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Multilateral Collaboration Still Crucial For Tackling Africa’s Conflicts

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Professor Maurice Okoli

By Professor Maurice Okoli

Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have adopted an incredible approach towards tackling chronic conflicts and related security threats from various extremist groups like Boko Haram, al-Qaida, and Islamic State-affiliated groups by creating a formidable military alliance in the semi-arid Sahel region in West Africa.

As these West African States are entangled in fierce ethnic-Islamic conflicts that have adversely impacted their sustainable development and economic progress, the trio-military force reflects more proactive and dynamic coordination in resolving their security hurdles. It would also enhance practical possibilities of combating terrorism and extremism in the interests of strengthening peace and security in the Sahel-Sahara region and other parts of West Africa.

Historically the three were closely under French political control and have extended economic and security ties since colonial times. This geographically landlocked Burkina Faso has had several military coup d’états, the latest took place in Jan. 2022. Mali (May 24, 2021) and Niger (July 26, 2023) witnessed similar political trends, and both are now under military administration and share startling critical accusations of corruption and malfunctioning of state governance against previous governments. But the finger-end points to France for gross under-development and large-scale exploitation.

These former French colonies have, for the past years, suffered from growing political deficiencies and frequent Islamic attacks. But the key reason, the underlying cause, those tribes are rebelling is due to deep-seated abject poverty across the region. Staging military takeovers was the trio’s dynamic struggle to wage a collective war against their governments and France’s influence and hegemony. For instance, France, the United States and other European nations have poured hundreds of millions of dollars into shoring up Niger’s army and the coup has been seen as a major setback. Overall security environment poses uncertain challenges and devises strategies to tackle these emerging threats in the region.

Existing Sanctions

Since last year, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have been under regional and continental sanctions. The 15-member West African regional bloc has imposed stringent sanctions, finding a peaceful solution to the deepening crisis, but yielded little tangible results with no clarity on the next steps.

The African Union (AU), the continental organization which primarily coordinates the political and economic as well as the socio-cultural activities, observes the new trends as military rule spreads or re-appears in the West African region. That however, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat, strongly condemned such actions and further moved to impose its sanctions as well on the military-ridden states. Their AU memberships, since then, have accordingly been suspended too.

Quite recently, on 28 November 2023, the United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres and the African Union Commission Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat convened their seventh African Union-United Nations Annual Conference in New York. In a joint communiqué issued at the end of the meeting, both reviewed progress in the implementation of the UN-AU Joint Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security and the AU-UN Framework for the Implementation of Agenda 2063.

In particular, António Guterres and  Moussa Mahamat again condemned the resurgence of unconstitutional changes of government in Africa and stressed the need for a timely and peaceful return to constitutional order in Burkina Faso, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Sudan which are undergoing complex political transitions to sustain peace, development and human rights in the long term. There must be extensive political awareness among the people in the Sahel region to focus on democracy, development, security and stability. It also called for the release of President Bazoum and other arrested government officials.

Nevertheless, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) were tasked to enhance their joint efforts to promote inclusive political transitions in those countries in support of the efforts of the respective transitional authorities and regional bodies. The meeting called for continued efforts towards the timely completion of all ongoing political transitions through peaceful, inclusive, transparent and credible elections.

Against this backdrop, they expressed concern over the challenges African countries continue to face towards the achievement of the AU Agenda 2063. Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali and Niger, nevertheless have displayed defiance to the sanctions and, crafting a number of approaches and making their efforts toward addressing security and development-oriented issues combined with some kind of good governance.

Revisiting the Past

Within the context of the changing political situation, Russia is rapidly penetrating the Sahel. Moreover, to Russia’s expectations, these Sahelian States have in place provisional governments, which include civil society representatives. “We believe that a military approach to settling the crisis in Niger risks leading to a protracted standoff in the African country and a sharp destabilization of the situation in the Sahara-Sahelian region as a whole,” according to the statement posted to the Foreign Affairs Ministry’s website.

South African Institute of International Affairs reports established the fact that Russia seeks to build on Soviet-era ties, steadily widening its influence, and noticeably deploy the rhetoric of anti-colonialism in Africa. Russia is engaged in an asymmetric influence campaign in Africa. Borrowing from its Syria playbook, Moscow has followed a pattern of parachuting to prop up politically isolated leaders facing crises, often with abundant natural resources. Russia is fighting neo-colonialism from the West, especially in relations with the former colonies. According to the report, Russia sees France as a threat to its interests in Francophone West Africa, the Maghreb and the Sahel. The SAIIA is South Africa’s premier non-government research institute on international issues. (SAIIA, Nov. 2021 Report).

“Sanctions have already been announced against Niger, and its membership in the organization is likely to be suspended. Thus, a belt of states in political isolation and bordering on each other is forming in the Sahara-Sahelian region: Guinea – Mali – Burkina Faso – Niger. Russia is interested in expanding relations with Niger, as well as with all other African States, and thus could help to normalize the situation there,” Vsevolod Sviridov, Expert at the HSE University Center for African Studies, told Russia’s Financial Izvestia.

Russia’s Economic Interest

In pursuit of development, the five Sahel states need peace. An analysis of geopolitical factors underscores glaring facts that Russia is getting stronger with its military influence on a bilateral basis, bartering equipment in exchange for access to natural resources. Mali has an agreement with Russia to build a gold refinery while Burkina Faso also wanted energy power. A four-year memorandum guarantees the West African country’s largest gold refinery. Russia’s state nuclear energy company Rosatom signed a deal with Mali in October 2023 to explore minerals and produce nuclear energy. It unreservedly offered a high-level promise to build a 200- to 300-megawatt solar power plant by mid-2025.

Economic Performance

International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank research reports show that Sahelian states’ economy may face relative stagnation due to unstable conditions including persistent protests in the region. Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali and Niger have been severely affected by the rise in militancy, affecting overall economic performance. Agriculture represents 32% of its gross domestic product and occupies 80% of the working population in Burkina Faso. A large part of the economic activity of the country is funded by international aid, despite having gold ores in abundance. Burkina Faso is the fourth-largest gold producer in Africa, after South Africa, Mali and Ghana.

The December 2023 report by the World Bank, for example, indicated that the poverty rate across the Sahelian region is still deepening due to poor management and governance. The economic and social development could, to some extent, be sustained based on ensuring political stability in the subregion, supporting and intensifying local production, its openness to international trade and export diversification.

According to the UN’s Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) report of 2023, Niger is one of the poorest countries in the world. It faces challenges to development due to its landlocked position, even though it possesses some natural resources including uranium ore. Government finance is derived from revenue exports (mining, oil and agricultural exports) as well as various forms of taxes collected by the government. Reports, however, estimated improvement in its revenues after the exit of France. Niger was the main supplier of uranium to the EU, followed by Kazakhstan and Russia.

Across the Sahel, the estimated aggregate population of 120 million is predominantly young, with 49.2% generally under 25 years old. The conflicts have only deepened poverty and food insecurity, and the challenges increasingly gaining ground in those countries. Future growth may be sustained by the exploitation of various untapped resources. Uranium prices have recovered somewhat over the last few years. But much also depends largely on state control, and good governance, by prioritizing economic sectors in the region.

Latest Developments

Niger has scrapped two key security agreements with the European Union that were intended to help fight violence in the Sahel region. It completely withdrew from EU Military Partnership Mission that was launched in February in Niger. It has also revoked approval for the EU Civilian Capacity-Building Mission, which was established in 2012 to help the country’s security forces fight militants and other threats. Most of Niger’s foreign economic and security allies have sanctioned the country, including France, which had 1,500 troops operating in Niger. All of them have been asked to leave.

In June 2022, Mali also abruptly withdrew from the G5-Sahel group and its Joint Force. The Joint Force was created in 2017 by the “G5” Heads of State—Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger—to counter-terrorism in the region. Reports pointed to the anti-French sentiments and under-equipped local armies to quickly step up their game against Islamist rebels in the volatile Sahelian region. By the end of 2022, France reduced and moved its troops. That ended the so-called “Operation Barkhane” which was a military mission marked by a tactic of permanent occupation of the Sahel countries by French troops. The French government, however, apparently would try to reorganize its strategy in Africa. From some indications, it appears the focus of action turns to the Gulf of Guinea.

At the AU Extraordinary Summit from May 25 to 28, 2022, held in Equatorial Guinea, Moussa Faki Mahamat, Chairperson of the African Union Commission, highlighted the factors contributing to the lack of development including good governance, the growing tendency of usurping power by the military and the significance of forging collective solidarity as a basis for resolving continental and regional problems. Both Senegalese president Macky Sall (then the AU Chairperson) and Moussa Mahamat, issued statements urging the interim military governments to return to constitutional regimes as early as possible, reassuring that the solutions to continental problems and overcoming the existing challenges depend on strong mobilization of African leaders and the effective coordination provided by the African Union. Regrettably, all these have not yet become a thing of the past.

United Nation’s Approach

The United Nations (UN) Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, Jean-Pierre Lacroix, has argued that the peacekeeping and terrorism fight faces greater challenges than ever and that it requires multinational mechanisms and approaches. It also requires member-states to adopt a collective capacity to support political and peace processes. Conflict is more complex and multi-layered.

According to Jean-Pierre Lacroix, peacekeepers are facing terrorists, criminals, armed groups and their allies, who have access to powerful modern weapons and a vested interest in perpetuating the chaos in which they thrive.  Further complicating this situation is the fact that most peacekeeping operations – particularly our large, so-called multidimensional missions in Africa – have long been affected by a discrepancy between their capacities and what is demanded of them by the Security Council and host countries. Financial resources are often inadequate for their mandated tasks.

What’s at Stake

Niger and Burkina Faso exited the anti-Islamist force this early December 2023, withdrawing from an international force known as the G5 that was set up to fight Islamists in the Sahel region. Now Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger – run by military rulers following coups who have formed their mutual defence pact. Their so-called Alliance of Sahel States (AES) was signed back in September. United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres has often spoken against such inter-state collaboration.

But Chad and Mauritania are still part of the G5 force which is meant to be made up of about 5,000 soldiers. A statement from the military-led governments of Burkina Faso and Niger was critical of the G5 force for failing to make the Sahel region safer. It also suggested the anti-jihadist force undermined the two African nations’ desire for greater “independence and dignity” – and was serving foreign interests instead. They almost certainly meant France, whose power has dramatically deteriorated.

Usually referred to as the G5 Sahel, these countries – Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger – are engulfed with various socio-economic problems primarily due to the system of governance and poor policies toward sustainable development. In addition, rights abuse and cultural practices to a considerable extent affect the current state of development.

The big question is what impact this would have on the Islamist militant groups that have been growing in numerical strength, scope of operations and degree of force across the Sahel region. Russia is back in prominence on the world stage. As it flexes its muscles and tentacles to gain influence, the stature of the EU/US continues seemingly fading away. And former French colonies are simply turning to Russia for military support, bartering their natural resources for further much-anticipated collaborative partnerships. Russia has already agreed to develop nuclear power plants in Mali, while in Burkina Faso, it plans to construct an oil refinery.

For fear and concerns about the new rise of all kinds of terrorism and frequent attacks, the Sahel-5 are all turning to Russia for military assistance to fight growing terrorism, and efforts to strengthen political dialogue and promote some kind of partnerships relating to trade and the economy in the region. At the same time, with renewed and full-fledged interest to uproot French domination, Russia has ultimately begun making inroads into the entire Sahel region, an elongated landlocked territory located between North Africa (Maghreb) and West Africa, that stretches from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea.

Unique Lessons from Southern Africa

At least the majority of African leaders have to consider a complete overhaul of their security system across Africa. The Security Committees of the African Union and that of the Economic Community of West African States have to learn a few lessons and methodological approaches in dealing with indiscriminate threats of terrorism, militant groups, Islamic State-linked insurgencies and other related issues in Mozambique.

The worsening security situation at that time was a major setback for Mozambique but has been controlled by the involvement of regional troops from Rwanda and the Southern African Development Community Military Mission (SAMIM). Rwanda offered 1,000 in July 2021. South Africa has the largest contingent of approximately 1,500 troops. External countries are enormously helping to stabilize the situation in Mozambique. Its former colonizers Portugal and the United States both sent special forces to train local troops. Mozambique’s approach towards fighting growing threats of terrorism and conflict resolution offers explicit valuable lessons for the G5 Sahel which are Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger.

At the panel discussions during the mid-December U.S.-Africa Summit in Washington, Mozambican President Filipe Nyusi was very outspoken and shared valuable experiences with the audience about the use of well-constituted regional military force for enforcing peace and security in Mozambique. He told the panellists that there has been “remarkable progress” as businesses have restarted and displaced people began returning to Cabo Delgado, northern Mozambique. His argument simply was on the necessity of adopting ‘African solutions to African problems’ on peace and security issues across Africa, and this should be seriously considered as the most suitable, comprehensive approach under the current emerging geopolitical situation.

Joint regional forces within the context of multilateralism still have, to a large degree, significance in tackling conflicts in Africa. The Joint Forces of the Southern African Development Community are keeping peace in northern Mozambique. The rules, standards and policies, provision of assistance as well as the legal instruments and practices are based on the protocols of building and security stipulated by the African Union. It falls within the framework of peace and security requirements of the African Union. And has an appreciable commendation from the United Nations Security Council.

“We welcome collective action from SADC in committing to bringing sustainable peace to the region. We urge our leaders to consider the lessons learnt from other similar conflicts in Africa. In the Sahel, Somalia, and the Niger Delta offer stark contemporary reminders that a purely militaristic solution (devoid of measures to address the causes of the insurgency) increases the likelihood of its intractability. It is also unlikely to pave the way towards achieving sustainable peace,” the official statement from SADC.

The complexity and challenges in navigating this regional security partnership could be diverse, it depends also on political culture and mechanism of pragmatic approach. There have been various assessments and interpretations, but the security initiative to create the joint southern force underscores the multiplex dynamics to better play at home-grown solutions. The SADC initiative portrays a distinctive blueprint for purely African-headed peacekeeping success stories in the region, precisely for Mozambique and this could be replicated in West Africa.

With the changes sweeping across the world, it is glaringly well-known that a number of external countries are using Africa to achieve geopolitical goals, sowing seeds of confrontation which threaten African unity. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE), during the 36th Ordinary Session of the African Union (AU) held in Addis Ababa, interestingly used the phrase – “African solutions to African problems” – seven times in his speech delivered on February 2023. He strongly suggested that for the existing conflicts and disputes on the continent, it is necessary to mobilize collective efforts to resolve them and “must be confined to this continent and quarantined from the contamination of non-African interference.”

Final Security Breathe

As the security situation stands, the best option is to consider new approaches, taking into cognizance local factors, to regulate tensions and to prioritize development and economic sovereignty in the Sahel. And of course, many experts have suggested that addressing the Sahel crisis requires collective efforts and cooperation from all parties involved that can bring positive change in the region. Ultimately, it must be through tailored collective efforts and, most importantly, within the African context taking local conditions into account. As shown by Mozambique, carefully evaluating the tangible advantages combined with results, underscores the degree of consideration given to foreign involvement in conflicts without bartering natural resources. Sometimes the geopolitical factors are intertwined, though. In any case, to separate facts from fiction, Mozambique’s exemplary case is undoubtedly marked by significant successes.

In the context of – “African solutions to African problems” –  the SADC’s regional force was earlier constituted in April 2021, agreed to deploy a regional force (3,000 troops) in Cabo Delgado, located in northern Mozambique and to fight threats of terrorism in neighbouring Southern African countries. What is referred to as Islamic attacks and insurgency caused havoc and devastation in Cabo Delgado province of Mozambique. The insurgency began in 2017 and left an unimaginable negative effect on settlements of the civilian population, and business and industry operations. The situation now is under control and seen as a distinctive example for the rest of Africa. With relative regional peace, Southern Africa looks now toward the direction of attaining its economic sovereignty. Besides that, SADC counted on funding from the United States and European Union (EU) and the United Nations.

Professor Maurice Okoli is a fellow at the Institute for African Studies and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences. He is also a fellow at the North-Eastern Federal University of Russia. He is an expert at the Roscongress Foundation and the Valdai Discussion Club. As an academic researcher and economist with a keen interest in current geopolitical changes and the emerging world order, Maurice Okoli frequently contributes articles for publication in reputable media portals on different aspects of the interconnection between developing and developed countries, particularly in Asia, Africa and Europe. With comments and suggestions, he can be reached via email: [email protected].

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Why Africa Requires Homegrown Trade Finance to Boost Economic Integration

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Cyprian Rono Ecobank Kenya

By Cyprian Rono

Africa’s quest to trade with itself has never been more urgent. With the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) gaining momentum, governments are working to deepen intra-African commerce. The idea of “One African Market” is no longer aspirational; it is emerging as a strategic pathway for economic growth, job creation, and industrial competitiveness. Yet even as infrastructure and regulatory reforms advance, one fundamental question remains; how will Africa finance its cross-border trade, across markets with diverse currencies, regulations, and standards?

Today, only 15 to 18 percent of Africa’s internal trade happens within the continent, compared to 68 percent in Europe and 59 percent in Asia. Closing this gap is essential if AfCFTA is to deliver prosperity to Africa’s 1.3 billion people.

A major constraint is the continent’s huge trade finance deficit, which exceeds USD 81 billion annually, according to the African Development Bank. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which provide more than 80 percent of the continent’s jobs, are the most affected. Many struggle with insufficient collateral, stringent risk profiling and compliance requirements that mirror international banking standards rather than the realities of African business.

To build integrated value chains, exporters and importers must operate within trusted, predictable, and interconnected financial systems. This requires strong pan-African financial institutions with both local knowledge and continental reach.

Homegrown trade finance is therefore indispensable. Pan-African banks combine deep domestic roots with extensive regional reach, making them the most credible engines for financing trade integration. By retaining financial activity within the continent, homegrown lenders reduce exposure to external shocks and keep liquidity circulating locally. They also strengthen existing regional payment infrastructure such as the Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS), developed by the Africa Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) and backed by the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Secretariat, enabling faster, cheaper and seamless cross-border payments across the continent.

Digital transformation amplifies this advantage. Real-time payments, seamless Know-Your-Customer (KYC) verification, automated credit scoring and consistent service delivery across markets are essential for intra-African trade. Institutions such as Ecobank, operating in 34 African countries with integrated core banking systems, demonstrate how such digital ecosystems can enable continent-wide commerce.

Platforms such as Ecobank’s Omni, Rapidtransfer and RapidCollect, together with digital account-opening services, make it much easier for traders to operate across borders. Rapidtransfer enables instant, secure payments across Ecobank’s 34-country network, reducing delays in regional trade, while RapidCollect gives cross-border enterprises the ability to receive payments from multiple African countries into a single account with real-time confirmation and automated reconciliation. Together, these solutions create an integrated digital ecosystem that lowers friction, accelerates payments, and strengthens intra-African commerce.

Trust, however, remains a significant barrier. Cross-border commerce depends on the confidence that partners will honour contracts, deliver goods as promised, pay on time, and present authentic documentation. Traders often lack reliable information on potential partners, operate under different regulatory regimes, and exchange documents that are difficult to verify across borders. This heightens the risk of fraud, non-payment, and contractual disputes, discouraging businesss from expanding beyond familiar markets.

Technology is closing this trust gap. Artificial Intelligence enables lenders to assess risk using alternative data for SMEs without formal credit histories. Distributed ledger tools make shipping documents, certificates of origin, and inspection reports tamper-proof. In addition, supply-chain visibility platforms enable real-time tracking of goods and cross-border digital KYC ensures that both buyers and sellers are verified before any transaction occurs.

Ecobank’s Single Trade Hub embodies this trust infrastructure by offering a secure digital marketplace where buyers and sellers can trade with confidence, even in markets where no prior relationships exist. The platform’s Trade Intelligence suite provides customers instant access to market data from customs information and product classification tools across 133 countries.

Through its unique features such as the classification of best import/export markets, over 25,000 market and industry reports, customs duty calculators, and local and universal customs classification codes, businesses can accurately assess market opportunities, anticipate trends, reduce compliance risks, and optimise supply chains, ultimately helping them compete and grow in regional and global markets.

SMEs need more than financing. Many operate in cash-heavy cycles where suppliers and logistics providers require upfront payment. Lenders can support these businesses with advisory services, business intelligence, compliance guidance, and platforms for secure partner verification, contract negotiation, and secure settlement of payments. Trade fairs, industry forums, and partnerships with chambers of commerce further build the trust networks needed for cross-border trade.

Ultimately, Africa’s path toward meaningful trade integration begins with financial integration. AfCFTA’s promise will only be realised when enterprises can trade with confidence, knowing that payments will be honoured, partners verified, and disputes resolved. This requires collaboration between banks, regulators, and trade institutions, alongside harmonised financial regulations, interoperable payment systems, and continent-wide verification networks.

Africa can no longer rely on external actors to finance its trade. Its economic transformation depends on strong, trusted, and digitally enabled African financial institutions that understand Africa’s unique risks and opportunities. By building an African-led trade finance ecosystem, the continent can unlock liquidity, reduce dependence on external currencies, empower SMEs, and retain more value locally. Africa’s trade revolution will accelerate when its financing is driven by African institutions, African systems, and African ambition.

Cyprian Rono is the Director of Corporate and Investment Banking for Kenya and EAC at Ecobank Kenya

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Tax Reform or Financial Exclusion? The Trouble with Mandatory TINs

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Tax Reform or Financial Exclusion

By Blaise Udunze

It is not only questionable but an aberration that a nation where over 38million Nigerians remain financially excluded, where trust in institutions is fragile, and where citizens are pressured under the weight of rising living costs, the use of Tax Identification Number (TIN) has been specified as the only option for their bank accounts operation from January 1, 2026 by the Federal Government of Nigeria.

In practice, the policy spearheaded by Taiwo Oyedele, Chairman of the Presidential Committee on Fiscal Policy and Tax Reforms, is rooted in the Nigerian Tax Administration Act (NTAA), and the intention can be understood in the areas of improving tax compliance, widening the tax net, and formalizing economic activities. But in practice, the directive risks becoming yet another well-meaning reform that punishes the wrong people, disrupts financial inclusiveness, and potentially destabilises an already stressed economy.

Yes, Nigeria needs tax reforms. Yes, the country must broaden its tax base. And yes, public revenues must increase to address fiscal pressures.

But compelling citizens to obtain TINs as a condition for operating bank accounts is the wrong tool for the right objective.

Below are five core arguments against the directive, and sustainable alternatives that actually strengthen tax compliance without endangering banking access or punishing informal earners.

The Directive Risks Deepening Financial Exclusion

Nigeria still struggles with financial inclusion. According to several official assessments, over 38 million adults remain outside the formal financial system. Many of them operate small, irregular businesses, survive through subsistence earnings, or depend on cash-based livelihoods.

The Federal Government’s compulsory TIN-for-bank-accounts policy is built on the assumption that every banked Nigerian is structured, organised, and tax-ready. This is false.

For instance, the rural market woman with N30,000 in rotating savings, the okada rider who deposits cash once a week, the petty trader using a mobile POS agent account, the retiring pensioner managing a small monthly income, and the migrant worker sends small remittances to their family. These are not tax evaders; they are survivalists.

Most operate bank accounts not because they run formal businesses, but because those accounts are essential to modern financial life: receiving transfers, accessing loans, participating in digital commerce, saving against emergencies, and avoiding the risks of moving cash in insecure environments.

By creating an additional bureaucratic barrier, the directive risks pushing millions back into a cash-dominant shadow economy, precisely the opposite outcome of what Nigeria’s financial-sector reforms are trying to achieve.

Bank Accounts Are Not Proof of Taxable Income

The NTAA clarifies that the TIN requirement applies only to taxable persons, individuals engaged in trade, employment, or income-generating activities.

But herein lies the problem: banks cannot determine who is “taxable” and who is not. Banks only see deposits and withdrawals. They do not audit the source or consistency of income. They are not tax authorities.

A student may run a small online clothing resale gig. A retiree may occasionally rent out farmland.

A dependent may receive cash support from a relative abroad. A job seeker may get intermittent gifts from family.

Who decides which of these scenarios qualifies as taxable? Banks? FIRS? Or will citizens be expected to self-declare under threat of account restrictions?

The result will be confusion, over-compliance, and mass panic with banks indiscriminately demanding TINs from everyone to avoid regulatory penalties.

This not only contradicts the spirit of the law but also exposes ordinary Nigerians to harassment and arbitrary compliance requirements.

The Policy Could Trigger Disruption, Panic Withdrawals, and Cash Hoarding

Whenever Nigerians perceive threats to their access to funds, the natural reaction is withdrawal and hoarding. We saw it during:

–       the 2023 Naira redesign crisis,

–       the 2016 TSA-bank consolidation tightening, and multiple periods of financial instability.

Telling citizens that bank accounts may face “operational restrictions” if they do not obtain a TIN creates a predictable behavioural response: people will rush to withdraw money.

This would be disastrous for a banking system already pressured by:

–       high interest rates,

–       inflation eroding deposits,

–       rising loan defaults, and

–       declining public trust.

Any government policy that unintentionally creates an incentive for citizens to flee the formal banking system is counterproductive.

The TIN Requirement Will Become a Bureaucratic Nightmare

Even if millions of Nigerians want to comply, the system is not ready. Nigeria’s administrative infrastructure does not have the capacity to process tens of millions of TIN registrations within months without:

–       long queues,

–       delays,

–       data mismatches,

–       duplicate records, and

–       systemic errors.

The National Identity Number (NIN)-SIM registration experience is a painful reminder of what happens when ambitious policy meets weak execution capacity.

–       Citizens spent months in overcrowded enrolment centres.

–       Millions were blocked from services.

–       Data inconsistencies persisted.

–       The economy suffered productivity losses.

If Nigeria could not seamlessly synchronise NIN and SIM data, how will it synchronise NIN, BVN, and TIN at a national scale without dislocation?

Forcing TIN Adoption Ignores the Real Problem: Nigeria’s Broken Tax Culture

The Federal Government’s real challenge is not that citizens lack TINs, but that they lack trust in how taxes are used.

A government cannot widen the tax net when:

–       tax leakages remain widespread,

–       citizens feel services do not match taxation,

–       corruption perceptions are high,

–       government spending lacks transparency, and

–       taxpayers do not feel seen, heard, or valued.

Coercion does not build a tax culture. Engagement does. Policy does not create legitimacy. Accountability does.

If the Federal Government wants Nigerians to freely participate in the tax system, it must earn legitimacy first, not mandate compliance through financial restrictions.

What the Government Should Do Instead: A Smarter Path to Tax Reform

Instead of enforcing a policy that may backfire economically and socially, the Federal Government can adopt four smarter, people-centred alternatives.

–       Automatic TIN Issuance Linked to NIN and BVN

Rather than forcing Nigerians to apply manually, the government should:

  • auto-generate TINs for all existing BVN/NIN holders,
  • send the TINs via SMS, email, and bank alerts,
  • allow self-activation only when needed for tax obligations.

This eliminates queues, delays, and confusion.

–       Build a Voluntary Tax Compliance Culture Through Transparency and Incentives

Tax morale improves when citizens see value. Government should:

  • publish annual audited reports of tax revenue use,
  • incentivise compliant taxpayers with benefits (priority access to government grants, credit scoring, etc.),
  • simplify tax filings for small businesses.

People comply more when they feel respected, not coerced.

–       Target High-Value Tax Evaders, Not Low-Income Account Holders

Nigeria’s real tax leakages come from:

  • large corporations shifting profits,
  • politically exposed persons,
  • illicit financial flows,
  • multinational tax avoidance strategies,
  • the informal “big money” class operating outside the banking system.

Instead of threatening small depositors, the government should strengthen:

  • FIRS intelligence and investigation units,
  • inter-agency data integration (CAC, Customs, Immigration),
  • beneficial ownership transparency enforcement.

The fight against tax evasion should focus on those hiding billions, not those depositing thousands.

–       Strengthen Digital Tax Platforms for Easy Self-Registration and Compliance

If tax registration becomes as easy as opening a social media account, compliance will rise naturally. The government should build:

  • a mobile-first tax app,
  • simplified online TIN retrieval,
  • one-click tax filing for gig workers and small traders.

Digital convenience can achieve what regulatory coercion cannot.

Reform Should Not Punish the Public

No doubt, tax reforms are needed urgently, but they must come with a human face, an intelligent, equitable, and aligned with the realities of ordinary Nigerians.

The TIN-for-bank-accounts policy, while well-intentioned, risks undermining financial inclusion, triggering economic instability, and imposing unnecessary burdens on millions who are not tax evaders but survival-based earners.

Good tax policy is built on trust, not fear. On transparency, not threats. On civic legitimacy, not administrative compulsion.

If the Federal Government truly wants to modernise Nigeria’s tax system, it must focus not on restricting citizens’ access to their own money, but on:

  • repairing tax trust,
  • digitising compliance,
  • targeting the real evaders, and
  • making participation easier, not harder.

Financial inclusion took Nigeria decades to build. We cannot afford a policy that carelessly reverses these gains.

A better tax system is possible, but it must start with the people, not with their bank accounts.

Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos, can be reached via: [email protected]

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Dangote and Farouk: The Distance Between Capital and Conscience

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Dangote and Farouk

By Abiodun Alade

Within the space of 48 hours, Aliko Dangote offered Nigeria a rare demonstration of what leadership looks like when power is exercised with responsibility and consequence.

First came the announcement of a N100 billion annual education support programme — a decade-long N1 trillion commitment projected to keep more than 1.3 million Nigerian children in school. Its architecture was intentional, not ornamental: girls’ education, STEM disciplines, technical skills, and those children most likely to disappear quietly into the margins of poverty were placed at the centre, not the footnotes.

Then, almost immediately, his refinery reduced the price of Premium Motor Spirit by over N100 per litre. This was not achieved through government fiat, subsidy or public funds, but through internal cost absorption, aimed at easing the pressure of inflation on households, transport operators and small businesses already stretched thin.

Two decisive interventions. One individual. Forty-eight hours.

In a country where scarcity has been normalised and excuses institutionalised; these actions stand out precisely because they are uncommon. Nigeria does not lack wealth. It lacks the nerve to use it responsibly.

Dangote’s interventions were not symbolic gestures designed for applause. They were structural acts. Education secures the future. Affordable energy steadies the present. Together, they form the foundation of any serious development strategy.

Now set this against the performance of Nigeria’s downstream petroleum regulation.

Engr Farouk Ahmed, Chief Executive of the Nigerian Midstream and Downstream Petroleum Regulatory Authority (NMDPRA), presides over a sector whose policy objectives are clearly stated: support domestic refining, reduce imports, conserve foreign exchange and strengthen energy security. These goals are enshrined in the Petroleum Industry Act and reinforced by the Federal Government’s Nigeria First policy.

Yet in practice, the downstream market remains crowded with import licences, uneven enforcement and regulatory decisions that continue to weaken local refining. Even with Africa’s largest refinery operating on Nigerian soil, import dependence persists — not because capacity is lacking, but because incentives remain misaligned.

This is where comparison ends.

Dangote and Farouk Ahmed do not operate on the same economic or moral plane. One commits private capital to solve national problems. The other leads a public institution whose outcomes are increasingly questioned by industry players, economists and the public alike.

One expands supply.

The other presides over a system where scarcity recurs.

One cuts prices.

The other manages a framework in which price instability has become familiar.

One reinvests personal wealth into Nigerian children.

The other reportedly expends questionable millions of dollars on secondary education abroad, while in his home state, Sokoto, thousands of children drop out of school over tuition fees as low as N10,000.

Only in Nigeria does the arithmetic of public life so often defy reason. Where official incomes are modest, lifestyles sometimes appear imperial. Where the books are thin, the living is lavish. And where questions should naturally arise, silence frequently answers instead.

It is a country where some who labour in the open marketplace live with studied moderation, while others, known only to the payroll of the state, move with a splendour their salaries cannot reasonably sustain. Children are educated across distant borders, fees quoted in foreign currencies that mock the modest figures attached to public service, yet accountability remains elusive.

When regulators falter, it is rarely for lack of laws or mandates. More often, authority is softened by comfort, dulled by compromise, and entangled in interests it was meant to police. A regulator burdened by unanswered questions cannot stand upright; oversight weakens when conscience is clouded.

In such moments, one does not need a forensic accountant to sense disorder. A soothsayer is hardly required to see where lines have blurred, where vigilance has yielded to indulgence, and where public trust has quietly been mortgaged.

This is how institutions lose their moral centre — not always through spectacular scandal, but through a series of small indulgences that mature, unnoticed, into systemic decay.

The fuel price reduction alone deserves careful attention. In Nigeria, petrol is not merely a commodity; it is the bloodstream of the economy. When prices rise, transport fares rise. Food prices rise. School attendance drops. Small businesses shut early. Families cancel travel or risk storing petrol in jerry cans — turning highways into mobile fire hazards during festive seasons.

By reducing PMS prices by over N100 per litre, the Dangote Refinery accomplished what years of policy meetings failed to deliver. It restored breathing space. It returned dignity to commuters. It reduced pressure on traders. It saved millions of productive man-hours otherwise lost to queues, panic buying and logistical paralysis.

That this occurred alongside a historic education commitment is not accidental. It reflects an understanding that energy without education builds nothing, and education without economic stability cannot thrive.

Meanwhile, regulatory bottlenecks remain. Local refiners cite delays in approvals, vessel clearances and inconsistent enforcement. Importers continue to flourish. Arbitrage adapts. Rent-seeking survives. The system continues to reward trading over production.

This is not accidental. Systems behave exactly as they are designed to behave.

Nigeria does not suffer from a shortage of ideas. It suffers from a shortage of alignment. When private citizens act more decisively in the national interest than institutions legally mandated to do so, something fundamental is broken.

No country industrialises by frustrating its producers. No economy grows by privileging imports over domestic value creation. No regulator earns legitimacy by operating in tension with stated national objectives.

Dangote’s actions within 48 hours expose an uncomfortable truth: Nigeria’s most binding constraint is no longer capital, technology or scale. It is governance culture.

Leadership is revealed not by speeches, but by choices. In two days, one Nigerian chose to educate the future and ease the present. Others continue to curate systems that profit from delay, opacity and dependence.

History is rarely neutral.

It remembers who built.

And it remembers who stood in the way.

Abiodun, a communications specialist, writes from Lagos

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