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In Era of COVID-19, Russia’s Strategic Politics of Coronavirus Aid Takes Stage in Africa

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Coronavirus Aid

By Kester Kenn Klomegah

With coronavirus rapidly spreading among the population of 148 million, Russia took the third position in the world.

According to the official data provided on May 11, Russia had an aggregate total of 221,344 COVID-19 cases. The United Kingdom and Italy earlier reported 219,183 and 219,070 cases, respectively.

Spain comes in second with 224,390 coronavirus cases, and the United States ranked first with nearly 1.4 million cases.

That are huge gaps compared to over 50,000 cases among 1.3 billion population of Africa, at a first glance, and readily offered an understandable story. South Africa and Maghreb region are the hardest hit and worse affected with the coronavirus in Africa. As expected, the pandemic places diverse impact on the global economies and the society, recommended measures have been taken in a bid to prevent the coronavirus spread.

According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) report, Africa still behind European countries when it comes to the COVID-19 outbreak and is far from seeing its peak. While Africa has only reported more than 50,000 confirmed cases of the novel coronavirus early May, the UNECA-released report “COVID-19 in Africa: Protecting Lives and Economies” said “anywhere between 300,000 and 3.3 million African people could lose their lives as a direct result of COVID-19, depending on the intervention measures taken to stop the spread.”

According to the Regional Office for Africa of the World Health Organization (WHO), the hardest hit are South Africa and mostly Maghreb countries of Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. These Maghreb countries have strengthened information controls, instead of upholding transparency during the health crisis, but generally reported to have more than 5,000 infections, while in Tunisia, there are 1,018 patients and 43 people have died. In sub-Saharan West Africa, Ghana and Nigeria are also among the top ten African countries affected the pandemic.

While Russia, for a time, appeared to escape a serious coronavirus outbreak, the situation there has changed drastically during these two months of April and May, – passing Germany and France to become the third most-infected country in the world, according to The Moscow Times. Russia now has the fastest rate of new cases in Europe, and second-fastest rate of new cases in the world behind the United States.

In an important part, Russian health workers are still reporting a shortage on protective equipment. With the picture getting highly scary, Russian President Vladimir Putin worries about any slightest missteps when, in one of his live television speeches, he warned: “We cannot jump ahead of ourselves. Any carelessness or haste may cause a setback.”

Despite its internal difficulties, Russia has been offering coronavirus assistance to a number of Africa countries. Russia is using it bilateral and multilateral mechanisms in addressing these requests filed by African countries since March after the coronavirus pandemic had spread to the continent that consists of 54 countries. However, Lesotho and Comoros are free from the coronavirus.

Russian Foreign Ministry said a number of African countries have requested Moscow’s assistance in combating the coronavirus. “A number of countries on the African continent have requested Russia’s assistance in combating COVID-19. African nations need a wide range of medical equipment, including ventilators, as well as testing systems, individual protective gear, disinfectants and consumables. These requests are carefully studied and the situation in a particular country is taken into account,” it reported, adding that coronavirus spread rates were relatively low in African countries, with the exception of Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and South Africa.

“However, this issue is causing serious concern to many countries on the continent. The social and economic situations in many of these countries are complicated, while high population density, poor healthcare systems, various crises and conflicts, transparent borders and uncontrolled migration can lead to a sharp rise in cases and unpredictable consequences,” the statement said.

According to the Russian Foreign Ministry, the pandemic may negatively affect African countries’ ability to carry out major tasks to overcome poverty, ensure sustainable development and implement integration projects. Russia had been assisting African countries in responding to natural disasters and the spread of infectious diseases, including the Ebola fever. “We will do what we can to help the continent combat the coronavirus pandemic, using bilateral mechanisms and those of international organizations,” the ministry said, noting that “when making decisions, we will take a whole set of factors into account, including Russia’s coronavirus spread rate.”

Understandably, wholesale provision of coronavirus assistance is, absolutely and practically, impossible to Africa. Therefore, in the shadow of COVID-19, Russia is strategically choosing for its coronavirus aid destinations inside Africa, experts argued. Historically, Russia has had a high preference for the Maghreb region and southern African countries. Thus, in the months of April and May, aid was delivered to Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia in North Africa. Ethiopia and Djibouti in eastern Africa. In southern Africa, the beneficiaries included Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe, according to various media reports inside Africa.

On May 11, at the National Institute of Biomedical Research (NIBI) of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), more than 28 thousand units of laboratory supplies and 8 thousand units of personal protective equipment including protective clothing, respirators, reusable full-face masks with a set of filters and gloves were delivered. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs media report, the cargo was sent by Russia’s Rospotrebnadzor.
The delivery event was attended by the DRC Minister of Health, Dr Eteni Longondo, Advisers to the President, P. Muanda Congo and S. Sial Sial, as well as the Director of the National Institute of Biomedical Research (NIBI), Professor J.M. Muyembe Tampam and Russian Ambassador Aleksey Leonidovich Sentebov.

According to WHO, Congo confirmed its first case of coronavirus mid-March, and as of May 5, there were only 264 confirmed cases and 11 deaths in a country of some 80 million people. Therefore, the Russia’s assistance provided is extremely timely, since epidemics of coronavirus, Ebola, Cholera and Measles broke out, at the same time, in the country. In difficult sanitary and epidemiological conditions, DR Congo is experiencing a sharp shortage of equipment, tests, medicines, vaccines, and there are not enough masks, gloves, and disinfectants.

In this regard, the Congolese are looking forward to the arrival of two mobile laboratories at the end of May this year, which, due to their versatility, can be used to combat the spread of a number of especially dangerous infections, including COVID-19. Russia plans to train Congolese personnel in these microbiological complexes.
In addition, as part of the provision of gratuitous anti-epidemic assistance, Rospotrebnadzor plans to send modern laboratory equipment, diagnostic preparations, vaccines against BVE, cholera, plague and measles, test systems for the detection of Ebola, dengue fever, malaria, cholera and coronavirus to Kinshasa.
Russian-Congolese health contacts are quite extensive and are backed by an agreement signed between the Federal Service for Supervision of Consumer Rights Protection and Humanitarian Affairs and the DRC on the sidelines of the Russia-Africa summit in October 2019 in Sochi. Over the course of several years, Russian virologists have repeatedly visited this country in order to identify its urgent needs, held meetings with local specialists and, in the most difficult period of the global spread of coronavirus in the Republic of Congo.

Russia’s Sputnik News, under the headline, “Tunisia Asks Russia for Respirators, Masks, Medical Equipment Amid Pandemic” quoted the Tunisian Ambassador to the Russian Federation, Tarak ben Salem who said: “This request for assistance is a part of friendly relations between Tunisia and Russia. Tunisia, like many other countries, is facing an unprecedented health and economic crisis. We need respirators, masks and medical equipment that will help provide services in public hospitals.”

“Tunisia, a country close to Italy, appreciated the assistance provided by Russia to this neighboring friendly country,” Salem explained and added “Tunisia hopes for a step forward from Russia, which has promised to consider our request. This can only confirm the quality of friendly and fraternal relations between our countries and our peoples.”

Nevertheless, Russia is also exploring the opportunities in Tunisia, and as part of its geopolitical expansion and influence in Maghreb region. According to the ambassador, Russia has pledged to look into Tunisia’s request.

The United States had granted $500,000 in health assistance to address the coronavirus outbreak in Djibouti. Shortly thereafter, the Russian Foreign Ministry also posted to its official website that Russia had delivered humanitarian assistance to Djibouti in East Africa. Late April, Russian humanitarian aid to the Ministry of Health of the Republic of Djibouti was delivered and was described as part of a joint project with the World Health Organization. It was financed by the Russian Government to enhance Djibouti’s potential in the field of medical emergency readiness and response.

“This humanitarian action comes in response to an official request from the Djiboutian authorities in view of the serious deterioration in the sanitary and epidemiological situation in the country caused by heavy floods and the spread of the novel COVID-19 infection. A consignment of humanitarian aid weighing a total of 13.5 tons and consisting of more than 20 multi-purpose medical modules to fight dangerous infectious diseases was delivered to Djibouti’s seaport. The shipment included tents and components to build two medical units for rendering skilled assistance to over 200,000 people,” according to report of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The report indicated that “the ceremony was attended by Russian Ambassador to Djibouti Mikhail Golovanov, WHO Representative Dr Ahmed Zouiten and Djiboutian Minister of Health Mohamed Warsama Dirieh. The Djiboutian leadership expressed its sincere appreciation to the Russian side for the assistance amid such a complicated epidemiological situation.”

Djibouti has seen a rapid spike in coronavirus cases with the Horn of Africa nation, as the population largely ignores measures imposed by authorities. As a tiny country, it shares borders with Somalia in the south, Ethiopia in the south and west, Eritrea in the north and the Red Sea. Djibouti is a multi-ethnic, with a population about one million, but strategically important country that hosts the United States and French military bases, has recorded 1,116 positive coronavirus cases — small on a global scale. Only two (2) people have died to date, according to the report from the Ministry of Health.

With its burgeoning commercial hub, it serves strategically as the site for various foreign military bases. The hosting of foreign military bases is an important part of Djibouti’s economy. The United States pays $63 million a year to rent Camp Lemonnier, France and Japan each pay about $30 million a year and China pays $20 million a year. The lease payments added up to more than 5% of Djibouti’s GDP of $2.3 billion in 2018.

China has stepped up its military presence in Africa, with ongoing plans to secure an even greater military presence in Djibouti specifically. China’s presence in Djibouti is tied to strategic ports to ensure the security of Chinese assets. Djibouti’s strategic location makes the country prime for an increased military presence.

Undoubtedly, Russia has shown interest in strengthening its ties with the country. Russians believe it could take steps to overcome the impasses in the disputes between Ethiopia and Eritrea, between Ethiopia and Djibouti, as well as international support for Somalia’s efforts to restore its statehood in the Horn of Africa. It has proposed an elaborate plan from maintaining peace and security to promoting socioeconomic development in the Horn of Africa and that includes Djibouti.

Over the past few years, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has had extensive discussions on investment in high technology and transport logistics in Djibouti and Eritrea, both neighboring countries in the region.

It is worth to note that Russia and Algeria have friendly sustainable relations. A Russian cargo aircraft has delivered personal protective equipment to help tackle the novel coronavirus pandemic in Algeria. Algeria’s Minister of Health, Population and Hospital Reform Abderrahmane Benbouzid and Russian Ambassador Igor Belyaev were at the air base of Boufarik, Blida (50-km south of Algiers), to take delivery of the cargo, Algeria Press Service reported April 30.

According to the information made available, the Russia’s humanitarian aid, consists of medical protective equipment was purchased by the Rosoboronexport, the State Arms Exporter, it was done upon the Russian government’s instructions in order to fight the coronavirus pandemic. “Among the medical items delivered to Algeria are infrared thermometers, suits, medical masks and other goods, needed by the friendly nation of Algeria and its healthcare sector,” the media said. Cooperation in fighting COVID-19 strengthens the humanitarian aspect of Russian-Algerian relations.

Given this global scenario of COVID-19, it becomes a conduit to play some game cards. For instance, Russia’s pursuit of playing a bigger role in global political realm is grounded on the consequences Russia faced in the aftermath of the collapse of USSR. That was followed by a huge political chaos and instability of its socio-economic space. However, Russia cling to it as the new game changer and now plays the catch-up. Russia seems to have neglected the potential opportunities in Africa, according to Punsara Amarasinghe, a former research fellow at the Faculty of Law, Higher School of Economics in Moscow, and now a PhD candidate in international law from the Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies in Pisa, Italy.

“Perhaps, Russia needs a lot more of efforts to revive old ties in African countries, to engage in a large scale investments and energy. Humanitarian assistance could be a strategic mechanism, the lack of Russian soft power in African states is another main trouble that continues to hinder Russia’s realization of its policy projects,” Amarasinghe wrote in his emailed discussion.

He further compares how Britain, France and even India are performing with the use of their soft power in African space, added finally that “Russia still has the opportunities, Moscow only needs to address more on African states beyond arms trade and offering assistance, but covering much important issues such as education, energy politics and investment. These have to be taken in practical terms, not just mere rhetoric.”

On April 29, Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), a powerful autonomous Russian NGO that focuses on foreign policy, held an online conference under theme “The Future of Africa in the Context of Energy Crisis and COVID-19 Pandemic” – with participation of foreign policy experts on Africa.  Chairing the online discussions, Igor Ivanov, former Russian Foreign Affairs Minister and now RIAC President, made an opening speech. He pointed out that Russia’s task in Africa following the pandemic is to present a strategy and define priorities with the countries of the continent, build on the decisions of the first Russia-Africa Summit, held in Sochi in October 2019.

On the development of cooperation between Russia and African countries, Igor Ivanov strongly reminded that “Russia’s task is to prevent a rollback in relations with African countries. It is necessary to use the momentum set by the first Russia-Africa Summit. First of all, it is necessary for Russia to define explicitly its priorities: why are we returning to Africa? Just to make money, strengthen our international presence, help African countries or to participate in the formation of the new world order together with the African countries? Some general statements of a fundamental nature were made at the first Summit, now it is necessary to move from general statements to specificity.”

The speakers presented scenarios of the development of the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic on the continent, the impact of the coronavirus on various industries, the economic and social development of African countries. Experts discussed the role of integration associations on the continent, the existing and the expected problems in the work of humanitarian missions and programs supervised by international organizations.

For many African countries, it is the time to reflect on African countries’ responses to COVID-19. It is time to take the opportunity it offers to catalyze action on structural deficits. The current predicament triggers long-term shifts toward universal access to health and education. It is time to think of improving communities with the necessary infrastructure. Although it has abundant natural resources, Africa remains the world’s poorest and least developed continent, the result of a variety of causes that include corrupt governments, and worse with poor development policies. It is time to prioritize and focus on sustainable development.

With its 1.3 billion people, Africa accounts for about 16% of the world’s human population. Africa, comprising 54 countries, is the world’s second largest and second-most populous continent after Asia. As the coronavirus spreads around the world, many foreign eyes, such as the United States and Canada, Europe, China, Russia and the Gulf States, are still on Africa.

Significantly, the global pandemic has exposed the weaknesses in Africa’s health system, adversely affected its economic sectors, it is therefore necessary for African leaders, the African Union (AU), Regional organization and African partners be reminded of issues relating to sustainable economic development and subsequent integration. It sets further as a reminder to highlight and prioritize the significance of these in the context of tasks set out by the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the African Union’s Agenda 2063.

By Kester Kenn Klomegah writes frequently about Russia, Africa and the BRICS. 

Dipo Olowookere is a journalist based in Nigeria that has passion for reporting business news stories. At his leisure time, he watches football and supports 3SC of Ibadan. Mr Olowookere can be reached via [email protected]

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4 Ways AI is Changing How Nigerians Discover Businesses

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Olumide Balogun Google West Africa

By Olumide Balogun

Nigerians are natural explorers. Whether finding the best supplier in Balogun market, hunting down a recipe for party jollof, or looking for the most affordable flight out of Lagos, we are always searching.

Today, human curiosity is expanding, and the way Nigerians express it is evolving. We are speaking to our phones, snapping photos of things we like, and asking incredibly complex questions. For the Nigerian business owner, understanding this shift is a massive opportunity to get discovered by eager customers.

Here are four ways AI is rewriting how Nigerians search, along with simple steps to ensure your business is exactly what they find.

1. Visual Discovery is the New Normal

People are increasingly using their cameras to discover the world around them. Picture someone spotting a brilliant pair of sneakers in traffic and wanting to know exactly where to buy them. Today, shoppers simply take out their phones and search visually.

Tools like Google Lens now process over 25 billion visual searches every single month, and many of these searches are from people looking to make a purchase.

How to adapt: Your product’s visual appeal is paramount. Make sure you upload clear, high-quality images of your products to your website and social media. When a customer snaps a picture of a bag that looks like the one you sell, having great photos ensures your business pops up in their visual search results.

2. Conversations Replace Simple Keywords

Shoppers are asking highly nuanced, conversational questions. They are typing queries like, “Where can I find affordable leather shoes in Ikeja that are open on Sundays and do home delivery?”

To handle these detailed questions, new features like AI Overviews act like a superfast librarian that has read everything on the web. It provides users with a perfectly organised summary and links to dig deeper.

How to adapt: Answer your customers’ questions before they even ask. Create detailed, helpful content on your website and fully update your Google Business Profile. List your opening hours, delivery areas, and unique services clearly. This ensures the technology easily finds your details and recommends your business when a customer asks a highly specific question.

3. Intent Matters More Than Exact Words

Predicting every single word a customer might use to find your product is a huge task for any business owner. Thankfully, modern search technology focuses on the underlying need behind a search.

If someone searches for “how to bring small dogs on flights,” AI understands that the person likely needs to buy an airline-approved pet carrier. The technology looks at the true intent of the shopper.

How to adapt: You no longer need to obsess over guessing exact keywords. By using AI-powered campaigns, you allow the technology to understand your products and match them to the customer’s true needs. Your business will show up for highly relevant searches, bringing you customers who are actively looking for solutions you provide.

4. Smart Assistants Handle the Heavy Lifting

Running a business in Nigeria requires incredible hustle. Managing digital marketing on top of daily operations takes significant time and energy. The next frontier in digital advertising introduces agentic capabilities, which hold a simple promise of delivering better results for your business with much less effort.

The technology now acts as your personalised assistant.

How to adapt: You can simplify your marketing by using the Power Pack of AI-driven campaigns, including Performance Max. You simply provide your business goals, your budget, and your creative assets like photos and videos. The AI automatically finds new, high-value customers across Google Search, YouTube, and the web. It adapts your ads in real time to match exactly what the shopper is looking for, allowing you to focus on running your business.

The language of curiosity is constantly expanding. Nigerians are discovering brands in entirely new ways using cameras, voice notes, and highly specific questions. By understanding these behaviours and embracing helpful AI tools, you can let the technology connect eager customers directly to your digital doorstep.

Olumide Balogun is a Director at Google West Africa

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One SA Bank Equals Nigeria’s Entire Banking Sector – Why Recapitalisation Is Critical for Global Competitiveness

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Nig vs. SA Bank

By Blaise Udunze

Nigeria has always prided itself as Africa’s largest economy and most populous nation. Currently, its banking sector is confronting a moment of truth that should send shockwaves. Today, a single South African bank, Standard Bank Group, commands a market value at roughly $21-22 billion that rivals and, in some comparisons, exceeds the entire Nigerian banking industry. Though it may seem to be unbelievable, it is real. This striking imbalance is not merely about market valuations for individuals who are perturbed by this alarming revelation. Hence, it must be known that this reflects deeper structural challenges in Nigeria’s financial system and underscores why the Central Bank of Nigeria’s recapitalisation drive has become essential for restoring competitiveness, resilience, and global relevance.

Without any iota of doubt, for a nation of over 200 million people and Africa’s largest economy by several metrics, this reality is more than an uncomfortable statistic. This is truly a reflection of deeper structural weaknesses within the financial system. It highlights the urgent need for reform and explains why the ongoing recapitalisation drive by the Central Bank of Nigeria has become one of the most consequential policy interventions in the country’s banking industry in two decades.

Recapitalisation is not merely a regulatory exercise. If, genuinely, the key stakeholders consider this exercise as an attempt to reposition Nigerian banks to compete with global peers, strengthen financial stability, restore investor confidence, and enable the banking sector to support economic transformation, they must not handle this report with bias.

The disparity between Nigerian and South African banks illustrates the scale of the challenge.

While Standard Bank Group, the largest by assets, has a market capitalisation of roughly R372 billion ($21-22 billion = N32.66 trillion). Similar whooping amounts valued in the multi-billion-dollar range as of 2025 apply to several other South African banks, including FirstRand, Absa Group, and Nedbank. For apt juxtaposition from what is obtainable with the South African bank, the combined market capitalisation of 13 Nigerian banks listed on the Nigerian Exchange (NGX) stood at about N16.14 trillion ($10.87 billion) as of 2025-2026. However, the earlier benchmarks show that around May 2025, it was about N11.07 trillion. The current valuation of N16.14 trillion is a result of the funds tapped by some banks from the capital market through rights issues and public offerings.

Nigeria’s largest banks tell a different story. Guaranty Trust Holding Company, widely regarded as one of Nigeria’s most efficient banks, is valued at less than $2 billion (N3.3 trillion). Access Holdings, despite managing assets exceeding $70 billion, carries a market capitalisation of under $1 billion.

To further buttress Africa’s largest financial institution’s position, as of June 30, 2025, Standard Bank Group of South Africa reported total assets of R3.4 trillion. This amount is equivalent to $191.8 billion, and it points to the fact that it is at the top in Africa’s financial space. The equivalent in naira at Nigeria’s exchange rate of N1,484.50 to $1. Hence, $191.8 billion translates to approximately N284,983 trillion, or roughly N285 trillion. This means a single South African bank now outvalues the entire Nigerian banking industry, when compared to the 10 largest lenders collectively holding N218.99 trillion in assets. Though Nigerian banking industry assets were projected to reach N242.3 trillion ($151.4 billion) by 2025-2026.

The obvious and alarming disconnect between asset size and market value signals a deeper crisis of confidence as enumerated thus far. One underlying mistake is to understand that investors are not merely assessing balance sheets; they are evaluating governance standards, currency stability, regulatory predictability, and long-term growth prospects, as these remain their focal interests. The market’s verdict is clear: Nigerian banks remain undervalued because investors perceive higher systemic risks.

It would be recalled that Nigeria has travelled this road before, in 2004-2006, which didn’t end as planned. The then-governor of the Central Bank, Charles Soludo, launched a bold consolidation reform that reshaped the banking industry. Also, it would be recalled that Nigeria, in numbers, had 89 banks, which were more than what is in operation today, and many of them were small, fragile, and undercapitalised.

Similar steps are being witnessed today, as Soludo then raised the minimum capital base from N2 billion to N25 billion, triggering a wave of mergers and acquisitions that reduced the number of banks to 25. The industry witnessed the emergence of champions as the reform produced stronger institutions, such as Zenith Bank, United Bank for Africa, Guaranty Trust Bank, and Access Bank.

For a period, the experience was that Nigerian banks expanded aggressively across Africa and emerged as formidable competitors on the continent, but unfortunately, the momentum gradually faded because of certain missing pieces, and this must be addressed if the industry is ready for economic relevance.

The global financial crisis of 2008 exposed weaknesses in risk management and regulatory oversight. With the industry reacting, several banks were heavily exposed to the stock market and the oil sector. This led to another wave of reforms under former CBN governor Sanusi Lamido Sanusi in 2009.

Although one would say that those interventions stabilised the system. But more harm than good, they also ushered in a more conservative banking culture, as witnessed in the system, where many institutions prioritised survival over innovation.

Two decades after the Soludo reforms, Nigeria’s financial landscape has changed dramatically.

The size of the economy has expanded, inflation has eroded the real value of bank capital, and global regulatory standards have become more demanding. Banks that once appeared adequately capitalised now find themselves operating with limited buffers against economic shocks.

Recognising these vulnerabilities, the CBN introduced a new recapitalisation framework requiring banks to raise their capital bases to the following thresholds: N500 billion for international banks, N200 billion for national banks, and N50 billion for regional banks.

As has always been the case, these requirements are designed to ensure that Nigerian banks possess the financial strength required to compete with institutions in advanced economies.

The Nigerian banking sector should take a new leaf as the recapitalisation exercise comes to an end, with the understanding that capital adequacy is not merely a regulatory metric; it determines how much risk banks can absorb, how much they can lend, and how resilient they remain during economic crises, which must be accompanied by innovation.

In developed financial systems, banks operate with deep capital buffers, which is common with South African banks that allow them to finance infrastructure, industrial projects, and large corporate investments. Without similar capital strength, Nigerian banks cannot effectively support large-scale economic development.

One of the most persistent obstacles facing Nigeria’s banking sector is currency volatility. The Nigerian naira has experienced repeated devaluations in recent years, eroding investor returns and weakening confidence in local financial assets.

When the currency depreciates sharply, equity valuations expressed in dollars decline even if banks report strong profits in local currency. This dynamic partly explains why Nigerian banks appear profitable domestically yet remain undervalued in international markets.

In contrast, South Africa’s financial system benefits from a more stable currency environment and deeper capital markets.

The strength of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange allows South African banks to attract large pools of institutional capital from pension funds, asset managers, and international investors. Nigeria’s financial markets, though improving, remain comparatively shallow.

Another irony in Nigeria’s banking sector is the difference between reported profits and genuine productivity within the economy, and the contradiction is glaring. Though it is known that many Nigerian banks recorded extraordinary profit growth in recent years, partly driven by foreign-exchange revaluation gains following the depreciation of the naira but the contradiction is that such gains do not necessarily reflect improvements in efficiency, innovation, or lending performance.

One measure the apex bank adopted was recognising the risks and restricting banks from paying dividends derived from these gains, insisting they be retained as capital buffers.

This intervention revealed how much of the apparent profitability was linked to currency fluctuations rather than sustainable business growth.

True banking strength lies not in accounting windfalls but in the ability to finance real economic activity, and this should be one of the ongoing recapitalisation targets.

The core function of banks in any economy is to channel savings into productive investment.  Yet Nigerian banks have increasingly shifted toward safer and more profitable activities, such as investing in government securities, which has continued to weigh negatively on the growth of the real economy.

Other mitigating headwinds, such as high interest rates, regulatory uncertainty, and credit risks, discourage lending to manufacturing firms and small businesses. The result is a financial system that often prioritises short-term returns over long-term economic development.

By contrast, South African banks play a more significant role in financing infrastructure projects, corporate expansion, and consumer credit.

Recapitalisation aims to address this imbalance by strengthening banks’ capacity to support the real economy. The fact is that stronger balance sheets will allow Nigerian banks to finance large projects in sectors such as energy, transportation, agriculture, and manufacturing; alas, the narrative is totally different, going by what is obtainable in the Nigerian finance sector when compared to others.

Investor perception is shaped not only by financial performance but also by governance standards. International investors place significant emphasis on transparency, regulatory stability, and corporate accountability.

While Nigerian banks have made relative progress in improving governance frameworks, concerns remain about insider lending, regulatory inconsistencies and complex ownership structures, as these issues have continued to weigh on the industry, while some of these obvious factors may have contributed to the challenges observed in the operations of institutions such as First Bank Plc and another example is the liquidation of Heritage Bank.

Recapitalisation provides an opportunity to strengthen governance by attracting new institutional investors and enforcing stricter disclosure requirements, and not mainly dwelling on the pursuit of bigger capital because capital alone does not guarantee resilience, as it would be recalled that Nigeria has travelled this road before.

Larger, better-capitalised banks tend to operate with more robust governance systems because they face greater scrutiny from regulators and shareholders.

The global banking industry has become increasingly competitive, which should be a wake-up call for the Nigerian banking industry.

Technological innovation, cross-border expansion, and regulatory harmonisation have transformed how financial institutions operate, and this means that African banks, especially in Nigeria, known as the economic giant of Africa, must therefore compete not only with regional peers but also with global players.

Recapitalisation is essential if Nigerian banks are to participate meaningfully in this evolving landscape. On this aspect, it must be emphasised that stronger capital bases will enable banks to invest in digital infrastructure, expand internationally, and develop sophisticated financial products.

Besides, they will also enhance the ability of Nigerian banks to participate in large syndicated loans and international trade financing.

Without adequate capital strength, Nigerian banks risk being marginalised in the global financial system, and for this reason, the CBN must ensure that every dime injected or raised for recapitalisation is genuinely devoid of any form of irregularities.

At the same time, traditional banks face increasing competition from financial technology companies. Nigeria has emerged as one of Africa’s leading fintech hubs, attracting billions of dollars in venture capital investment. These companies are reshaping payments, lending, and digital banking services.

While fintech innovation presents opportunities for collaboration, it also poses a competitive threat to traditional banks. To remain relevant, banks must invest heavily in technology and digital transformation.

The CBN must ensure that the ongoing recapitalisation provides the financial capacity needed to support such investments, just like its counterpart in South Africa’s banking sector, which operates with a large pool of capital.

The success of Nigeria’s recapitalisation programme will depend on more than regulatory mandates, which is a fact that must be taken into cognisance. Since banks must demonstrate a genuine commitment to transparency, innovation, and long-term economic development.

Policymakers must also address the broader macroeconomic environment. Of a truth, the moment Nigeria maintains a stable exchange rate, lower inflation, and predictable regulatory policies, it will be essential to restoring investor confidence, and if aptly implemented effectively, recapitalisation could usher in a new era for Nigeria’s banking sector.

The country does not necessarily need dozens of weak banks competing for limited opportunities. What Nigeria truly needs are just fewer, stronger institutions capable of financing industrialisation, supporting entrepreneurs, and competing globally.

Nigeria often describes itself as the giant of Africa. But size alone does not determine financial strength. The comparison with South Africa’s banking sector serves as a sobering reminder that institutional quality matters far more than population size.

The ongoing recapitalisation exercise, which is due March 31, 2026, represents an opportunity to rebuild Nigeria’s financial architecture and position its banks for global competitiveness.

If the reforms succeed, Nigerian banks could once again emerge as powerful players on the African stage. If they fail, the uncomfortable reality will persist, one South African bank standing taller than an entire Nigerian banking industry.

Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: bl***********@***il.com

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Nigeria’s CPI Rebase Broke the Data: Here’s What the Unbroken Picture Actually Shows

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Nigeria’s CPI Rebase

By Ejiye Jimeta Ibhawoh

When the NBS rebased the Consumer Price Index in February 2025, and headline inflation fell overnight from 34.80% to 24.48%, yields compressed, and fixed income rallied. A question that should have been straightforward became almost impossible to answer: what is cash actually earning in Nigeria after inflation?

We know what the commentary said. Statistical fix or economic illusion. Cost of living still high. Basket weights shifted. All true, all well-covered. But nobody did the obvious next thing: build the bridge between the old series and the new one, then show what a continuous 15-year picture of Nigerian real returns actually looks like. We did.

The problem with two CPI series

The old NBS CPI ran from a November 2009 base, 740 items weighted by the 2003/04 Nigeria Living Standards Survey. The new methodology uses a 2024 average base, 934 items, and 2023 weights. Food and non-alcoholic beverages dropped from 51.8% to 40.1%. Restaurants and accommodation surged from 1.2% to 12.9%. A 13th COICOP division was added (Insurance and Financial Services). That alone tells you how much the consumption basket has shifted.

These are legitimate improvements. Nigeria’s spending patterns have genuinely changed since 2009. Nobody disputes that.

The problem is continuity. NBS published no officially chain-linked historical series. The old index ends in December 2024. The new one picks up in January 2025. Month-on-month rates don’t match across the boundary. Stops & Gaps documented a particularly egregious discontinuity: the rebased index implies prices fell 12.3% in a single month in December 2024. The largest actual single-month decline since 1995 was 3.5%.

For anyone maintaining a time series (pension fund benchmarking, fixed income attribution, real return measurement), the data is broken. Every analyst in Lagos knows this. Most shrugged and moved on.

Chain-linking: what we built and why

We followed the IMF CPI Manual, Chapter 9, for linking series across base-period changes. December 2024 is the overlap month where both old-base and new-base CPI levels exist. The chain-linking factor comes out at 0.11523. We rescaled the entire old series onto the new base.

The result: 204 continuous monthly CPI observations from February 2009 to January 2026. One hundred and ninety-one back-tested months on the old base, spliced to 13 live months on the new base. No interpolation. No estimation. Month-on-month rates are preserved through the splice point, and every calculation is reproducible from published NBS and CBN data.

We paired this CPI series with CBN 91-day T-bill stop rates from primary auctions to construct the VNG-CRR, the Venoble Nigeria Cash Real Return Index. Two inputs per month. NBS CPI level. CBN stop rate. Fisher equation. All compounds into an index.

The headline: over 204 months, Nigerian cash earned +9.48% annualised in nominal terms and −5.48% annualised in real terms. This is consistent, cumulative, and structural purchasing power destruction.

Put it differently. N1 million placed in 91-day T-bills in February 2009 would be worth roughly N4.7 million as of January 2026 in nominal terms. Adjust for what that money can actually buy, and the real value is closer to N380,000. The T-bill investor multiplied his digits and shrank his wealth.

Why this matters now

Start with pension fund allocation. Nigeria’s pension assets reached N26.66 trillion as of October 2025. Roughly 60% (c.N16 trillion) sits in FGN securities. If the annualised real return on government paper has been negative for 15 consecutive years, what does that mean for 10 million contributor accounts? The OECD flagged this in its 2024 pension report using 2023 data. Pension funds in Nigeria, Angola, and Egypt, where more than half of assets sit in bills and bonds, delivered negative real returns. PenCom raised equity limits in February 2026: RSA Fund I from 30% to 35%, RSA Fund II from 25% to 33% and while this is indeed a step in the right direction, it is not enough.

Then there is the visibility problem. Under the old methodology, a 91-day bill at 18% against 34.8% inflation was obviously underwater. Under the new CPI, the same bill at 15% against 15.15% inflation looks like a break-even. Did real returns improve, or did the statistical agency change the yardstick? In our view, both. Inflation has genuinely decelerated: monthly CPI growth dropped below 1.0% for several consecutive months in H2 2025. But the rebase also flatters the comparison by c.10 percentage points. Without a continuous series, you cannot separate the two effects.

And the sign has flipped. This is not speculation. From August 2025 through January 2026, the VNG-CRR recorded six consecutive months of positive real returns. January 2026 was the strongest at +4.39% real. Month-on-month CPI fell 2.88% while the nominal T-bill return was 1.38%. The real index climbed from

984 to 1,027, above its inception base of 1,000 for the first time.

After 15 years of negative returns, real returns have turned positive. Whether that holds is the question nobody can answer yet.

What we do not know

We don’t have a strong view on the persistence of the disinflation trend. The December 2025 CPI base effect is messy. The rebased December 2024 level was set at 100, which creates arithmetic distortions in year-on-year comparisons as that month rotates out. Headline YoY inflation could spike artificially in December 2025 data even if underlying prices remain stable. Anyone anchoring allocation decisions to year-on-year headline numbers will get whipsawed.

We also cannot tell you whether the new CPI basket accurately captures the cost-of-living reality for the median Nigerian. Restaurants and accommodation at 12.9% may reflect urban middle-class spending in Victoria Island and Wuse. It does not reflect what a civil servant in Kano or a smallholder farmer in Benue pays for food and transport. The CPI measures what it measures. It is not a cost-of-living index. That distinction matters more than most post-rebase commentary acknowledged, and it is the gap a continuous real return series is designed to fill.

The allocation question

Here is what the data does tell you. Over 204 months, the real return hurdle rate (what an alternative investment must beat just to match cash in purchasing-power terms) has been low. Negative, in fact. Any asset class generating positive real returns has beaten cash. Equities: the NGX ASI returned 51.19% in 2025. Real estate in Lekki and Abuja CBD. Dollar-denominated instruments accessed through NAFEM. All cleared the hurdle.

With real yields now positive, the calculus shifts. Cash is no longer guaranteed wealth destruction. But 15 years of compounded losses do not reverse in six months. The real index is at 1,027. It needs sustained positive real returns to recover the purchasing power lost over the prior decade.

For pension fund administrators and asset managers, the implication is straightforward: measure everything against the real return on cash. Not nominal yields. Not headline inflation. The actual, chain-linked, continuously compounded purchasing-power return. If your portfolio is not beating that number, you are losing money regardless of what the nominal statement says.

Why independent benchmarks matter

Nigeria has the largest economy in Africa and the largest pension assets on the continent. Its data infrastructure for institutional investors is among the weakest. South Africa has inflation-linked bonds, a real repo rate published by the SARB, and a mature index ecosystem. Nigeria has a CPI series with a structural break and no official chain-linked alternative.

The gap is not in analytical capacity. There’s no shortage of Nigerian research firms producing excellent work. The gap is infrastructure. Auditable, rules-based benchmarks that any market participant can verify.

Not commentary. Not opinions about what inflation feels like. Published, reproducible numbers.

That is what we built the VNG-CRR to provide. Two inputs. One equation. One index. Updated monthly.

Methodology published. Data downloadable. Every calculation is auditable against source data. All are completely free to the public.

The CPI rebase broke the data. We built the unbroken picture because nobody else did. Whether NBS eventually publishes its own chain-linked series, or the market continues relying on independent providers, says something about where Nigeria’s capital market infrastructure actually stands. We do not think anyone in Abuja is losing sleep over it, but maybe they should be.

E.J. Ibhawoh is the founder and CEO of Venoble Limited, an investment intelligence and capital management firm for African markets. He is a FINRA-qualified capital markets professional with a background spanning investment banking, trading, and software development.

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