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Russia’s Romance With Africa After Soviet Collapse

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Russia Africa Soviet Collapse

By Professor Abdullahi Shehu

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the decades of the 90s seemed to have reversed the gains made in Africa-Soviet Relations and, by extension, in Africa-Russia relations.

Understandably, it was a period of politico-ideological downturn and harsh economic realities for Russia, the successor nation to the Soviet Union. The speech of H. W Bush on December 25, 1991, was clear and unambiguous. He summarized the victory of the value-based American/Western model thus: “This is a victory for democracy and freedom. It is a victory for the moral force of our values. Every American can take pride in this victory.”

Following the collapse of the USSR, a new wave of democratic change blew all over Africa. Old ideological friends of the Soviet Union changed camps in line with the changing political dynamics. Party models became transformed from single-party to multiparty systems in Africa.

Interestingly, ideologues became transformed in favour of the capitalist-democratic model. The United States sub-committee on Foreign Relations in March 1998 commended Laurent Kabila of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Paul Kagame of Rwanda, Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia and Isaiah Afwerke of Eritrea as examples of the power of democracy in Africa. Incidentally, relations with Russia’s traditional friends and those with which it had diplomatic ties were at their lowest ebb. Many Russian missions in Africa were closed down; those unclosed were severely pruned down.

ln the case of Angola, for instance, where the USSR had made tremendous financial, material, technical and military investments, the Soviet-backed Cuban military and technical personnel were all withdrawn at short notice. Demand was made for the repayment of debts owed to Russia by African countries, including her traditional partners, at a seemingly odd time when Africa’s debt burden was unbearable. These measures facilitated a new romance between African and Western partners, the latter of which were all too eager to entrench themselves in the vacuum left behind by the Soviet Union.

Old Music, New Dance

There are at least two specific commendable initiatives towards Africa designed by the government of H.E President Vladimir Putin to re-launch Russia into Africa’s geopolitical space. These initiatives, in my view, tally with the personality of H.E President Vladimir Putin, who, as an agent of the former KGB (now FSB), saw the collapse of the Soviet Union as “the major geopolitical catastrophe of the century”. In this sense, a new partnership with Africa could be defined not in terms of ideology but by alternative economic and developmental options which give Africa competitive parity.

The two initiatives are H.E President Vladimir Putin’s debt cancellation of twenty billion dollars ($20 billion) owed to Russia by African countries, which, in his very own word, “was not only a mark of generosity but also a manifestation of pragmatism”. In 2019, Russia held the first ever “Russia-Africa Summit” in Sochi, in which it committed $12.5 billion in business deals, mainly in Arms and grains.

Analysts may be quick to interpret this as the usual trend, more in the fashion of United States-Africa, China-Africa, Japan-Africa, France-Africa summits, etc; but as observed by Landry Signé between 2005 and 2015, Africa’s trade with Russia grew by 185% a “reawakening” which commenced since the 2000s.

Though this trade surge is worthy of note, the volume of trade between Russia and Africa was $14.5billion per annum in 2020. This figure, however, pales into insignificance when compared with China, whose trade with Africa has attained $165 billion per annum during the same period and $254 billion in 2021, even with its late-comer status in Africa. This is to say that the doubling of trade relations within the next five years between Africa and Russia, as stated by Vladimir Putin in 2019 in Sochi, is not only a vision in the right direction of growing Russia’s partnership with Africa, but it is also a desirable imperative.

As argued by Emman El-Badawy in the article ‘Security, Soft Power and Regime Support: Spheres of Russian Influence in Africa,’ “two distinct, now common explanations, have emerged to explain Russia’s growing interest in Africa. The first argues that Russia is intent on rekindling old Soviet-era ties to the continent to extract resources in return for security assistance – a mutually beneficial yet opportunistic strategy that is, short-term and transactional…

The alternative suggests that Putin considers Africa a so-called second frontier, after Eastern Europe for encircling Western Europe…” These reasons may sound strategic, yet they remain largely speculative and conjectural. Understandably, the perceived geopolitical irrelevance of Africa by Russia has changed, and new dynamics have beckoned on both sides of subsisting opportunities for increased collaboration between Africa and Russia. One clear thing, therefore, is that Africa-Russia relations are on the ascendancy again after the post-Soviet era of passivity and inaction.

Between 2015 and 2019, a total of 20 bilateral military cooperation agreements were signed between Russia and African states. Many Russian companies such as Lukoil, Gasprom, Rosatom and Restec are some of Russia’s energy and power industries which are actively engaged in Nigeria, Egypt, Angola, Algeria and Ethiopia. Here, it must be stressed that in 2018, “Nigerian oil and gas Exploration Company Oranto Petroleum announced that it would be cooperating with Russia’s largest oil producer, Rosneft, to develop 21 oil assets across 17 African countries.”

Unfortunately, this has not materialized due to Rosneft’s lack of interest in doing business in Africa. Additionally, Russian Rosatom has signed nuclear energy agreements with 18 African countries, including Nigeria, Egypt, Ethiopia and Rwanda, to address the power needs of those countries.

In summarizing the Russian strategic policy interest in Africa and given the strong limitation of its current capability, according to Paul Stronski, one time Senior Analyst for Russian domestic politics for the U.S State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, “in many respects, Russia’s reemergence in Africa, is an earnest attempt to resume relations where they were left when the Soviet Union departed the scene.”

Continuing, Paul Stronski further argues that “the Horn of Africa represents an opportunity for Russia to secure a springboard for projecting power into the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and the Persian Gulf. In sub-Saharan Africa, its priority is on exploiting new commercial opportunities and securing diplomatic support for its positions in multilateral institutions.”

The visible signs of Russian activities in the Central African Republic, Mali, Libya and Angola lend incredulity to Stronki’s assertion judging from the concrete deliverables so far enjoyed from Africa-Russia relationships. For instance, when the United States was unwilling to supply Nigeria with arms in 2014 to execute the war against Boko Haram because of allegations of human rights violations, Nigeria was able to place an order for 12 attack helicopters from Russia. To my Russian friends, I say thank you. Thank you on behalf of H.E Muhammadu Buhari, whom I represent. Thank you on behalf of the Nigerian people whom it is my privilege to serve in Russia.

Africa and Neo-Colonialism

Africa may have divested itself majorly from the vestiges of colonial bondage, yet the yoke of neocolonialism continues to bring new challenging shackles which erode the gains of Africa’s independence. As observed by Charles McKelvey (2017), the new struggle is characterized by “core peripheral economic relations that in essence is a continuation of the economic relations imposed by conquest and force during the colonial era… it is a rule through a figure-head bourgeoisie that inserts itself into the structures of economic penetration and exploitation benefiting itself at the expense of the majority of the people in the nation. It finds expression in economic and cultural imperialism, in conditional aid designed to exert influence or indirect control.”

Although Africa is not alone in this new malaise, its emphatic vulnerability is more reflected in Africa by the weaknesses of its institutions and the pervasive invasion of the world order that keeps it in perpetual economic subjugation to the global north. One of the famous speeches of Julius Nyerere, the former President of Tanzania, on “Ujamaa” aptly captures this situation when he said that before independence, fifteen tons of our maize could buy us a car; today, we have to produce twenty-five tons of maize to buy the same brand of car.

It is in light of the foregoing that an international trading system that guarantees equity and fairness needs to be revisited and renegotiated. In this context, I commend the shift of BRICS in its new method of doing business. This is just a beginning and not an end in the long and tortuous road to the route along which a new world order that will be based on equity, fairness and justice will go. There is no doubt that that long road towards a desired equitable world order of which only a step has been taken by BRICS, will have a series of dangerous rivers to cross in its journey to maturation. The visibility of and the potent challenge against the current world order by BRICS is indicative of the order’s waning influence and its global loss of appeal.

Understanding The Realities

Despite the tidal surge in the new Africa-Russia relations and given the strategic role played by the defunct Soviet Union, now succeeded by Russia, in the attainment of the independence of many African countries, both parties must accept the constraints posed by the former (Russia) by the new economic cum geopolitical realities. The acceptance of these new realities is important in order to properly assist in the management of Africa’s expectations from Russia, particularly in the short term.

The first reality is that though Russia is the successor to the defunct Soviet Union, it is not a substitute for the latter economically, materially, geopolitically and financially. Africa’s mindset must therefore change from that of aid-recipient nations to one of the competitive trading nations in which there must be a valuable addition to its primary products.

Next is that, as demonstrated in the recent sanctions imposed on Russia by the West, Africa holds a good prospect for the viability and profitability of Russian manufacturing companies desirous of relocating to Africa in order to capitalize on the advantage of cheap African labour. If the west is declaring fortunes as profits in Africa, Russian companies can also do so only if they agree and are willing to venture out. The booming young population of Africa and its vast reserve of natural and mineral resources provide the catalytic appeal for a such a profitable venture.

Arms Sales and African Security

A very important component in Russia-Africa relations is the supply of military equipment such as battle tanks, warships, fighter aircraft and combat helicopters. Others are small arms such as pistols and assault rifles like the Kalashnikov AK-200 series. Russian soaring arms interest in Africa can briefly be summarized as follows: arms export from Russia to Africa contributes about 35% of global arms export to the African region, while China accounts for 17%. Others are the United States (9.6%) and France (6.9%).

This increasing export of arms to the African continent by Russia could, however, in a sense, exacerbate insecurity and instability, as well as escalate the level of crimes and the proclivity to criminality. It is, therefore, in the strategic interest of Russia to be critically selective in its arms sales to African countries. Of particular worry and strategic concern to Africa is the “deployment of private Russian mercenary groups” as well as other private military groups in countries like Libya, Sudan, Mozambique and CAR. As noted by Paul Stronski, “guns have opened many more doors for the Kremlin in Africa than butter.”

Support for Africa’s democratic institutions and agencies will lead to a more stable Africa which is in Russia’s overall long-term interest and positive image than immediate short-term economic and financial gain.

Changing the Narratives

Although Russia, through the defunct Soviet Union, has had long-standing warm relations with Africa, particularly during the cold war era, today’s realities offer long-term opportunities which can be explored and exploited by both sides to advantage. An example is that with Africa’s bourgeoning young population and the increasing quality of that population through education, the exportation of Africa’s raw materials to Europe and, by extension, Russia is no longer a feasible and sustainable trajectory in any meaningful Africa-Russian long-term relations. As a viable alternative and sustainable option, I foresee an Africa which will demand more of Russian direct engagement in the extractive and manufacturing sectors.

Today, for instance, Nigeria offers Russia the advantage of that cheap and robust labour. Given Russia’s recent experience of sanctions by America and its western allies, a new model of doing business with Africa through investment has become not only sustainable but also imperative. Perhaps, one of the sectors where this model of doing business can be symbiotically harnessed is in the field of agriculture and its value chain as a result of the steep rise in the large African market and the projected certainty of huge returns on investment in this sector.

Africa holds a sizeable amount of the world’s natural resources. However, as noted by Jideofor Adibe, “Russia – just like other major powers – also covets many of Africa’s raw materials and is creating joint projects and investments in order to access them. From the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the Central African Republic, Russian companies are scaling up their activities in the mining of resources such as coltan, cobalt, gold and diamonds.

In Zimbabwe, for instance, a joint venture between Russia’s JSC Afromet and Zimbabwe’s Pen East Ltd is developing one of the world’s largest deposits of platinum group metal”. Such an example of Russia’s visibility in the collaboration and the exploitation of African natural resources can be extended to the development of vast mineral deposits in, for example, Nigeria. In this connection, contacts have been initiated with the Hon. Minister for Solid Mineral Development of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to initiate business with JSC Afromet so as to jointly explore and exploit the comparative advantage that Nigeria enjoys in its solid minerals.

Given the challenges that most African countries face in providing adequate power and energy, the number of Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) that Rosatom, Russia’s nuclear power company, has signed with at least fourteen African countries is welcoming news. What will be more significant, however, is the extent of the implementation of the MOUs since, by their very nature, the construction and operation of nuclear plants are ventures with prospects for deepening long-term relationships.

Recommendations for Future

The rapid intervention of the Russian SPUTNIK V Vaccine in Africa during the severe COVID-19 period was a magnificent show of solidarity with Africa and its people and thus demonstrated the importance of such collaboration and partnership in the face of future pandemics or calamity. Nigeria, for example, remains ever prepared to collaborate with Russia to deepen scientific knowledge in the areas of research on pandemics such as we have in COVID-19.

Although there is no doubt that Africa has benefitted immensely from its collaboration with Russia, politically, educationally, militarily, financially and security-wise yet, much circumspection and delicate balancing needs to be done by Russia between its commercial interests of arms exports to Africa and the latter’s security concerns. Africa’s long-term sustainability, stability and development are in the overall interest of both parties and the fulcrum of their relations. Nigeria, nevertheless, remains eternally grateful for Russia’s arms assistance whenever its sovereignty is challenged and Russia is called to come to its assistance.

Nigeria offers Russia the economic advantage of “produce in Africa and export elsewhere.” Such a model was effectively used by the United States of America in China. For example, imagine how many Russian pharmaceutical companies Nigeria can cheaply and conveniently service with starch as the world’s largest producer of cassava, the derivative of which is starch?

Part of Africa’s inability to optimize its economic opportunities is as a result of low energy and power. The subsisting contracts signed between Russian energy and power companies such as Lukoil, Gazprom, Rosatom and Restec and Nigeria, Egypt, Angola, Algeria and Ethiopia etc to help solve the power needs in Africa are steps in the right direction. Similarly, Rosneft’s agreement with Nigerian oil and gas Exploration Company Oranto Petroleum to develop 21 oil assets across 17 African countries should now move beyond agreement into concrete deliverables. Furthermore, Rosatom’s nuclear energy agreements with 18 African countries, including Nigeria, Egypt, Ethiopia and Rwanda, to address their energy and power concerns should be transformed into measurable results.

Additionally, the establishment of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which is the largest of its kind in the world, provides Africa with a unique opportunity for intra-African trade and hence, empowers Africa’s own capacities and investments. In this respect, there has been increased agreement by African leaders for a common African currency so as to protect Africa from the associated shocks due to the vulnerabilities of commodity prices. A such common currency will give Africa a better voice in international trade and will significantly enhance Africa-Russia trade, as well as global competitiveness for foreign investment.

Meanwhile, according to the World Bank projection, by 2050, Nigeria’s population will be about 400 million, making it the third world’s largest. Such a huge market provides sufficient grounds now for strong and strategic partnerships to meet the beneficial ends of Africa and Russia. A further step in this partnership could be the gravitation from BRICS to perhaps a larger partnership that includes Nigeria – BRINCS.

Africa has remained, for too long, an inconsequential pawn on the chessboard of political-power play where the wishes and aspirations of the African people hardly mattered. Like other regions of the world, Africa’s wishes and desires, expressed in the choice of its leaders through free, fair and credible-election processes, remain sacrosanct. Imposition, super-imposition or subversion of this order challenges the sovereignties of member nations, undermines its people and questions the commonality of our shared humanity.

It is in this context that Africa and, indeed, Nigeria desires to assiduously walk and work with the Russian Federation toward the realization of this noble objective of fairly, equitably and creditably electing (not selecting) Africa’s leaders in accordance with the aspiration of the African people. This is going to be a long walk and hard work in which Africa will be at the vanguard or driver’s seat, conscious that in its own hands lies its destiny.

Africa is aware of the inextricable correlation between bad leadership and poverty. Undoubtedly, therefore, many elected African leaders have failed the litmus test of good governance through their primitive accumulation of illegal state wealth by evidential demonstration of corruption, nepotism, ethnicism and tribalism. They have, by doing so, thwarted the critical aspirations of the African people by bequeathing unto them abject poverty and hopelessness.

Yet, the cherished values of the democratic principles under which those leaders were elected provide for the method of their removal from office. In Nigeria, for example, the government of Goodluck Jonathan was voted out of power after a term in office despite his incumbency. Furthermore, the fact that some countries in Africa have recorded certain democratic successes translates to the fact that Africa’s problem is not the system but the operators of the system.

It is, therefore, hoped that Russia, along with other powerful actors in the continent, will continue to respect the integrity and sacrosanct nature of Africa’s political-leadership recruitment and change processes. Such respect provides the solid foundation on which the future stability, progress and development of Africa will be anchored. It also helps to build up the accumulated reservoir of the body of knowledge so required in Africa’s leadership recruitment process and electoral change.

In conclusion, I have attempted to summarize the context and content that shape Africa-Russia Relations. In that context and content, I have discussed Africa’s resonating past, the struggle against colonialism, the independence of African nations and the role of the then Soviet Union and, by extension, Russia in that struggle, as well as the subtle emergence of neocolonialism of the global north against the south. Part of the major essence of this lecture was to look at the past with a view to charting a course for the future, inhaling the fresh aroma of the beauty of the ‘rose’ in the Africa-Russia relationship, weeding out the thorns of inconvenience on which Africa and Russia have marched and straighten any crooked path along which both have passed so as to arrive faster to the desired destination.

Doing so calls for an atmosphere of cordiality and frankness, commitment and re-dedication. Africa-Russia relations have been a warm one, with Russia offering Africa a lot of assistance often, on an ideological basis, during Africa’s decolonization struggle. The immediate post-Soviet era marked a period of aloofness and indifference to Africa. However, the ascendancy of Africa to relevance, marked by the competition for Africa’s resources in what has been described as the “New Scramble” for Africa, has launched Russia as an indispensable part of Africa’s developmental equation.

While Africa cherishes the important MOUs and agreements Russia has with Africa through ROSATOM, GAZPROM, ROSNEFT, etc, there is a need to translate such agreements and MOUs into concrete realities. Additionally, balancing of Russia’s commercial interests of arms sales to Africa will ensure that the latter enjoys relative stability and peace so vital for its own development.

Equally important is that the constitutions of African countries remain sacrosanct with respect to the political-leadership recruitment process. The constitutions of member states of Africa also specify the methods of leadership change rather than creating leaders in perpetuity. Respect for the constitutions of African countries provides the basis for leadership legitimacy and the foundation for enduring democracy and hope in institutions and authority.

It is important to end with a quote from Joseph Siegle, the Director of Research for the African Centre for Strategic Studies, “building more mutually beneficial Africa relations depends on changes in both substance and process. Such a shift would require Russia to establish more conventional bilateral engagements with African institutions and not individuals. These initiatives would focus on strengthening trade, investment, technology transfer and educational exchanges. If transparently negotiated and equitably implemented, such Russian initiatives would be welcomed by many Africans.”

Professor Abdullahi Shehu, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to the Russian Federation with concurrent accreditation to the Republic of Belarus.

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AFC Backs Future Africa, Lightrock in $100m Tech VC Funding Bet

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Lightrock Africa

By Adedapo Adesanya

Infrastructure solutions provider, Africa Finance Corporation (AFC), has committed parts of a $100 million investment to fund managers—Future Africa and Lightrock Africa—to boost African tech venture backing.

The commitment to Lightrock Africa Fund II and Future Africa Fund III is the first tranche of a broader deployment, AFC noted.

The corporation added that it is actively evaluating a pipeline of additional Africa-focused funds spanning a range of strategies and stages, with further commitments expected in the near term.

This is part of its efforts to plug a persistent gap in long-term institutional capital on the continent, which constrains the development and scaling of high-potential technology businesses across the continent, especially with a drop in foreign investments.

“Through this commitment, AFC will deploy catalytic capital in leading Africa-focused technology Funds and, in particular, African-owned fund managers,” it said in a statement on Monday.

AFC aims to address the underrepresentation of local capital in venture funding by catalysing greater participation from African institutional investors and deepening local ownership within the ecosystem.

Despite some success stories on the continent, local institutional capital remains significantly underrepresented across many fund cap tables, with the majority of venture funding continuing to flow from international sources.

AFC’s commitment is designed to shift that dynamic, according to Mr Samaila Zubairu, its chief executive.

“Across the continent, young Africans are not waiting for the digital economy to arrive; they are seizing the moment — adopting technology, creating markets and solving real economic problems faster than infrastructure has kept pace. That is the investment signal.

“AFC’s $100 million Africa-focused Technology Fund will accelerate the convergence of growing demand, rapid technology adoption, youthful demographics and the enabling infrastructure we are building.

“Digital infrastructure is now as fundamental to Africa’s transformation as roads, rail, ports and power — enabling productivity, payments, logistics, services, data and cross-border trade, while creating jobs and industrial scale.”

Mr Pal Erik Sjatil, Managing Partner & CEO, Lightrock, said: “We are delighted to welcome Africa Finance Corporation as an anchor investor in Lightrock Africa II, deepening a strong partnership shaped by our collaboration on high-impact investments across Africa, including Moniepoint, Lula, and M-KOPA.

“With aligned capital, a long-term perspective, and a shared focus on value creation, we are well positioned to support exceptional management teams and scale category-leading businesses that deliver attractive financial returns alongside measurable environmental and social outcomes,” he added.

Adding his input, Mr Iyin Aboyeji, Founding Partner, Future Africa, said: “By investing in AI-native skills, financing productive tools such as phones and laptops, and expanding energy, connectivity and compute infrastructure, we can convert Africa’s greatest asset — its people — into critical participants in the new global economy. AFC’s US$100 million commitment is the anchor this moment demands.

“As our first multilateral development bank partner, AFC is sending a clear signal that digital is as fundamental to Africa’s transformation as agriculture, manufacturing and physical infrastructure. We trust that other development finance institutions, insurers, reinsurers and pension funds will follow AFC’s lead.”

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Africa ‘Reawakening’ In Emerging Multipolar World

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Gustavo de Carvalho

By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh

In this interview, Gustavo de Carvalho, Programme Head (Acting): African Governance and Diplomacy, South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), discusses at length aspects of Africa’s developments in the context of shifting geopolitics, its relationships with external countries, and expected roles in the emerging multipolar world. Gustavo de Carvalho further underscores key issues related to transparency in agreements, financing initiatives, and current development priorities that are shaping Africa’s future. Here are the interview excerpts:

Is Africa undergoing the “second political re-awakening” and how would you explain Africans’ perceptions and attitudes toward the emerging multipolar world?

We should be careful not to overstate novelty. African states exercised real agency during the Cold War, too, from Bandung to the Non-Aligned Movement. What has actually shifted is the structure of the international system around the continent. The unipolar moment has faded, the menu of partners has widened, and a generation of policymakers under fifty operates without the inhibitions of either the Cold War or the immediate post-Cold War period. African publics, however, are more pragmatic than multipolar rhetoric assumes. Afrobarometer’s surveys across more than thirty countries consistently show citizens evaluating external partners on tangible outcomes such as infrastructure, jobs and security, rather than on civilisational narratives. China is generally associated with positive economic influence, the United States retains the strongest pull as a development model, and Russia, despite a louder political profile, registers a smaller and more geographically concentrated footprint. Multipolarity is not a destination Africans are arriving at. It is a working environment that creates more options and more risks at once.

Do you think it is appropriate to use the term “neo-colonialism” referring to activities of foreign players in Africa? By the way, who are the neo-colonisers in your view?

The term has analytical value when used carefully, and loses it when deployed selectively against whichever power one wishes to embarrass. Nkrumah’s 1965 formulation was precise: political independence accompanied by continued external control over economic and political life. The honest test is whether contemporary patterns reproduce that asymmetry, irrespective of the capital from which they originate. The structural picture is well documented. Africa still exports primary commodities and imports manufactured goods. Intra-African trade hovers around fifteen per cent of total trade, well below Asian or European levels. African sovereigns pay a measurable risk premium on debt that exceeds what fundamentals alone justify. Applied consistently, the lens directs attention to opaque resource-for-infrastructure contracts, security-for-mineral bargains, debt agreements with confidentiality clauses, and aid architectures that bypass African institutions. That description fits legacy French commercial arrangements in francophone Africa, Chinese mining concessions in the DRC, Russian-linked gold extraction in the Central African Republic and Sudan, Gulf-backed port and farmland deals along the Red Sea, and Western corporate practices that have not always met the standards their governments preach. Naming a single neo-coloniser tells us more about the speaker’s politics than about the structure.

How would you interpret the current engagement of foreign players in Africa? Do you also think there is geopolitical competition and rivalry among them?

Competition is real and intensifying, and the proliferation of Africa-plus-one summits is the clearest indicator. Russia has held two summits, in Sochi in 2019 and St Petersburg in 2023. The EU, Turkey, Japan, India, the United States, South Korea, Saudi Arabia and the UAE all host their own variants. Trade figures give a more honest sense of weight than diplomatic theatre. China-Africa trade reached around 280 billion dollars in 2023, United States-Africa trade sits in the 60 to 70 billion range, and Russia-Africa trade is roughly 24 billion, heavily concentrated in grain, fertiliser and arms. Describing the continent as a chessboard, however, understates how African states themselves are shaping these dynamics, sometimes through skilful diversification and sometimes through security bargains that entail longer-term costs. The Sahel illustrates the latter starkly. Between 2020 and 2023, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger expelled French forces, downgraded their relationships with ECOWAS and the UN stabilisation mission, and welcomed Russian security contractors. ACLED data shows civilian fatalities from political violence rising rather than falling across the same period. Substituting providers without strengthening domestic institutions does not produce sovereignty. It changes the terms of dependence.

Do you think much depends on African leaders and their people (African solutions to African problems) to work toward long-term, sustainable development?

The principle is correct, and it is regularly weaponised in two unhelpful directions. External actors invoke it to justify withdrawing from responsibilities they continue to hold, particularly over financial flows and arms transfers that pass through their own jurisdictions. Some African leaders invoke it to deflect legitimate scrutiny of governance failings, repression or corruption. Genuine African agency requires more than rhetoric. The AU’s operating budget remains modest in absolute terms, and external partners still cover a significant share of programmatic activities, which shapes what gets funded. The African Standby Force, conceived in 2003, remains only partially operational more than two decades on. The African Continental Free Trade Area, in force since 2021, has rolled out more slowly than drafters hoped because the political will to lower national barriers lags the speeches. Long-term development depends on African leaders financing more of their own security and development priorities, on publics holding them accountable, and on a clearer-eyed view of what foreign forces can deliver. Whether the actors are Russian-linked contractors in the Sahel and Central African Republic, Western counter-terrorism deployments, or others, external security providers tend to address symptoms while leaving the political and economic drivers of insecurity intact.

Often described as a continent with huge, untapped natural resources and large human capital (1.5 billion), what then specifically do African leaders expect from Europe, China, Russia and the United States?

Expectations differ across the three relationships, and that differentiation is itself a marker of agency. From China, leaders expect infrastructure financing, sustained commodity demand, and a partnership that does not condition itself on domestic governance reforms. FOCAC commitments have delivered visible results in ports, railways and power generation, though Beijing itself has shifted toward smaller, more selective lending since around 2018. From Russia, expectations are narrower because the economic footprint is. Moscow’s offer is political backing in multilateral forums, arms transfers, grain and fertiliser supply, civilian nuclear cooperation in a handful of cases, and security partnerships, including those involving private military formations. The record of those security arrangements in the Central African Republic, Mali, Sudan and Mozambique deserves a sober assessment on its own terms, because the human and political costs are documented and uneven. From the United States, leaders look for market access through instruments such as AGOA, whose post-2025 future has generated significant uncertainty, alongside private capital, technology partnerships and a posture that treats the continent as more than a counter-terrorism theatre. The priorities across all three relationships are essentially the same: transparency in the terms of agreements, arrangements that preserve future policy space, and partnerships that build domestic productive capacity rather than substitute for it. The continent’s leverage in this multipolar moment is real, but it is not permanent. It will be squandered if used to rotate among external dependencies rather than reduce them.

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Africa Startup Deals Activity Rebound, Funding Lags at $110m in April 2026

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By Adedapo Adesanya

Africa’s startup ecosystem showed tentative signs of recovery in April 2026, with deal activity picking up after a subdued March, though funding volumes remained weak by recent standards, Business Post gathered from the latest data by Africa: The Big Deal.

In the review month, a total of 32 startups across the continent announced funding rounds of at least $100,000, raising a combined $110 million through a mix of equity, debt and grant deals, excluding exits. The figure represents a notable rebound from the 22 deals recorded in March, suggesting renewed investor engagement after a slow start to the second quarter.

However, the recovery in deal count did not translate into stronger capital inflows. April’s $110 million total marks the lowest monthly funding volume since March 2025, when startups raised $52 million, and falls significantly short of the previous 12-month average of $275 million per month.

The data highlights a growing divergence between investor activity and cheque sizes, with more deals being completed but at smaller ticket values.

The data showed that, despite this, looking at the numbers on a month-to-month basis does not tell the whole story of venture funding cycles as a broader 12-month rolling view presents a more stable picture of Africa’s startup ecosystem.

Based on this, over the 12 months to April 2026 (May 2025–April 2026), startups across the continent raised a total of $3.1 billion, excluding exits – largely in line with the range observed since August 2025. The figure has hovered around $3.1 billion, with only marginal deviations of about $90 million, indicating relative stability despite recent monthly dips.

A closer breakdown shows that equity financing accounted for $1.7 billion of the total, while debt funding contributed $1.4 billion, alongside approximately $30 million in grants. This composition underscores the growing role of debt in sustaining overall funding levels.

The data suggests that while headline monthly figures may point to short-term weakness, the broader funding environment remains resilient, supported in large part by continued activity in debt financing, even as equity investments show signs of moderation.

The report said if April’s total amount was lower than March’s overall, it was higher on equity: $74 million came as equity and $36 million as debt, while March had been overwhelmingly debt-led ($55 million equity, $96 million debt).

In the review month, the deals announced include Egyptian fintech Lucky raising a $23 million Series B, while Gozem ($15.2 million debt) and Victory Farms ($15 milliomn debt) did most of the heavy lifting on the debt side. Ethiopia-based electric mobility start-up Dodai announced $13m ($8m Series A + $5m debt).

April also saw two exits as Nigeria’s Bread Africa was acquired by SMC DAO as consolidation continues in the country’s digital asset sector, and Egypt’s waste recycling start-up Cyclex was acquired by Saudi-Egyptian investment firm Edafa Venture.

Year-to-Date (January to April), startups on the continent have raised a total of $708 million across 124 deals of at least $100,000, excluding exits. The funding mix was almost evenly split, with $364 million in equity (51.4 per cent) and $340 million in debt (48.0 per cent), alongside a small contribution from grants (0.6 per cent). This is an early sign that funding startups is taking a different shape compared to what the ecosystem witnessed in 2025.

For instance, in the first four months of last year, startups raised a higher $813 million across a significantly larger 180 deals. More notably, last year’s funding was heavily skewed toward equity, which accounted for $652 million (80.1 per cent) compared to just $138 million in debt (16.9 per cent).

The year-on-year comparison points to two clear trends: a contraction in deal activity as evidenced by a 31 per cent drop, and a 13 per cent decline in total funding. At the same time, the composition of capital has shifted meaningfully, with debt now playing a much larger role in sustaining funding volumes.

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