Connect with us

Feature/OPED

In Era of COVID-19, Russia’s Strategic Politics of Coronavirus Aid Takes Stage in Africa

Published

on

Coronavirus Aid

By Kester Kenn Klomegah

With coronavirus rapidly spreading among the population of 148 million, Russia took the third position in the world.

According to the official data provided on May 11, Russia had an aggregate total of 221,344 COVID-19 cases. The United Kingdom and Italy earlier reported 219,183 and 219,070 cases, respectively.

Spain comes in second with 224,390 coronavirus cases, and the United States ranked first with nearly 1.4 million cases.

That are huge gaps compared to over 50,000 cases among 1.3 billion population of Africa, at a first glance, and readily offered an understandable story. South Africa and Maghreb region are the hardest hit and worse affected with the coronavirus in Africa. As expected, the pandemic places diverse impact on the global economies and the society, recommended measures have been taken in a bid to prevent the coronavirus spread.

According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) report, Africa still behind European countries when it comes to the COVID-19 outbreak and is far from seeing its peak. While Africa has only reported more than 50,000 confirmed cases of the novel coronavirus early May, the UNECA-released report “COVID-19 in Africa: Protecting Lives and Economies” said “anywhere between 300,000 and 3.3 million African people could lose their lives as a direct result of COVID-19, depending on the intervention measures taken to stop the spread.”

According to the Regional Office for Africa of the World Health Organization (WHO), the hardest hit are South Africa and mostly Maghreb countries of Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. These Maghreb countries have strengthened information controls, instead of upholding transparency during the health crisis, but generally reported to have more than 5,000 infections, while in Tunisia, there are 1,018 patients and 43 people have died. In sub-Saharan West Africa, Ghana and Nigeria are also among the top ten African countries affected the pandemic.

While Russia, for a time, appeared to escape a serious coronavirus outbreak, the situation there has changed drastically during these two months of April and May, – passing Germany and France to become the third most-infected country in the world, according to The Moscow Times. Russia now has the fastest rate of new cases in Europe, and second-fastest rate of new cases in the world behind the United States.

In an important part, Russian health workers are still reporting a shortage on protective equipment. With the picture getting highly scary, Russian President Vladimir Putin worries about any slightest missteps when, in one of his live television speeches, he warned: “We cannot jump ahead of ourselves. Any carelessness or haste may cause a setback.”

Despite its internal difficulties, Russia has been offering coronavirus assistance to a number of Africa countries. Russia is using it bilateral and multilateral mechanisms in addressing these requests filed by African countries since March after the coronavirus pandemic had spread to the continent that consists of 54 countries. However, Lesotho and Comoros are free from the coronavirus.

Russian Foreign Ministry said a number of African countries have requested Moscow’s assistance in combating the coronavirus. “A number of countries on the African continent have requested Russia’s assistance in combating COVID-19. African nations need a wide range of medical equipment, including ventilators, as well as testing systems, individual protective gear, disinfectants and consumables. These requests are carefully studied and the situation in a particular country is taken into account,” it reported, adding that coronavirus spread rates were relatively low in African countries, with the exception of Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and South Africa.

“However, this issue is causing serious concern to many countries on the continent. The social and economic situations in many of these countries are complicated, while high population density, poor healthcare systems, various crises and conflicts, transparent borders and uncontrolled migration can lead to a sharp rise in cases and unpredictable consequences,” the statement said.

According to the Russian Foreign Ministry, the pandemic may negatively affect African countries’ ability to carry out major tasks to overcome poverty, ensure sustainable development and implement integration projects. Russia had been assisting African countries in responding to natural disasters and the spread of infectious diseases, including the Ebola fever. “We will do what we can to help the continent combat the coronavirus pandemic, using bilateral mechanisms and those of international organizations,” the ministry said, noting that “when making decisions, we will take a whole set of factors into account, including Russia’s coronavirus spread rate.”

Understandably, wholesale provision of coronavirus assistance is, absolutely and practically, impossible to Africa. Therefore, in the shadow of COVID-19, Russia is strategically choosing for its coronavirus aid destinations inside Africa, experts argued. Historically, Russia has had a high preference for the Maghreb region and southern African countries. Thus, in the months of April and May, aid was delivered to Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia in North Africa. Ethiopia and Djibouti in eastern Africa. In southern Africa, the beneficiaries included Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe, according to various media reports inside Africa.

On May 11, at the National Institute of Biomedical Research (NIBI) of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), more than 28 thousand units of laboratory supplies and 8 thousand units of personal protective equipment including protective clothing, respirators, reusable full-face masks with a set of filters and gloves were delivered. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs media report, the cargo was sent by Russia’s Rospotrebnadzor.
The delivery event was attended by the DRC Minister of Health, Dr Eteni Longondo, Advisers to the President, P. Muanda Congo and S. Sial Sial, as well as the Director of the National Institute of Biomedical Research (NIBI), Professor J.M. Muyembe Tampam and Russian Ambassador Aleksey Leonidovich Sentebov.

According to WHO, Congo confirmed its first case of coronavirus mid-March, and as of May 5, there were only 264 confirmed cases and 11 deaths in a country of some 80 million people. Therefore, the Russia’s assistance provided is extremely timely, since epidemics of coronavirus, Ebola, Cholera and Measles broke out, at the same time, in the country. In difficult sanitary and epidemiological conditions, DR Congo is experiencing a sharp shortage of equipment, tests, medicines, vaccines, and there are not enough masks, gloves, and disinfectants.

In this regard, the Congolese are looking forward to the arrival of two mobile laboratories at the end of May this year, which, due to their versatility, can be used to combat the spread of a number of especially dangerous infections, including COVID-19. Russia plans to train Congolese personnel in these microbiological complexes.
In addition, as part of the provision of gratuitous anti-epidemic assistance, Rospotrebnadzor plans to send modern laboratory equipment, diagnostic preparations, vaccines against BVE, cholera, plague and measles, test systems for the detection of Ebola, dengue fever, malaria, cholera and coronavirus to Kinshasa.
Russian-Congolese health contacts are quite extensive and are backed by an agreement signed between the Federal Service for Supervision of Consumer Rights Protection and Humanitarian Affairs and the DRC on the sidelines of the Russia-Africa summit in October 2019 in Sochi. Over the course of several years, Russian virologists have repeatedly visited this country in order to identify its urgent needs, held meetings with local specialists and, in the most difficult period of the global spread of coronavirus in the Republic of Congo.

Russia’s Sputnik News, under the headline, “Tunisia Asks Russia for Respirators, Masks, Medical Equipment Amid Pandemic” quoted the Tunisian Ambassador to the Russian Federation, Tarak ben Salem who said: “This request for assistance is a part of friendly relations between Tunisia and Russia. Tunisia, like many other countries, is facing an unprecedented health and economic crisis. We need respirators, masks and medical equipment that will help provide services in public hospitals.”

“Tunisia, a country close to Italy, appreciated the assistance provided by Russia to this neighboring friendly country,” Salem explained and added “Tunisia hopes for a step forward from Russia, which has promised to consider our request. This can only confirm the quality of friendly and fraternal relations between our countries and our peoples.”

Nevertheless, Russia is also exploring the opportunities in Tunisia, and as part of its geopolitical expansion and influence in Maghreb region. According to the ambassador, Russia has pledged to look into Tunisia’s request.

The United States had granted $500,000 in health assistance to address the coronavirus outbreak in Djibouti. Shortly thereafter, the Russian Foreign Ministry also posted to its official website that Russia had delivered humanitarian assistance to Djibouti in East Africa. Late April, Russian humanitarian aid to the Ministry of Health of the Republic of Djibouti was delivered and was described as part of a joint project with the World Health Organization. It was financed by the Russian Government to enhance Djibouti’s potential in the field of medical emergency readiness and response.

“This humanitarian action comes in response to an official request from the Djiboutian authorities in view of the serious deterioration in the sanitary and epidemiological situation in the country caused by heavy floods and the spread of the novel COVID-19 infection. A consignment of humanitarian aid weighing a total of 13.5 tons and consisting of more than 20 multi-purpose medical modules to fight dangerous infectious diseases was delivered to Djibouti’s seaport. The shipment included tents and components to build two medical units for rendering skilled assistance to over 200,000 people,” according to report of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The report indicated that “the ceremony was attended by Russian Ambassador to Djibouti Mikhail Golovanov, WHO Representative Dr Ahmed Zouiten and Djiboutian Minister of Health Mohamed Warsama Dirieh. The Djiboutian leadership expressed its sincere appreciation to the Russian side for the assistance amid such a complicated epidemiological situation.”

Djibouti has seen a rapid spike in coronavirus cases with the Horn of Africa nation, as the population largely ignores measures imposed by authorities. As a tiny country, it shares borders with Somalia in the south, Ethiopia in the south and west, Eritrea in the north and the Red Sea. Djibouti is a multi-ethnic, with a population about one million, but strategically important country that hosts the United States and French military bases, has recorded 1,116 positive coronavirus cases — small on a global scale. Only two (2) people have died to date, according to the report from the Ministry of Health.

With its burgeoning commercial hub, it serves strategically as the site for various foreign military bases. The hosting of foreign military bases is an important part of Djibouti’s economy. The United States pays $63 million a year to rent Camp Lemonnier, France and Japan each pay about $30 million a year and China pays $20 million a year. The lease payments added up to more than 5% of Djibouti’s GDP of $2.3 billion in 2018.

China has stepped up its military presence in Africa, with ongoing plans to secure an even greater military presence in Djibouti specifically. China’s presence in Djibouti is tied to strategic ports to ensure the security of Chinese assets. Djibouti’s strategic location makes the country prime for an increased military presence.

Undoubtedly, Russia has shown interest in strengthening its ties with the country. Russians believe it could take steps to overcome the impasses in the disputes between Ethiopia and Eritrea, between Ethiopia and Djibouti, as well as international support for Somalia’s efforts to restore its statehood in the Horn of Africa. It has proposed an elaborate plan from maintaining peace and security to promoting socioeconomic development in the Horn of Africa and that includes Djibouti.

Over the past few years, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has had extensive discussions on investment in high technology and transport logistics in Djibouti and Eritrea, both neighboring countries in the region.

It is worth to note that Russia and Algeria have friendly sustainable relations. A Russian cargo aircraft has delivered personal protective equipment to help tackle the novel coronavirus pandemic in Algeria. Algeria’s Minister of Health, Population and Hospital Reform Abderrahmane Benbouzid and Russian Ambassador Igor Belyaev were at the air base of Boufarik, Blida (50-km south of Algiers), to take delivery of the cargo, Algeria Press Service reported April 30.

According to the information made available, the Russia’s humanitarian aid, consists of medical protective equipment was purchased by the Rosoboronexport, the State Arms Exporter, it was done upon the Russian government’s instructions in order to fight the coronavirus pandemic. “Among the medical items delivered to Algeria are infrared thermometers, suits, medical masks and other goods, needed by the friendly nation of Algeria and its healthcare sector,” the media said. Cooperation in fighting COVID-19 strengthens the humanitarian aspect of Russian-Algerian relations.

Given this global scenario of COVID-19, it becomes a conduit to play some game cards. For instance, Russia’s pursuit of playing a bigger role in global political realm is grounded on the consequences Russia faced in the aftermath of the collapse of USSR. That was followed by a huge political chaos and instability of its socio-economic space. However, Russia cling to it as the new game changer and now plays the catch-up. Russia seems to have neglected the potential opportunities in Africa, according to Punsara Amarasinghe, a former research fellow at the Faculty of Law, Higher School of Economics in Moscow, and now a PhD candidate in international law from the Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies in Pisa, Italy.

“Perhaps, Russia needs a lot more of efforts to revive old ties in African countries, to engage in a large scale investments and energy. Humanitarian assistance could be a strategic mechanism, the lack of Russian soft power in African states is another main trouble that continues to hinder Russia’s realization of its policy projects,” Amarasinghe wrote in his emailed discussion.

He further compares how Britain, France and even India are performing with the use of their soft power in African space, added finally that “Russia still has the opportunities, Moscow only needs to address more on African states beyond arms trade and offering assistance, but covering much important issues such as education, energy politics and investment. These have to be taken in practical terms, not just mere rhetoric.”

On April 29, Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), a powerful autonomous Russian NGO that focuses on foreign policy, held an online conference under theme “The Future of Africa in the Context of Energy Crisis and COVID-19 Pandemic” – with participation of foreign policy experts on Africa.  Chairing the online discussions, Igor Ivanov, former Russian Foreign Affairs Minister and now RIAC President, made an opening speech. He pointed out that Russia’s task in Africa following the pandemic is to present a strategy and define priorities with the countries of the continent, build on the decisions of the first Russia-Africa Summit, held in Sochi in October 2019.

On the development of cooperation between Russia and African countries, Igor Ivanov strongly reminded that “Russia’s task is to prevent a rollback in relations with African countries. It is necessary to use the momentum set by the first Russia-Africa Summit. First of all, it is necessary for Russia to define explicitly its priorities: why are we returning to Africa? Just to make money, strengthen our international presence, help African countries or to participate in the formation of the new world order together with the African countries? Some general statements of a fundamental nature were made at the first Summit, now it is necessary to move from general statements to specificity.”

The speakers presented scenarios of the development of the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic on the continent, the impact of the coronavirus on various industries, the economic and social development of African countries. Experts discussed the role of integration associations on the continent, the existing and the expected problems in the work of humanitarian missions and programs supervised by international organizations.

For many African countries, it is the time to reflect on African countries’ responses to COVID-19. It is time to take the opportunity it offers to catalyze action on structural deficits. The current predicament triggers long-term shifts toward universal access to health and education. It is time to think of improving communities with the necessary infrastructure. Although it has abundant natural resources, Africa remains the world’s poorest and least developed continent, the result of a variety of causes that include corrupt governments, and worse with poor development policies. It is time to prioritize and focus on sustainable development.

With its 1.3 billion people, Africa accounts for about 16% of the world’s human population. Africa, comprising 54 countries, is the world’s second largest and second-most populous continent after Asia. As the coronavirus spreads around the world, many foreign eyes, such as the United States and Canada, Europe, China, Russia and the Gulf States, are still on Africa.

Significantly, the global pandemic has exposed the weaknesses in Africa’s health system, adversely affected its economic sectors, it is therefore necessary for African leaders, the African Union (AU), Regional organization and African partners be reminded of issues relating to sustainable economic development and subsequent integration. It sets further as a reminder to highlight and prioritize the significance of these in the context of tasks set out by the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the African Union’s Agenda 2063.

By Kester Kenn Klomegah writes frequently about Russia, Africa and the BRICS. 

Dipo Olowookere is a journalist based in Nigeria that has passion for reporting business news stories. At his leisure time, he watches football and supports 3SC of Ibadan. Mr Olowookere can be reached via [email protected]

Feature/OPED

AU Must Reform into an Institution Africa Needs

Published

on

African Union AU Active Collaboration

By Mike Omuodo

From an online post, a commentator asked an intriguing question: “If the African Union (AU) cannot create a single currency, a unified military, or a common passport, then what exactly is this union about?”.

The comment section went wild, with some commentators saying that AU no longer serves the interest of the African people, but rather the interests of the West and individual nations with greedy interests in Africa’s resources. Some even said jokingly that it should be renamed “Western Union”.

But seriously, how has a country like France managed to maintain an economic leverage over 14 African states through its CFA Franc system, yet the continent is unable to create its own single currency regime? Why does the continent seem to be comfortable with global powers establishing their military bases throughout its territories yet doesn’t seem interested in establishing its own unified military? Why does the idea of an open borders freak out our leaders, driving them to hide under sovereignty?

These questions interrogate AU’s relevance in the ensuing geopolitics. No doubt, the AU is still relevant as it still speaks on behalf of Africa on global platforms as a symbol of the continent’s unity. But the unease surrounding it is justified because symbolism is no longer enough.

In a continent grappling with persistent conflict, economic fragmentation, and democratic reversals, institutions are judged not by their presence, but by their impact.

From the chat, and several other discussion groups on social media, most Africans are unhappy with the performance of the African Union so far. To many, the organization is out of touch with reality and they are now calling for an immediate reset.

To them, AU is a club of cabals, whose main achievements have been safeguarding fellow felons.

One commentator said, “AU’s main job is to congratulate dictators who kill their citizens to retain power through rigged elections.” Another said, “AU is a bunch of atrophied rulers dancing on the graves of their citizens, looting resources from their people to stash in foreign countries.”

These views may sound harsh, but are a good measure of how people perceive the organization across the continent.

Blurring vision

The African Union, which was established in July 2002 to succeed the OAU, was born out of an ambitious vision of uniting the continent toward self-reliance by driving economic Integration, enhancing peace and security, prompting good governance and, representing the continent on the global stage – following the end of colonialism.

Over time, however, the gap between this vision and the reality on the ground has widened. AU appears helpless to address the growing conflicts across the continent – from unrelenting coups to shambolic elections to external aggression.

This chronic weakness has slowly eroded public confidence in the organization and as such, AU is being seen as a forum for speeches rather than solutions – just as one commentator puts it, “AU has turned into a farce talk shop that cannot back or bite.”

Call for a new body

The general feeling on the ground is that AU is stagnant and has nothing much to show for the 60+ years of its existence (from the times of OAU). It’s also viewed as toothless and subservient to the whims of its ‘masters’.  Some commentators even called for its dissolution and the formation of a new body that would serve the interests of the continent and its people.

This sounds like a no-confidence vote. To regain favour and remain a force for continental good, AU must undertake critical reforms, enhance accountability, and show political courage as a matter of urgency. Without these, it may endure in form while fading in substance.

The question is not whether Africa needs the AU, but whether the AU is willing and ready to become the institution Africa needs – one that is bold enough to initiate a daring move towards a common market, a single currency, a unified military, and a common passport regime. It is possible!

Mr Omuodo is a pan-African Public Relations and Communications expert based in Nairobi, Kenya. He can be reached on [email protected]

Continue Reading

Feature/OPED

Recapitalisation: Silent Layoffs, Infrastructure Deficit Threat to $1trn Economy

Published

on

cbn gov. banks recapitalisation

By Blaise Udunze

The Central Bank of Nigeria’s recapitalisation exercise, which is scheduled for a March 31, 2026, deadline, has continued to reignite optimism across financial markets and is designed to build stronger, more resilient banks capable of financing a $1 trillion economy. With the ongoing exercise, the industry has been witnessing bank valuations rising, investors are enthusiastic, and balance sheets are swelling. However, beneath these encouraging headline numbers, unbeknownst to many, or perhaps some troubling aspects that the industry players have chosen not to talk about, are the human cost of consolidation and the infrastructure deficit.

Recapitalisation often leads to mergers and acquisitions. Mergers, in turn, almost always lead to job rationalisation. In Nigeria’s case, this process is unfolding against an already fragile labour structure in the banking industry, one where casualisation has become the dominant employment model.

One alarming fact in the Nigerian banking sector is the age-old workforce structure raised by the Association of Senior Staff of Banks, Insurance and Financial Institutions (ASSBIFI), which says that an estimated 60 percent of operational bank workers today are contract staff. This reality raises profound questions about the sustainability of Nigeria’s banking reforms and the credibility of its economic ambitions.

A $1 trillion economy cannot be built on insecure labour, shrinking institutional knowledge, and an overstretched financial workforce.

Recapitalisation and the Hidden Merger Trap

History is instructive. Referencing Nigeria’s 2004-2005 banking consolidation exercise, which reduced the number of banks from 89 to 25, and no doubt, it produced larger institutions, while it also triggered widespread job losses, branch closures, and a wave of outsourcing that permanently altered employment relations in the sector. The current recapitalisation push risks repeating that cycle, only this time within a far more complex economic environment marked by inflation, currency volatility, and rising unemployment.

Mergers promise efficiency, but efficiency often comes at the expense of people. Speaking of this, duplicate roles are eliminated, technology replaces frontline staff, and non-core functions are outsourced. The troubling part of it is that this is already a system reliant on contract labour; mergers could accelerate workforce instability, turning banks into balance-sheet-heavy institutions with shallow human capital depth.

ASSBIFI’s warning is therefore not a labour agitation; it is a macroeconomic red flag.

Casualisation as Structural Weakness, Not a Cost Strategy

It has been postulated by proponents of job casualisation that it is a cost-control mechanism necessary for competitiveness. Contrary to this argument, evidence increasingly shows that it is a false economy. In reaction to this, ASSBIFI President Olusoji Oluwole, who kicked against this structural weakness, asserted that excessive reliance on contract workers undermines job security, suppresses wages, limits access to benefits and blocks career progression while affirming that over time, this erodes morale, loyalty, and productivity.

More troubling are the systemic risks. Casualisation creates operational vulnerabilities, higher fraud exposure, weaker compliance culture, and lower institutional memory.

One of the banking regulators, the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC), has not desisted from repeatedly cautioning that excessive outsourcing and short-term staffing models increase security risks within banks. On the negative implications, when employees feel disposable, ethical commitment weakens, and reputational risk grows.

Banking is not a factory floor. It is a trust business. And trust does not thrive in insecurity.

Inside Outsourcing Web of Conflict of Interest

Beyond cost efficiency, Nigeria’s casualisation crisis is also fuelled by a deeper governance problem, conflicts of interest embedded within the outsourcing ecosystem.

In many cases, bank chief executives and executive directors are reported to own, control, or have beneficial interests in outsourcing companies that provide services to their own banks. Invariably, it is the same firms supplying contract staff, cleaners, security personnel, call-centre agents, and even IT support. Structurally, this arrangement allows senior executives to profit directly from the same outsourcing model that strips workers of job security and benefits.

The incentive is clear. Outsourcing enables banks to maintain lean payrolls, bypass strict labour protections associated with permanent employment, and reduce long-term obligations such as pensions and healthcare. But when those designing outsourcing strategies are also financially benefiting from them, the line between efficiency and exploitation disappears.

This model entrenches casualisation not as a temporary adjustment tool, but as a permanent business strategy, one that externalises social costs while internalising private gains.

Exploitation and Its Systemic Consequences

The human impact is severe because the contract staff employed through executive-linked outsourcing firms often face poor working conditions, low wages, limited or no health insurance, and zero job security, which is demotivating. Many perform the same functions as permanent staff but without benefits, voice, or career prospects.

ASSBIFI has warned that prolonged exposure to such insecurity leads to psychological stress, declining morale, and reduced productive life years. Studies on Nigeria’s banking sector confirm that casualisation weakens employee commitment and heightens anxiety, conditions that directly undermine service quality and operational integrity.

From a systemic standpoint, exploitation feeds fragility. High staff turnover erodes institutional memory. Disengaged workers weaken internal controls. Meanwhile, this should be a sector where trust, confidentiality, and compliance are paramount; this is a dangerous trade-off if it must be acknowledged for what it is.

Why Workforce Numbers Tell a Deeper Story

It is in record that as of 2025, Nigeria’s banking sector employs an estimated 90,500 workers, up from roughly 80,000 in 2021. The top five banks today, such as Zenith, Access Holdings, UBA, GTCO, and Stanbic IBTC, account for about 39,900 employees, reflecting moderate growth driven by digital expansion and regional operations.

At face value, truly, these figures suggest resilience. But when viewed alongside the 60 percent casualisation rate, they paint a different picture, revealing that employment growth is without employment quality. A workforce dominated by contract staff lacks the stability required to support long-term credit expansion, infrastructure financing, and industrial transformation.

This matters because banks are expected to be the engine room of Nigeria’s $1 trillion economy, funding roads, power plants, refineries, manufacturing hubs, and digital infrastructure. Weak labour foundations will eventually translate into weak execution capacity.

Nigeria’s Infrastructure Financing Contradiction

Nigeria’s infrastructure deficit is estimated in the hundreds of billions of dollars. Power, transport, housing, and broadband require long-term financing structures, sophisticated risk management, and deep sectoral expertise. Yet recapitalisation-induced mergers often lead to talent loss in precisely these areas.

As banks consolidate, specialist teams are downsized, project finance units are merged, and experienced professionals exit the system, either voluntarily or through redundancy. Casual staff, by design, are rarely trained for complex, long-term infrastructure deals. The result is a contradiction, revealing that larger banks have bigger capital bases but thinner technical capacity.

Without deliberate workforce protection and skills development, recapitalisation may produce banks that are too big to fail, but too hollow to build.

South Africa Offers a Useful Contrast

South Africa offers a revealing counterpoint. As of 2025, the country’s “big five” banks, such as Standard Bank, FNB, ABSA, Nedbank, and Capitec, employ approximately 136,600 workers within South Africa and about 184,000 globally. This is significantly higher than Nigeria’s banking workforce, despite South Africa having a smaller population.

More importantly, South African banks maintain a far higher proportion of permanent staff. While outsourcing exists, core banking operations remain firmly institutionalized compared to the Nigerian banking system. For this reason, South Africa’s career progression pathways are clearer, labour regulations are more robustly enforced, and unions play a more structured role in workforce negotiations.

The result is evident in outcomes. South Africa’s top six banks are collectively valued at over $70 billion, with Standard Bank alone boasting a market capitalisation of approximately $30 billion and total assets nearing $192 billion. Nigeria’s top 10 banks, by contrast, held combined assets of about $142 billion as of early 2025, even with a much larger population and economy, and its 13 listed banks reached a combined market capitalisation of about N17 trillion ($11.76 billion at an exchange rate of N1,445) in 2026.

Though this gap is not just about capital. It is about institutional depth, workforce stability, and governance maturity.

Bigger Valuations, But a Weaker Foundations?

Nigeria’s 13 listed banks reached a combined market capitalisation of about N17 trillion in 2026. It is no surprise, as it is buoyed by investor anticipation of recapitalisation and higher capital thresholds. Yet market value does not automatically translate into economic impact. Without parallel investment in people, systems, and long-term skills, valuation gains remain fragile.

South Africa’s experience shows that strong banks are built not only on capital adequacy, but on human capital adequacy. Skilled, secure workers are better risk managers, better innovators, and better custodians of public trust.

Labour Law and its Regulatory Blind Spots

ASSBIFI’s call for a review of Nigeria’s Labour Act is timely, and this is because the current framework lags modern employment realities, particularly in sectors like banking, where technology and outsourcing have blurred traditional employment lines. Regulatory silence has effectively legitimised casualisation as a default model rather than an exception.

The Central Bank of Nigeria cannot afford to treat workforce issues as outside its mandate. Prudential stability is inseparable from labour stability. Regulators must begin to view excessive casualisation as a risk factor, just like liquidity mismatches or weak capital quality.

Recapitalisation Without Inclusion Is Incomplete

If recapitalisation is to succeed, it must be inclusive; therefore, the industry must witness the enforcement of career path frameworks for contract staff, limiting the proportion of outsourced core banking roles, and aligning capital reforms with employment protection. It also means recognising that labour insecurity ultimately feeds systemic fragility.

South Africa’s banking sector did not avoid consolidation, but it managed it alongside workforce safeguards and institutional continuity. Nigeria must do the same or risk building banks that look strong on paper but crack under economic pressure.

True Measure of Reform

Judging by the past reform in 2004-2005, it has shown that Nigeria’s banking recapitalisation will be judged not by the size of balance sheets, but by the resilience of the institutions it produces. As part of the recapitalisation target for more resilient banks capable of financing a $1 trillion economy, it demands banks that can think long-term, absorb shocks, finance infrastructure, and uphold trust. None of these goals is compatible with a workforce trapped in perpetual insecurity.

Casualisation is no longer a labour issue; it is a national economic risk. If mergers proceed without deliberate workforce stabilisation, Nigeria may end up with fewer banks, fewer jobs, weaker institutions, and a slower path to prosperity.

The lesson from South Africa is clear, as it shows that strong banks are built by strong people. Until Nigeria’s banking reforms fully embrace that truth and the missing pieces are addressed, recapitalisation will remain an unfinished project. and the $1 trillion economy, an elusive promise.

Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos, can be reached via: [email protected]

Continue Reading

Feature/OPED

In Nigeria… One Day Monkey Go Go Market

Published

on

Monkey Go Go Market

By Prince Charles Dickson PhD

In Nigeria, the road has become a stage where power performs its most absurd theatre. The siren—once a tool of emergency—now plays the soundtrack of ego. The convoys, longer than a bride’s procession, louder than a market quarrel, move through our streets like small invading armies. And every time that blaring, violent sound slices through the air, a simple truth echoes behind it: one day monkey go go market… and e no go return.

Because power, especially Nigerian power, has a short memory. And even shorter patience.

These leaders who move as though the sun itself must pause when they pass were once ordinary Nigerians. They once queued at bus stops, once waited under the rain for taxis, once navigated potholed streets with the same caution as every other citizen trying not to die by negligence. But somewhere between election and inauguration, ambition and arrogance, something snapped. Their feet left the ground. Their humanity blurred. And their ears, now accustomed to sirens; forgot how silence feels.

The bizarre culture of convoys in Nigeria has metastasized into something theatrical, violent, and deeply offensive. What began as protocol has become performance. Sirens scream not just to clear the road, but to announce hierarchy. Vehicles speed not just to meet schedules but to demonstrate superiority. And the citizens, the people in whose name this power is supposedly held, scatter like startled chickens. Or worse, end up dead under tires that never brake.

The irony is painful. The same leaders who demand absolute obedience from citizens once walked among those same citizens unnoticed. Once upon a time they lived without outriders, without black-tinted SUVs, without pickup vans carrying heavily armed security men who point guns at commuters as though Lagos traffic is a battlefield. They were once people. Now they behave like a species apart.

But the road remembers. The people remember. And power always forgets that it is a tenant, never a landlord.

Escorts in Nigeria don’t just move with urgency; they move with intimidation. They shove, push, threaten, and roar through roads where ordinary Nigerians are merely trying to survive the day. The siren becomes a weapon, the convoy a declaration of dominance. The message is clear: “Your life must move aside. My importance is passing.”

In what country should this be normal?

Even emergency vehicles; ambulances carrying dying patients, fire trucks racing to burning buildings, sometimes cannot pass because a government official’s convoy has occupied the road with the entitlement of royalty.

This isn’t governance; it’s theater of the absurd.

And the casualties are not metaphorical. Nigerians have died—pregnant women hit by convoys, okada riders knocked off the road, children flung away like debris. Drivers in these convoys behave like warhorses let loose, sworn not to slow down regardless of what or who is ahead.

But who will hold them accountable? Who dares question power that sees questions as disrespect and disrespect as rebellion?

The institutions meant to regulate these excesses are the same institutions that created them. Protocol offices treat speed like divinity. Security details mistake aggression for duty. Schedules are treated as holy commandments. Every meeting becomes urgent. Every movement becomes life-or-death. Every road must clear.

But the truth sits quietly behind all this noise: no meeting is that important, no leader is that indispensable, and no road should require blood to make way.

Somewhere, a child grows up believing public office means public intimidation. A young man sees the behavior of convoys and dreams not of service but of dominance. A young woman imagines that leadership means never waiting in traffic like the rest of society. And so, the cycle of arrogance reproduces itself. A country becomes a laboratory where entitlement multiplies.

In Nigeria, the convoy culture reveals a deeper sickness: a leadership class that has disconnected from the lived realities of the people they claim to govern.

When did proximity to power become justification for violence?

When did schedules become more sacred than lives?

When did we normalize leaders who move like emperors, not elected representatives?

But more importantly: how do these leaders forget so quickly where they came from?

Many of them grew up in the same chaos their convoys now worsen. They once asked why leaders were insensitive. Now they have inherited the same insensitivity and advanced it.

The convoy is more than metal and noise. It is a metaphor. It illustrates how Nigerian governance often operates: pushing the people aside, demanding unquestioned obedience, prioritizing position over responsibility.

And yet, the proverb whispers:

One day monkey go go market… e no go return.

Not because we wish harm on anyone, but because history has its own logic. Power that forgets compassion eventually forgets itself. Leadership that drives recklessly, morally, politically, and literally—will one day crash against the boundaries of public patience.

This metaphor is a quiet mirror for every leader who believes their current status is divine permanence. One day, the sirens will go silent. The tinted windows will roll down. The outriders will be reassigned. The road will no longer clear itself. Reality will return like harmattan dust.

And then the question will confront them plainly:

When your power fades, what remains of your humanity?

The tragedy of Nigeria’s convoy culture is that it makes leadership look like tyranny and renders citizens powerless in their own country. It fosters a climate where ordinary people live in perpetual startle. It deepens distrust. It fuels resentment. It reinforces the perception that leadership is designed to intimidate rather than serve.

And what does it say about us as a nation that we accept this?

We accept the absurdity because we assume it cannot be overturned. We accept arrogance because we assume it is the price of power. We step aside because we assume there is no alternative.

But nations are not built on assumptions. They are built on accountability.

The temporary nature of political power should humble leaders, not inflate them. Four or eight years or whatever time they spend clinging to office cannot compare to the lifetime they will spend as private citizens once the convoys disappear.

When the noise stops, will they walk among us head high or with their face hidden?

When the sirens lose their voice, will they find their own?

What if true leadership was measured not by how loudly you move through society but by how gently you walk among the people?

Imagine a Nigeria where power travels quietly. Where convoys move with the dignity of service, not the violence of entitlement. Where leaders move with humility, not hysteria. Where the streets do not tremble at the approach of authority. Where citizens do not shrink to the roadside, waiting to survive the thunder of tinted SUVs.

It is possible. It is necessary. It begins with leaders remembering that every journey through Nigeria’s roads is a reminder of their accountability, not their dominion.

Because one day, and it will come—monkey go go market.

The convoy will stop.

The siren will fade.

The power will dissolve into yesterday.

And the road will ask the only question that matters:

While you passed through, did you honor the people… or terrorize them?

History will remember the answer.

And so will we—May Nigeria win!

Continue Reading

Trending