World
Geopolitical Implications of South Africa’s G20 Presidency Without United States
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
South Africa, for the first time, heads the G20, a multilateral organization, and it is taking pecuniary measures to balance the heightening complexities around the world. With President Donald Trump in the helm of power in the United States, the most different pragmatic approach in being adopted towards a number of issues ranging from politics through the global economy to social and humanitarian parameters. Geographical regions, including Africa, are also affected to a distinctive extent.
Below is an insightful interview conducted by Kestér Kenn Klomegâh with Mr Tariq Khan, a Senior Research Associate at the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD) associated with the University of South Africa. Tariq focuses on economic, security and diplomatic issues in areas such as Pakistan-Africa Relations, Africn Relations, and Major Powers’ relations with Africa, Asia-Africa Relations and South-South Cooperation, Maritime Affairs. In this interview, Tariq Khan discussed Global Powers, G20 and Africa relations in the emerging new world. Here are the significant excerpts.
What are the practical implications of the United States, a major contributor among G20 members, skipping South Africa’s February summit?
The absence of the United States at the South Africa G20 summit poses diplomatic and strategic connotations of some importance. As a key global economic player, the U.S. influences major policy decisions within the G20, and its non-attendance could signal a de-prioritization of Africa within its foreign policy agenda.
First, it seems that there is no real commitment to the critical issues which the African continent is facing including debt relief, fair trade and development funding. South Africa, as the only African G20 member, has been a strong advocate for the continent’s economic priorities. If the Washington give unimportance or sideline this engagement, it risks reinforcing the perception that Washington is more focused on geopolitical tensions in Europe and Asia while offering only rhetorical support to Africa.
In adding up, such a move will give BRICS a boost, of which South Africa is a component and plays a prominent role. With BRICS growing and positioning itself as an alternative to Western-led institutions, the U.S. absence might encourage African nations to deepen their economic and political cooperation within BRICS which will lead to reduce reliance on Western-dominated frameworks.
Finally, absence of US could deteriorate or weaken the trustworthiness or credibility of the G20 as an inclusive global forum. South Africa has effectively championed the inclusion of the African Union (AU) as a permanent G20 member. If the U.S. disengages from the summit, it could slow momentum for integrating African priorities into global decision-making, reinforcing existing frustrations about Western dominance in multilateral institutions.
Can South Africa’s presidency change perceptions of the G20’s role in global politics and its contributions to Africa’s development?
South Africa’s G20 presidency presents a significant opportunity to reshape Africa’s role in global governance. Traditionally, the G20 has been dominated by the economic priorities of Western and Asian powers, often sidelining the challenges of the Global South. As the only African G20 member, South Africa can drive a more inclusive agenda through three key areas:
- Reinforcing Africa’s Economic Potential: South Africa can emphasize Africa’s role as a strategic investment destination rather than just an aid recipient, advocating for reforms in global financial institutions to support Africa’s economic growth.
- Advocating for Structural Reform: Building on its success in securing AU membership in the G20, South Africa can push for concrete actions such as debt restructuring, fair trade terms, and increased voting rights for Africa in institutions like the IMF and World Bank.
- Shaping Global South Solidarity: By aligning G20 priorities with those of BRICS and the broader Global South, South Africa can challenge the perception that the G20 merely upholds Western economic dominance and instead position it as a balanced institution where emerging economies wield real influence. On the other hand, South Africa must navigate its complex diplomatic positioning. At the same time as maintaining strong Western ties, its BRICS membership and increasing alignment with China and Russia could generate tensions. Achievement will depend on its capability to bridge these divides and promote an Africa-first agenda.
In the context of a rapidly changing global landscape, do we see G20 competing or collaborating with BRICS?
The relationship between G20 and BRICS is distinguished and characterized by both competition and selective collaboration. BRICS as an organization has turned out to be more and more self-confident to challenge Western domination in global governance, mainly following its expansion to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Iran, and Ethiopia and other states.
This reflects a broader shift toward a multipolar world where such organizations similar to the G20 face substitute governance frameworks. Though, collaboration between G20 and BRICS remains indispensable. Several BRICS members such as South Africa, China, India, and Brazil are also in the G20 which means they have an interest in shaping both platforms rather than abandoning one for the other.
Cooperation on issues such as debt relief, climate change and development financing is promising, but ideological and strategic differences may persist. If the G20 remains inflexible in its Western-centric approach, then BRICS could become a direct competitor, attracting more nations disappointed with Western-led economic policies.
The challenge of South Africa is to balance its engagement with both which ensures that interests of Africa are advanced across multiple platforms and could not be compromised its broader economic and diplomatic objectives.
What is the future of the G20, particularly in relation to Africa, given BRICS’ growing influence?
The G20’s significance to Africa will depend on whether it can transition from symbolic commitments to tangible actions. Traditionally, African engagement with the G20 has been marked by unfulfilled promises. To remain a meaningful partner for Africa, the G20 must focus on:
- Debt Relief and Fair Financing: Many African nations struggle with unsustainable debt burdens. The G20 must push for genuine restructuring mechanisms rather than perpetuating cycles of dependency.
- Infrastructure Investment: Africa’s development hinges on infrastructure, yet financing remains a challenge. The G20 should support merged financing models that combine public and private investment in sustainable projects.
- Technology and Industrialization Support: Africa’s long-term prosperity depends on industrialization and technological advancement. The G20 must facilitate technology transfer and capacity-building initiatives that give power to African economies. If the G20 fails to deliver meaningful reforms, African nations may increasingly turn to BRICS, which is enthusiastically positioning itself as a more responsive and approachable alternative.
Should African leaders first reform the African Union (AU) and regional blocs like ECOWAS before expecting changes in global institutions?
Of course yes, African leaders must first strengthen internal institutions before expecting global institutions to treat the continent as a unified force. Weak regional organizations undermine Africa’s bargaining power in global negotiations.
Key areas for reform include:
- Financial Independence: Reducing reliance on external donors would allow the AU and regional blocs to act with greater autonomy in decision-making.
- Stronger Enforcement Mechanisms: Regional organizations need better mechanisms to uphold democratic norms and economic agreements to prevent instability from weakening Africa’s global influence.
- Policy Coordination: A fragmented Africa cannot effectively engage with global institutions. Greater intra-African coordination is needed to present a unified front in international forums. If Africa wants to negotiate from a position of strength, its institutions must be stable, credible, and self-sufficient. Strengthening the AU and regional organizations will enhance Africa’s ability to engage effectively with both G20 and BRICS.
Final Thoughts: The Vision of ‘Africa We Want’
The realization of the “Africa We Want,” as outlined in the AU’s Agenda 2063, requires strategic engagement with external partners. However, Africa must ensure that these partnerships are mutually beneficial rather than reinforcing external dependencies. South Africa’s role is fundamental in this vision. As a bridge between the West, BRICS, and the African continent, it must advocate and promote policies that advance Africa’s long-term interests and objectives. Africa’s engagement with the G20, BRICS, and other international platforms must be strategic to ensure that these institutions contribute to Africa’s broader development agenda rather than perpetuating historical imbalances. In the end, Africa’s success in the global arena will depend on its ability to take advantage from both external partnerships and internal reforms.
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
Despite geopolitical complexities, tensions and pressure, Russia’s military arms and weaponry sales earned approximately $15 billion at the closure of 2025, according to Kremlin report. At the regular session, chaired by Russian President Vladimir Putin on Jan. 30, the Commission on Military and Technical Cooperation with Foreign Countries analyzed the results of its work for 2025, and defined plans for the future.
It was noted that the system of military-technical cooperation continued to operate in difficult conditions, and with increased pressure from the Western countries to block business relations with Russia. The meeting, however, admitted that export contracts have generally performed sustainably. Russian military products were exported to more than 30 countries last year, and the amount of foreign exchange exceeded $15 billion.
Such results provide an additional opportunity to direct funds to the modernization of OPC enterprises, to the expansion of their production capacities, and to advanced research. It is also important that at these enterprises a significant volume of products is civilian products.
The Russian system of military-technical cooperation has not only demonstrated effectiveness and high resilience, but has created fundamental structures, which allow to significantly expand the “geography” of supplies of products of military purpose and, thus strengthen the position of Russia’s leader and employer advanced weapons systems – proven, tested in real combat conditions.
Thanks to the employees of the Federal Service for Military Technical Cooperation and Rosoboronexport, the staff of OPC enterprises for their good faith. Within the framework of the new federal project “Development of military-technical cooperation of Russia with foreign countries” for the period 2026-2028, additional measures of support are introduced. Further effective use of existing financial and other support mechanisms and instruments is extremely important because the volumes of military exports in accordance with the 2026 plan.
Special attention would be paid to the expansion of military-technological cooperation and partnerships, with 14 states already implementing or in development more than 340 such projects.
Future plans will allow to improve the characteristics of existing weapons and equipment and to develop new promising models, including those in demand on global markets, among other issues – the development of strategic areas of military-technical cooperation, and above all, with partners on the CIS and the CSTO. This is one of the priority tasks to strengthen both bilateral and multilateral relations, ensuring stability and security in Eurasia.
From January 2026, Russia chairs the CSTO, and this requires working systematically with partners, including comprehensive approaches to expanding military-technical relations. New prospects open up for deepening military-technical cooperation and with countries in other regions, including with states on the African continent. Russia has been historically strong and trusting relationships with African countries. In different years even the USSR, and then Russia supplied African countries with a significant amount of weapons and military equipment, trained specialists on their production, operation, repair, as well as military personnel.
Today, despite pressure from the West, African partners express readiness to expand relations with Russia in the military and military-technical fields. It is not only about increasing supplies of Russian military exports, but also about the purchase of other weapons, other materials and products. Russia has undertaken comprehensive maintenance of previously delivered equipment, organization of licensed production of Russian military products and some other important issues. In general, African countries are sufficient for consideration today.
By Adedapo Adesanya
President Donald Trump has named Mr Kevin Warsh as the successor to Mr Jerome Powell as the Federal Reserve chair, ending a prolonged odyssey that has seen unprecedented turmoil around the central bank.
The decision culminates a process that officially began last summer but started much earlier than that, with President Trump launching a criticism against the Powell-led US central bank almost since he took the job in 2018.
“I have known Kevin for a long period of time, and have no doubt that he will go down as one of the GREAT Fed Chairmen, maybe the best,” Mr Trump said in a Truth Social post announcing the selection.
US analysts noted that the 55-year old appear not to ripple market because of his previous experience at the apex bank as Governor, with others saying he wouldn’t always do the bidding of the American president.
If approved by the US Senate, Mr Warsh will take over the position in May, when Mr Powell’s term expires.
Despite having argued for reductions recently, “Warsh has a long hawkish history that markets have not forgotten,” one analyst told Bloomberg.
President Trump has castigated Mr Powell for not lowering interest rates more quickly. His administration also launched a criminal investigation of Powell and the Federal Reserve earlier this month, which led Mr Powell to issue an extraordinary rebuke of President Trump’s efforts to politicize the independent central bank.
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
Donald Trump has been leading the United States as its president since January 2025. Washington’s priority is to Make America Great Again (MAGA). Trump’s tariffs have rippled many economies from Latin America through Asian region to the continent of Africa. Trump’s Davos speech has explicitly revealed building a ‘new world order’ based on dominance rather than trust. He has also initiated whirlwind steps to annex Greenland, while further created the Board of Peace, aimed at helping end the two-year war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza and to oversee reconstruction. Trump is handling the three-year old Russia-Ukraine crisis, and other deep-seated religious and ethnic conflicts in Africa.
These emerging trends, at least in a considerable short term, are influencing BRICS which has increased its geopolitical importance, and focusing on uniting the countries in the Global East and Global South. From historical records, BRICS, described as non-western organization, and is loosing its coherence primarily due to differences in geopolitical interests and multinational alignments, and of course, a number of members face threats from the United States while there are variations of approach to the emerging worldwide perceptions.
In this conversation, deputy director of the Center for African Studies at Moscow’s National Research University High School of Economics (HSE), Vsevolod Sviridov, expresses his opinions focusing on BRICS agenda under India’s presidency, South Africa’s G20 chairmanship in 2024, and genegrally putting Africa’s development priorities within the context of emerging trends. Here are the interview excerpts:
What is the likely impact of Washington’s geopolitics and its foreign policy on BRICS?
From my perspective, the current Venezuela-U.S. confrontation, especially Washington’s tightened leverage over Venezuelan oil revenue flows and the knock-on effects for Chinese interests, will be read inside BRICS as a reminder that sovereign resources can still be constrained by financial chokepoints and sanctions politics. This does not automatically translate into BRICS taking Venezuela’s side, but it does strengthen the bloc’s long-running argument for more resilient South-South trade settlement, diversified energy chains, and financing instruments that reduce exposure to coercive measures, because many African and other developing economies face similar vulnerabilities around commodities, shipping, insurance, and correspondent banking. At the same time, BRICS’ expansion makes consensus harder: several members maintain significant ties with the U.S., so the most likely impact is a technocratic push rather than a loud political campaign.
And highlighting, specifically, the position of BRICS members (South Africa, Ethiopia and Egypt, as well as its partnering African States (Nigeria and Uganda)?
Venezuela crisis urges African members to demand that BRICS deliver usable financial and trade tools. For South Africa, Ethiopia, and Egypt, the Venezuela case is more about the precedent: how quickly external pressure can reshape a country’s fiscal room, debt dynamics, and even investor perceptions when energy revenues and sanctions compliance collide. South Africa will likely argue that BRICS should prioritize investment, industrialization, and trade facilitation. Ethiopia and Egypt, both debt-sensitive and searching for FDI, will be especially attentive to anything that helps de-risk financing, while avoiding steps that could trigger secondary-sanctions anxieties or scare off diversified investors.
Would the latest geopolitical developments ultimately shape the agenda for BRICS 2026 under India’s presidency?
India’s 2026 chairmanship is already framed around “Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability,” and Venezuela’s shock (paired with broader sanction/market-volatility lessons) will likely sharpen the resilience part. From an African perspective, that is an opportunity: South Africa, Ethiopia, and Egypt can press India to translate the theme into deliverables that matter on the ground: food and fertilizer stability, affordable energy access, infrastructure funding. India, in turn, has incentives to keep BRICS focused on economic problem-solving rather than becoming hostage to any single flashpoint. So the Venezuela episode may function as a cautionary case study that accelerates practical cooperation where African members have the most to gain. And I would add: the BRICS agenda will become increasingly Africa-centered simply because Africa’s weight globally is rising, and recent summit discussions have repeatedly highlighted African participation as a core Global South vector. South Africa’s G20 chairmanship last year explicitly framed around putting Africa’s development priorities high on the agenda, further proves this point.
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