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Now That There Is No Immediate Threat of Floods in Nigeria

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Floods in Nigeria

By Jerome-Mario Chijioke Utomi

Seemingly good news came recently the way of Nigerians living in the flood-prone areas of the country. The message, which was from the new Minister of Water Resources and Sanitation, Prof Joseph Utsev, among other remarks, stated that ‘there is no immediate threat of flooding in the country.

Utsev, who spoke to newsmen in Abuja on Friday, explained that the Nigeria Hydrological Services Agency (NIHSA) had observed an increase in the volume of flow along the River Benue system, registering a flow level of 8.97 meters today. This, he said, was insignificant, as compared to a flow level of 8.80 meters on the same date in 2022, noting that reports from inland dams, including Kainji, Jebba, and Shiroro, also showed a consistent flow regime.

While this piece of information is celebrated, one vital question crying for an answer is: What are the tiers of government in Nigeria currently doing/ appropriate measures to ensure preparedness to minimize the potential impact of flooding during the peak of the rainy season?

The above poster becomes well appreciated when one remembers that last year (2022), raving floods which lasted over two months reportedly hit parts of Nigeria; according to the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), about 2.5 million persons were affected and over 603 persons killed by the flooding. Within the period under review, houses and farmlands were submerged in Lagos, Yobe, Borno, Taraba, Adamawa, Edo, Delta, Kogi, Niger, Plateau, Benue, Ebonyi, Anambra, Bauchi, Gombe, Kano, Jigawa, Zamfara, Kebbi, Sokoto, Imo, Abia States, and the Federal Capital Territory.

Without any shadow of a doubt, flooding, as noted in a similar piece in the past, is a natural disaster. A natural disaster, going by information available at Wikipedia, a global information power horse, is “the negative impact following an actual occurrence of natural hazard in the event that it significantly harms a community”. A natural disaster can cause loss of life or damage property and typically leaves some economic damage in its wake. It includes events such as a flood, earthquake, or hurricane that causes great damage or loss of life’.

However, while Wikipedia’s intention for classifying flood as a natural disaster is understandable and commendable, some questions immediately come to mind as to whether the series of floods that ravaged communities, villages, towns and cities in the past truly qualifies as an act of God/natural disaster. In the applied sense of the word, it cannot, in all honesty, be qualified as a natural disaster or an Act of God and even though it has taken a great toll on Nigeria and its economy,

Aside from the lackadaisical attitude displayed over the years by both past and present Governments, the above opinion is predicated on the mountains of early warning signs which ought to have activated some remedial measures but was not hearkened to by any of the tiers of government.

In 2012, for example, when the flood of unimaginable magnitude and volume first occurred, President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan (GEJ), as he then was, during a visit to flood victims in Lagos, promised to create an artificial/dry lake to contend with future surge in flood. As at the time of leaving office in May 2015 (that was three years after the promise was made), not even a pit was dug.

Between 2015 and now, President Muhammadu Buhari, who succeeded former President Jonathan, did next to nothing to resolve the issue of flooding in the country.

Let’s assume that he (Buhari) lacks the needed leadership and creative prowess to generate ideas in this direction. One should have expected him to, at the very least, implement/execute the proposed Dam in Adamawa state, as suggested years ago, to take care of flood eventualities. After all, leadership is a continuum. There is also a saying that if you cannot create, copy!

The truth is that we failed as a nation in all these directions, and therefore, we lack the moral justification as a nation to describe flood as an unexpected occurrence.

But instead of doing the needful, we fail in our responsibility as a nation and attribute the same failure to God. What has happened in the past as it relates to flooding were totally, squarely and completely leadership failures. It is a sign of an absence of foresighted leadership in the country. It tells a story of people whose poor leadership has drained their rational will, a nation devoid of proactive leadership but filled with sets of reactors masquerading as leaders.

Fundamentally, the inability of the government to manage the flooding in the country all these years further serves as proof that ‘poverty of our leaders certainly does not mean material poverty, but lack of commitment to duty, lack of vision and greediness characterized by corruption’. That is the only possible explanation. If not poor leadership, how do we explain the fact that each year, the three tiers of government periodically gather to share the National Ecological Funds and yet cannot tackle the issue that is as simple as a flood?

For a better understanding of the argument, the ecological fund was established in 1981 through the Federation Account Act 1981, on the recommendation of the Okigbo Commission, Decree 36 of 1984 and 106 of 1992, as well as the allocation of Federation Account modification order of 2002 subsequently modified the act.  The prime objective of this initiative was to have a pool of funds that would be solely devoted to the funding of ecological projects to ameliorate serious ecological problems nationwide. This is at variance with the practice elsewhere in the world where funds are set aside, especially for natural disasters.

In the United States, for example, there are at least four major pieces of Federal Legislations enacted for this purpose: the Water Quality Act of 1965, the Water Pollution Control Act and its amendment of 1972(PL92 500), the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1976 (PL 94 800), The Toxic Substance Control Act of 1983 (PL 94 469) and Comprehensive Environmental Response. Compensation and Labiality Act of 1983 (CERCLA) (PL96 510).

These laws all make provisions for funding and other facilities for the protection, monitoring and remediation of polluted aquifers. The funds are additional to the existing periodic statutory allocation to the United Environmental Protection Agency and are also readily accessible to local governments and individuals. Looking at the above explanation will elicit the question as to why ecological funds are not readily available for use in a period such as this. As the flood rages, the question that is as important as the flood itself is: What is the nation doing to prepare for the next one because we know that it will happen again in the near future?

Finally, even as Nigerians continue to celebrate the cheerful from the Minister that there is no threat to lives and properties, especially those states that are contiguous to Rivers Niger and Benue, this piece, on a final note, calls on relevant agencies of all the three tiers of government in Nigeria, particularly the flood-prone states such as Delta, Kogi and Bayelsa, among others, to ensure preparedness and deploy appropriate measures to minimize the potential impact of flooding during the peak of the rainy season.

Nigerians, on their part, must unlearn the ‘culture’ of indiscriminate waste disposal and, in its place, imbibe the tradition of organized waste management. Non-Governmental Organizations and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) should, as part of their Corporate Social Responsibilities (CSR), train Nigerians on waste-to-wealth practice.

These are little efforts that will produce great results.

Utomi is the Programme Coordinator (Media and Public Policy) at Social and Economic Justice Advocacy (SEJA). He writes via Je*********@***oo.com 

Jerome-Mario Chijioke Utomi Floods in Nigeria

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What Does Nigeria’s $51bn Reserves Milestone Mean if Most New Foreign Money Can Leave Quickly?

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Nigeria’s foreign reserves have climbed to about $51 billion, a decade-plus high, according to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). EBC Financial Group (EBC) notes that this reflects stronger investor confidence, but the second half may show whether it holds, as the build rests on three cyclical drivers: oil earnings, short-term foreign money and a narrowing official-to-street naira gap.

Reserves rose from about $32 billion in April 2024, during a dollar shortage, to about $51 billion now, near the CBN’s target. Much came from two cyclical sources, strong oil earnings and money chasing high-yielding naira assets, so EBC expects the pace to slow or reverse. Fitch Ratings, a major international credit rating agency, expects a marginal decline to about $47 billion by the end of 2026, citing higher spending and external pressures.

David Precious, Senior Market Analyst at EBC Financial Group, said, “Nigeria’s reserve build is real but may not be durable yet, because nearly all of the new money is the kind that can leave quickly. Of the $10.37 billion that came in over the first quarter, the overwhelming majority was short-term portfolio funds rather than long-term investment, so a shift in oil prices, global interest rates or confidence in the naira might pull a large part of it straight back out.”

Most New Money Can Still Leave Quickly

The composition of the foreign inflows explains the caution over how long the build can last. The country attracted $10.37 billion in foreign investment in the first quarter of 2026, up 83.83 per cent year-on-year, according to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Of that, $9.86 billion or 95.09 per cent, was portfolio money, largely short-term naira debt such as Treasury bills that investors can sell at the next auction, while foreign direct investment, the long-term kind that builds factories and jobs, was $135.08 million, or 1.30 per cent. Put simply, of each dollar coming in, about 95 cents can leave quickly, and barely one cent stays.

That money supports reserves while it stays. Dollars brought in to buy naira assets add to market supply, letting the CBN hold more reserves and steady the naira. It leaves when conditions change. Nigeria earns most of its export dollars from oil and gas, so lower oil prices mean fewer dollars, and as a member of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), it cannot simply produce more, output capped by quota and reduced by theft and ageing fields. Higher global interest rates draw money toward safer returns abroad, and a weakening naira prompts investors to sell early. When oil fell in 2016 and 2020, foreign investors withdrew and could not convert naira to dollars as supply dried up, leaving the CBN to clear more than $7 billion in trapped obligations into 2024.

The Oil Boost is No Longer Certain

Oil looked like a dependable source of the dollars behind the reserves only months ago. Earlier in 2026, concern over disruption around the Strait of Hormuz lifted crude prices, and stronger receipts flowed in, with crude oil export earnings of $8.11 billion in the first quarter in the CBN’s balance-of-payments data. That support is now easing. The tension has subsided, and Brent traded near $72 on June 29, down about 24 per cent over the month, back to pre-conflict levels. With the price boost gone and output constrained, reserves are more exposed, leaning on non-oil earnings and investor patience rather than oil.

The Naira Still Trades at Two Prices

The naira has traded at two prices, an official rate and a higher parallel-market rate, and closing that gap into one trusted price is what many investors might watch most. Before committing funds, they may want assurance they can convert naira to dollars at a fair rate when they exit, and a wide gap revives the fear of being trapped that lingers from earlier shortages. The gap has narrowed to roughly N20 to N30, with the CBN’s official rate near N1,380 per dollar on June 26 against parallel-market quotes around N1,400. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2026 Article IV review urged Nigeria to depend less on this fast-moving portfolio money and to keep phasing out its multiple exchange-rate practices. The CBN’s Foreign Exchange Manual, in force from 1 June, is intended to make the market clearer, though such rules build confidence only once investors can freely trade dollars at the posted rate.

What could Make the Build Durable

A few signs that may show the build turning durable include a smaller gap between the official and street naira rates, more long-term foreign investment, and steadier oil earnings. A gap that stays small, now roughly N20 to N30, may mean investors trust the official rate and no longer need the street market. A clear rise in foreign direct investment, only $135 million last quarter against $9.86 billion of short-term money, might mean lasting capital is replacing funds that can leave at the next auction. Oil earnings that hold up, rather than sliding from the low $70s, should help keep reserves steady, since oil and gas bring in most of Nigeria’s export dollars.

“Reserves built on money chasing high yields can fall as fast as they rose, as they did after the last two oil shocks, when investors left, and the CBN spent years clearing a foreign-exchange backlog,” Precious added. “What holds through a downturn is slower money, direct investment, steady oil and non-oil export earnings and one credible naira rate, and that is the shift Nigeria has yet to make.”

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Rethinking How Nigeria Supports SME Growth

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By Olajumoke Bello

Across Nigeria, small and medium enterprises remain the backbone of economic activity. They drive trade, create jobs, and sustain millions of livelihoods. Yet, despite their importance, many SMEs continue to operate below their full potential due to persistent structural challenges.

Access to finance remains one of the most cited constraints. However, the issue today goes beyond the availability of capital. Many businesses struggle with financial readiness, weak documentation, and limited understanding of what lenders require. This often leads to missed opportunities, even when funding options exist.

At the same time, SMEs face gaps in market access and visibility. Business owners operate in highly localised environments, with limited exposure to broader networks that can unlock partnerships, new markets, and growth opportunities. This isolation can constrain scalability and reduce long-term competitiveness.

Equally important is the capability gap. Many entrepreneurs grow through resilience and experience but lack structured knowledge on critical areas such as financial management, export readiness, and digital adoption. Without this, even well-capitalised businesses can struggle to sustain growth.

These challenges point to a clear need for a more practical and integrated approach to SME support. It is no longer sufficient to offer standalone solutions. SMEs require ecosystems that combine knowledge, access, and direct engagement in ways that reflect how they actually operate.

A key shift is the move from centralised interventions to localised engagement. SMEs are deeply influenced by their immediate environments, whether markets, industrial clusters, or trade corridors. Solutions must therefore be brought closer to where these businesses function, allowing for more relevant support and stronger relationships.

Another important shift is from awareness to action. Business owners do not only need information; they need insights that they can apply immediately. This includes understanding how to structure their finances, how to access trade opportunities, and how to connect with the right partners to scale their operations.

There is also a growing need for continuity. Many SME-focused initiatives deliver strong initial impact but lack follow-through. For support to be effective, it must extend beyond one-off engagements into sustained relationships, with clear pathways for onboarding, advisory, and growth.

For financial institutions, this presents both responsibility and an opportunity. Supporting SMEs now requires moving beyond transactional banking to deeper partnership models. It requires understanding businesses at a granular level and co-creating solutions that evolve with their needs.

At Stanbic IBTC, this perspective continues to shape our approach to SME development. Our focus is on delivering practical support that translates into real business outcomes, helping enterprises grow, compete, and contribute more meaningfully to the economy.

As part of this commitment, we are extending our SME engagement to the regions through the Nigeria Business Summit Regional Tour. The tour will take structured, on-ground activations into key commercial hubs, where SMEs can access funding guidance, trade insights, advisory support, and direct engagement with financial experts.

The regional tour will take place across five strategic locations, bringing these solutions closer to business owners in Aba, Onitsha, Ibadan and Kano.

This approach reflects an important principle. When support moves closer to businesses and when solutions are delivered in ways that are practical and continuous, SMEs are better positioned to grow sustainably. In turn, this strengthens not only individual enterprises but the broader economy.

Olajumoke Bello is the Head of Enterprise Banking at Stanbic IBTC Bank

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How Data Deconstructs the Myth of the ‘High-Risk’ Nigerian Borrower

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Winston Osuchukwu Mathesis Analytics

By Winston Osuchukwu

The average Nigerian borrower is widely considered high-risk – a claim repeated in credit committees, priced into retail loans, and largely treated as settled fact. Every credit market accepts that an individual loan may not be repaid; this is ordinary, priced risk. The high-risk claim, however, is applied to whole segments – the informal trader, the gig economy earner whose income is steady but split across several accounts, the remote worker paid by an overseas client into a fintech FX wallet. What the assessment establishes is not whether they are likely to repay, but how they fit into an arbitrary segment. Having spent years building decisioning systems for this market, my thesis is a specific one: “high-risk” does not mean “no credit” – it simply requires that the lender embrace alternative datasets to price the risk appropriately.

This is not a criticism of the institutions that built their frameworks around collateral and documentation; those were rational responses to the tools available at the time. When data is scarce, prudence means defaulting to the status quo. The limitation is not that this approach is wrong, but that it leaves a blind spot – excluding fundamentally sound borrowers whose economic lives simply are not captured on the bank’s ledger. A market trader who has moved consistent, growing volumes of cash through mobile money for three years is not, in any meaningful sense, unknowable. Their financial behaviour is observable and patterned; it simply occurs outside the traditional banking system, rendering it invisible to conventional underwriting.

This is the gap technology is now positioned to close – not by replacing institutional judgment, but by augmenting it. When AI-driven analysis is applied rigorously to the financial behaviour these borrowers generate, a far more complete picture of their repayment ability emerges – and a meaningful share presents a risk profile that compares favourably with segments the traditional system has long considered safe. The “high-risk” label, applied broadly to an entire category of borrower, was never a risk pricing tool so much as the limit of what the available tools could see.

For banks, this is the opportunity to extend capital with confidence beyond the borrowers who fit their stringent criteria. Nigerian banks are highly liquid; the constraint on credit growth has rarely been capital, but the ability to assess and price the borrowers who sit outside the traditional file. Close that gap, and the whole ecosystem strengthens: banks grow their loan books into segments they have long wanted to serve, and the real economy gets the capital it needs to expand.

This is precisely what we focus on at Mathesis Analytics: building AI-powered credit decisioning that gives lenders a fuller, more defensible picture of the individuals long excluded as high-risk when they were simply misjudged. The Nigerian credit gap has never been a non-lendable population problem, but one of incomplete visibility. By unifying varied data sources and partnering with the institutions that hold the capital and scale to move the market, we translate out-of-ecosystem behaviour into reliable, bank-grade risk scores. Closing this gap is one of the clearest, highest-leverage opportunities in Nigerian financial services today.

Winston Osuchukwu is the founder & CEO of Mathesis Analytics

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