interview with Bloomberg.
“We’ve seen Morocco receive investment grade during the last few months, and we expect other countries by next year to get toward that,” he added.
The outlook reflects improving fiscal positions and reforms implemented across countries on the continent, even as the conflict in the Middle East threatens to slow economic growth and raise costs for energy-importing nations. Better credit ratings can help countries borrow at lower rates and fund development projects.
The AfDB projects the continent’s gross domestic product expansion will accelerate to 4.4 per cent next year, if the conflict in the Middle East does not extend for a longer period. It expects the continent to slow to 4.2 per cent this year.
The war in Iran has benefited oil producers such as Nigeria, Angola and Gabon, while exerting pressure on the fiscal positions of net energy importers such as South Africa, Kenya, Ghana and Senegal.
Mr Ould Tah said the bank is ready to support countries facing budget constraints and high debt burdens due to the impact of the Iran crisis, including increasing credit lines to them.
“The board of directors of the bank will examine in the coming days how the bank can increase the volume of resources it will provide to its member countries in this specific situation,” he said.
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