Connect with us

World

Explainer: Russia’s Geopolitical Games With Africa

Published

on

Russia policy goals in Africa

By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh

Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, expresses desperate fears and is highly nervous over possible clandestine threats by the United States and its European allies to derail the second Russia-Africa summit scheduled for late July 2023.

With the rapidly changing geo-political situation, mostly due to its ‘special military operation’ in the neighbouring Ukraine, which has adversely affected Africa’s economy and its 1.3 billion population, Russia plans to hold a summit to review and patch up the straddling relations.

After the first Russia-Africa summit held in October 2019, Russia has not delivered on several bilateral agreements that were signed with African countries. Moscow has not delivered on most of its pledges and promises that usually characterized talks with African leaders over these years.

According to summit reports, 92 bilateral agreements were pinned with a number of African countries. Russia is only passionate about signing tonnes of agreements. A classical case was during the critical period of coronavirus, Russia agreed to supply 300 million Sputnik vaccines through the African Union but was disappointed with delivery. It, however, sprinkled a few thousand to a couple of African countries to muscle-flex its soft power.

Besides that, Russia’s economic presence is hardly seen across Africa. There have been several development-oriented initiatives over these years but without tangible results. As expected, these weaknesses were compiled and incorporated in the ‘Situation Analytical Report’ by 25 policy researchers headed by Professor Sergey Karaganov, the Dean of the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs at Moscow’s Higher School of Economics.

The report criticized Russia’s current policy and lukewarm approach towards implementing bilateral agreements in Africa. It pointed to the lack of coordination among various state and para-state institutions working with Africa.

According to the report, Russia plays very little role in Africa’s infrastructure, agriculture and industry. This 150-page report was presented in November 2021, which also offers new directions and recommendations for improving policy methods and approaches with Africa.

On the other side, anti-Western rhetoric and political confrontation have become the main content of foreign policy instead of focusing on its economic paradigms or directions within its capability to raise economic influence in the continent.

Lavrov’s early April interview with the local Russian news site, Argumenty i Fakty, and copy posted on the Foreign Ministry’s website vehemently reiterated fears that the United States is attempting to wreck the Russia-Africa summit.

“Indeed, the United States and its allies are doing all they can to isolate Russia internationally. For example, they are trying to torpedo the second Russia-Africa Summit scheduled to take place in St Petersburg in late July. They are trying to dissuade our African friends from taking part in it,” the top Russian diplomat said.

“However, there are fewer and fewer volunteers willing to sacrifice their vital interests for Washington and its henchmen and to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for the former colonial powers,” Lavrov noted. “Attempts to undermine our cooperation with the states of the global South and East will persist, although their success is far from guaranteed,” he added.

Lavrov, in the interview, said questions relating to the critical infrastructure development in Africa were on the agenda of the forthcoming summit. Russia views the summit as “a systemic element of Russia-Africa cooperation and will be filling it with meaningful content in close cooperation with African friends.”

“Its agenda includes such items as technology transfer and development of industry and critical infrastructure in Africa. We are going to discuss in detail Russia’s participation in projects on digitizing African states, developing their power engineering, agriculture and mineral extraction, and ensuring their food and energy security,” he further explained.

“I believe that the summit will strengthen Russia-Africa cooperation, provide a vector for the development of the entire range of relations with Africa in a mid-term perspective, and make a tangible contribution to the effective resolution of regional and international issues,” Lavrov added.

Further down the interview, Lavrov pointed to multifaceted and mutually advantageous cooperation between Russia and Africa. Russia would continue ensuring national security and sovereignty, continue building interstate cooperation on the principles of international law, equality, and mutual respect and consider both interests in Russia and Africa.

According to several expert policy reports, Russia sees growing neo-colonial tendencies as a threat to its participation in economic sectors in Africa. It consistently attributes Africa’s economic instability, development obstacles and pitfalls to the United States and its European allies. But the U.S. State Department, in a statement, did not address Lavrov’s accusations directly but said Washington was pursuing strong relationships with African countries “to address the shared challenges we face. Our Africa policy is about Africa.”

The statement quoted the US Secretary of State, Mr Antony Blinken, as saying the United States “(doesn’t) want to limit African partnerships with other countries. We want to give African countries choices.” Shunned by most Western countries since its invasion of Ukraine just over a year ago, Moscow has turned its efforts to countries in Asia and Africa. Lavrov has been particularly eager to nurture ties with Africa, visiting the continent twice this year as well as making a tour in mid-2022.

In terms of working with the African continent, experts usually say the African continent remains little known in Russia. And Russia’s presence is well-noted only for anti-Western rhetoric instead of concentrating on what it could concretely do in Africa.

It is struggling to regain influence and win sympathy, but Russia has to be serious with policy initiatives. It remains at the bottom level with its tourism, cultural and people-to-people interactions, often referred to as an essential part of public diplomacy. It claims to lead an emerging multipolar world order which requires basic openness, interaction and an integrative approach to aspects of social life.

At the same time, it expects and persuades Africans to simply sacrifice their Western and European cultural connections and even ‘family ties’ for the sake of friendship with Russia. It is a typical irrational step – extremely difficult to do. How do you ask Africans to cut such accumulated relations overnight? Historically, despite the negative effects of slavery, which everybody knows and also much criticized U.S. hegemony, but African-American diaspora is closely knitted by culture and by blood and now forms an undeniable core of the development processes of both societies.

Over the years, African leaders have been engaging with their diasporas, especially those excelling in sports, academia, business, science, technology, engineering and other significant fields that the continent needs to optimize its diverse potentials and to meet development priorities. These professionals primarily leverage various sectors and act as bridges between the United States and Africa. As explicitly acknowledged, the overarching efforts are to focus on deepening and expanding the long-term US-Africa partnership and advancing shared common priorities.

The Vice President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Professor Yemi Osinbajo, argues that the great resource that will enable Africa to cope with a rapidly changing world is its diaspora. He asked African leaders, public and private institutions, and businesses to take advantage of the diaspora outside the continent and relate with them for their education and professional skills for development inside Africa. He pointed to remittances from the African diaspora, which is substantial, rising from $37 billion in 2010 to $96 billion by 2021; the African diaspora is a source of strength for Africa.

As well-known, the world is going through a highly complex and somewhat confusing time. In addition to the United States, there are China, Russia, the European Union, the UK, India and Brazil as dominant regional powers. In comparison, China is Africa’s largest bilateral trading partner and will have about $254 billion in trade in 2021. That said, Africa has the United States and Europe, and a number of Asian countries as the traditional markets for exports earn a significant amount of revenue from those regions.

Does this situation mean the severing of all ties with the United States and Europe? What is Russia’s market for Africa? What is the level of Russia’s engagement, especially in the industrial sector, development of needed infrastructures and other relevant sectors for employment creation in the continent? How much revenue do African countries earn from Russia? Interestingly African leaders rather travel there with the ‘begging bowls’ and give ‘ear-deafening applause’ to offers of free grains, while their own agricultural practices are rudimentary and a vast expanse of their land remains uncultivated.

Professor Fyodor Lukyanov, Chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Research Director at the Valdai Discussion Club, and Editor-in-Chief of Russia in Global Affairs journal, told this author in an interview that Russia’s engagement depends largely on several factors. Notwithstanding all that, Africa has its strengths and weaknesses based on history, but the balance is positive in this emerging new world. Most of the potential success (especially transforming the economy and raising trade levels) depends on African countries themselves and their ability to build up relations with outside powers on a rational and calculated basis.

In comparison with other players, Russia largely plays words to win support or sympathy and most often rattles investment slogans with Africa. The United States, European Union members, China, India, Turkey and even the Gulf States discuss Africa from different perspectives, but more importantly, follow their desires and ways to establish their economic footprints on the continent.

Reports show that Russia has been strengthening its relations, meeting African ministers and delegations these several years. It has even opened trade missions with the responsibility of providing sustainable business services in a number of African countries. In addition, more than a decade since the establishment of the Coordinating Committee on Economic Cooperation with Sub-Saharan Africa. There are also several Joint Commissions on Trade and Economic Cooperation, and of course, there are 38 Russian diplomatic offices in Africa.

Across Africa, when officials and experts are discussing the situation in various sectors, they hardly mention infrastructures undertaken, completed and commissioned in the continent by Russians. A lot more important issues have received little attention since the first African leaders’ gathering. Russia has few achievements and few success stories to show at the next summit, according to another policy report by the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), a reputable policy think tank, published in 2022.

The report noted the dimensions of Russian power projection in Africa, new frontiers of Russian influence and a roadmap towards understanding how Russia is perceived in Africa. It highlighted narratives about anti-colonialism and described how these sources of solidarity are transmitted by Russian elites to the African public. For seeking long-term influence, Russian elites have oftentimes used elements of anti-colonialism as part of the current policy to control the perceptions of Africans and primarily as new tactics for power projection in Africa.

In the context of a multipolar geopolitical order, Russia’s image of cooperation could be seen as highly enticing, but it is also based on illusions. Better still, Russia’s posture is a clash between illusions and reality. “Russia, it appears, is a neo-colonial power dressed in anti-colonial clothes,” says the report.

Simply put, Moscow’s strategic incapability, inconsistency and dominating opaque relations are adversely affecting sustainable developments in Africa. Thus far, Russia looks more like a ‘virtual great power’ than a genuine challenger to European, American and Chinese influence.

The next report, titled – Russia’s Private Military Diplomacy in Africa: High Risk, Low Reward, Limited Impact – says that Russia’s renewed interest in Africa is driven by its quest for global power status. Few expect Russia’s security engagement to bring peace and development to countries with which it has security partnerships.

While Moscow’s opportunistic use of private military diplomacy has allowed it to gain a strategic foothold in partner countries successfully, the lack of transparency in interactions, the limited scope of impact and the high financial and diplomatic costs expose the limitations of the partnership in addressing the peace and development challenges of African host countries, the report says.

Furthermore, African countries where Russia intends to assist in ensuring a peaceful environment will require comprehensive peace and development strategies that include conflict resolution and peacebuilding, state-building, security sector reform, and profound political reforms to improve governance and the rule of law – not to mention sound economic planning critical for attracting foreign direct investment needed to spur economic growth.

Joseph Siegle, Director of Research and Daniel Eizenga, Research Fellow at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, in a series of articles these few years, offered excellent comprehensive insights into possible reasons why military governments delay to fast-track or are hesitant in making a smooth return to constitutional government.

The two researchers reminded the African Union and ECOWAS to invoke the African Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism, which went into effect in 1985, prohibiting states from allowing mercenaries into their territories. Borrowing from its Syria playbook, Moscow has followed a pattern of parachuting to prop up politically isolated leaders facing crises in regionally pivotal countries, often with abundant natural resources.

Many African experts explained that the interim military leaders in Africa are vacillating, turning down proposals to change over to constitutional rule. Their decision to remain in power absolutely violates the “Silence the Guns” policy adopted by the African Union. Holding media briefings after talks with his Malian counterpart, Lavrov has often reiterated that with the threats posed by frequent terrorist attacks, it is not the best time to hold democratic elections. It implies that Russia encourages military rule in Africa and that “one should not change horses in the middle of the stream,” according to official website sources.

Moreover, this is one area in which the great powers and emerging powers can put aside rivalries and work together with ECOWAS and the African Union on an initiative to stamp out terrorism in Africa, especially in the Sahel. Many simply forget the fact that an outstandingly good example uses regional integration arrangements to promote peace and security on the one hand and pursue economic development, trade and industry on the other.

During the 36th Ordinary Session of the African Union (AU) held in Addis Ababa, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE), interestingly used the phrase – “African solutions to African problems” – seven times during his speech delivered on February 18. Besides that, he offered the suggestion that existing conflicts and disputes on the continent, it necessary to mobilize collective efforts to resolve them and “must be confined to this continent and quarantined from the contamination of non-African interference.”

Notwithstanding the current geopolitical games, African leaders have to utterly resist the landscape being used as playing fields; leaders who adopt excellent strategies could still benefit from all sides, especially not to join the political confrontation but rather remain neutral. The perspectives, decisions and actions of these global actors, including in multilateral forums, could impact on economic development across Africa.

In practical terms, what is needed today is systematic economic transformation, industrialization and upgrading employment-generating sectors; therefore, Africa can take full advantage of the global complexities and uncertainties. With external players, the focus has to be on practical economic diplomacy. The decisive factor in this context will then be knowledgeable leadership seriously committed to good governance and economic development.

Understandably, Russia has to clearly define its parameters despite the growth of external players’ influence and presence in Africa. While Russia appears to be consolidating relations, it is only full of symbolism; its policy model (distinctive opposite that of China and its passion for building infrastructures across Africa) is characterized by bilateral agreements without appreciably visible results. Yet, in these critical times, it strategically seeks enormous support, in any form, from Africa’s regional organizations and from the African Union.

Despite the current conditions of global changes, the irreversible fact is that Africa simply needs genuine external investors without frequent rhetorics and without geo-political slogans. Africa has already attained its political independence and sovereignty these sixty years in the process of economic transformation. With its 1.3 billion population, Africa is a potential market for all kinds of consumable goods and for services. In the coming years, there will obviously be an accelerated competition between or among the external players over access to resources and, of course, economic influence in Africa.

World

AFC Backs Future Africa, Lightrock in $100m Tech VC Funding Bet

Published

on

Lightrock Africa

By Adedapo Adesanya

Infrastructure solutions provider, Africa Finance Corporation (AFC), has committed parts of a $100 million investment to fund managers—Future Africa and Lightrock Africa—to boost African tech venture backing.

The commitment to Lightrock Africa Fund II and Future Africa Fund III is the first tranche of a broader deployment, AFC noted.

The corporation added that it is actively evaluating a pipeline of additional Africa-focused funds spanning a range of strategies and stages, with further commitments expected in the near term.

This is part of its efforts to plug a persistent gap in long-term institutional capital on the continent, which constrains the development and scaling of high-potential technology businesses across the continent, especially with a drop in foreign investments.

“Through this commitment, AFC will deploy catalytic capital in leading Africa-focused technology Funds and, in particular, African-owned fund managers,” it said in a statement on Monday.

AFC aims to address the underrepresentation of local capital in venture funding by catalysing greater participation from African institutional investors and deepening local ownership within the ecosystem.

Despite some success stories on the continent, local institutional capital remains significantly underrepresented across many fund cap tables, with the majority of venture funding continuing to flow from international sources.

AFC’s commitment is designed to shift that dynamic, according to Mr Samaila Zubairu, its chief executive.

“Across the continent, young Africans are not waiting for the digital economy to arrive; they are seizing the moment — adopting technology, creating markets and solving real economic problems faster than infrastructure has kept pace. That is the investment signal.

“AFC’s $100 million Africa-focused Technology Fund will accelerate the convergence of growing demand, rapid technology adoption, youthful demographics and the enabling infrastructure we are building.

“Digital infrastructure is now as fundamental to Africa’s transformation as roads, rail, ports and power — enabling productivity, payments, logistics, services, data and cross-border trade, while creating jobs and industrial scale.”

Mr Pal Erik Sjatil, Managing Partner & CEO, Lightrock, said: “We are delighted to welcome Africa Finance Corporation as an anchor investor in Lightrock Africa II, deepening a strong partnership shaped by our collaboration on high-impact investments across Africa, including Moniepoint, Lula, and M-KOPA.

“With aligned capital, a long-term perspective, and a shared focus on value creation, we are well positioned to support exceptional management teams and scale category-leading businesses that deliver attractive financial returns alongside measurable environmental and social outcomes,” he added.

Adding his input, Mr Iyin Aboyeji, Founding Partner, Future Africa, said: “By investing in AI-native skills, financing productive tools such as phones and laptops, and expanding energy, connectivity and compute infrastructure, we can convert Africa’s greatest asset — its people — into critical participants in the new global economy. AFC’s US$100 million commitment is the anchor this moment demands.

“As our first multilateral development bank partner, AFC is sending a clear signal that digital is as fundamental to Africa’s transformation as agriculture, manufacturing and physical infrastructure. We trust that other development finance institutions, insurers, reinsurers and pension funds will follow AFC’s lead.”

Continue Reading

World

Africa ‘Reawakening’ In Emerging Multipolar World

Published

on

Gustavo de Carvalho

By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh

In this interview, Gustavo de Carvalho, Programme Head (Acting): African Governance and Diplomacy, South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), discusses at length aspects of Africa’s developments in the context of shifting geopolitics, its relationships with external countries, and expected roles in the emerging multipolar world. Gustavo de Carvalho further underscores key issues related to transparency in agreements, financing initiatives, and current development priorities that are shaping Africa’s future. Here are the interview excerpts:

Is Africa undergoing the “second political re-awakening” and how would you explain Africans’ perceptions and attitudes toward the emerging multipolar world?

We should be careful not to overstate novelty. African states exercised real agency during the Cold War, too, from Bandung to the Non-Aligned Movement. What has actually shifted is the structure of the international system around the continent. The unipolar moment has faded, the menu of partners has widened, and a generation of policymakers under fifty operates without the inhibitions of either the Cold War or the immediate post-Cold War period. African publics, however, are more pragmatic than multipolar rhetoric assumes. Afrobarometer’s surveys across more than thirty countries consistently show citizens evaluating external partners on tangible outcomes such as infrastructure, jobs and security, rather than on civilisational narratives. China is generally associated with positive economic influence, the United States retains the strongest pull as a development model, and Russia, despite a louder political profile, registers a smaller and more geographically concentrated footprint. Multipolarity is not a destination Africans are arriving at. It is a working environment that creates more options and more risks at once.

Do you think it is appropriate to use the term “neo-colonialism” referring to activities of foreign players in Africa? By the way, who are the neo-colonisers in your view?

The term has analytical value when used carefully, and loses it when deployed selectively against whichever power one wishes to embarrass. Nkrumah’s 1965 formulation was precise: political independence accompanied by continued external control over economic and political life. The honest test is whether contemporary patterns reproduce that asymmetry, irrespective of the capital from which they originate. The structural picture is well documented. Africa still exports primary commodities and imports manufactured goods. Intra-African trade hovers around fifteen per cent of total trade, well below Asian or European levels. African sovereigns pay a measurable risk premium on debt that exceeds what fundamentals alone justify. Applied consistently, the lens directs attention to opaque resource-for-infrastructure contracts, security-for-mineral bargains, debt agreements with confidentiality clauses, and aid architectures that bypass African institutions. That description fits legacy French commercial arrangements in francophone Africa, Chinese mining concessions in the DRC, Russian-linked gold extraction in the Central African Republic and Sudan, Gulf-backed port and farmland deals along the Red Sea, and Western corporate practices that have not always met the standards their governments preach. Naming a single neo-coloniser tells us more about the speaker’s politics than about the structure.

How would you interpret the current engagement of foreign players in Africa? Do you also think there is geopolitical competition and rivalry among them?

Competition is real and intensifying, and the proliferation of Africa-plus-one summits is the clearest indicator. Russia has held two summits, in Sochi in 2019 and St Petersburg in 2023. The EU, Turkey, Japan, India, the United States, South Korea, Saudi Arabia and the UAE all host their own variants. Trade figures give a more honest sense of weight than diplomatic theatre. China-Africa trade reached around 280 billion dollars in 2023, United States-Africa trade sits in the 60 to 70 billion range, and Russia-Africa trade is roughly 24 billion, heavily concentrated in grain, fertiliser and arms. Describing the continent as a chessboard, however, understates how African states themselves are shaping these dynamics, sometimes through skilful diversification and sometimes through security bargains that entail longer-term costs. The Sahel illustrates the latter starkly. Between 2020 and 2023, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger expelled French forces, downgraded their relationships with ECOWAS and the UN stabilisation mission, and welcomed Russian security contractors. ACLED data shows civilian fatalities from political violence rising rather than falling across the same period. Substituting providers without strengthening domestic institutions does not produce sovereignty. It changes the terms of dependence.

Do you think much depends on African leaders and their people (African solutions to African problems) to work toward long-term, sustainable development?

The principle is correct, and it is regularly weaponised in two unhelpful directions. External actors invoke it to justify withdrawing from responsibilities they continue to hold, particularly over financial flows and arms transfers that pass through their own jurisdictions. Some African leaders invoke it to deflect legitimate scrutiny of governance failings, repression or corruption. Genuine African agency requires more than rhetoric. The AU’s operating budget remains modest in absolute terms, and external partners still cover a significant share of programmatic activities, which shapes what gets funded. The African Standby Force, conceived in 2003, remains only partially operational more than two decades on. The African Continental Free Trade Area, in force since 2021, has rolled out more slowly than drafters hoped because the political will to lower national barriers lags the speeches. Long-term development depends on African leaders financing more of their own security and development priorities, on publics holding them accountable, and on a clearer-eyed view of what foreign forces can deliver. Whether the actors are Russian-linked contractors in the Sahel and Central African Republic, Western counter-terrorism deployments, or others, external security providers tend to address symptoms while leaving the political and economic drivers of insecurity intact.

Often described as a continent with huge, untapped natural resources and large human capital (1.5 billion), what then specifically do African leaders expect from Europe, China, Russia and the United States?

Expectations differ across the three relationships, and that differentiation is itself a marker of agency. From China, leaders expect infrastructure financing, sustained commodity demand, and a partnership that does not condition itself on domestic governance reforms. FOCAC commitments have delivered visible results in ports, railways and power generation, though Beijing itself has shifted toward smaller, more selective lending since around 2018. From Russia, expectations are narrower because the economic footprint is. Moscow’s offer is political backing in multilateral forums, arms transfers, grain and fertiliser supply, civilian nuclear cooperation in a handful of cases, and security partnerships, including those involving private military formations. The record of those security arrangements in the Central African Republic, Mali, Sudan and Mozambique deserves a sober assessment on its own terms, because the human and political costs are documented and uneven. From the United States, leaders look for market access through instruments such as AGOA, whose post-2025 future has generated significant uncertainty, alongside private capital, technology partnerships and a posture that treats the continent as more than a counter-terrorism theatre. The priorities across all three relationships are essentially the same: transparency in the terms of agreements, arrangements that preserve future policy space, and partnerships that build domestic productive capacity rather than substitute for it. The continent’s leverage in this multipolar moment is real, but it is not permanent. It will be squandered if used to rotate among external dependencies rather than reduce them.

Continue Reading

World

Africa Startup Deals Activity Rebound, Funding Lags at $110m in April 2026

Published

on

By Adedapo Adesanya

Africa’s startup ecosystem showed tentative signs of recovery in April 2026, with deal activity picking up after a subdued March, though funding volumes remained weak by recent standards, Business Post gathered from the latest data by Africa: The Big Deal.

In the review month, a total of 32 startups across the continent announced funding rounds of at least $100,000, raising a combined $110 million through a mix of equity, debt and grant deals, excluding exits. The figure represents a notable rebound from the 22 deals recorded in March, suggesting renewed investor engagement after a slow start to the second quarter.

However, the recovery in deal count did not translate into stronger capital inflows. April’s $110 million total marks the lowest monthly funding volume since March 2025, when startups raised $52 million, and falls significantly short of the previous 12-month average of $275 million per month.

The data highlights a growing divergence between investor activity and cheque sizes, with more deals being completed but at smaller ticket values.

The data showed that, despite this, looking at the numbers on a month-to-month basis does not tell the whole story of venture funding cycles as a broader 12-month rolling view presents a more stable picture of Africa’s startup ecosystem.

Based on this, over the 12 months to April 2026 (May 2025–April 2026), startups across the continent raised a total of $3.1 billion, excluding exits – largely in line with the range observed since August 2025. The figure has hovered around $3.1 billion, with only marginal deviations of about $90 million, indicating relative stability despite recent monthly dips.

A closer breakdown shows that equity financing accounted for $1.7 billion of the total, while debt funding contributed $1.4 billion, alongside approximately $30 million in grants. This composition underscores the growing role of debt in sustaining overall funding levels.

The data suggests that while headline monthly figures may point to short-term weakness, the broader funding environment remains resilient, supported in large part by continued activity in debt financing, even as equity investments show signs of moderation.

The report said if April’s total amount was lower than March’s overall, it was higher on equity: $74 million came as equity and $36 million as debt, while March had been overwhelmingly debt-led ($55 million equity, $96 million debt).

In the review month, the deals announced include Egyptian fintech Lucky raising a $23 million Series B, while Gozem ($15.2 million debt) and Victory Farms ($15 milliomn debt) did most of the heavy lifting on the debt side. Ethiopia-based electric mobility start-up Dodai announced $13m ($8m Series A + $5m debt).

April also saw two exits as Nigeria’s Bread Africa was acquired by SMC DAO as consolidation continues in the country’s digital asset sector, and Egypt’s waste recycling start-up Cyclex was acquired by Saudi-Egyptian investment firm Edafa Venture.

Year-to-Date (January to April), startups on the continent have raised a total of $708 million across 124 deals of at least $100,000, excluding exits. The funding mix was almost evenly split, with $364 million in equity (51.4 per cent) and $340 million in debt (48.0 per cent), alongside a small contribution from grants (0.6 per cent). This is an early sign that funding startups is taking a different shape compared to what the ecosystem witnessed in 2025.

For instance, in the first four months of last year, startups raised a higher $813 million across a significantly larger 180 deals. More notably, last year’s funding was heavily skewed toward equity, which accounted for $652 million (80.1 per cent) compared to just $138 million in debt (16.9 per cent).

The year-on-year comparison points to two clear trends: a contraction in deal activity as evidenced by a 31 per cent drop, and a 13 per cent decline in total funding. At the same time, the composition of capital has shifted meaningfully, with debt now playing a much larger role in sustaining funding volumes.

Continue Reading

Trending