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Expanding BRICS for Numerical Strength or Ensuring Qualitative Geopolitical Influence

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BRICS Geopolitical Influence

By Professor Maurice Okoli

As stipulated by the guidelines, Russia will take over BRICS [Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa] from January 2024.  With the heightening of geopolitical tensions, Russia’s priority focus is on the group’s possible enlargement to counter U.S. hegemony. It plans to push seriously for critical reforms in the international financial architecture and create a solidified platform for building an equitable multipolar world order.

In the past few years, the BRICS group has taken a number of broad initiatives that aim at countering hegemonic policies and against the collective West for imposing the ‘rules of the game’ on the world majority. There have been explicit indications that Russia’s BRICS presidency from January 2024 will constitute another clear chance towards entering into forming alliances with Africa, Asia and Latin America.

Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov said in early October that BRICS had agreed on a list of candidates for partner-state status ahead of the upcoming summit in Kazan in 2024. According to Ryabkov, during the Russian BRICS chairmanship, special attention would be expanding the “circle of BRICS friends,” including in Latin America.

Many Latin American countries have expressed their desire to join the group. African countries, particularly Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Niger and Central African Republic have appeared on Russia’s list as potential members. In addition, Angola, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal and Zimbabwe have appeared in media reports, striking membership deals with Russia, hoping to secure their ultimate accession to BRICS status during Russia’s chairmanship.

Currently, Russia is supporting African countries in their fight against trends of growing neocolonialism, forging close cooperation in preserving their sovereignty and political independence. Russia has persistently been confronting Europe and the United States over dominating and exploiting Africa. The relationship between China and Russia is strengthening. Nevertheless, China and Russia still have their approaches to some global issues. China promotes cooperation even with the United States, while Russia insists on confrontation. Creating divisions and partitions is simply not the right path to global peace and development. Why not attempt to reach ‘consensus’ – the catchword of BRICS? This fierce political confrontation is sharpening disunity across Africa, and impacting the prospects of the African Continental Trade Area [AfCFTA], the African Union’s flagship program under the Agenda 2063.

Despite the continental instability, African countries still seriously consider the traditional markets in the United States and Europe for their revenue products, and the recent Johannesburg summit witnessed in-depth discussions relating to new agreements between the AfCFTA and the African Growth and Opportunity Act [AGOA] which will presumably be extended for another 16 years, until 2041. It offers certain broad conditions as a stepping-stone to address regional and global challenges, especially for Africa’s young and entrepreneurial population. That expected leverage will strengthen trade relations with Africa.

South Africa and BRICS

South Africa has so far displayed pragmatism. It deals with global players without discriminating. Moreover, South Africa has adopted ‘neutrality’ and further taken non-aligned positions on many issues in its foreign policy, thus fulfilling the promise of strategically working on the bilateral relationship with all countries. Research establishes noticeable facts, for instance, that South Africa’s export trade to the United States, United Kingdom and the European Union account for a combined 35%, and with China around 9%. United States trade with South Africa totalled $25.5 billion in 2022. Exports were $9.3 billion; imports were $16.2 billion. Russia’s trade was $1.3 billion with South Africa in 2023.

With an estimated population of 58 million, South Africa [BRICS member] is the southernmost country in Africa. Energy deficit has crippled industrial operations and supplies for domestic use have largely been reduced. Social discontent, as a result of the multiple crises, has engulfed every corner of South Africa. The World Bank has approved a $1 billion loan to support South Africa’s energy sector which is currently experiencing worse conditions including inadequate funds for overhauling, renovation and upgrading.

At the end of the 15th BRICS summit held in South Africa, the leaders called for a more active use of national currencies in financial transactions as part of the adopted declaration. But the basic arguable question here remains that the well-established BRICS+ format and many new members joining BRICS in 2024 have, over a long period, had profitable trade ties with the United States and Europe.

For fresh members, it is the significance of trade and economic partnership between them and BRICS. In fact, balancing the economic interests of these African countries is as important for this sustainable world order as lasting peace and indivisible security. Therefore, Russia’s leadership has to provide that platform and step-by-step to advance their development-oriented aspirations and streamline the effective full-scale operational activity with BRICS.

Application process

Discussions about the expansion and entry of new members were little addressed until the early 2020s. The leaders and top-ranking diplomats of the founding bloc began the discussions for the expansion of the group, most often referring to 2010, the year South Africa joined after accepting an invitation from China. BRICS is the acronym composed of the first letters of the countries’ names in English. The term BRIC was originally coined in 2001 by Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neill at the University of Manchester, and with South Africa, it was renamed BRICS.

Until today, there is no formal application process as such to join BRICS, but any hopeful government must receive unanimous backing from all existing BRICS members – Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa – to receive an invitation. In a rush to overcome Western imperialist-economic hegemony on the path of strengthening economic integration and developing economic activities, BRICS members, particularly Russia set to indiscriminately ask for applications it termed ‘friendly allies’ from around the world.

While sharing positive concerns for the group’s expansion, existing conflicting issues among new members have to be taken into serious account, as it may likely influence future genuine policy partnerships. The BRICS bloc has not set any concrete criteria, admission of new candidates is determined by a simple ‘consensus’ – a general agreement at the summit. But experts, as the situation over expansion is increasingly evolving, have beamed warning lights over indiscriminate admission of new members.

In August 2023, it was reported that more than 40 countries had shown interest in joining BRICS, including 22 that had formally applied to join. Historically, since 2017 it was China that insisted on promoting the BRICS+ format to attract a large number of non-participating countries to the organization. BRICS’ scope of activities has indeed widened to include issues relating to education and culture, health and living standards, science and technology, finance and politics. Now, of course, many appreciate others joining in building a partnership with BRICS. But now so frequently, and often asked – quality or quantity?

Monitoring various discussions and developments, Alexander Shokhin, head of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP), in early November suggested that BRICS countries should agree on the rules of the game ‘for the five’ before expanding the organization. The BRICS countries have not yet sufficiently formed a common economic policy, whose most important element should be a new monetary and financial system, in order to accept new countries into the organization.

“Considering BRICS as such an alternative [to the Western model of the global economy], to be honest, is that we have not succeeded in rendering BRICS an effective mechanism for forming new rules of global trade, payment and settlement relations, an alternative financial system, and so on, in order to have begun to engage in expansion,” Shokhin said at the plenary session of the International Financial University Forum.

“For me, it would be better for the five [countries] to develop the rules of the game, and to incorporate new members as members joining not the organization, but the rules of the game,” Shokhin added.

Shokhin noted that the process of coming to a consensus is difficult even with the current BRICS composition, “Even when talking about the interests of India and China in creating an alternative monetary and financial system, we see that this is not an easy matter.” In addition, it will be even more difficult to form common rules with such participants as Iran or Ethiopia.

“With the presence of Ethiopia, for example, Iran and a number of other countries, of course, it will be rather difficult to do [to develop new ‘rules of the game’]. In fact, it would be good for us to have Indonesia as a member of BRICS, because Indonesia is one of the examples of a growing economy, based on a combination of the old principles of inexpensive labour resources and technological progress, among other matters, on the latest technological solutions, including robotics, artificial intelligence, and so on,” Shokhin said, describing the preferred vector to expand BRICS.

“BRICS chairmanship should rather aim at trying to make maximum progress in forming the rules of the game within the organization, so that alternative systems could be proposed; and above all, of course, an alternative monetary and financial system, as well as a payment and settlement system,” Shokhin said, summarizing his position regarding the tasks facing BRICS.

Arguments for Expansion

According to Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Africa should be an essential part of the BRICS expansion, and form the necessary part of the platform for dealing with growing neocolonialism in the continent. South Africa was considered as a conduit and entry point into Africa when it was admitted as the fifth member in 2010. Despite showing large-scale varying rates of economic development, and unresolved long-standing conflicts between them, Ethiopia and Egypt stand as new members on the recommendation by Russia backed by South Africa and China.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Yusuf Tuggar said in an interview with Bloomberg that Nigeria would seek to become a member of the BRICS group within the next two years as part of a new foreign policy push to have its voice heard in important global organizations.

Nigeria, Africa’s most populous nation, is seeking to assert its leadership role on the continent after years of playing a subordinate in international politics. “Nigeria has come of age to decide for itself who her partners should be and where they should be, being multiple aligned is in our best interest, and therefore it is necessary to transfer cooperation to a new strategic level on the globe,” Tuggar said.

“We need to belong to groups like BRICS, like the G-20 and all these other ones because if there’s a certain criterion, say the largest countries in terms of population and economy should belong, then why isn’t Nigeria part of it?” Tuggar said.

Nigerian President Bola Tinubu, who was invited to attend the G-20 summit in India in September, has said he would push to join as a permanent member. South Africa, the continent’s most industrialized nation, is already a member of the Group of 20 and joined BRICS in 2010, a year after it was formed.

South Sudan’s Ambassador to Moscow Chol Tong Mayay Jang also said that his country is studying the possibility of joining BRICS. The diplomat noted that “given the current geopolitical situation in the world, you see, there are many people who see that BRICS may be the best option.”

The envoy pointed out that “even most of the allies from the Middle East, allies of the West, have already expressed interest to join BRICS.” “Saudi Arabia, which is a very close ally to the US, is now a member of BRICS,” he stressed, adding: “It means that there is something, which is making people now seek a refuge.”

Before we even delve further into the complexity of the possibilities that could happen if those African countries listed to join BRICS, it is important to know what the BRICS agenda has for them or say simply as a show of solidarity, as reports indicated that Central African Republic (CAR) plans to submit an official application to BRICS. Russian Ambassador to the CAR Alexander Bikantov acknowledged in an interview that the CAR continues to develop its relations with the BRICS member states, both at the bilateral level and on various international platforms. “In August 2023, CAR President Faustin-Archange Touadera participated in the [15th] BRICS Summit in Johannesburg,” the diplomat noted. “Contacts were established with the International Alliance of BRICS Strategic Projects. As well, the joint intention for opening representative offices in Moscow and Bangui was declared.”

From various points of view, it is convincing to conclude that the aim of the latest irreversible expansion is touted as a large part of the plan for building a ‘multipolar’ world order that will definitely put weight on hitherto subdued voices of the Global South and brings them up to the centre of the world agenda. Russian President Vladimir Putin said at the St Petersburg International Cultural Forum – Forum of United Cultures on November 17 underlined this fact that the flexible admission of new members to the BRICS association presents an example of “how a compromise can and needs to be sought and achieved without imposing any viewpoint.”

“These are the organizational principles of BRICS, which is not a bloc, all the more so, it is not a military bloc but it creates conditions for achieving mutual understanding,” Putin underscored the principles for enrolling new members.

President Xi Jinping said at the extraordinary BRICS online summit on the Middle East in November that China, along with other BRICS members, would support Russia’s chairmanship of the organization next year. Xi described the BRICS cooperation mechanism as “an important platform for emerging markets and developing countries to strengthen unity and cooperation and safeguard common interests.”

At the Primakov Readings international forum held in late November, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov remarked the trends shaping the multipolar order are new realities. The unbalanced and unfair model of globalization is becoming a thing of the past. The emergence of new global development centres, the increasing self-awareness of many developing countries and their refusal to blindly follow former colonial powers.

Today, new players representing the Global South and Global East have stepped onto the international political stage. The geopolitical ambitions of the new global players are buttressed by their economic potential. Their numbers are growing, according to Lavrov, and to support his argument referred to President Vladimir Putin who said at the G20 extraordinary summit on November 22, that a “significant portion of global investment, trade and consumer activity is shifting to the Asian, African and Latin American regions, which are home to the majority of the world’s population.”

“Proceeding from the principles of equality and mutual respect, they are reaching a balance of interests via consensus. It’s no surprise that dozens of states want to get closer to BRICS. The number of BRICS members will double. Another 20 states have made similar inquiries or would like to establish special, privileged relations with this association. Next year, Russia will be chairing BRICS. We will do everything we can for BRICS to strengthen its stature in the international arena and to continue playing an increasingly greater role in creating a fair world arrangement,” underlined Lavrov at the Primakov Readings international forum, which is held yearly for politicians, diplomats, experts and academics, originally initiated since 2015.

Lavrov noted a bit earlier, in mid-Autumn, that “the weight, prestige and role of an individual candidate country and, of course, its position in the international arena” were taken into account in decision-making on accepting new members to expand BRICS. An updated list of candidate countries for BRICS membership will be prepared for consideration at the group’s next annual summit in Kazan under Russia’s one-year chairmanship.

South Africa holds the rotating presidency of BRICS until December 2023 and will pass it on to Russia. According to official sources, BRICS members [Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa] have decided to invite Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to join as full-fledged members of the group from January 1, 2024.

Professor Maurice Okoli is a fellow at the Institute for African Studies and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences. He is also a fellow at the North-Eastern Federal University of Russia. He is an expert at the Roscongress Foundation and the Valdai Discussion Club.

As an academic researcher and economist with a keen interest in current geopolitical changes and the emerging world order, Maurice Okoli frequently contributes articles for publication in reputable media portals on different aspects of the interconnection between developing and developed countries, particularly in Asia, Africa and Europe. With comments and suggestions, he can be reached via email: markolconsult (at) gmail (dot) com

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Africa ‘Reawakening’ In Emerging Multipolar World

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Gustavo de Carvalho

By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh

In this interview, Gustavo de Carvalho, Programme Head (Acting): African Governance and Diplomacy, South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), discusses at length aspects of Africa’s developments in the context of shifting geopolitics, its relationships with external countries, and expected roles in the emerging multipolar world. Gustavo de Carvalho further underscores key issues related to transparency in agreements, financing initiatives, and current development priorities that are shaping Africa’s future. Here are the interview excerpts:

Is Africa undergoing the “second political re-awakening” and how would you explain Africans’ perceptions and attitudes toward the emerging multipolar world?

We should be careful not to overstate novelty. African states exercised real agency during the Cold War, too, from Bandung to the Non-Aligned Movement. What has actually shifted is the structure of the international system around the continent. The unipolar moment has faded, the menu of partners has widened, and a generation of policymakers under fifty operates without the inhibitions of either the Cold War or the immediate post-Cold War period. African publics, however, are more pragmatic than multipolar rhetoric assumes. Afrobarometer’s surveys across more than thirty countries consistently show citizens evaluating external partners on tangible outcomes such as infrastructure, jobs and security, rather than on civilisational narratives. China is generally associated with positive economic influence, the United States retains the strongest pull as a development model, and Russia, despite a louder political profile, registers a smaller and more geographically concentrated footprint. Multipolarity is not a destination Africans are arriving at. It is a working environment that creates more options and more risks at once.

Do you think it is appropriate to use the term “neo-colonialism” referring to activities of foreign players in Africa? By the way, who are the neo-colonisers in your view?

The term has analytical value when used carefully, and loses it when deployed selectively against whichever power one wishes to embarrass. Nkrumah’s 1965 formulation was precise: political independence accompanied by continued external control over economic and political life. The honest test is whether contemporary patterns reproduce that asymmetry, irrespective of the capital from which they originate. The structural picture is well documented. Africa still exports primary commodities and imports manufactured goods. Intra-African trade hovers around fifteen per cent of total trade, well below Asian or European levels. African sovereigns pay a measurable risk premium on debt that exceeds what fundamentals alone justify. Applied consistently, the lens directs attention to opaque resource-for-infrastructure contracts, security-for-mineral bargains, debt agreements with confidentiality clauses, and aid architectures that bypass African institutions. That description fits legacy French commercial arrangements in francophone Africa, Chinese mining concessions in the DRC, Russian-linked gold extraction in the Central African Republic and Sudan, Gulf-backed port and farmland deals along the Red Sea, and Western corporate practices that have not always met the standards their governments preach. Naming a single neo-coloniser tells us more about the speaker’s politics than about the structure.

How would you interpret the current engagement of foreign players in Africa? Do you also think there is geopolitical competition and rivalry among them?

Competition is real and intensifying, and the proliferation of Africa-plus-one summits is the clearest indicator. Russia has held two summits, in Sochi in 2019 and St Petersburg in 2023. The EU, Turkey, Japan, India, the United States, South Korea, Saudi Arabia and the UAE all host their own variants. Trade figures give a more honest sense of weight than diplomatic theatre. China-Africa trade reached around 280 billion dollars in 2023, United States-Africa trade sits in the 60 to 70 billion range, and Russia-Africa trade is roughly 24 billion, heavily concentrated in grain, fertiliser and arms. Describing the continent as a chessboard, however, understates how African states themselves are shaping these dynamics, sometimes through skilful diversification and sometimes through security bargains that entail longer-term costs. The Sahel illustrates the latter starkly. Between 2020 and 2023, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger expelled French forces, downgraded their relationships with ECOWAS and the UN stabilisation mission, and welcomed Russian security contractors. ACLED data shows civilian fatalities from political violence rising rather than falling across the same period. Substituting providers without strengthening domestic institutions does not produce sovereignty. It changes the terms of dependence.

Do you think much depends on African leaders and their people (African solutions to African problems) to work toward long-term, sustainable development?

The principle is correct, and it is regularly weaponised in two unhelpful directions. External actors invoke it to justify withdrawing from responsibilities they continue to hold, particularly over financial flows and arms transfers that pass through their own jurisdictions. Some African leaders invoke it to deflect legitimate scrutiny of governance failings, repression or corruption. Genuine African agency requires more than rhetoric. The AU’s operating budget remains modest in absolute terms, and external partners still cover a significant share of programmatic activities, which shapes what gets funded. The African Standby Force, conceived in 2003, remains only partially operational more than two decades on. The African Continental Free Trade Area, in force since 2021, has rolled out more slowly than drafters hoped because the political will to lower national barriers lags the speeches. Long-term development depends on African leaders financing more of their own security and development priorities, on publics holding them accountable, and on a clearer-eyed view of what foreign forces can deliver. Whether the actors are Russian-linked contractors in the Sahel and Central African Republic, Western counter-terrorism deployments, or others, external security providers tend to address symptoms while leaving the political and economic drivers of insecurity intact.

Often described as a continent with huge, untapped natural resources and large human capital (1.5 billion), what then specifically do African leaders expect from Europe, China, Russia and the United States?

Expectations differ across the three relationships, and that differentiation is itself a marker of agency. From China, leaders expect infrastructure financing, sustained commodity demand, and a partnership that does not condition itself on domestic governance reforms. FOCAC commitments have delivered visible results in ports, railways and power generation, though Beijing itself has shifted toward smaller, more selective lending since around 2018. From Russia, expectations are narrower because the economic footprint is. Moscow’s offer is political backing in multilateral forums, arms transfers, grain and fertiliser supply, civilian nuclear cooperation in a handful of cases, and security partnerships, including those involving private military formations. The record of those security arrangements in the Central African Republic, Mali, Sudan and Mozambique deserves a sober assessment on its own terms, because the human and political costs are documented and uneven. From the United States, leaders look for market access through instruments such as AGOA, whose post-2025 future has generated significant uncertainty, alongside private capital, technology partnerships and a posture that treats the continent as more than a counter-terrorism theatre. The priorities across all three relationships are essentially the same: transparency in the terms of agreements, arrangements that preserve future policy space, and partnerships that build domestic productive capacity rather than substitute for it. The continent’s leverage in this multipolar moment is real, but it is not permanent. It will be squandered if used to rotate among external dependencies rather than reduce them.

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Africa Startup Deals Activity Rebound, Funding Lags at $110m in April 2026

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By Adedapo Adesanya

Africa’s startup ecosystem showed tentative signs of recovery in April 2026, with deal activity picking up after a subdued March, though funding volumes remained weak by recent standards, Business Post gathered from the latest data by Africa: The Big Deal.

In the review month, a total of 32 startups across the continent announced funding rounds of at least $100,000, raising a combined $110 million through a mix of equity, debt and grant deals, excluding exits. The figure represents a notable rebound from the 22 deals recorded in March, suggesting renewed investor engagement after a slow start to the second quarter.

However, the recovery in deal count did not translate into stronger capital inflows. April’s $110 million total marks the lowest monthly funding volume since March 2025, when startups raised $52 million, and falls significantly short of the previous 12-month average of $275 million per month.

The data highlights a growing divergence between investor activity and cheque sizes, with more deals being completed but at smaller ticket values.

The data showed that, despite this, looking at the numbers on a month-to-month basis does not tell the whole story of venture funding cycles as a broader 12-month rolling view presents a more stable picture of Africa’s startup ecosystem.

Based on this, over the 12 months to April 2026 (May 2025–April 2026), startups across the continent raised a total of $3.1 billion, excluding exits – largely in line with the range observed since August 2025. The figure has hovered around $3.1 billion, with only marginal deviations of about $90 million, indicating relative stability despite recent monthly dips.

A closer breakdown shows that equity financing accounted for $1.7 billion of the total, while debt funding contributed $1.4 billion, alongside approximately $30 million in grants. This composition underscores the growing role of debt in sustaining overall funding levels.

The data suggests that while headline monthly figures may point to short-term weakness, the broader funding environment remains resilient, supported in large part by continued activity in debt financing, even as equity investments show signs of moderation.

The report said if April’s total amount was lower than March’s overall, it was higher on equity: $74 million came as equity and $36 million as debt, while March had been overwhelmingly debt-led ($55 million equity, $96 million debt).

In the review month, the deals announced include Egyptian fintech Lucky raising a $23 million Series B, while Gozem ($15.2 million debt) and Victory Farms ($15 milliomn debt) did most of the heavy lifting on the debt side. Ethiopia-based electric mobility start-up Dodai announced $13m ($8m Series A + $5m debt).

April also saw two exits as Nigeria’s Bread Africa was acquired by SMC DAO as consolidation continues in the country’s digital asset sector, and Egypt’s waste recycling start-up Cyclex was acquired by Saudi-Egyptian investment firm Edafa Venture.

Year-to-Date (January to April), startups on the continent have raised a total of $708 million across 124 deals of at least $100,000, excluding exits. The funding mix was almost evenly split, with $364 million in equity (51.4 per cent) and $340 million in debt (48.0 per cent), alongside a small contribution from grants (0.6 per cent). This is an early sign that funding startups is taking a different shape compared to what the ecosystem witnessed in 2025.

For instance, in the first four months of last year, startups raised a higher $813 million across a significantly larger 180 deals. More notably, last year’s funding was heavily skewed toward equity, which accounted for $652 million (80.1 per cent) compared to just $138 million in debt (16.9 per cent).

The year-on-year comparison points to two clear trends: a contraction in deal activity as evidenced by a 31 per cent drop, and a 13 per cent decline in total funding. At the same time, the composition of capital has shifted meaningfully, with debt now playing a much larger role in sustaining funding volumes.

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Nigeria Summons South Africa Envoy Over Xenophobic Attacks

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South Africa Xenophobic Attacks

By Adedapo Adesanya

Nigeria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has summoned South Africa’s Acting High Commissioner to complain about xenophobic attacks against its citizens, weeks after a similar complaint was lodged by Ghana.

The ministry called the meeting to convey “profound concern regarding recent events that have the potential to impact the established cordial relations between Nigeria and South Africa,” it said in a statement posted on X on Monday.

It noted that the country is aware of the growing discontent among Nigerians concerning the treatment of their nationals in South Africa, but implored calm while it plans to repatriate those willing to return home voluntarily, amid growing fears that recent attacks on foreigners there could escalate.

Foreign Minister, Mrs Bianca Odumegwu-Ojukwu, said 130 applicants had already registered for the exercise, adding that the number was expected to rise.

She expressed President Bola Tinubu’s concern about the attacks in the southern African nation, and condemned the violence against foreign nationals and demonstrations characterised by “xenophobic rhetoric, hate speeches and incendiary anti-migrant statements”.

“Nigerian lives and businesses in South Africa must not continue to be put at risk, and we remain committed to working to explore with South Africa ways to put an end to this,” she said.

She cited the killing of two Nigerians in separate incidents involving local security personnel, insisting that her government was demanding justice.

She said the Nigerian president’s priority was for the safety of citizens and “consequently, arrangements are currently underway to collate details of Nigerians in South Africa for voluntary repatriation flights for those seeking assistance to return home”.

According to reports, four Ethiopian nationals have also been killed in recent weeks, while there have been attacks on citizens of other African countries.

South African President Cyril Ramaphosa has condemned the attacks but also cautioned foreigners to respect local laws.

He used his Freedom Day address last week – marking the country’s first democratic elections in 1994 – to remind South Africans of the support other African nations had given in the struggle against the racist system of apartheid.

However, anti-immigrant groups in South Africa have accused foreigners of being in the country illegally, taking jobs from locals and having links to crime, especially drug trafficking.

They have also reportedly been stopping people outside hospitals and schools, demanding to see their identity papers.

Last month, Ghana summoned South Africa’s top envoy after a video was widely shared showing a Ghanaian man being challenged to prove he had the correct immigration papers.

Anti-immigrant sentiment rose earlier this year after reports that the head of the Nigerian community in the port city of KuGompo (formerly East London) had been installed in a traditional role often translated as “king”. Some South Africans in the local area saw this as an attempt to grab political power and kicked against it.

South Africa is home to about 2.4 million migrants, just less than 4 per cent of the population, according to official figures. However, many more are thought to be in the country without official authorisation. Most come from neighbouring countries such as Lesotho, Zimbabwe and Mozambique, which have a history of providing migrant labour to their wealthy neighbour.

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