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In Era of COVID-19, Russia’s Strategic Politics of Coronavirus Aid Takes Stage in Africa

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Coronavirus Aid

By Kester Kenn Klomegah

With coronavirus rapidly spreading among the population of 148 million, Russia took the third position in the world.

According to the official data provided on May 11, Russia had an aggregate total of 221,344 COVID-19 cases. The United Kingdom and Italy earlier reported 219,183 and 219,070 cases, respectively.

Spain comes in second with 224,390 coronavirus cases, and the United States ranked first with nearly 1.4 million cases.

That are huge gaps compared to over 50,000 cases among 1.3 billion population of Africa, at a first glance, and readily offered an understandable story. South Africa and Maghreb region are the hardest hit and worse affected with the coronavirus in Africa. As expected, the pandemic places diverse impact on the global economies and the society, recommended measures have been taken in a bid to prevent the coronavirus spread.

According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) report, Africa still behind European countries when it comes to the COVID-19 outbreak and is far from seeing its peak. While Africa has only reported more than 50,000 confirmed cases of the novel coronavirus early May, the UNECA-released report “COVID-19 in Africa: Protecting Lives and Economies” said “anywhere between 300,000 and 3.3 million African people could lose their lives as a direct result of COVID-19, depending on the intervention measures taken to stop the spread.”

According to the Regional Office for Africa of the World Health Organization (WHO), the hardest hit are South Africa and mostly Maghreb countries of Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. These Maghreb countries have strengthened information controls, instead of upholding transparency during the health crisis, but generally reported to have more than 5,000 infections, while in Tunisia, there are 1,018 patients and 43 people have died. In sub-Saharan West Africa, Ghana and Nigeria are also among the top ten African countries affected the pandemic.

While Russia, for a time, appeared to escape a serious coronavirus outbreak, the situation there has changed drastically during these two months of April and May, – passing Germany and France to become the third most-infected country in the world, according to The Moscow Times. Russia now has the fastest rate of new cases in Europe, and second-fastest rate of new cases in the world behind the United States.

In an important part, Russian health workers are still reporting a shortage on protective equipment. With the picture getting highly scary, Russian President Vladimir Putin worries about any slightest missteps when, in one of his live television speeches, he warned: “We cannot jump ahead of ourselves. Any carelessness or haste may cause a setback.”

Despite its internal difficulties, Russia has been offering coronavirus assistance to a number of Africa countries. Russia is using it bilateral and multilateral mechanisms in addressing these requests filed by African countries since March after the coronavirus pandemic had spread to the continent that consists of 54 countries. However, Lesotho and Comoros are free from the coronavirus.

Russian Foreign Ministry said a number of African countries have requested Moscow’s assistance in combating the coronavirus. “A number of countries on the African continent have requested Russia’s assistance in combating COVID-19. African nations need a wide range of medical equipment, including ventilators, as well as testing systems, individual protective gear, disinfectants and consumables. These requests are carefully studied and the situation in a particular country is taken into account,” it reported, adding that coronavirus spread rates were relatively low in African countries, with the exception of Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and South Africa.

“However, this issue is causing serious concern to many countries on the continent. The social and economic situations in many of these countries are complicated, while high population density, poor healthcare systems, various crises and conflicts, transparent borders and uncontrolled migration can lead to a sharp rise in cases and unpredictable consequences,” the statement said.

According to the Russian Foreign Ministry, the pandemic may negatively affect African countries’ ability to carry out major tasks to overcome poverty, ensure sustainable development and implement integration projects. Russia had been assisting African countries in responding to natural disasters and the spread of infectious diseases, including the Ebola fever. “We will do what we can to help the continent combat the coronavirus pandemic, using bilateral mechanisms and those of international organizations,” the ministry said, noting that “when making decisions, we will take a whole set of factors into account, including Russia’s coronavirus spread rate.”

Understandably, wholesale provision of coronavirus assistance is, absolutely and practically, impossible to Africa. Therefore, in the shadow of COVID-19, Russia is strategically choosing for its coronavirus aid destinations inside Africa, experts argued. Historically, Russia has had a high preference for the Maghreb region and southern African countries. Thus, in the months of April and May, aid was delivered to Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia in North Africa. Ethiopia and Djibouti in eastern Africa. In southern Africa, the beneficiaries included Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe, according to various media reports inside Africa.

On May 11, at the National Institute of Biomedical Research (NIBI) of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), more than 28 thousand units of laboratory supplies and 8 thousand units of personal protective equipment including protective clothing, respirators, reusable full-face masks with a set of filters and gloves were delivered. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs media report, the cargo was sent by Russia’s Rospotrebnadzor.
The delivery event was attended by the DRC Minister of Health, Dr Eteni Longondo, Advisers to the President, P. Muanda Congo and S. Sial Sial, as well as the Director of the National Institute of Biomedical Research (NIBI), Professor J.M. Muyembe Tampam and Russian Ambassador Aleksey Leonidovich Sentebov.

According to WHO, Congo confirmed its first case of coronavirus mid-March, and as of May 5, there were only 264 confirmed cases and 11 deaths in a country of some 80 million people. Therefore, the Russia’s assistance provided is extremely timely, since epidemics of coronavirus, Ebola, Cholera and Measles broke out, at the same time, in the country. In difficult sanitary and epidemiological conditions, DR Congo is experiencing a sharp shortage of equipment, tests, medicines, vaccines, and there are not enough masks, gloves, and disinfectants.

In this regard, the Congolese are looking forward to the arrival of two mobile laboratories at the end of May this year, which, due to their versatility, can be used to combat the spread of a number of especially dangerous infections, including COVID-19. Russia plans to train Congolese personnel in these microbiological complexes.
In addition, as part of the provision of gratuitous anti-epidemic assistance, Rospotrebnadzor plans to send modern laboratory equipment, diagnostic preparations, vaccines against BVE, cholera, plague and measles, test systems for the detection of Ebola, dengue fever, malaria, cholera and coronavirus to Kinshasa.
Russian-Congolese health contacts are quite extensive and are backed by an agreement signed between the Federal Service for Supervision of Consumer Rights Protection and Humanitarian Affairs and the DRC on the sidelines of the Russia-Africa summit in October 2019 in Sochi. Over the course of several years, Russian virologists have repeatedly visited this country in order to identify its urgent needs, held meetings with local specialists and, in the most difficult period of the global spread of coronavirus in the Republic of Congo.

Russia’s Sputnik News, under the headline, “Tunisia Asks Russia for Respirators, Masks, Medical Equipment Amid Pandemic” quoted the Tunisian Ambassador to the Russian Federation, Tarak ben Salem who said: “This request for assistance is a part of friendly relations between Tunisia and Russia. Tunisia, like many other countries, is facing an unprecedented health and economic crisis. We need respirators, masks and medical equipment that will help provide services in public hospitals.”

“Tunisia, a country close to Italy, appreciated the assistance provided by Russia to this neighboring friendly country,” Salem explained and added “Tunisia hopes for a step forward from Russia, which has promised to consider our request. This can only confirm the quality of friendly and fraternal relations between our countries and our peoples.”

Nevertheless, Russia is also exploring the opportunities in Tunisia, and as part of its geopolitical expansion and influence in Maghreb region. According to the ambassador, Russia has pledged to look into Tunisia’s request.

The United States had granted $500,000 in health assistance to address the coronavirus outbreak in Djibouti. Shortly thereafter, the Russian Foreign Ministry also posted to its official website that Russia had delivered humanitarian assistance to Djibouti in East Africa. Late April, Russian humanitarian aid to the Ministry of Health of the Republic of Djibouti was delivered and was described as part of a joint project with the World Health Organization. It was financed by the Russian Government to enhance Djibouti’s potential in the field of medical emergency readiness and response.

“This humanitarian action comes in response to an official request from the Djiboutian authorities in view of the serious deterioration in the sanitary and epidemiological situation in the country caused by heavy floods and the spread of the novel COVID-19 infection. A consignment of humanitarian aid weighing a total of 13.5 tons and consisting of more than 20 multi-purpose medical modules to fight dangerous infectious diseases was delivered to Djibouti’s seaport. The shipment included tents and components to build two medical units for rendering skilled assistance to over 200,000 people,” according to report of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The report indicated that “the ceremony was attended by Russian Ambassador to Djibouti Mikhail Golovanov, WHO Representative Dr Ahmed Zouiten and Djiboutian Minister of Health Mohamed Warsama Dirieh. The Djiboutian leadership expressed its sincere appreciation to the Russian side for the assistance amid such a complicated epidemiological situation.”

Djibouti has seen a rapid spike in coronavirus cases with the Horn of Africa nation, as the population largely ignores measures imposed by authorities. As a tiny country, it shares borders with Somalia in the south, Ethiopia in the south and west, Eritrea in the north and the Red Sea. Djibouti is a multi-ethnic, with a population about one million, but strategically important country that hosts the United States and French military bases, has recorded 1,116 positive coronavirus cases — small on a global scale. Only two (2) people have died to date, according to the report from the Ministry of Health.

With its burgeoning commercial hub, it serves strategically as the site for various foreign military bases. The hosting of foreign military bases is an important part of Djibouti’s economy. The United States pays $63 million a year to rent Camp Lemonnier, France and Japan each pay about $30 million a year and China pays $20 million a year. The lease payments added up to more than 5% of Djibouti’s GDP of $2.3 billion in 2018.

China has stepped up its military presence in Africa, with ongoing plans to secure an even greater military presence in Djibouti specifically. China’s presence in Djibouti is tied to strategic ports to ensure the security of Chinese assets. Djibouti’s strategic location makes the country prime for an increased military presence.

Undoubtedly, Russia has shown interest in strengthening its ties with the country. Russians believe it could take steps to overcome the impasses in the disputes between Ethiopia and Eritrea, between Ethiopia and Djibouti, as well as international support for Somalia’s efforts to restore its statehood in the Horn of Africa. It has proposed an elaborate plan from maintaining peace and security to promoting socioeconomic development in the Horn of Africa and that includes Djibouti.

Over the past few years, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has had extensive discussions on investment in high technology and transport logistics in Djibouti and Eritrea, both neighboring countries in the region.

It is worth to note that Russia and Algeria have friendly sustainable relations. A Russian cargo aircraft has delivered personal protective equipment to help tackle the novel coronavirus pandemic in Algeria. Algeria’s Minister of Health, Population and Hospital Reform Abderrahmane Benbouzid and Russian Ambassador Igor Belyaev were at the air base of Boufarik, Blida (50-km south of Algiers), to take delivery of the cargo, Algeria Press Service reported April 30.

According to the information made available, the Russia’s humanitarian aid, consists of medical protective equipment was purchased by the Rosoboronexport, the State Arms Exporter, it was done upon the Russian government’s instructions in order to fight the coronavirus pandemic. “Among the medical items delivered to Algeria are infrared thermometers, suits, medical masks and other goods, needed by the friendly nation of Algeria and its healthcare sector,” the media said. Cooperation in fighting COVID-19 strengthens the humanitarian aspect of Russian-Algerian relations.

Given this global scenario of COVID-19, it becomes a conduit to play some game cards. For instance, Russia’s pursuit of playing a bigger role in global political realm is grounded on the consequences Russia faced in the aftermath of the collapse of USSR. That was followed by a huge political chaos and instability of its socio-economic space. However, Russia cling to it as the new game changer and now plays the catch-up. Russia seems to have neglected the potential opportunities in Africa, according to Punsara Amarasinghe, a former research fellow at the Faculty of Law, Higher School of Economics in Moscow, and now a PhD candidate in international law from the Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies in Pisa, Italy.

“Perhaps, Russia needs a lot more of efforts to revive old ties in African countries, to engage in a large scale investments and energy. Humanitarian assistance could be a strategic mechanism, the lack of Russian soft power in African states is another main trouble that continues to hinder Russia’s realization of its policy projects,” Amarasinghe wrote in his emailed discussion.

He further compares how Britain, France and even India are performing with the use of their soft power in African space, added finally that “Russia still has the opportunities, Moscow only needs to address more on African states beyond arms trade and offering assistance, but covering much important issues such as education, energy politics and investment. These have to be taken in practical terms, not just mere rhetoric.”

On April 29, Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), a powerful autonomous Russian NGO that focuses on foreign policy, held an online conference under theme “The Future of Africa in the Context of Energy Crisis and COVID-19 Pandemic” – with participation of foreign policy experts on Africa.  Chairing the online discussions, Igor Ivanov, former Russian Foreign Affairs Minister and now RIAC President, made an opening speech. He pointed out that Russia’s task in Africa following the pandemic is to present a strategy and define priorities with the countries of the continent, build on the decisions of the first Russia-Africa Summit, held in Sochi in October 2019.

On the development of cooperation between Russia and African countries, Igor Ivanov strongly reminded that “Russia’s task is to prevent a rollback in relations with African countries. It is necessary to use the momentum set by the first Russia-Africa Summit. First of all, it is necessary for Russia to define explicitly its priorities: why are we returning to Africa? Just to make money, strengthen our international presence, help African countries or to participate in the formation of the new world order together with the African countries? Some general statements of a fundamental nature were made at the first Summit, now it is necessary to move from general statements to specificity.”

The speakers presented scenarios of the development of the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic on the continent, the impact of the coronavirus on various industries, the economic and social development of African countries. Experts discussed the role of integration associations on the continent, the existing and the expected problems in the work of humanitarian missions and programs supervised by international organizations.

For many African countries, it is the time to reflect on African countries’ responses to COVID-19. It is time to take the opportunity it offers to catalyze action on structural deficits. The current predicament triggers long-term shifts toward universal access to health and education. It is time to think of improving communities with the necessary infrastructure. Although it has abundant natural resources, Africa remains the world’s poorest and least developed continent, the result of a variety of causes that include corrupt governments, and worse with poor development policies. It is time to prioritize and focus on sustainable development.

With its 1.3 billion people, Africa accounts for about 16% of the world’s human population. Africa, comprising 54 countries, is the world’s second largest and second-most populous continent after Asia. As the coronavirus spreads around the world, many foreign eyes, such as the United States and Canada, Europe, China, Russia and the Gulf States, are still on Africa.

Significantly, the global pandemic has exposed the weaknesses in Africa’s health system, adversely affected its economic sectors, it is therefore necessary for African leaders, the African Union (AU), Regional organization and African partners be reminded of issues relating to sustainable economic development and subsequent integration. It sets further as a reminder to highlight and prioritize the significance of these in the context of tasks set out by the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the African Union’s Agenda 2063.

By Kester Kenn Klomegah writes frequently about Russia, Africa and the BRICS. 

Dipo Olowookere is a journalist based in Nigeria that has passion for reporting business news stories. At his leisure time, he watches football and supports 3SC of Ibadan. Mr Olowookere can be reached via [email protected]

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After the Capital Rush: Who Really Wins Nigeria’s Bank Recapitalisation?

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CBN Building Governor Yemi Cardoso

By Blaise Udunze

By any standard, Nigeria’s ongoing bank recapitalisation exercise is one of the most consequential financial sector reforms since the 2004-2005 consolidation that shrank the number of banks from 89 to 25. Then, as now, the stated objective was stability to have stronger balance sheets, better shock absorption, and banks capable of financing long-term economic growth.

The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), in 2024, mandated a sweeping recapitalisation exercise compelling banks to raise substantially higher capital bases depending on their license categories. The categorisation mandated that every Tier-1 deposit money bank with international authorization is to warehouse N500 billion minimum capital base, and a national bank must have N200 billion, while a regional bank must have N50 billion by the deadline of 31st March 2026. According to the apex bank, the objectives were to strengthen resilience, create a more robust buffer against shocks, and position Nigerian banks as global competitors capable of funding a $1 trillion economy.

But in the thick of the race to comply and as the dust gradually settles, a far bigger conversation has emerged, one that cuts to the heart of how our banking system works. What will the aftermath of recapitalisation mean for Nigeria’s banking landscape, financial inclusion agenda, and real-sector development?

Beyond the headlines of rights issues, private placements, and billionaire founders boosting stakes, every Nigerians deserve a sober assessment of what has changed, and what still must change, if recapitalisation is to translate into a genuinely improved banking system.

The points are who benefits most from its evolution, and whether ordinary Nigerians will feel the promised transformation in their everyday financial lives, because history has taught us that recapitalisation is never a neutral policy. The fact remains that recapitalization creates winners and losers, restructures incentives, and often leads to unintended outcomes that outlive the reform itself.

Concentration Risk: When the Big Get Bigger

Recapitalisation is meant to make banks stronger, and at the same time, it risks making them fewer and bigger, concentrating power and risks in an ever-narrowing circle. Nigeria’s Tier-1 banks, those already controlling roughly 70 percent of banking assets, are poised to expand further in both balance sheet size and market influence. This deepens the divide between the “haves” and “have-nots” within the sector.

A critical fallout of this exercise has been the acceleration of consolidation. Stronger banks with ready access to capital markets, like Access Holdings and Zenith Bank, have managed to meet or exceed the new thresholds early by raising funds through rights issues and public offerings. Access Bank boosted its capital to nearly N595 billion, and Zenith Bank to about N615 billion.

In contrast, banks that lack deep pockets or the ability to quickly mobilise investors are lagging. The results always show that the biggest banks raise capital faster and cheaper, while smaller banks struggle to keep pace.

As of mid-2025, fewer than 14 of Nigeria’s 24 commercial banks met the required capital base, meaning a significant number were still scrambling, turning to rights issues, private placements, mergers, and even licensing downgrades to survive.

The danger here is not merely numerical. It is systemic: as capital becomes more concentrated, the banking system could inadvertently mimic oligopolistic tendencies, reducing competition, narrowing choices for customers, and potentially heightening systemic risk should one of these “too-big-to-fail” institutions falter.

Capital Flight or Strategic Expansion? The Foreign Subsidiary Question

One of the most contentious aspects of the recapitalisation aftermath has been the deployment of newly raised capital, especially its use outside Nigeria. Several banks, flush with liquidity from rights issues and injections, have signalled or executed investments in foreign subsidiaries and expansions abroad, like what we are experiencing with Nigerian banks spreading their tentacles to the Ivory Coast, Ghana, Kenya, and beyond. Zenith Bank’s planned expansion into the Ivory Coast exemplifies this outward push.

While international diversification can be a sound strategic move for multinational banks, there is an uncomfortable optics and developmental question here: why is Nigerian money being deployed abroad when millions of Nigerians remain unbanked or underbanked at home?

According to the World Bank, a large number of Nigeria’s adult population still lack access to formal financial services, while millions of SMEs, micro-entrepreneurs, and rural households remain on the edge, underserved by traditional banks that now chase profitability and scale.

Of a truth, redirecting Nigerian capital to foreign markets may deliver shareholder returns, but it does little in the short term to advance domestic financial inclusion, poverty reduction, or grassroots economic participation. The optics of capital flight, even when legal and strategic, demand scrutiny, especially in a nation still struggling with deep regional and demographic disparities.

Impact on Credit and the Real Economy

For the ordinary Nigerian, the most important question is simple: will recapitalisation make credit cheaper and more accessible?

History suggests the answer is not automatic. The tradition in Nigeria’s bank system is mainly to protect returns, and for this reason, many banks respond to higher capital requirements by tightening lending standards, raising interest rates, or focusing on low-risk government securities rather than private-sector loans, because raising capital is expensive, and banks are profit-driven institutions.  Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), often described as the engine of growth, are usually the first casualties of such risk aversion.

If recapitalisation results in stronger balance sheets but weaker lending to the real economy, then its benefits remain largely cosmetic. The economy does not grow on capital adequacy ratios alone; it grows when banks take measured risks to finance production, innovation, and consumption.

Retail Banking Retreat: Handing the Mass Market to Fintechs?

In recent years, we have witnessed one of the most striking shifts, or a gradual retreat of traditional banks from mass retail banking, particularly low-income and informal customers.

The question running through the hearts of many is whether Nigerian banks are retreating from retail banking, leaving space for fintech disruptors to fill the void.

In recent years, players like OPAY, Moniepoint, Palmpay, and a host of digital financial services arms have become de facto retail banking platforms for millions of Nigerians. They provide everyday payment services, wallet functionalities, micro-loans, and QR-enabled commerce, areas traditional banks once dominated. This trend has accelerated as banks chase corporate clients where margins are higher and risk profiles perceived as more manageable. The true picture of the financial landscape today is that the fintechs own the retail space, and banks dominate corporate and institutional finance. But it is unclear or uncertain if this model can continue to work effectively in the long term.

Despite the areas in which the Fintechs excel, whether in agility, product innovation, and customer experience, they still rely heavily on underlying banking infrastructure for liquidity, settlement, and regulatory compliance. Should the retail banking ecosystem become split between digital wallets and corporate corridors, rather than being vertically integrated within banks, systemic liquidity dynamics and financial stability could be affected.

Nigerians deserve a banking system where the comforts and conveniences of digital finance are backed by the stability, regulatory oversight, and capital strength of licensed banks, not a system where traditional banks withdraw from retail, leaving unregulated or lightly regulated players to carry that mantle.

Corporate Governance: When Founders Tighten Their Grip

The recapitalisation exercise has not been merely a technical capital-raising exercise; it has become a theatre of power plays at the top. In several banks, founders and major investors have used the exercise to increase their stakes, concentrating ownership even as they extol the virtues of financial resilience.

Prominent founders, from Tony Elumelu at UBA to Femi Otedola at First Holdco and Jim Ovia at Zenith Bank, have all been actively increasing their shareholdings. These moves raise legitimate questions about corporate governance when founders increase control during a regulatory exercise. Are they driven by confidence in their institutions, or are they fortifying personal and strategic influence amid industry restructuring?

Though there might be nothing inherently wrong with founders or shareholders demonstrating faith in their institutions, one fact remains that the governance challenge lies not simply in who holds the shares, but how decisions are made and whose interests are prioritised. Will banks maintain robust internal checks and balances, ensuring that capital deployment aligns with national development goals? The question is whether the CBN is equipped with adequate supervisory bandwidth and tools to check potential excesses if emerging shareholder concentrations translate into undue influence or risks to financial stability. These are questions that transcend annual reports; they strike at the heart of trust in the system.

Regional Disparity in Lending: Lagos Is Not Nigeria

One of the persistent criticisms of Nigerian banking is regional lending inequality. It has been said that most bank loans are still overwhelmingly concentrated in Lagos and the Southwest, despite decades of financial deepening in this region; large swathes of the North, Southeast, and other underserved regions receive disproportionately smaller shares of credit. This imbalance not only undermines inclusive growth but also fuels perceptions of economic exclusion.

Recapitalisation, in theory, should have enhanced banks’ capacity to support broader economic activity. Yet, the reality remains that loans and advances are overwhelmingly concentrated in economic hubs like Lagos.

The CBN must deploy clear incentives and penalties to encourage geographic diversification of lending. This could include differentiated capital requirements, credit guarantees, or tax incentives tied to regional loan portfolios. A recapitalised banking system that does not finance national development is a missed opportunity.

Cybersecurity, Staff Welfare, and the Technology Deficit

Beyond balance sheets and brand expansion, there is a human and technological dimension to the banking sector’s challenge. Fraud remains rampant, and one of the leading frustrations voiced by Nigerians involves failed transactions, delayed reversals, and poor digital experience. Banks can raise capital, but if they fail to invest heavily in cybersecurity, fraud detection, staff training, and welfare, the everyday customer will continue to view the banking system as unreliable.

Nigeria’s fintech revolution has thrived precisely because it has pushed incumbents to become more customer-centric, agile, and tech-savvy. If banks now flush with capital don’t channel a portion of those funds into robust IT systems, workforce development, fraud mitigation, and seamless customer service, then the recapitalisation will have achieved little beyond stronger balance sheets. In short, Nigerians should feel the difference, not merely in stock prices and market capitalisation, but in smooth banking apps, instant reversals, responsive customer care, and secure platforms.

The Banks Left Behind: Mergers, Failures, or Forced Restructuring?

With fewer than half the banks having fully complied with the recapitalisation requirements deep into 2025, a pressing question is: what awaits those that lag? Many banks are still closing capital gaps that run into hundreds of billions of naira. According to industry estimates, the total recapitalisation gap across the sector could reach as much as N4.7 trillion if all requirements are strictly enforced.

Banks that fail to meet the March 2026 deadline face a few options:

–       Forced M&A. Regulators could effectively compel weaker banks to merge with stronger ones, echoing the consolidation wave of 2005 that reduced the sector from 89 to 25 banks.

–       License downgrades or conversions. Some banks may choose to operate at a lower license category that demands a smaller capital base.

–       Exits or closures. In extreme cases, banks that can neither raise capital nor find a merger partner might be forced out of the market.

This regulatory pressure should not be construed merely as punitive. It is part of the CBN’s broader architecture of ensuring that only solvent, well-capitalised, and risk-prepared institutions operate. However, the transition must be managed carefully to prevent contagion, protect depositors, and preserve confidence.

Why Are Tier-1 Banks Still Chasing Capital?

Perhaps the most intriguing puzzle is why some Tier-1 banks, long regarded as strong and profitable, are aggressively raising capital. Even banks thought to be among the strongest, such as UBA, First Holdco, Fidelity, GTCO, and FCMB, have struggled to close their capital gaps. UBA, for instance, succeeded in raising around N355 billion toward its N500 billion target at one point and planned additional rights issues to bridge the remainder.

This reveals another reality that capital is not just numbers on paper; it is investor confidence, market appetite, and macroeconomic stability.

One can also say that the answer lies partly in ambition to expand into new markets, infrastructure financing, and compliance with stricter global standards.

However, it also reflects deeper structural pressures, including currency depreciation eroding capital, rising non-performing loans, and the substantial funding required to support Nigeria’s development needs. Even giants are discovering that yesterday’s capital is no longer sufficient for tomorrow’s challenges.

Reform Without Deception

As the Nigerian banking sector recapitalization exercise comes to a close by March 31, 2026, the ultimate test will be whether the reforms deliver on their transformational promise.

Some of the concerns in the minds of Nigerians today will be to see a system that supports inclusive growth, equitable credit distribution, world-class customer service, and resilient financial intermediation. Or will we see a sector that, despite larger capital bases, still reflects old hierarchies, geographic biases, and operational friction? The cynic might say that recapitalisation simply made big banks bigger and empowered dominant shareholders.

But a more hopeful perspective invites stakeholders, including regulators, customers, civil society, and bankers themselves, to co-design the next chapter of Nigerian banking; one that balances scale with inclusion, profitability with impact, and stability with innovation. The difference will be made not by press releases or shareholder announcements, but by deliberate regulatory action and measurable improvements in how banks serve the economy.

For now, the capital has been raised, but the true capital that counts is the confidence Nigerians place in their banks every time they log into an app, make a transfer, or deposit their life’s savings. Only when that trust is visible in everyday experience can we say that recapitalisation has truly succeeded.

Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: [email protected]

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Ledig at One: The Year We Turned Stablecoins Into Real Liquidity for the Real World

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Ledig

Ever tried sending a large amount of money into or out of certain markets and felt your stomach twist a bit? That was the feeling many companies carried long before Ledig existed. Delays. Guesswork. Phone calls that sounded unsure. People waiting on people, and no reliable derivatives hedging protocol to shield them from currency swings. It was messy.

That frustration is what pushed us to open Ledig to the world a year ago. We wanted a system built for big transfers. Not a few hundred dollars. Serious amounts. A hundred thousand. A million. Even more. And we wanted it to move in seconds, not a strange timeline that no one could explain.

So, we built a setup that lets companies bring in stablecoins and get local currency out quickly. We also kept the opposite direction just as clean. Local currency in, stablecoins out. Both ways needed to feel the same because business doesn’t move in only one direction. Some clients even switch between the two during the same week.

In the early days, people sent smaller amounts to test us. Fair enough. But once they saw a large payment settle almost instantly, confidence spread. This is how we crossed our first $100M. Most of that came from global companies working across Africa and other emerging markets. These firms care about stability, not buzzwords. They just want their money to land where it should.

A lot of the magic sits behind the scenes. Wallets. Local settlement tools. A solid FX engine that adjusts as needed. None of this appears on the surface. All a user sees is a simple dashboard or a set of API calls that get the job done. They don’t even need to think about crypto. The tech exists under the hood, doing the heavy lifting quietly.

But fast movement alone wasn’t enough.

Ledig derivatives hedging protocol

There was another problem staring companies in the face. Currency swings. And they hurt. Imagine finishing a project today and waiting ninety days to get paid in a currency that drops often. By the time the company receives the money, the value has fallen so much that the profit is almost gone. This is a real issue, and many firms have lived through that shock.

This is where our derivatives hedging protocol stepped in. It lets companies lock in their value early so they don’t get caught off guard later. The product ran off-chain at first and still passed $55M in activity. Now we’re taking the derivatives hedging protocol fully on-chain. We picked Base for this next step because it fits the type of stablecoins our settlement system relies on. It also gives companies a clean, transparent environment to execute derivatives hedging protocol strategies built for actual commercial needs rather than trading games.

It took time to get here. Our team is small, which surprised a lot of people, but that worked in our favour. We avoided noise. We focused on building pieces that work. Think of it like a set of tools. One tool converts stable to fiat. Another handles fiat to stable. Another manages FX. Another supports treasury. Another delivers hedging to protect value. Each tool works alone, but when a company puts them together, they get a full workbench that covers money movement and risk in one place.

We rarely talk about revenue publicly, but the business is in a good place. The real sign of health is that companies keep trusting us with large transactions. Not one-off tests. Proper flows. The kind that supports payrolls, suppliers, expansion, and daily operations. In markets where delays can break everything, this matters.

Looking ahead, our focus for 2026 is simple. Bring the derivatives hedging protocol on-chain at scale. Grow our liquidity pipeline so larger payments stay just as smooth as they are today. Strengthen our licensing and regulatory setup, so bigger institutions can work with us without extra steps. And continue tightening the entire system so companies entering emerging markets can do it with far less stress.

Ledig is one year old. The mission is still the same. Move large amounts of money fast. Protect companies from painful currency swings using a battle-tested derivatives hedging protocol. Build tools they can rely on without worrying about how the background tech works.

This is just the beginning.

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If You Understand Nigeria, You Fit Craze

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By Prince Charles Dickson PhD

There is a popular Nigerian lingo cum proverb that has graduated from street humour to philosophical thesis: “If dem explain Nigeria give you and you understand am, you fit craze.” It sounds funny. It is funny. But like most Nigerian jokes, it is also dangerously accurate.

Catherine’s story from Kubwa Road is the kind of thing that does not need embellishment. Nigeria already embellishes itself. Picture this: a pedestrian bridge built for pedestrians. A bridge whose sole job description in life is to allow human beings cross a deadly highway without dying. And yet, under this very bridge, pedestrians are crossing the road. Not illegally on their own this time, but with the active assistance of a uniformed Road Safety officer who stops traffic so that people can jaywalk under a bridge built to stop jaywalking.

At that point, sanity resigns.

You expect the officer to enforce the law: “Use the bridge.” Instead, he enforces survival: “Let nobody die today.” And therein lies the Nigerian paradox. The officer is not wicked. In fact, he is humane. He chooses immediate life over abstract order. But his humanity quietly murders the system. His kindness baptises lawlessness. His good intention tells the pedestrian: you are right; the bridge is optional.

Nigeria is full of such tragic kindness.

We build systems and then emotionally sabotage them. We complain about lack of infrastructure, but when infrastructure shows up, we treat it like an optional suggestion. Pedestrian bridges become decorative monuments. Traffic lights become Christmas decorations. Zebra crossings become modern art—beautiful, symbolic, and useless.

Ask the pedestrians why they won’t use the bridge and you’ll hear a sermon:

“It’s too stressful to climb.”

“It’s far from my bus stop.”

“My knee dey pain me.”

“I no get time.”

“Thieves dey up there.”

All valid explanations. None a justification. Because the same person that cannot climb a bridge will sprint across ten lanes of oncoming traffic with Olympic-level agility. Suddenly, arthritis respects urgency.

But Nigeria does not punish inconsistency; it rewards it.

So, the Road Safety officer becomes a moral hostage. Arrest the pedestrians and risk chaos, insults, possible mob action, and a viral video titled “FRSC wickedness.” Or stop cars, save lives, and quietly train people that rules are flexible when enough people ignore them.

Nigeria often chooses the short-term good that destroys the long-term future.

And that is why understanding Nigeria is a psychiatric risk.

This paradox does not stop at Kubwa Road. It is a national operating system.

We live in a country where a polite policeman shocks you. A truthful politician is treated like folklore—“what-God-cannot-do-does-exist.” A nurse or doctor going one year without strike becomes breaking news. Bandits negotiate peace deals with rifles slung over their shoulders, attend dialogue meetings fully armed, and sometimes do TikTok videos of ransoms like content creators.

Criminals have better PR than institutions.

In Nigeria, you bribe to get WAEC “special centre,” bribe to gain university admission, bribe to choose your state of origin for NYSC, and bribe to secure a job. Merit is shy. Connection is confident. Talent waits outside while mediocrity walks in through the back door shaking hands.

You even bribe to eat food at social events. Not metaphorically. Literally. You must “know somebody” to access rice and small chops at a wedding you were invited to. At burial grounds, you need connections to bury your dead with dignity. Even grief has gatekeepers.

We have normalised the absurd so thoroughly that questioning it feels rude.

And yet, the same Nigerians will shout political slogans with full lungs—“Tinubu! Tinubu!!”—without knowing the name of their councillor, councillor’s office, or councillor’s phone number. National politics is theatre; local governance is invisible. We debate presidency like Premier League fans but cannot locate the people controlling our drainage, primary schools, markets, and roads.

We scream about “bad leadership” in Abuja while ignoring the rot at the ward level where leadership is close enough to knock on your door.

Nigeria is a place where laws exist, but enforcement negotiates moods. Where rules are firm until they meet familiarity. Where morality is elastic and context-dependent. Where being honest is admirable but being foolish is unforgivable.

We admire sharpness more than integrity. We celebrate “sense” even when sense means cheating the system. If you obey the rules and suffer, you are naïve. If you break them and succeed, you are smart.

So, the Road Safety officer on Kubwa Road is not an anomaly. He is Nigeria distilled.

Nigeria teaches you to survive first and reform later—except later never comes.

We choose convenience over consistency. Emotion over institution. Today over tomorrow. Life over law, until life itself becomes cheap because law has been weakened.

This is how bridges become irrelevant. This is how systems decay. This is how exceptions swallow rules.

And then we wonder why nothing works.

The painful truth is this: Nigeria is not confusing because it lacks logic. It is confusing because it has too many competing logics. Survival logic. Moral logic. Emotional logic. Opportunistic logic. Religious logic. Tribal logic. Political logic. None fully dominant. All constantly clashing.

So, when someone says, “If dem explain Nigeria give you and you understand am, you fit craze,” what they really mean is this: Nigeria is not designed to be understood; it is designed to be endured.

To truly understand Nigeria is to accept contradictions without resolution. To watch bridges built and ignored. Laws written and suspended. Criminals empowered and victims lectured. To see good people make bad choices for good reasons that produce bad outcomes.

And maybe the real madness is not understanding Nigeria—but understanding it and still hoping it will magically fix itself without deliberate, painful, collective change.

Until then, pedestrians will continue crossing under bridges, officers will keep stopping traffic to save lives, systems will keep eroding gently, and we will keep laughing at our own tragedy—because sometimes, laughter is the only therapy left.

Nigeria no be joke.

But if you no laugh, you go cry—May Nigeria win.

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